Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002067

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65684/2023
LP/03488/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GILL

Between

AS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms E. Sanders, instructed by Morgan Hill Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the Judge’) dated 20 January 2025, in which the Judge dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal. Permission to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 23 July 2025.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who seeks protection as he fears that he will be arrested, imprisoned and killed if returned to Bangladesh because of his political affiliation and the false cases being brought against him. He alleges that threats were made to his family, which resulted in him going into hiding before leaving Bangladesh and arriving in the UK in October 2021. He states that while in the UK he has continued to participate in political protests, demonstrations and processions. The appellant’s asylum claim was refused by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘SSHD’) on 11 December 2023 and his appeal to the FtT was refused on 20 January 2025.
Discussion
3. I was provided with a Composite Bundle (350 pages), which included the respondent’s rule 24 response dated 19 August 2025 and the appellant’s rule 25 response dated 17 September 2025. Having heard submissions from both parties I reserved my decision, which I now set out below.
Ground 1
4. Ms Sanders, on behalf of the appellant, argued that the Judge made material errors of fact when assessing the appellant’s credibility. Submitting that these errors impacted upon the Judge’s entire assessment of both credibility and the reliability of documents relied upon by the appellant. Ms Sanders argued that these errors went to the heart of the appellant’s entire claim both in terms of his history and risk in the context of current conditions in Bangladesh. The respondent argues that any errors of fact, even if taken cumulatively, do not materially impact upon the overall credibility findings at [29] – [31] of the Judge’s decision.
5. The errors of fact can be summarised as follows:
i. The appellant failed to mention the December 2019 case against him until his March 2024 witness statement [29(g)]. It is not in dispute that the appellant informed the SSHD about the December 2019 case in his Preliminary Information Questionnaire (‘PIQ’) dated 20 May 2022, during his substantive asylum interview on 20 October 2023 and provided the FIR, charge sheet and arrest warrant, all of which were before the SSHD prior to her decision. The respondent argues that because the appellant did not mention the 2019 case in his screening interview on 28 April 2022, the Judge was entitled to make the adverse credibility finding at [29(g)]. The appellant submits that in his screening interview he did however refer to his difficulties starting in December 2019. Having considered the Judge’s finding at [29(g)] I reject the respondent’s submission. It is clear the Judge is considering the appellant’s perceived failure to inform the SSHD in both the screeding interview on 28 April 2022 and substantive interview 20 October 2023, inaccurately stating that the ‘first mention’ of the December 2019 case was in his witness statement in 2024. Thereby relying on a perceived significant delay of a number of years, when this was not the case, as the 2019 case was first expressly mentioned in the PIQ on 20 May 2022 and not 2024. I am therefore satisfied that there was an error of fact in this regard. In the alternative, the Respondent submits the finding is not material as the Judge provided a clearly structured credibility assessment, accounting for a series of credibility issues in the Appellant’s claim. I will address materiality below.
ii. The appellant’s claim relies on the authorities filing a single case against him which was inconsistent with what he said at his interview [29(f)]. The Appellant argues that at the time of the Fire-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) hearing he expressly relied upon documentation in relation to two cases against him, one initiated in December 2019 leading to the issue of an arrest warrant in December 2021 and one in 2024 (the evidence being submitted in a supplementary bundle on 19 June 2024). However, the Judge’s decision refers to a single case and makes adverse credibility findings on this basis. The respondent argues that the Judge addresses the 2019 warrant in detail at [30] and that it is implicit that the Judge was aware of the 2024 warrant considering it was part of material before the FtT. The respondent submits that even if the Judge does not specifically refer to the 2024 arrest warrant the reasoning at [30] applies to the 2024 warrant. Having considered [30] of the Judge’s decision I reject the respondent’s submissions; the language used in the decision indicates that the Judge did not consider the 2024 case, (the evidence of which was in the supplementary bundle – see Ground 2 below) and there is no basis upon which this can be implied or read into the decision. The Judge specifically and unambiguously states ‘his claim is predicated on the authorities filing a single case against him’ (emphasis added) and goes on to find that this is inconsistent with his substantive asylum interview. I am therefore satisfied there was an error of fact in this regard. In the alternative, the respondent argues that any error of fact is not material as the Judge makes lengthy adverse credibility findings which are sustainable.
iii. It was not credible that the authorities would issue an arrest warrant 2 years after the appellant left the country [29(d)]. The appellant argues that he has not at any stage claimed the arrest warrant relating to the December 2019 case was issued 2 years after he left Bangladesh but that it was issued 2 years after the case was filed, at a time when he was in the UK, namely December 2021, as confirmed by the arrest warrant which was before the Judge. The FIR was issued in December 2019, the charges in November 2020, and the arrest warrant in December 2021. The respondent argues that the Judge’s adverse credibility findings remain untainted by this error, as the primary finding centres on the delay between the alleged filing of the case in 2019 and the eventual arrest warrant in December 2021. Furthermore, that this does not materially impact the Judge’s overall credibility assessment. Having considered [29(d)] I am satisfied that there was an error of fact that is relied upon in the Judge’s credibility assessment in so far as the paragraph states “it is not credible that the authorities would issue an arrest warrant 2 years after he has left the country”, which it is accepted in inaccurate.
