Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002053
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01732/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 24 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

MK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Reza, JKR Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms L. Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) Judge Monson (the “Judge”) promulgated on 21 February 2025 dismissing the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal.
Relevant background
2. The appellant arrived in the UK on 18 October 2022 on a visit visa and claimed asylum on 1 November 2022. The basis of his asylum claim was that he was a member of the BNP and worked as a lawyer in Bangladesh representing BNP supporters who had false criminal charges brought against them. He stated that a false case had also been filed against him by the Awami League, who were in government at the time. The appellant’s asylum claim was refused by the respondent in a decision dated 2 April 2024.
3. On 30 January 2025 the appellant lodged a section 120 notice setting out an alternative basis to his asylum claim. The statement records that the appellant’s fear of the Awami League government had diminished since 5 August 2024, when Sheikh Hasina’s regime was overthrown by a popular uprising, but that he was now anxious regarding the influence of religious organisations, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami and other fundamentalist Islamist parties. The statement asserts that the current regime in Bangladesh is very hostile towards the Hindu community and is strongly aligned with Islamist groups.
4. The appeal was heard at the First-tier Tribunal at Taylor House on 5 February 2025. At the hearing, the respondent’s Presenting Officer gave consent on behalf of the respondent for the new matter raised in the section 120 notice to be considered at the hearing. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds in a decision promulgated on 21 February 2025.
The FTT decision
5. In relation to his claim for political asylum, the Judge accepted that the appellant had been a member of the BNP in Bangladesh, had been appointed as Assistant Secretary of the Bangladesh Nationalist Lawyers Forum Chattogram Unit in 2017 and worked as a lawyer defending BNP members and supporters in false criminal cases instigated by activists for the Awami League. However, the Judge did not find the appellant’s account to be credible regarding his claim that he was also subject to criminal proceedings in Bangladesh.
6. At [26] to [34] of the decision, the Judge addressed the country situation and the respondent’s December 2024 CPIN. He found that following the fall from power of Sheikh Hasina and the Awami League in August 2024, there are no substantial grounds for believing that the appellant faces a real risk of persecution due to his previous conduct in Bangladesh, or due to him continuing his BNP activism on his return, or due to there being any outstanding false and politically-motivated criminal cases against him.
7. At [35] the Judge found that the appellant’s general credibility was undermined by his admission that neither he nor his daughters were genuine visitors to the UK, but that it was always his plan to claim asylum after having deceived the UK authorities into issuing him and his family with visit visas. Further, the Judge found that the appellant’s general credibility was undermined by the fact that his wife returned to Bangladesh on completion of a short visit, to resume her employment as a doctor, but did not take the children with her.
8. The Judge recorded at [20] that the appellant’s fear of religious persecution began in 2017 and that his reason for coming to the UK in 2022 was because it was unsafe for him to remain in Bangladesh as a Hindu, as well as his political affiliation to the BNP. It is recorded that the appellant explained that the reason why he had not raised his fear as a Hindu when claiming asylum in 2022 was because he did not know that he could claim asylum on both religious and political grounds. At [36] the Judge found that this explanation was not credible.
9. The decision records that the main thrust of the appellant’s new claim is that he faces a real risk of religious persecution due to developments that have occurred in Bangladesh since the fall of the regime of Sheikh Hasina, and that he principally relies on an extract from Hansard on 2 December 2024 in which Barry Gardiner MP claimed that since the fall of the Awami League regime there had been 2,000 incidents of violence, “most of which have been targeted against the Hindu community”. The Judge found that the appellant’s claim largely ran counter to the objective evidence indicated by the December 2024 CPIN which indicates that the rights and interests of the Hindu minority community are adequately protected by the Interim Government (IG). The Judge referred to the fact that the IG cabinet includes a member of Bangladesh’s Hindu community.
10. In relation to the position and influence of Jamaat and Islamic groups, the Judge noted that the IG had removed the ban from their participation in national elections on the basis there was no specific evidence of the involvement of Jamaat and its affiliates in terrorist activities. He notes that these groups had elicited sympathy in Bangladesh as one of the many victims of Hasina’s administration. The decision states at [45]:
While the objective evidence shows that Jamaat has been brought back into the political fold, it does not show that the IG is thereby openly antagonistic towards the Hindu community. It also does not show that the rise of Islamist groups poses an existential threat to the Hindu community. There may have been politically motivated acts of violence against the Hindu community in August and September 2024, because (according to the ASA) its members were traditionally supportive of the [Awami League], but there is no reliable evidence of a sustained campaign of violence against Hindus, or any other group, thereafter. Even assuming that the unsourced claims made by the MP in Parliament on 2 December 2024 are reliable, they do not show that Hindus are being systematically targeted throughout the country by Jamaat extremists. In any event, as the appellant claims to be a high-profile member of the BNP, he and his family members are insulated against being targeted as suspected [Awami League] supporters or sympathisers.
