Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002044

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02921/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23rd of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

AP
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R. Halim, Counsel, instructed by Lawmatic Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E. Terell, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 August 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (FTT) dated 17 February 2025 in which the FTT dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim.
2. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh and he claimed asylum on arrival on 4 June 2021 fearing persecution from his uncle following a land feud. He claimed his uncle had links with a local Awami League MP. At the time of his claim, the Awami League were the ruling party in Bangladesh but their government fell in August 2024. Nevertheless, at the date of the hearing before the FTT, the appellant continued to claim he was at risk of persecution on return to Bangladesh.
3. The respondent accepted that the appellant was involved in a land dispute in Bangladesh and that he was attacked by members of his family. However, as to the balance of the claim, the respondent decided the appellant had provided inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation and a lack of detail. Accordingly, the respondent did not accept that his uncle worked for an MP or that he managed to locate the appellant in Bangladesh. In short, the respondent did not accept the appellant’s family had the power and influence in Bangladesh which the appellant claimed they did.
4. The judge dismissed the appeal as he did not find the appellant credible for a number of reasons, discussed further below. In any event, the judge found the appellant unable to show that it was reasonably likely he would be persecuted on return to Bangladesh given the regime change and the absence of evidence to support the appellant’s claim [29].
5. The appellant challenges the decision on four grounds:
Ground 1: at [24]-[25] the FTT erred in making findings based on no evidence and/or made illogical findings;
Ground 2: at [26] the FTT made illogical findings as to the uncle’s address;
Ground 3: at [27] the FTT failed to take into account relevant medical evidence;
Ground 4: at [29] the FTT failed to give adequate reasons for finding the appellant not to be at risk.
6. On 17 June 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman granted permission on all grounds and made the following observations in so doing:
“(2) Ground 2 argues that the judge made an illogical finding regarding the evidence relating to the appellant’s uncle’s address. It is difficult to discern how material this finding was given the judge immediately goes on to find “Moreover” that the medical evidence in relation to the alleged attack was inconsistent. However, I am satisfied that this ground reaches the threshold for a grant of permission.
(3) Ground 3 argues that the judge failed to take into account relevant medical evidence. It may be found that the evidence that the appellant refers to in this ground does not address the key point that the judge was making, which was that the evidence regarding the reason for the appellant’s hospital admission between 19 September 2017 and 21 September 2017 was conflicting. However, I am satisfied that it is at least arguable that the judge failed to have proper regard to all of the medical documentation before him.
(4) I am less convinced of the merits of Grounds 1 and 4. With regard to the former, it seems to me that that the opening sentence to [25] shows that the judge was referring to the appellant’s failure to mention in his asylum interview that he had been “hospitalized” in December 2018. This is supported by the contents of the second sentence of that paragraph where the judge again refers to there being “no mention in the PIQ or elsewhere of a serious attack at the family home in December 2018 which put the appellant in hospital again”. The answer to Q66 that the appellant relies upon refers only to him being attacked in December 2018, not hospitalised. With regard to the latter, I struggle to see how the judge was not entitled to make the finding that he did at [29]. However, I do not intend to restrict the grant of permission.”
7. The error of law hearing was listed before me. I was provided with a 327 page bundle which contained all the relevant material. Although the respondent had not filed a Rule 24 response, Mr Terrell confirmed the appeal was opposed. I heard detailed submissions from both representatives and at the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.
The Legal Framework
8. Section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (the 2007 Act) provides (as relevant):
(1) Subsection (2) applies if the Upper Tribunal, in deciding an appeal under section 11, finds that the making of the decision concerned involved the making of an error on a point of law.

(2) The Upper Tribunal—
(a)may (but need not) set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and
(b)if it does, must either—
(i)remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal with directions for its reconsideration, or
(ii)re-make the decision.
9. It is common ground that the FTT decision need not be set aside if any errors are immaterial. That much is clear from [10] of R(Iran) v Secretary of State for the State Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982.
