Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002074

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62957/2023
LP/06078/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’RYAN

Between

MS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Faryl of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr A McVeety, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 21 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the Appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1 The Appellant appeals against the decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Farrelly, (sitting in the First tier Tribunal) dated 21 February 2025, dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 30 October 2023 refusing the Appellant’s claim for protection.

2 The Appellant is a national of Iraq, is of Kurdish ethnicity and comes from Sulaymania. None of those matters are in dispute.

3 The Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on or around 8 October 2021 by boat. He made a claim for protection, asserting that he was born a Muslim, but had abandoned his Islamic faith and had adopted Christianity. This was said to be by reason of the influence of a young woman of Christian faith who he had met and with whom he had developed a romantic relationship. He claimed to be at risk of serious harm in Iraq due to having converted to Christianity, and relied upon evidence of his attendance at churches in the United Kingdom, and posts made on Facebook, appearing to promote Christian faith.

4 The Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim for protection in her decision dated 30 October 2023, rejecting the Appellant’s claims that (a) he had been a follower of Islam; (b) he was a Christian convert; and (c) had proselytised in the UK, for reasons (in summary) as follows:

(i) the Appellant was vague and externally inconsistent with his answers regarding the Islamic faith;
(ii) there was an inconsistency between the Appellant’s assertion of having converted to Christianity in Iraq, and an assertion recorded in his screening interview that he did not believe in any religion;
(iii) the Appellant’s motivations for converting from Islam to Christians were vague and lacking in detail;
(iv) the Appellant showed a lack of knowledge of Christianity;
(v) the Appellant’s evidence as to his attendance at church in United Kingdom, and his activities of introducing other people to Christianity in the UK, was vague and lacking in detail;
(vi) there would be no risk of harm for the Appellant on return to Iraq, on the basis that he would be able to replace his CSID card, as it was not credible that he had lost all contact with his family in Iraq.

5 The Appellant appealed to the First tier Tribunal and the matter came before the judge on 22 November 2024. The judge heard oral evidence from the Appellant.

6 In the judge’s subsequent decision, the judge directed himself briefly in law at paragraph 13, stating ‘I bear in mind the low standard of proof applicable’.

7 The judge accepted in that same paragraph that if the Appellant had converted from Islam to Christianity and were to proselytise, then he would be at serious risk of persecution. It was stated that the key question was whether his claimed conversion was genuine.

8 At paragraphs 14 to 17 of the determination, the judge sets out general features within an applicant’s account which might speak to the genuineness/credibility of that account. We consider that these paragraphs do not contain findings in relation to the Appellant’s specific account, or reasons for any such findings.

9 We consider the judge’s actual findings and reasons in more detail below. However, the judge ultimately concluded at paragraph 28 that the Appellant had not demonstrated he was a genuine convert to Christianity, and held at paragraph 29, that ‘I do not find any risk arising on the basis of religious beliefs’. In relation to documentation, the judge noted a discrepancy in the Appellant’s account that he had at one stage stated that he had lost his CSID card, but had also stated that it was at home with his family, but stated that ‘Because I do not accept his (underlying) claim about conversion, I also do not accept (he is) estranged from his family’. The appeal was dismissed.

Grounds of appeal

10 The Appellant sought permission to appeal against the judge’s decision in grounds of appeal which could be summarised as follows:

(i) Inadequate reasons had been giving for the judge’s findings; ‘no’ reasons had been given for the negative findings, with the judge mentioning merely that evidence was ‘superficial’; there was a need for adequate reasons to be given; and reference was made to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in SB (Sri Lanka) [2019] EWCA Civ 160:

“All of this explains why first instance judges need carefully to assess credibility and why appellate courts will accord due deference to the fact finder who is experienced in sifting evidence of this sort. But it also explains why an appellate court needs to be able to satisfy itself that the fact finder has at least identified the most relevant pieces of evidence and given sufficient reasons (which might be quite concise) for accepting or rejecting it.”

(ii) The decision was not consistent with guidance said to be given in the Court of Appeal’s judgment in HK v Secretary of State for the home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1037, to the effect that caution should be applied when assessing the plausibility of an applicant’s behaviour based on the experience of the tribunal of fact.

(iii) The judge’s assessment of risk of harm arising from possession of a CSID card was said not to be ‘aligned’ with country guidance provided in SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation, article 15) (CG)) Iraq [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC) .

Permission to appeal

11 Permission to appeal was initially refused, but granted upon a renewed application to the Upper Tribunal, by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick, on the following grounds:

“Although the grounds are poorly drafted, it is arguable that the overall credibility assessment was undermined by a repeated reliance about what the FTT found plausible, without any proper consideration of the country context, or other clear basis for the FTT’s expectation that the persons in question would not have behaved in the way described. See particular [23] and the adverse credibility point made up [29] about the Appellant’s failure to conduct a ‘search amongst religions’ ... The FTT’s finding that the Appellant will be able to redocument in Iraq rested in part on its adverse credibility funding, such that if the FTT erred in the credibility assessment, the conclusion on redocumentation would arguably not stand.”

