Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002032
UI-2025-002033
UI-2025-002034

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02180/2023
PA/03515/2024
PA/03663/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
22nd August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WEBB

Between

DB
KAD
KLD
(Anonymity Order Made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Miss Rashmi (Counsel)
For the Respondent: Miss Kerr (Senior Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 4 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal by the appellants against the decision of Judge Cary promulgated on 11 March 2025, refusing their appeals. That decision was made following an oral hearing on 04 March 2025. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes.
2. We have decided to make an anonymity order because the importance of properly discharging the obligations of the United Kingdom under the refugee convention outweigh the principle of open justice. This case raises issues about the appellants’ potential risk on return to their country of nationality and it is appropriate that the appellants’ identity be protected.
The hearing
3. We had before us a 450 page consolidated bundle that consisted of the decision being appealed, grounds of appeal, decision on permission, and the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal. The bundle also contained evidence that was not before the First-tier Tribunal, but Miss Rashmi confirmed that she would only be seeking to rely on that evidence if we were to set aside the decision and retain the appeal for remaking in the Upper Tribunal.
4. We also had an appeal skeleton argument that had been drafted by counsel who had settled the grounds of appeal.
5. We heard submissions from Miss Rashmi and Miss Kerr in relation to the grounds of appeal.
6. At the conclusion of submissions, we indicated that we were reserving our decision. We now give our decision in writing.
Errors of law
7. When assessing if there have been errors of law the starting position is that we should exercise judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal, as explained by the higher courts on many occasions.
8. Although the grounds of appeal are not clear, Mrs Kerr helpfully identified that the appellants had two distinct grounds of appeal that we deal with in turn.
Ground 1
9. In this ground, identified in paragraphs 7-12 of the grounds of appeal, the appellant argues that Judge Cary erred in law by not correctly applying the principles in TD and AD (Trafficked women) (CG) [2016] UKUT 92 IAC. The grounds identify a number of criticisms with the Judge’s approach.
10. The grounds accept in paragraph 7 that the Judge correctly identified the risk factors set out in TD and AD but seek to argue that the Judge failed to make findings of fact in relation to those factors.
11. With respect to the grounds, reading the Judge’s decision as a whole it is apparent that relevant findings of fact were made in relation to each factor identified in TD and AD. Findings of fact about the social status and economic standing of the family as well as potential support networks were made in paragraphs 48 - 49 of the decision. Findings of fact about the appellant’s mental health were made in paragraphs 50-56 and 58 of the decision. The Judge made findings about her level of education and background in paragraph 59.
12. Findings about the appellant’s children, and in particular that one of her children would be regarded as illegitimate were made in paragraph 57. In the skeleton argument particular emphasis was placed on the Judge’s finding in that paragraph that:
“…illegitimacy is a factor which may impact on the Appellants reintegration but does not by itself or in conjunction with any other factors automatically mean that the Appellant will be reduced to destitution or will be at risk of re-trafficking.”
13. In our view, while it may not be articulated as clearly as it could have been, the Judge was expressing the view that having a child, who would be regarded as being illegitimate, was not determinative of the risk assessment, but was just another factor to be taken into account when assessing the risk the appellant may face on return.
14. In her submission Miss Rashmi sought to argue that there was a failure on the part of the judge to consider the best interests of the children when assessing the factors in TD and AD. Putting aside that there was no mention of such an argument in the grounds, we noted that this was not a challenge to an Article 8 claim, but a risk assessment, and the children’s best interests are not a factor that goes to the risk of ill treatment. Miss Rashmi confirmed that she did not seek to pursue that submission.
15. We find that reading the decision as a whole it can not be said that the Judge failed to make findings on the risk factors identified in TD and AD.
16. It is further argued in paragraphs 8-10 of the grounds, that the Judge erred in paragraph 46 of the decision by requiring corroboration of an interest in the appellant by those who initially trafficked her. While an interest from the original traffickers is a risk factor, the Judge on a full reading of that paragraph was not requiring corroboration but was commenting that there was no evidential basis for a finding that they would be interested in the appellant.
