Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002024

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64111/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of July 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUM
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

L Y
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr H Malik (counsel), instructed by Victoria Solicitors ltd
For the Respondent: Ms R Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and any member of her family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a female national of China, has been granted permission by the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) to appeal a decision by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Atkins (the judge) promulgated on 17 February 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (respondent) dated 17 November 2023 that refused the appellant’s protection and human rights claims.
The First-tier Tribunal (IAC) decision
2. Following a hearing that involved oral evidence from the appellant, and having considered documents provided by both parties, the judge found that the appellant was a victim of trafficking for sexual exploitation. The appellant’s husband was in debt to lone sharks through the abuse of drugs and gambling. The couple separated and the appellant was unaware of his whereabouts. The lone sharks approached the appellant in 2018 seeking repayment of her husband’s debt and threatened her. She reported this to the police three times and the police visited her house on two occasions and work address on a third occasion. The police claimed they were unable to help as the appellant had not actually been hurt. She moved to another city but the lone sharks found her. She had not tried to move to a bigger city. With the intention of working off her husband’s debt the appellant provided the lone sharks with her personal details to enable them to make an application for her to enter the UK as a visitor. She believed she would pay off the debt working as a beautician. Instead, after arriving in the UK, her passport was taken and she was beaten and then forced to work as a prostitute. She managed to escape and made a protection claim.
3. There has been no cross-appeal by the respondent in respect of the judge’s factual findings relating to the appellant being a victim of trafficking or her account of what happened to her in China or when she arrived in the UK. The only aspects of the appellant’s account that were not accepted by the judge related to whether her Chinese ID card was taken from her, and whether she had any mental health vulnerabilities. The judge found that the appellant still had her Chinese ID card and that there was insufficient evidence of any mental health condition.
4. Although accepting the appellant’s core account, the judge nevertheless found she was not entitled to international protection. This was because the judge considered the appellant’s assertion, that there was a connection between the loan sharks and local officials, to be speculative, particularly given that the local police did make some efforts to protect her, albeit that they were unable to act as the threats were inchoate. Given the serious ill-treatment to which the appellant had now been subjected the judge considered that the local police would be more willing to offer her protection. Even if that was not the case, the judge concluded that the appellant could internally relocate, i.e. that there were other parts of China in which she would be safe and that it was reasonable to expect her to go to these other parts of the country. In reaching this decision the judge relied on the Country Guidance case of HC & RC (Trafficked women) China CG [2009] UKAIT 00027. The judge found there was no evidence to show that the lone sharks were able to reach the appellant in all parts of China and concluded that any such assertion to the contrary was purely speculative. The judge then found there would be no breach of the appellant’s private life rights under Article 8 ECHR were she to be removed.
5. The judge consequently concluded that the appellant’s removal to China would not constitute a breach of the Refugee Convention or the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), and that the appellant was not entitled to a grant of Humanitarian Protection under the Immigration Rules.
The challenge to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC)’s decision and discussion
6. There are three grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal. Although the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge who granted permission to appeal only referred to the 3rd ground as being arguable, and was silent in respect of the 1st and 2nd grounds, there was not express limitation in the grant of permission. We find that all three grounds are in issue.
7. The 1st ground essentially contends that the appellant is a member of a Particular Social Group (PSG), namely woman in China, and that the judge failed to consider whether the appellant’s removal to China would establish a refugee claim on this basis.
8. In support of the 1st ground reliance is placed on the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in C-621/21 WS v Intervyuirasht organ na Darzhavna agentsia ze bezhantsite pri Ministerskia savet. Being a decision of the CJEU dated 16 January 2024 this is only of persuasive authority. We nevertheless note the conclusions of the CJEU that when considering what can constitute a PSG, at least in respect of Article 10(1)(d) of Directive 2011/95, that, depending on the circumstances in the country of origin, women in that country, as a whole, and more restricted groups of women who share an additional common characteristic may be regarded as belonging to a PSG, as a ‘reason for persecution’ capable of leading to the recognition of refugee status. Although it is not necessary for us to consider this decision in any detail, the CJEU’s conclusion does not appear to us to be dissimilar to that of the Supreme Court in SSHD (Respondent) v. K (FC) (Appellant) Fornah (FC) (Appellant) v. SSHD (Respondent) [2006] UKHL 46, which dealt with the position of women in Sierra Leone as a PSG.