Submissions

12 We heard submissions from Ms Faryl for the Appellant and from Mr McVeety for the Respondent.

13 Ms Faryl adopted the grounds of appeal generally, with the overarching submission that the judge’s reasons for finding the Appellant’s account incredible were inadequate in law and/or failed to take into account relevant evidence.

14 Ms Faryl submitted in particular that when referring at paragraphs [21] and [25] to the Appellant’s evidence as to whether on arrival he did not believe in religion, compared with his assertion that he had already converted to Christianity in Iraq, the judge had failed to take into account the Appellant’s evidence at paragraph 8 of his witness statement dated 2 August 2024, wherein he stated that he disputed that in his screening interview he had said that he did not believe in any religion. The Appellant there asserted ‘I remember very clearly that, in that screening interview, I said that I was Muslim before and now I am Christian. As I did not speak much English at the time, I do not know what the interpreter said. I had a lawyer, but the interview notes were not read to me in my language.”

15 Ms Faryl further submitted that there was no adequate reasoning for the judge’s findings at:

(i) paragraph [23], that it was incredible that upon the Appellant meeting the young woman asking his family to approach hers, that the young woman and her family would ‘promptly’ leave to go to Canada;

(ii) paragraph [23], that the Appellant’s account that he travelled to Turkey in the hope of finding them was not ‘likely’;

(iii) paragraph [29] that his conversion had been unbelievable, there being ‘nothing to support his claim that he was troubled before this about the meaning of life’, and the judge had erred in law in failing to take into account evidence set out at paragraphs 7 and 28 of the Appellant’s witness statement as regards his motivations.

16 Mr McVeety relied upon the Respondent’s written reply under Rule 24, Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, resisting the Appellant’s appeal. Further, Mr McVeety submitted that the Appellant’s grounds of appeal were a mere disagreement with the judge’s findings of fact, and referred to the authority of Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 in support of the proposition that an appeal court should not interfere with a trial judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied he was plainly wrong. Judges were not required to give reasons for reasons. Giving an every day example of this principle, Mr McVeety opined that if a person were to ask themself ‘Why did I get up this morning?’ or ‘Why did I go to work this morning?’, it would be a legally adequate response, applying the principles in Volpi & Anor v Volpi, to respond merely ‘Because I did’, and there was no need for any further explanation. The judge’s findings were not perverse.

17 Mr McVeety’s responses to certain observations of the Tribunal are set out below.

18 In reply, Ms Faryl reiterated that the judge’s findings were not adequate in law.

Discussion

19 We find it appropriate to consider in some detail Mr McVeety’s submission as to the application of Volpi & Anor v Volpi. This was a case involving a dispute of fact as to whether certain substantial sums of money provided from one family member to another were by way of gift, or loan. Paragraph 2 sets out:

“2 The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.”

20 Having due regard to that guidance, we find that it is also appropriate to have regard to the judgment of Dove J, UTIAC President, and Judge Plimmer, FTTIAC President, in TC (PS compliance - "Issues-based reasoning") Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 164 (IAC), which provides at [25]:

“25 In approaching submissions reliant upon inadequate reasoning, it is helpful to bear firmly in mind the observations of Lord Brown of Eaton under Heywood in South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33; [2004] 1 WLR 1953. Whilst a case about the duty to give reasons in the decisions of planning inspectors, it appears to us to provide appropriate legal parameters for decisions in the FTT. Lord Brown’s observations were as follows:

“36. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and they must be adequate. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the “principal controversial issues”, disclosing how any issue of law or fact was resolved. Reasons can be briefly stated, the degree of particularity required depending entirely on the nature of the issues falling for decision. The reasoning must not give rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the decision-maker erred in law, for example by misunderstanding some relevant policy or some other important matter or by failing to reach a rational decision on relevant grounds. But such adverse inference will not readily be drawn. The reasons need refer only to the main issues in dispute, not to every material consideration…Decision letters must be read in a straightforward manner, recognising that they are addressed to parties well aware of the issues involved and the arguments advanced. A reasons challenge will only succeed if the party aggrieved can satisfy the court that he has genuinely been substantially prejudiced by the failure to provide an adequately reasoned decision.”

21 The Presidential Panel’s judgment also contains an Appendix, specifically setting out principles that can be derived from the authorities in relation to the giving of reasons by the FTT and the subsequent scrutiny on appeal in the UT. These numbered principles include the following:

“1 Reasons can be briefly stated and concision is to be encouraged but FTT decisions must be careful decisions, reflecting the overarching task to determine matters relevant to fundamental human rights and /or international protection.