10. In deciding upon arriving at my decision I kept in mind the principles set out at [26] of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201. In summary, the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, assumed to know the relevant authorities and the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law because it might have reached a different conclusion, expressed itself differently or because there appears to be an unusually generous view of the facts; the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that the FTT has not taken a relevant point just because it is not expressly mentioned; judicial restraint should be exercised when considering the FTT’s reasoning and the FTT is not required to set out every step of its reasoning nor directly set out the issues for decision or the basis of its decision on those issues which may also be done by inference.
Discussion
11. Mr Terrell made the preliminary observation that unless the appellant is able to overcome the judge’s finding at [29] (in other words succeed on Ground 4), this appeal is bound to fail. Whilst that may be so, that does not absolve me from the responsibility of determining whether there are any errors of law contained within Grounds 1-3 ([59] of ASO v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1282 applies). In truth, Mr Terrell was not suggesting I do so, merely making the point about the significance of Ground 4 to this appeal.
12. As to Ground 1, I heard submissions from both representatives as to what the judge meant in the impugned paragraphs [24]-[25]. I set out both in full given their significance to this ground:
“24. Firstly, according to the substantive interview and the appellant’s oral evidence, the third and final attack on him was made outside the house of his maternal uncle on 19 September 2017. However, the appeal bundle contains a complaint purportedly made by the appellant’s father on 20 December 2018 in respect of an attack on his son led by Advocate Sayadur Rahman earlier that day. He says that when the defendants wanted to cut the tree at the boundary of his house, he stopped them. During an argument with them, his son (the appellant) came home from school. Then they attacked him along with his son with native weapons. The defendants climbed on his son’s chest and strangled him with a rope around his neck with the intention of killing him. With the help of local people, he rescued his son and took him to the local health complex. The doctor on duty advised him to take his son to Sylhet MAG Medical Hospital as soon as possible. At present, his son was under treatment at the hospital.
25. In the PIQ, the only mention of the appellant being hospitalized was in the context of the attack in 2014. There is no mention in the PIQ or elsewhere of a serious attack at the family home in December 2018 which put the appellant in hospital again, and no medical evidence has been provided to show that the appellant was treated in hospital in December 2018.”
13. Mr Halim submitted that it was clear from the first sentence of [24] that the judge made an error of fact when he said that in the appellant’s substantive interview the appellant said that the third and final attack on him was in 2017. In fact, at [65] of the appellant’s substantive interview, the appellant did say that he was attacked in 2018. Accordingly, Mr Halim submitted that it was wrong of the judge to find the appellant’s account in interview inconsistent with the evidence in the complaint dated 20 December 2018.
14. Mr Terrell argued that the judge was clear at [25] that what concerned him was the lack of evidence in the Preliminary Information Questionnaire (PIQ) or elsewhere about an attack (other than the 2014 one) which was serious enough to lead to the appellant being treated in hospital. In other words, the judge was not referring merely to an attack, but was referring to an attack which led to hospital treatment. When read in that way, Mr Terrell submitted, there was no need to turn to [24] to understand what the judge meant at [25].
15. In any event, Mr Terrell argued that even if the judge was mistaken at [24] nothing turns on it as there is no part of [24] on which the judge relied to make a finding adverse to the appellant’s credibility.
16. To that point, Mr Halim pointed to [28] in which the judge said “the appellant’s credibility is further undermined …” (my emphasis). He submitted the whole section from [24]-[28] is the judge’s evaluation of the appellant’s credibility.
17. I also drew to the parties’ attention (so they could comment if they wished) to what the judge said at [23]:
“The material in the appeal bundle does not address this controversial aspect of the core claim, but only goes to support the material facts that are accepted in the RFRL. Moreover, when the material is considered alongside the account which the appellant gave in his asylum interview, the material undermines - rather than enhances - the appellant’s credibility.”
18. Mr Terrell submitted caution should be exercised before reading too much into this paragraph as it is an introductory one. Mr Halim did not expressly rely on it.