17. Paragraph 11 of the grounds argues that the Judge made an error in the weight given to the risk factors identified. The weight given to any particular factor is a matter for the Judge, and the conclusions on the weight to be given to the factors in the decision are not outside the range that a reasonable judge could find.
18. Paragraph 12 of the grounds seeks to argue that the Judge failed to take in to account paragraph
5.1.1 of the CPIN – Albania; Human trafficking, version 5.0, July 2024. That paragraph is not country evidence but is a statement of the Secretary of State’s view on the country situation, it is policy not evidence. But in any event the Judge took into account the factors identified in that paragraph as it reflects the risk factors to be considered under TD and AD.
19. Having carefully considered the grounds of appeal and the submissions from Miss Rashmi we are not satisfied that the Judge made an error when applying the principles set out in TD and AD.
Ground 2
20. In this ground, contained in paragraphs 4-6 of the grounds of appeal, the appellant argues that the Judge erred when assessing the medical evidence, in particular the reports provided by Ms Ahmetaj, Counselling Psychologist.
21. In paragraphs 25-29, the Judge set out several concerns held with Ms Ahmetaj’s reports, some relating to whether she had complied with requirements of the Senior President’s Practice Direction of 13 May 2022 relating to expert evidence and other concerns relating to what information she had available to her other than the appellant’s account, as well as her experience more widely.
22. In the grounds of appeal, it was argued that the Judge erred in failing to attach weight to the medical report since some of the matters reported were corroborated by the medical records confirming the appellant had been prescribed medication for depression.
23. While hearing arguments about these grounds we raised with the parties whether the Judge had correctly approached the evidence, as Ms Ahmetaj appeared to be a treating health professional rather than an independent expert instructed to provide a report for the Tribunal, and in those circumstances whether the Judge was correct to apply the requirements of the Practice Direction to that evidence.
24. In her submission Ms Kerr sought to persuade us that a treating medical or health professional must meet the same formal requirements in their evidence as a medical expert instructed to provide a report. She sought to rely on HA (Sri Lanka) (Expert Evidence; Mental Health) [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC) to support her submission that the findings of the Judge in respect of the reports provided by Ms Ahmetaj did not contain an error of law.
25. On reflection we have formed the view that the reports provided by Ms Ahmetaj are expert reports, to which the requirements of the Practice Direction applied.
26. The reports were presented to the First-tier Tribunal as expert reports and not factual evidence from an individual. We accept when assessing if evidence is from an expert the way in which it is presented to the Tribunal is only indicative, but it is a strong starting point.
27. A stronger factor is the contents of the reports themselves, they contain factual information, but also the opinion of Ms Ahmetaj about the impact of removal based on her and her organisation’s research on the availability of health care services in Albania (see for example page 128 of the bundle). In our view that takes the matter beyond factual statements that one may expect from a treating health professional and into expert opinion.
28. We reject Ms Kerr’s submission that all evidence from treating medical or health professionals must comply with the same requirements as expert reports, since reports from such practitioners may not be commissioned in the same manner as independent expert reports need to be and may not include independently held expert opinions on contentious matters.
29. It was not argued before us on behalf of the appellant that the Practice Direction did not apply, whether in the grounds of appeal or following our raising this issue at the hearing.
30. We find in this case, that because it was expert evidence from Ms Ahmetaj, the Judge scrutinised the evidence appropriately. We find that the findings about the weight to give the expert reports were open to the Judge based on the evidence before them. In any event, the Judge also took into account Ms Ahmetaj’s view of the appellant’s therapeutic needs in paragraphs 50, 54 and 56.
31. Having considered the arguments put forward by the parties we are not satisfied that the Judge erred in his approach to the medical evidence.
Conclusion on errors of law
32. We find for the reasons set out above that the decision of Judge Cary did not contain material errors of law.
Notice of decision
33. The decision of Judge Cary, promulgated on 11 March 2025, does not contain material errors of law.
34. This appeal is dismissed on all grounds and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

N Webb

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 July 2025