9. Our attention was not however drawn, either in the grounds of appeal or by Mr Malik at the hearing before us, to any evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) that was capable of supporting the assertion that merely being a woman in China established a PSG under the Refugee Convention. This was acknowledged by Mr Malik at the hearing before us. As indicated by the CJEU and the Supreme Court, the establishment of women per se as being a PSG is dependent on the particular circumstances of women in their country of origin, in this case China. Although the skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) refers to C-621/21, the evidence presented to the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) judge in support of this contention was, with respect, minimal, consisting of reliance on extracts from the Country Policy and Information Note China: Background information, including actors of protection and internal relocation, Version 2.0 March 2018, and the US Department of State report of 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macau, and Tibet). We find that these references, to violence against women in China and discrimination and societal issues, was lacking in scope and detail, was general in nature, and was insufficient to entitle any reasonable judge, properly directing themselves on this evidence and the law, to conclude that women per se constitute a PSG in China. The 1st ground is not made out.
10. The 2nd ground contends that the judge erred in the assessment of whether there was a sufficiency of protection for the appellant if removed to China. This ground focuses on paragraphs 48 to 50 of the judge’s decision. We set out paragraphs 47 to 50 of the decision.
47. The Appellant fears that she will be located by the loan sharks if she returns to her local area, either through their connections there or through corrupt local officials. She says that she will have to do so in order to obtain an ID card.
48. There is some evidence that the loan sharks have a local network which allowed them to locate her when she moved to a different city.
49. However, the connection between the loan sharks and local officials is purely speculative. It is contradicted by the fact that the police made some efforts to offer her protection, visiting her several times and explaining that they could not protect her at that point because only threats had been made. The Appellant has suffered now from far more than mere threats and it may be that the local police are now more willing and able to offer her protection. If that is the case then she can avail herself of state protection upon return and will not be at risk.
50. Even if that is not the case and she cannot obtain state protection in her local area upon return (bearing in mind that Chinese rhetoric about offering such protection does not always translate into action on the ground), the country guidance also shows that the Appellant can relocate internally. There is no evidence to show that the loan sharks are able to reach her in all parts of China, this is pure speculation. She can move to an area where the loan sharks cannot locate or reach her. She can move to an area where state officials are assiduous in cracking down in modern slavery and traffickers, and avail herself of their protection. She does not have to return to her local area to obtain a new ID card, even if she needs one. Once she has done so she can avail herself of all the social protection China offers to its citizens.
11. The 2nd ground contends that the judge’s failure to take into account that the appellant’s previous experience as a victim of modern slavery meant she would be reluctant to seek help from the authorities. This contention is however not supported by the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal (IAC) and the judge’s factual findings (which have not been challenged), that the appellant did in fact approach the police in her local area on three separate occasions and they visited her on three occasions, and that the local police would be more willing to protect her now that she had experienced serious harm. The 2nd ground relied on 2.5.4 of the CPIN Modern Slavery Version 2.0 October 2024 which states, “evidence suggests that some victims of trafficking may still be reluctant to seek help from the authorities as they may be punished for secondary crimes committed during their exploitation.” Mr Malik was however unable to identify any “secondary crimes committed during their exploitation” for which the appellant may be punished if removed to China. Even if the judge did erred in law in her approach to the issue of sufficiency of protection in the appellant’s home area (which we do not accept), the judge’s assessment of the availability of internal relocation, which we consider next, renders any error immaterial. We find the 2nd ground is not made out.
12. The 3rd ground contends that, in finding that the appellant could internally relocate to another part of China, the judge failed to sufficiently consider the appellant’s particular circumstances as she would not be in possession of her ‘hukou’ and the difficulties of internally relocating without a hukou. The grounds place reliance on the CPIN on Modern slavery Version 2.0 October 2024 at 12.2.5, which states:
The USSD TiP report, 2024 noted: ‘The government hukou (household registration) system continued to contribute to trafficking risks of internal migrants by reducing access to social services, particularly for PRC victims returning from exploitation abroad, and by driving hundreds of millions of individuals to live and work illegally outside the jurisdiction of their household registration. The government continued to address some of these vulnerabilities by requiring local governments to provide a mechanism for migrant workers to obtain residency permits. However, authorities disproportionately made these residency permits unavailable to rural ethnic Han migrants and members of ethnic minority groups, exacerbating their constrained access to employment and social services.