11. The Judge concludes at [46] that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proving to the lower standard of proof that he qualifies for recognition as a refugee on either political or religious grounds or that there were substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk at the hands of the state, or at the hands of non-state agents, such as to cross the threshold of Article 3 ECHR.
12. In relation to his Article 8 claim, at [48] the Judge found that there were no exceptional circumstances which justified the appellant being granted “Article 8 relief outside the Rules”, and that requiring the appellant to return to Bangladesh was proportionate to the legitimate public interest in the maintenance of firm and effective immigration controls and the protection of the country’s economic well-being.
13. The appellant’s claim was dismissed on all grounds.
The grounds
14. The appellant sought permission to appeal on five grounds. In summary, the grounds assert that the Judge erred in the following respects:
1) Failing to properly assess the country situation;
2) Failing to consider the risk to the appellant as a “Hindu Rights Activist”;
3) Failing to give due weight to photographs and evidence of the appellant’s activism including attendance at an anti-government demonstration outside the Bangladeshi High Commission;
4) Failing to assess the reasons for the appellant’s late asylum claim on religious grounds; and
5) Failing to consider that a number of BNP leaders were killed by the Awami League after 5 August 2024.
15. Permission to appeal was refused by the FTT but subsequently granted by UTJ Ruddick on all grounds in a decision dated 25 June 2025. In her decision granting permission UTJ Ruddick identified a potential “Robinson obvious” matter which had not been pleaded in the grounds, stating:
Although this is not raised in the grounds, the FTT’s findings that there is not an “existential threat to the Hindu community” or evidence that they are being “systematically targeted throughout the country” arguably show that the FTT has asked itself the wrong questions. The refugee definition does not require a showing of an “existential threat” to an entire community or that it is being “systematically targeted throughout the country”, but rather a real risk to a particular individual. This is arguably a Robinson obvious misdirection in law.
The error of law hearing, discussion and reasons for decision
16. At the hearing I heard oral submissions in support of the grounds from Mr Reza and submissions from Ms Clewley who relied on the respondent’s Rules 24 response. I do not rehearse those submissions but refer to them where relevant in my reasoning below. At the conclusion of the hearing, I indicated that I would reserve my decision which I now give together with my reasons.
Ground 1
17. In respect of ground 1, Mr Reza submitted that the Judge failed to have sufficient regard to the country evidence in relation to the position of Hindus in Bangladesh. Mr Reza submitted that the appellant does not fear the Interim Government in Bangladesh but fears Islamic groups and states that the country evidence points towards a rise in Islamic fundamentalism in society in Bangladesh.
18. The day before the hearing in the FtT the appellant provided an Appeal Skeleton Argument (“ASA”) which referenced, at [23] to [26], three source of information in relation to “Attacks on Hindus in Bangladesh”. The information referenced was not separately adduced as documentary evidence, although I note that the respondent has not disputed the content reproduced in the ASA. It is accepted that the Judge expressly referred to the Hansard Report in his decision. The Judge found that the statement by Barry Gardiner MP was unsourced and the claims did not show that Hindus were being systematically targeted throughout the country by Jamaat extremists. In Mr Reza’s submission, the Judge erred in failing to consider the other objective evidence referred to in the ASA; namely an article from Al Jazeera dated 11 August 2024 and a question submitted to the European Parliament on 10 September 2024.
19. The Al Jazeera article refers to attacks on Hindus and other religious minorities in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Awami League on 5 August 2024 and refers to many Hindus being supporters of the Awami League. Although the article refers to attacks on Hindu households, temples and businesses, it was published just 6 days after the removal of the Awami League from government, at which time, based on reports, there was a febrile atmosphere in the country and clashes between rival groups. A feature of the article is the reference to Hindus being supporters or perceived as supporters of the Awami League. This is a matter which the Judge expressly addressed at [45] of the decision, where it is states that as a high profile member of the BNP, the appellant and his family would be insulated against being targeted as suspected Awami League supporters or sympathisers.
20. The question to the European Parliament is just that, a question about the reported attacks on the Hindu community since the fall of the Awami League. The sources of the matters contained in the question/assertion are all dated August 2024. The written answer to the question dated 21 October 2024 was not adduced by the appellant even though it was published prior to the hearing. In the written answer, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Vice-President Borrell i Fontelles) states that it is understood that the situation has since improved and that the EU would continue to follow the situation closely. Although the Judge did not expressly refer to this material referred to in the ASA, he unquestionably addressed the matters it raised. At [42] to [45] of the decision, the Judge addressed the threat to the Hindu community from Islamic groups and the attacks in the aftermath of the regime change. The Judge’s findings on the country situation are consistent with the written answer to the question the appellant relies on. The Judge’s failure to expressly refer to this evidence does not amount to a material error of law.