19. Mr Halim also made the point that the appellant mentioned the 2018 incident at [65] of his interview in response to the interviewer asking whether everything had been covered. Following the appellant’s relatively brief response in which he mentioned the 2018 attack, the interviewer repeated the question “are you happy I have covered your asylum claim in full today?” to which the appellant said “yes”. Mr Halim submitted that the interview was perfunctory and that should not be held against the appellant.
20. I invited Mr Halim to address me on the other ways in which the judge noted the appellant failed to mention an attack after the 2017 attack, namely “the appellant’s oral evidence”. Mr Halim said it was not accepted that the appellant failed to mention it in his oral evidence but accepted he (Mr Halim) was not present at the hearing at the FTT and no evidence had been produced as to what took place there. He argued however, that it mattered not as the gist of what the judge was saying was that there was ‘no’ evidence in the appellant’s account of an attack after 2017 but question 65 of the interview proved that wrong.
21. I have not been directed to any other part of the evidence in which the appellant referred to being hospitalised in 2018 but I further note that in his Initial Contact and Asylum Registration Questionnaire dated 4 June 2021 on arrival into the UK, the appellant said:
“.. but just before I left in 2019 they attacked us in our house”.
22. The judge noted that at [3] of the decision.
23. In the PIQ dated 23 June 2021 the appellant said:
“Towards the end of 2018, my uncles attacked my father and me in an attempt to kill us. Then my father helped me to escape the country”.
24. The judge noted this at [5] of the decision.
25. In his substantive interview the appellant had explained that there were two incidents earlier on in 2012 and 2014 and following the 2nd of those his father sent him away to live with his maternal uncle although he would return home from time to time. Once thereafter he was attacked at his maternal uncles following which he returned home [q. 63] then at [q. 65] he said the last attack was December 2018.
26. I am satisfied the judge did make adverse credibility findings against the appellant following his evaluation of the issues considered at [24] and [25]. I agree with Mr Halim that [24]-[28] were the operative paragraphs in which the judge was considering the appellant’s credibility as to what happened to him in Bangladesh. I am further fortified in that conclusion by the fact that those paragraphs were introduced by the judge at [23] when he raised the issue of credibility and that he started [24] with the word “firstly”.
27. However, I find there is some merit in Mr Terrell’s submission that what the judge was actually concerned about was the lack of evidence “in the PIQ or elsewhere of a serious attack at the family home in December 2018 which put the appellant in hospital again”.
28. Even had the judge expressly noted q.65 of the interview, it does not address the mischief here to which the judge referred. The appellant was given another chance at q.66 of the asylum interview to add anything else and he did not do so. As the appellant has not provided evidence of what he said at the hearing at the FTT, I am entitled to treat what the judge said about there being no reference therein to an attack in 2018 as unchallenged.
29. It is clear from [3] and [5] of the decision that the judge was aware that elsewhere in his claim the appellant referred to the incident in 2018 although of course on neither of these occasions did the appellant refer to it leading to him receiving hospital treatment.
30. Accordingly, I am satisfied that what the judge said in the first sentence of [24] does reveal a mistake of fact. I find it was clear on a proper reading of the evidence before the judge that the appellant did refer to the 2018 attack in his substantive interview contrary to what the judge said. Furthermore there was a number of references to it from the outset of the appellant’s claim.
31. I am satisfied that despite the error the judge made in the first sentence of [24], he was patently aware of the appellant’s account that he was attacked in 2018. Accordingly, I find the issue about which the judge was more vexed was that the appellant did not refer on any occasion to being hospitalised in 2018 which was therefore inconsistent with his father’s police complaint. I find what the judge said about that at [25] to be factually correct and a finding open to him on the evidence before him.
32. Accordingly, the particular error revealed at [24] is not one which I find, alone, to be a material one. I am not satisfied that the judge’s finding at [25] would be any different had he expressly noted what the appellant said at q.65 of his interview as that did not address the particular concern he had.
33. I leave open for the moment the question of whether this error, taken together with any other errors, reveal an error in the judge’s approach to the evidence such that they are likely together to have made a material difference to the outcome.
