Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002063
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/56594/2023
LE/03549/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 5th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIPLEY

Between

Ophelia Adjeiwaa Ofori
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Theilgaard Counsel, instructed by A1 Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Kerr, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

The appellant and decision appealed against
1. The appellant is a Ghanaian national and her date of birth is 22 May 1999. She has appealed against the respondent’s decision dated 27 October 2021 to refuse to grant her pre-settled status.

Background
2. On 10 March 2021 the appellant was granted an EUSS Family Permit as the family member of her mother, a Swedish national, and hereafter referred to as “the sponsor”. The appellant arrived in the UK on 6 April 2021. On 19 April 2021 the appellant made an application for pre-settled status, arguing that she was dependent on the sponsor. That application was refused in the decision which is the subject of this appeal, as set out in the Reasons for Refusal Letter (RFRL). The respondent considered that there was a lack of evidence that the appellant was a dependent as defined in Appendix EU.

3. The appellant initially made an unsuccessful application for review which was refused in a decision dated 29 October 2023, again on the basis of a lack of evidence of dependency. In their review, the respondent noted evidence that the appellant was working, the lack of evidence as to the appellant’s financial position since she turned 21 in May 2020 and payment made by the appellant for non-essential bills. The appellant then made this appeal. The appeal was dismissed in the First Tier Tribunal in a decision dated 11 February 2025. On 6 October 2025 the Upper Tier Tribunal set aside that decision, as it was found to include an error of law in failing to focus on the appellant’s circumstances as at the date of her application. This decision is the re-make of this appeal.

4. The appellant has prepared a composite hearing bundle of 225 pages including both parties’ bundles. The pagination referred to in this decision is the digital pagination of that bundle.

The hearing
5. The hearing has been recorded. The appellant adopted her statement and was asked questions as to the timing and nature of her dependence on the sponsor including where and with whom she had lived in the UK, her circumstances in the thirteen days following her arrival, the sponsor’s whereabouts, the appellant’s employment and her bank accounts.

6. Ms Kerr and Ms Theilgaard made submissions on the oral evidence, relying additionally respectively on the decision appealed against, review and the skeleton.

7. Immigration Law and Rules Relevant to the Appellant - extracts from Appendix EU

Persons eligible for limited leave to enter or remain as a joining family member of a relevant sponsor

EU14A. The applicant meets the eligibility requirements for limited leave to enter or remain as a joining family member of a relevant sponsor where the Secretary of State is satisfied, including by the required evidence of family relationship, that, at the date of application and in an application made after the specified date, the condition set out in the following table is met:
Condition
Is met where:

(a) The applicant is:
(i) a joining family member of a relevant sponsor; or
(ii) a family member who has retained the right of residence by virtue of a relationship with a relevant sponsor; and
(b) The applicant is:
(i) not eligible for indefinite leave to enter under paragraph EU11A of this Appendix, where the application is made outside the UK; or
(ii) not eligible for indefinite leave to remain under paragraph EU11A of this Appendix, where the application is made within the UK, solely because they have completed a continuous qualifying period of less than five years which began after the specified date; and
(c) Where the applicant is a joining family member of a relevant sponsor, there has been no supervening event in respect of the relevant sponsor
"Child" is defined in Annex 1 as
(a) the direct descendant under 21 years of a relevant EEA citizen; or …of their spouse or civil partner; or
(b)(i) the direct descendant aged 21 years or over of a relevant EEA citizen....or of their spouse or civil partner; and
(ii) (unless the applicant was previously granted limited leave to enter or remain under this Appendix as a child on the basis that sub-paragraph (a) above applied or under its equivalent in the Islands on that basis) dependent on..:
(aa) the relevant EEA citizen (or on their spouse or civil partner) at the date of application or, where the date of application is after the specified date, at the specified date;
(bb) not relevant
(cc) on the relevant sponsor (or on their spouse or civil partner) at the date of application....

"Dependent" means:
a) having regard to their financial and social conditions, or health, the applicant cannot meet their essential living needs (in whole or in part) without the financial or other material support of the relevant EEA citizen..; and
b) such support is being provided to the applicant by the relevant EEA citizen ....; and
c) there is no need to determine the reasons for that dependence or for the recourse to that support.