21. In line with MK (duty to give reasons) [2013] UKUT 641 (IAC) at [11] and the Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction of 4 June 2024, Reasons for Decisions, the Judge was not required to rehearse every item of evidence adduced. The decision does not indicate that the appellant only relied on the Hansard report. This is clear from the wording at [39] which states that the appellant “principally relies on an extract from Hansard on 2 December 2024”. The Judge has provided wholly adequate reasoning to demonstrate that all material evidence was considered and the key matters arising from that evidence were addressed. I find that the evidence in question does not realistically advance the appellant’s case in relation to the general country situation at the time of the hearing.
22. The grounds also refer to the Judge’s “blind dependency” on the respondent’s CPIN in assessing the country situation. As discussed above, the decision demonstrates that the Judge adequately considered the appellant’s evidence, such that it was. The appellant did not rely on any expert country evidence addressing the matters in the CPIN or addressing any individual risk to the appellant based on his personal circumstances. The CPIN had been published just eight weeks before the hearing. The respondent’s CPINs are compiled using a wide range of factual sources (listed in the ‘Bibliography’ section at the end), which range from reports by international organisations, charities and NGOs, such as the UNHCR, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, to journalistic sources, to documents produced by the government of the country in question. The appellant did not adduce any reliable evidence which could be said to have brought into question matters contained in the CPIN. It cannot be said that the Judge “blindly followed” the CPIN simply because he found that the appellant’s claim ran counter to the objective evidence and that the Judge preferred the evidence in the CPIN. Mr Reza accepted that no objective evidence had been adduced of an enhanced risk to the appellant on account of any activism as a Hindu.
23. For the reasons set out above I find that ground 1 is not made out.
Ground 2 and Ground 3
24. By ground 2 the appellant asserts that the Judge failed to consider the risk to the appellant as a “Hindu Rights Activist” and, by ground 3, that he failed to give adequate weight to the appellant’s supporting evidence of attendance at a demonstration at the Bangladesh High Commission and posts on his Facebook account. As recorded above, Mr Reza accepted that no objective evidence had been adduced of an enhanced risk to the appellant on account of any activism as a Hindu.
25. In the written grounds it is asserted that that “It is very likely that the Bangladesh High Commission may have members of intelligence services being deployed there and it is also very likely that they might have monitored this demonstration and have secretly taken photos of the participants”. I sought clarification from Mr Reza regarding the position he advanced at ground 2 in light of his clear submission at the outset of the hearing that the appellant did not fear the government or authorities in Bangladesh, but feared Islamic groups. It was Mr Reza’s submission that the appellant feared that state actors would have monitored his attendance at the demonstration and subsequently shared this information with Islamic groups which would put him at risk for his “activism” on return to Bangladesh. There is no indication before me that the appellant’s case was put on this specific basis in the FtT.
26. The main thrust of the appellant’s case before the FtT was his claim to at risk as a member of the Hindu community. There is a brief reference to his claim to be an activist on account of attendance at a demonstration at the High Commission and posts on social media at [23] of the ASA, but it was not suggested that Intelligence Services are sharing information with Islamic groups in Bangladesh. This assertion is entirely speculative and unsupported by any evidence adduced before the FtT, or at the hearing today.
27. The Judge did not make express reference to the undated photographs of the appellant at a demonstration in London or his posts on Facebook. The Facebook posts are dated 20 August to 10 October. No year is provided for the date of these posts and it is therefore assumed, with the hearing held in February 2025, that they relate to the preceding 12 month period. No further information has been provided in relation to the appellant’s Facebook account, such as how many friends or followers he has or how many people interacted with his posts. No evidence was adduced by the applicant to indicate that the current authorities in Bangladesh would be monitoring social media activity.
28. Although I accept that the Judge did not make specific reference to the photographs and Facebook posts, based on how the appellant’s case had been put in his ASA and the evidence adduced before the FtT, I do not consider the Judge’s failure to expressly refer to this evidence amounts to a material error of law. Mr Reza accepted that no objective evidence had been adduced in relation to any risk arising from the appellant’s claimed Hindu activism. There was no evidence before the FtT that posting on Facebook or attendance at a demonstration in London would place the appellant at risk on return from Islamic groups, and no evidence that the authorities would be monitoring attendance at demonstrations and sharing this information with Islamic groups, as is now asserted on the appellant’s behalf.