34. Turning to Ground 2, the operative paragraph of the FTT decision is [26] in which the judge said:
“In the same complaint, the appellant’s father refers to an earlier attack on his son in front of his uncle’s house at Sholo Ghor, Sunamganj. But this is not the address given by the appellant’s uncle. TA. in the complaint that he purportedly made on 19 September 2017.”
35. The address the uncle gave in his complaint of 19 September 2017 as being the ‘place of occurrence’ was “house no 26, Dhanshiri, Bonanipara, Under the Sunamganj Sadar Model police station”.
36. In his grounds, Mr Halim said “both were obviously describing a location in Sunamganj” and then proceeded to argue that if the judge intended to imply that house no. 26 was not located in the Sholo Ghor area of Sunamganj, he would need to say that, particularly as there was no evidence before him as to the geography of Sunamganj.
37. Mr Terrell’s simple point was that the two locations are inconsistent. If the appellant is suggesting (as Mr Halim did in oral submissions) that the uncle’s description of the address is simply the long version of the short one the appellant’s father had given, then it is without merit as the long version does not include the words ‘Sholo Ghor’.
38. In oral submissions, Mr Halim provided an analogy. He said he may talk about Field House being in the Chancery Lane area of London, whereas the actual address is Breams Building, London. Both are correct.
39. That may be so, but that is because I know it to be so, familiar as I am with Field House. But as Mr Halim identified in his grounds, there was no evidence of the local geography before the judge. The appellant had the burden of proving his claim. Absent evidence to help the judge reconcile the inconsistency, there is nothing illogical or irrational about the judge finding the two locations to be inconsistent when as a matter of simple language they are. Likewise, neither is it irrational for the judge to place weight on such an inconsistency.
40. Turning to Ground 3, this relates to [27] of the FTT decision, which follows on from the last sentence of [26] in which the judge is referring to the incident of which there was a complaint on 19 September 2017. I set out both below:
“26. … the medical evidence provided in respect of the injuries allegedly sustained by the appellant in this attack is inconsistent.
27. According to an apparently contemporaneous hospital discharge certificate dated 21 September 2017, the appellant was treated at the hospital for a sprained ankle from 19 September 2017 to 21 September 2017. But on 22 October 2023 Sunamgonj Sadar Hospital purportedly issued a certificate confirming that the appellant was admitted to the hospital on 19 September 2017 at 08:30pm and released on 21 September 2017 at 10:15am; and that his injuries consisted of multiple bruises all over his body of different size.”
41. The appellant relies on a document called an ‘outpatient ticket’ which was in the bundle of evidence before the FTT. It was dated 19 September 2017 and next to the pre-printed word ‘disease’ is a handwritten entry “H/O Physical Assault”. The appellant relies on this as corroboration for his account that he was in fact physically assaulted in the incident on 19 September 2017.
42. Mr Terrell’s primary submission was that, applying Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Tribunal should be slow to find that the Tribunal overlooked evidence which was before it, even if it had not been referred to.
43. In any event, he further submitted that the outpatient ticket does not address the point the judge was making at [27], namely that the evidence from 2017 and the evidence said to be confirming the appellant’s 2017 admission but dated 2023 said different things and, to that extent, the judge was plainly entitled to find there to be an inconsistency.
44. To that latter submission, I agree. However, notwithstanding the caution that was stipulated in Volpi and Volpi, I find there to be some merit in the appellant’s argument that the judge overlooked the evidence in the outpatient ticket, as it seems surprising he did not refer to it when he referred to both other pieces of medical evidence on the issue. However, I am not sure to what extent it helps the appellant given that it introduces evidence of a further lack of consistency as between medical evidence all purporting to be about the same incident.
45. In short, whilst I am prepared to find that the judge probably failed to notice the outpatient ticket, I am not persuaded it is material. It does not undermine the observation the judge made about the inconsistency in the medical evidence and I am not persuaded it would have made any difference (favourable to the appellant) to the judge’s findings about the inconsistent nature of the medical evidence relating to the 2017 incident.