...
3. The reasons for a decision must be intelligible and adequate in the sense that they must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was, and what conclusions were reached on the ‘principal important controversial issues’.

...
9. The reasoning should enable the losing party to understand why they have lost.”

22 We note that these principles are also echoed within “The Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions’, dated 4 June 2024; indeed, the Appendix within TC is repeatedly referenced in footnotes to the Practice Direction, which we have taken into account.

23 Finally, in QY (Vietnam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 607, the Court of Appeal considering the question of adequacy of reasoning, here within the specific context of asylum cases, and held that the losing party was entitled to reasons "..in sufficient detail to show..." what had led to the decision.

24 We find, agreeing with the Appellant’s submissions, that the judge’s reasons for dismissing the appeal were not adequate in law and/or, failed to take into account relevant evidence, as follows:

(i) The judge does not engage in any way with the Appellant’s explanation for the discrepancy between the screening interview and the rest of his account.

(ii) The Appellant had referred to the young woman’s family experiencing ‘an incident’ (ACQ, page 26 of the Respondent’s bundle) or a ‘problem’ (SEF interview question 93) causing them to leave. Whilst we accept that this evidence is opaque, it deserved at least some consideration.

(iii) In finding it incredible/unlikely that the Appellant would hope to find the young woman’s family in Turkey, it was not apparent the judge had taken into account the Appellant’s evidence that he had her telephone number (SEF q 94).

(iv) In finding the Appellant’s reasons for questioning his belief in Islam not credible, it is not apparent that the judge adequately took into account the following evidence within the Appellant’s witness statement:

“7. I have many questions and doubts about some of the teachings and way of life of the Muslims and I would not say that I was a good Muslim. I certainly was not formally educated about Islamic teaching and therefore, when questioned about Islam, I only said what I knew generally from what I saw...

...
28 Since I was 10 years old, I have seen so much religious confusion in Iraq and continued support from the Christian countries, in the name of Christianity so quite naturally I was inclined towards Christianity.

29 I also had a big impact from the action of ISIS and the teaching and preaching about Islam, with which I and many others I knew, were very uncomfortable.”

(v) We endorse the observation of UTJ Ruddick, granting permission to appeal, that the judge’s adverse credibility point made at [29] regarding the Appellant’s failure to conduct a ‘search amongst religions’ did not represent a clear basis for an expectation that the person would not have behaved in the way described.

(vi) As we have found that there are errors of law in the assessment of the credibility of the Appellant’s account, then we additionally find that the judge’s finding that the Appellant would be able to be re-documented also contains an error of law, because that finding was explicitly said at [30] to have been influenced by the judge’s findings about the Appellant’s claim to have converted to Christianity.

25 We do not find, taking into account the judge’s overarching task was to determine matters relevant to fundamental human rights and /or international protection (TP), that the reader of the decision would be able to understand why the matter was decided as it was, and why the Appellant lost. We did not with respect find Mr McVeety’s hypothetical questions helpful in illuminating the nature of the judge’s task, or explaining the ratio of Volpi & Anor v Volpi,

26 Mr McVeety ultimately appeared to agree, during discussion with the Tribunal, with the points set out at 24 (iv) to (vi) above.

Materiality

27 We direct ourselves on the basis when exercising its appellate jurisdiction this Tribunal will find an error of law not to be material only if the outcome would inevitably have been the same even if the error had not occurred: Detamu v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 604 and Simplex GE Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [2017] PTSR 1041.

28 In describing the overall merits of the Appellant’s claim for protection, we limit ourselves by observing only that there are obstacles for the Appellant to establish his claim for protection to a reasonable degree of likelihood. As to the assessment of the past events that he relies upon, the relevant approach is that set out by Brooke LJ in Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11:

“102. This approach does not entail the decision-maker (whether the Secretary of State or an adjudicator or the Immigration Appeal Tribunal itself) purporting to find "proved" facts, whether past or present, about which it is not satisfied on the balance of probabilities. What it does mean, on the other hand, is that it must not exclude any matters from its consideration when it is assessing the future unless it feels that it can safely discard them because it has no real doubt that they did not in fact occur (or, indeed, that they are not occurring at present).”

29 We are unable to find that the Appellant’s account is such that a tribunal of fact would inevitably find that there was no real doubt that the Appellant’s historical account did not occur. Hence, the judge’s error of law was material, and we set the judge’s decision aside.

Decision

30 (i) The decision involved the making of one or more material errors of law.

(ii) The decision is set aside.

31 Both parties agreed that in the event that the decision was set aside, fresh findings of fact would need to be made.

32 Given the extent of the findings fact that will need to be made in this matter, we are of view that it is appropriate that the matter be remitted to the First tier Tribunal.

Judge O’Ryan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 November 2025