iv. The appellant’s evidence of his sur place activities on Facebook does not comply with the guidance in XX as there is no evidence of his account. The appellant submits that he provided evidence of his account, his full profile page, the number of followers he has, his position etc, all at p2-4 of his supplementary bundle (which the Judge failed to consider – see Ground 2 below) and that this was fully compliant with XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC). The respondent argues that the Judge did consider the Facebook evidence and correctly identified it did not comply with XX, particularly as the ‘download your profile’ information was not provided. The Judge in his decision states at [29(k)] ‘there is no evidence of the Appellant’s full Facebook account in line with XX (PJAK) and his “Download Your Information”.’ (emphasis added). Given my findings at Ground 2 below, namely that the Judge did not consider the supplementary bundle submitted in June 2024, which contained further evidence in relation to the appellant’s Facebook profile including his profile page, the number of followers, creation date of profile, post insights, people reached, I find that there was an error of fact with regard the Judge’s finding that there was ‘no evidence’ , notwithstanding that evidence of the ‘download your profile’ was not provided in the bundles before the FtT. The respondent argues that any error of fact is not material either individually or cumulatively, particularly as the download your profile information was not provided and therefore did not comply with XX.
6. I therefore find that there were four errors of fact in the Judge’s credibility assessment, as set out above. I bear in mind that credibility findings are to be made in the round. The cumulative effect of these four errors is such that they are material errors, which infect the credibility assessment. I find that the first and second errors of fact, in particular, go to the heart of the appellant’s claim and are significant errors both individually and cumulatively. Although there are a number of unchallenged credibility findings at [29], the cumulative effect of these four errors of fact are such that it tainted the credibility assessment as a whole and thereafter the assessment of risk, which must be carried out on the basis of the appellant’s individual profile. Therefore, even though there has been a change in regime in Bangladesh, an individual assessment of risk must be carried out. Ground 1 therefore discloses a material error of law.
Ground 2
7. In relation to Ground 2, the Appellant argues that the Judge failed to have regard to, or make findings on material evidence that was before him. Specifically, the supplementary bundle which was uploaded in June 2024. The respondent submits that the Judge had regard to all of the evidence even if it is not expressly referred to in the decision and that the Judge is not required to expressly refer to each and every aspect of the evidence.
8. There is no dispute that the supplementary bundle was uploaded in June 2024 and therefore was before the Judge at the time of the hearing. The supplementary bundle included the appellant’s Facebook profile page indicating a following of 21,000 and further evidence of Facebook posts (as referred to at [5(iv)] above), photographs relating to the appellant’s sur place activities and evidence in relation to the 2024 case (FIR issued in April 2024, a charge sheet issued that same month, an arrest warrant, letter from a Bangladesh lawyer in relation to this case and a letter from the JCD in Bangladesh). The evidence contained in the supplementary bundle is not referenced anywhere in the Judge’s decision. I bear in mind my findings regarding Ground 1. Having considered the Judge’s decision as a whole and the language used, it cannot be implied that the material in the supplementary bundle was considered by the Judge. The omission of any reference to this evidence, which formed a key part of the appellant’s case, is glaring. Furthermore, the use of language such as there only being a single case against the appellant, refence to only one FIR and omitting any reference to the 2024 case, indicates that this aspect of the evidence was overlooked by the Judge. The evidence in the supplementary bundle was material to the assessment of credibility, reliability of the documents provided by the appellant and any assessment of risk on return. The Judge did not consider the full picture before reaching his decision, which included evidence of a further case against the appellant (2024), a news report which refers to the appellant being on the run and the police targeting his home, and further evidence to support the appellant’s case. Therefore Ground 2 also discloses a material error of law.
Ground 4
9. The appellant argues that the Judge erred in law in his assessment of risk and the current situation in Bangladesh because he failed to make a finding as to whether the appellant was a high or low level member of the opposition group [29(m)], did not consider material evidence contained in the supplementary bundle (which contained evidence of there being two live cases against the appellant and therefore his risk of being arrested on return on politically motivated charges). Furthermore, the error of law in respect of the adverse credibility findings taints the assessment of risk on return.
10. The respondent concedes that Ground 4 is parasitic on Grounds 1 and 2. Therefore, as Grounds 1 and 2 have succeeded the respondent concedes that risk on return may have to be reconsidered in light of the credibility findings.
11. I am satisfied that this concession is properly made. The errors of law with regards to the credibility findings and failure to consider evidence are material errors and infect the entire decision, including the assessment of risk on return. Accordingly, Ground 4 also succeeds.
12. The decision is therefore set aside in its entirety.
Ground 3
13. Although I heard submissions in respect of Ground 3, I see no utility in addressing those arguments as the appellant succeeds on the basis of Grounds 1, 2, and 4.
Disposal
14. I heard submissions from both parties as to whether the underlying appeal should be remitted to the FtT to be heard afresh, or whether it should be retained in the Upper Tribunal to be remade. Both parties submitted that the matter should be remitted to the FtT.
15. The starting point is paragraph 7.2 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the First-tier Tribunal and the Upper Tribunal. I have had regard to the guidance in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I am satisfied that the nature and extent of the judicial fact finding necessary is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the FtT. This is because the errors of law I have found relating to the credibility findings and overlooking material evidence have infected the entire decision and require significant judicial fact finding.
Notice of Decision
16. The Judge’s decision contained material errors of law and is set aside.
17. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard de novo and to be heard by a Judge other than FtT Judge Dobe.
18. I do not preserve any findings of fact.

A. Gill

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 December 2025