13. At the hearing Mr Malik accepted that there was no evidence that the appellant was a rural ethnic Han, or that she was a member of an ethnic minority group. In his oral submissions Mr Malik submitted that the judge contradicted herself by finding at paragraph 48 that there was some evidence that the loan sharks had a local network that allowed them to locate the appellant when she moved to a different city, but then finding at paragraph 50 that the appellant could relocate internally and that there was no evidence that the lone sharks would be able to reach her in all parts of China.
14. The reference to ‘hukou’ relates to the Chinese household registration system. This was considered in detail in HC & RC. At paragraph 33 of her decision the judge refers to the CPIN on modern slavery and notes, at 33(c), the CPIN’s reference to HC & RC, which included consideration of the hukou system as it applied to victims of modern slavery and trafficking. The judge then refers to the relevant Country Guidance case in the analysis section of her decision. We are satisfied that the judge had regard to HC & RC in making her decision. At paragraph 46 (see above) she specifically asked herself whether the facts of the appellant’s case indicated a departure from the general position outlined in HC & RC. The judge then refers again to her application of the Country Guidance case at paragraph 50. This suggests that the judge did consider the individual circumstances of the appellant’s case.
15. Headnotes 2 , 3 and 4 of HC & RC state:
(2) Women and girls in China do not in general face a real risk of serious harm from traffickers. Where, however, it can be established in a given case that a woman or a girl does face a real risk of being forced or coerced into prostitution by traffickers, the issue of whether she will be able to receive effective protection from the authorities will need careful consideration in the light of background evidence highlighting significant deficiencies in the system of protection for victims of trafficking. But each case, however, must be judged on its own facts. China is a vast country and it may be, for example, that in a particular part of Chine the efforts to eliminate trafficking are determined and the level of complicity between state officials and traffickers is low. If an appellant comes from such an area, or if she can relocate to such an area, there may be no real risk to her.
(3) The Chinese state has an obligation to house the homeless and will not allow their citizens to starve. Therefore a returned trafficked woman without family support will not be allowed by the authorities to fall into a state of destitution.
(4) Due to reforms of the Chinese household registration system known as the "hukou" system it is unlikely that a returned trafficked woman would be obliged to return to the place where she is registered. The reforms have made it relatively easy for ordinary migrant workers to get legal, albeit temporary, urban registration and there is no reason why this should not extend to returned trafficked women.
16. HC & RC was endorsed in QH (Christians - risk) China CG [2014] UKUT 00086 (IAC), which found that given the scale of internal migration, and the vast geographical and population size of China, that the lack of an appropriate hukou alone would not render internal relocation unreasonable or unduly harsh.
17. The judge made a finding that the appellant still had her ID card (paragraph 41). The judge also found that the appellant did not have any mental health vulnerabilities (paragraph 44). The judge also found there was some evidence that the lone sharks had a local network, and that it was this that allowed the lone sharks to find the appellant in a different city (paragraph 48). Although the appellant claimed that the lone sharks had connections throughout China (paragraph 45), this claim was not objectively supported by any independent evidence. We note that no independent evidence appears to have been drawn to the judge’s attention supportive of the assertion, made on behalf of the appellant, that the loan sharks had reach and influence throughout all of China. We find that the judge was entitled to find that the claim that the lone sharks would be able to find the appellant in all parts of China to be “pure speculation”. We find there is no inconsistency in the judge’s conclusions. A finding that there was evidence that the lone sharks only had local influence is not inconsistent with the judge’s subsequent conclusion that the lone sharks would not be able to find the appellant in another part of the country. We are satisfied that the judge has adopted the approach in HC & RC and has considered the individual facts of the appellant’s appeal. We find the 3rd ground is not made out.
Notice of Decision
The making of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law. The appeal is dismissed

D. Blum

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 July 2025