46. Before moving on the ground 4, I will pause to consider whether the two individual errors I have found at Grounds 1 and 3, become material when considered together. Mr Halim argued that the errors are part of a pattern in the judge’s evaluation of the evidence revealing a lack of anxious scrutiny. Furthermore, he argues that the Upper Tribunal would have to perform gymnastics in order to interpret or read words or reasoning into the decision in order to uphold it. He argues that to do that would be impermissible.
47. I am not persuaded that the judge’s decision can be characterised in the way Mr Halim argues. As I have set out above, the judge’s findings on the key issues about which he was concerned accurately reflect the evidence before him. The matters he overlooked do not take the appellant’s case any further. Given the potential significance of the claimed assault in 2018 as evidence of the ongoing familial dispute, that was not really an issue in the appeal given that the dispute and historic attacks were accepted. In any event, the claimed 2018 attack took place at home so it cannot really be relied on to show the ability of the uncle to find the appellant. I accept the 2017 incident took place at the uncle’s address so that may have a greater significance. That, however, ties in with Ground 4 to which I now turn.
48. This is a rationality/reasons argument relating to the judge’s finding about the present risk, if any, on return. I set out [29] in full:
“29. Moreover, as the Awami League regime has fallen, it is not credible that the appellant’s uncle continues to enjoy any influence or protection as the alleged former aide to a local AL politician. The appellant has not brought forward any objective evidence to substantiate his claim that a minority of AL members/supporters – including his uncle - have split from the AL and successfully re-aligned themselves with the Students Forum, and have thereby acquired power and influence by that route. Further, the claim runs counter to the information about the composition and conduct of the Interim Government which is given in the December 2024 CPIN.”
49. The primary submission was that the 2024 CPIN in facts offers support for the appellant’s claim so it was simply wrong for the judge to say what he did in the opening sentence. This was supplemented by the submission that the last sentence failed to identify the parts of the 2024 CPIN to which the judge referred and, it was incumbent upon him to identify this as part of his reasoning.
50. There was a dispute at the hearing before me as to the basis of the appellant’s case which the judge was considering. Mr Halim submitted that the uncle with the political connections was an “APP”. He derived this from the appellant’s interview at q.27. Mr Halim suggested this denoted “Assistant Public Prosecutor” although from where this came is not clear. It is characterised as a presumption in the written grounds. At q. 27 the appellant was asked about his uncle who was a solicitor and his response was “he is the APP of Sunamgonj code”. There was no follow up question about that. At q.22 the appellant had said “the solicitor is also a politically active and I can say he is the right hand man of our local MP” and at q.23 that the uncle and cousins are more nationally influential than local influential although he did not expand on that save to say that when the appellant fled home to other parts of the country (he had previously said he went to Dhaka and Noakhali) they and other people managed to find him (q.24) and they found him when he was at his maternal uncle’s home (q.57).
51. In his appeal witness statement the appellant said at [3] that his paternal uncle and cousins are “influential in the local and national political landscape”. He relied on the reluctance of the local police to take a complaint in 2014 and the fact his uncle located him elsewhere as evidence of his uncle’s reach and influence [6]-[7], [13]-[14]. At [11] he referred to his solicitor uncle and said “he is closely associated with the local Member of Parliament (MP) and is considered their right-hand man”.
52. At [20] of the judge’s decision, the judge summarised the appellant’s oral evidence on this issue noting that the local MP for whom the uncle worked was a representative of the Awami League and the appellant’s agreement that the Awami League’s power and influence was very much diminished after the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government. He noted the appellant’s evidence that whilst most Awami League members had fled, a minority, including his uncle had aligned himself with the Student’s Forum. The judge noted that appellant had not provided any newspaper articles showing either the uncle’s link with the local Awami League MP. The judge then said “but he had provided documents to show that he was an active member of the student wing of the Awami League in Bangladesh”.