9. In relation to the issue of dependency the summary of the case law made by the Upper Tribunal in Reyes (EEA Regs: dependency) [2013] UKUT 00314 (IAC) states:

19. From the above, we glean four key things. First, the test of dependency is a purely factual test. Second, the Court envisages that questions of dependency must not be reduced to a bare calculation of financial dependency but should be construed broadly to involve a holistic examination of a number of factors, including financial, physical and social conditions, so as to establish whether there is dependence that is genuine. The essential focus has to be on the nature of the relationship concerned and on whether it is one characterised by a situation of dependence based on an examination of all the factual circumstances, bearing in mind the underlying objective of maintaining the unity of the family. It seems to us that the need for a wide-ranging fact-specific approach is indeed enjoined by the Court of Appeal in SM (India): see in particular Sullivan LJ’s observations at [27]-[28]. Third, it is clear from the wording of both Article 2.2 and regulation 7(1) that the test is one of present, not past dependency. Both provisions employ the present tense (Article 2.2(b) and (c) refer to family members who “are dependants” or who are “dependent”; regulation 7(c) refers to “dependent direct relatives…”). Fourth (and this may have relevance to what is understood by present dependency), interpretation of the meaning of the term must be such as not to deprive that provision of its effectiveness.

The Burden and Standard of Proof
10. In this appeal the burden of proof is on the appellant and the standard of proof is the normal civil standard, that of the balance of probabilities.

Findings and reasons
11. Pursuant to the definition section of Appendix EU, the appellant must show that she is the joining family member of an EEA citizen who has both been resident for a continuous qualifying period and has been granted indefinite or limited leave under Appendix EU (or would be eligible to be granted indefinite leave under that Appendix). The sponsor meets those requirements and has indefinite leave.

12. The sponsor travelled to Ghana just before being notified of this hearing. Records show that the Notice of Hearing was not dispatched until 6 November 2025. Ms Kerr did not argue that the sponsor had intentionally chosen not to attend. Clearly, as the sponsor was not available to attend the hearing and her evidence was therefore not tested, less weight is placed on her written evidence.

Dependency as at date of application
13. It is for the appellant to establish on the balance of probabilities that she was dependent on the sponsor at the date of application, as set out above in the relevant definition for establishing dependency for an adult child as a joining family member. The definition of dependency requires her to show that she is dependent on the sponsor to meet her essential living needs.

14. In support of her claim that she was dependent on the sponsor after she turned 21 and before she arrived in the UK, the appellant has provided a money transfer receipt from the sponsor dated 24 February 2021 (page.74). The appellant also relies on a letter from her aunt stating that the sponsor has sent her money monthly for the appellant’s expenses (page 149). The appellant and the sponsor have explained in their statements that the appellant’s father had separated from the sponsor when the appellant was six, and since then her father has had little involvement in her life. She explained it was only the sponsor who was supporting her financially by paying for her schooling and all expenses (pages 35-36 and 52). Ms Kerr did not cross-examine the appellant regarding her claimed dependency on the sponsor before her arrival in the UK and I am satisfied that the appellant has established that she was dependent on the sponsor before she travelled to the UK.

15. The appellant arrived in the UK on 6 April 2021, 13 days before she made her application for pre-settled status on 19 April 2021. It is worth pointing out that this is a short period of time in which to establish herself independently from the sponsor in a new country and during a time when Covid restrictions were in place. The appellant has confirmed in her written and oral evidence and the written evidence of the sponsor that she has lived with her mother since her arrival. Her first address was at 207 Basingstoke Road, and she lived there for about a year. The appellant has not provided evidence of her address during that first thirteen days and nor financial evidence to show that she received funds from the sponsor. The appellant has explained that she did not open a bank account straightaway and thinks she opened her Lloyds account after she started full-time work in July 2021. Ms Kerr relied on the lack of financial evidence. In response Ms Theilgaard submitted that it was not reasonable to expect the appellant to provide documentary evidence of her dependency at that time. In the absence of a bank account or new tenancy agreement, it is difficult to identify what independent documentary evidence the appellant could have provided that related to this 13-day period.

16. Ms Kerr further argued that the appellant’s intention was to contribute towards the household, and this should be considered relevant to the issue of dependency. However, it is clear from the wording of Appendix EU, and as confirmed in Ali v. SSHD [2022] EWCA 1546, the issue to be determined is whether the appellant was in fact dependent on 19 April 2021, and not whether she had the intention of supporting herself in the future.

17. Ms Kerr further argued that the appellant was required to show that she had been dependent for at least a year prior to her application. She was unable to provide any legal provision or other basis for that submission and I am not satisfied that such a requirement exists. Nonetheless, I am satisfied that the appellant was so dependent.

18. I found the appellant to be a credible witness, giving direct clear evidence. I am not satisfied there is any reason to doubt the credibility of the appellant. There is a lack of evidence to suggest any alternative source of income before the appellant first found employment in July 2021.

19. Overall, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant was supported with accommodation and her essential living needs as at 19 April 2021.

20. I am therefore satisfied that the appellant meets the definition of a child in Appendix EU and she has therefore established that she is a joining family member of a relevant sponsor.

21. No application was made for an anonymity direction, and I can see no reason to make any such direction in the circumstances of this case.

Notice of Decision

22. I allow the appeal under Appendix EU of the immigration rules.

23. No anonymity direction is made.

F Ripley
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1 December 2025