29. The Judge assessed the appellant’s case based on the evidence before him and acknowledged the basis of the appellant’s case at [10] of the decision. The evidence which the appellant relied upon, discussed at ground 1 above, relates to the situation of the Hindu community generally. For the reasons expressed above, the Judge was entitled to prefer and rely on the evidence in the December 2024 CPIN, which indicated that the rights and interests of the Hindu community are adequately protected by the Interim Government. The Judge found that there was evidence of politically motivated acts of violence against the Hindu community in August and September 2024, because its members were traditionally supportive of the Awami League, but there that there was no reliable evidence of a sustained campaign of violence against Hindus thereafter, or that Hindu groups were being systematically targeted throughout the country by Jamaat extremists. The Judge’s findings were manifestly reasonably open to him on the evidence before the FtT. In the absence of any evidence to indicate that Hindu activists would be at any enhanced risk beyond that of the Hindu community generally, I find that the Judge’s findings in relation to the risk to the Hindu community also address his claim to be at risk as an activist. It is not established that the Judge materially erred in law in failing to consider a risk to the appellant as a Hindu rights activist or in failing to make express findings on his photographic and social media evidence.
30. In her grant of permission UTJ Ruddick identified a potential Robinson obvious matter which was not pleaded in the grounds, as set out at [15] above. The observation made by Judge Ruddick was likely prompted by the choice of language used at [45] of the decision where the Judge states that the objective evidence “does not show that the rise of Islamist groups poses an existential threat to the Hindu community”. However, I am satisfied that this was a finding of fact made by the Judge which was reasonably available to him on the evidence and did not indicate the legal test which he applied in determining the appellant’s protection claim.
31. The role of the Judge was to assess whether the appellant, with his individual profile, had an objectively well-founded fear of persecution on return to Bangladesh. Taking the decision as a whole, I am satisfied that the Judge assessed the appellant’s individual circumstances upon which his claim was based in light of the evidence before him. I do not find that the Judge asked himself the wrong question. The findings at [45] of the decision are the Judge’s findings on the evidence before the FtT. No evidence had been adduced to indicate any individual risk to the applicant. The background evidence in relation to the Hindu community adequately addressed the claimed risk to the appellant. There was no evidence that those advocating the rights of Hindus would be at risk in circumstances where the Judge had found that Hindus were not generally at risk. Moreover, it is apparent from [46] that the Judge applied the correct threshold for the assessment of risk to the applicant, finding that there were no substantial grounds for believing that upon return to Bangladesh, the appellant would face a real risk at the hands of the state, or at the hands of non-state agents.
32. In conclusion, I find that grounds 2 and 3 are not made out and that the Judge did not make a material misdirection of law.
Ground 4
33. By ground 4 the appellant asserts that the Judge failed to assess the appellant’s reasons for the appellant’s late asylum claim on religious grounds. The grounds assert that the appellant’s fear of religious persecution arose due to the changed country conditions arising from the fall of the Awami League.
34. The explanation now provided for the late asylum claim does not appear to be the same explanation which was offered to the Judge in the FtT. At [20] of the decision the Judge records that the appellant’s account was that his fear of religious persecution had begun in 2017 and his reason for coming to the UK in 2022 was because it was unsafe for him to remain in Bangladesh as a Hindu as well as because of his political affiliation to the BNP. At [36] the Judge found that the appellant’s explanation that he did not realise he could also claim asylum on religious grounds as well as political grounds was not credible. The appellant is a qualified lawyer. The Judge’s rejection of the appellant’s explanation was undoubtedly reasonably open to him in the circumstances. The decision demonstrates that the Judge did engage with the explanation he was provided at the time. It has not been demonstrated that the appellant offered the explanation that he now advances in these proceedings or that the Judge failed to engage with any explanation the appellant provided.
Ground 5
35. The appellant asserts by ground 5 that the Judge failed to consider that a number of BNP leaders were killed by Awami League activists after the August Revolution. Despite the evidence of general instability in Bangladesh in the immediate aftermath of the August revolution, the Judge was entitled to rely on the general position indicated by the December 2024 CPIN, that leaders, members and supporters of political groups are unlikely to face persecution or serious harm from non-state or rogue state actors. The Judge acknowledges at [36] that the objective evidence indicates that some politically motivated violence still occurs but records that the number of people who are affected remains low and that most reports of violence relate to incidents which took place during the July and August 2024 protests and which had been attributed to the Security Forces or BCL, which had since been banned by the Interim Government. On the objective evidence the Judge sustainably found that the appellant would no longer be at risk due to his activities with the BNP. For these reasons, ground 5 is not made out.
36. For all of these reasons, the appellant’s appeal is dismissed. The grounds fail to disclose any material error of law and the decision of the FtT stands.

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

S. Grey
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 August 2026