53. It is not immediately clear to whom the judge was referring in this latter sentence given the appellant was also claiming to have joined the student wing of the Awami Legue in 2016 [13]. However, reference to the appellant’s bundle before the FTT reveals that the political documents therein relate to the appellant. I was not directed to any evidence relating to the uncle’s role.
54. Accordingly, the second sentence of [29] in the decision is factually correct.
55. Mr Halim relied on paragraph 13.3.5 of the 2024 CPIN which is an extract from a report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) which reported on 25 July 2024 (see 10.2.2), 7 August 2024 (see 11.1.2) and 14 November 2024 (see 11.3.4). They also held an event on 4 November 2024 and it appears that the evidence at 13.3.5 comes from that event. The part on which the appellant relies says:
“Already, the interim government has replaced several senior and mid-level members of key institutions, particularly in the judiciary, bureaucracy and police. Many officials close to the AL remain in place, however. A full clean-out is impractical, and the government wants to give all those who remain a chance to get behind the reform agenda…”
56. I also note 11.1.4 which cited a report from the publication Prothom Alo dated 19 August 2024 “most AL-affiliated local government representatives had gone into hiding following sheik Hasina’s resignation” and the Daily Star reported on 20 August 2024 that the interim government removed “all mayors of 12 city corporations and 1,873 pubic representatives at three other tiers of local government”.
57. Section 11.2 of the 2024 CPIN deals with the “formation of the interim government” and section 11.3 deals with “the interim government’s mandate”. I am satisfied that it is these sections to which the judge was referring in the third sentence of [29]. I say that firstly because that is effectively what he said and secondly, because there is nothing in those sections which contradicts his comments. The thrust of the evidence contained in those sections is about the commitment of the interim government to restore order and political stability, and prepare for new elections (11.2.5/11.3.2/11.3.5); that the composition of the new government was selected from a diverse pool (11.2.6-11.2.8) save that the former Awami League has no representatives (11.3.1), and to introduce reforms (11.3.7).
58. Section 12 of the 2024 CPIN deals with the treatment of political groups August 2024 and at 12.1-12.3 dealing specifically with the Awami League and affiliates but in the context of action against them rather than their own influence. By contrast section 13 deals with law and order and the section on which the appellant relies is under the heading “reform of the security forces and the judiciary”. The sources cited from 13.3.1-13.3.3 deal with the attempts to clear out the police and judiciary of political partisanship although at 13.3.4 it notes a speaker at the 2024 ICG event commenting that replacement of pro-Awami League people has not been very successful and at 13.3.6 to the challenges there are in reforming the security services. However, that same speaker is noted as saying whilst there are some challenges the interim government is “seen as honest and committed to real reform” (11.3.21).
59. Accordingly, having found the judge entitled to say what he did in his second sentence at [29] I am further satisfied that he was entitled to say all he did in [29] on the basis of the evidence before him. The appellant’s evidence as to the precise role his uncle had in the Awami League regime can at best be characterised as vague. The main thrust of the evidence in the 2024 CPIN is that many Awami League officials have been replaced. In any event, on the appellant’s case at the hearing, his uncle had aligned himself with a student wing. The appellant has not taken me to any specific evidence about that. I did not find the judge to lack reasoning in the third sentence as it is clear which section of the CPIN the judge was talking about and there is nothing therein which undermines what the judge said. Whilst it may, at first blush, be wrong to characterise the CPIN as saying that former Awami League officials have NO role or influence in present day Bangladesh, this was not really what the judge said but, in any event, the appellant has not identified evidence in the 2024 CPIN which reaches the level of support for the appellant’s claim that he would need to satisfy me that the judge’s conclusions at [29] were irrational, inadequately reasoned or not open to him on the evidence before him.
Conclusions
60. For the reasons I have given above whilst I find the judge to have erred in law on Grounds 1 and 3, I do not find the errors to be material.
61. Grounds 2 and 4 do not reveal an error on a point of law, let alone a material one.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error on a point of law so the decision stands.

SJ Rastogi
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 September 2025