Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002076

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61732/2024
LP/01989/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st of October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

ADEL AYADI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Brown, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnwyz, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 22 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to lift the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because I can see no good reason why the order should be made. The claim originally involved a protection claim, but this was abandoned before the substantive hearing in the First-tier Tribunal. In addition, the human rights claim involves the interests of minor children, but there is no necessity to name them in this decision. I must keep in mind the strong public interest in judicial proceedings being conducted openly and in public particularly in circumstances where the appellant is a foreign criminal whose conviction came in open proceedings in the criminal courts. The fundamental principle of open justice outweighs the factors telling in favour of the appellant’s anonymisation.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 6 March 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on human rights grounds.
Background
3. The broad factual background is not in dispute between the parties. In summary, the appellant was convicted on 25 July 2017 for the use of a fraudulently obtained French passport and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment of 12 months which triggered the imposition of a deportation order. He resisted his deportation on human rights grounds arguing that his removal would have an unduly harsh impact on his partner and children in the UK, or that there were otherwise very compelling circumstances weighing against his deportation.
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The judge dismissed the appeal. For the purposes of the present proceedings, the following key matters emerge from the decision:
a) The extent of the appellant's and his partner’s family network in the UK, and further afield, were set out at [12]-[15] of the decision. It was noted that the appellant’s partner has eight siblings who live in Sheffield, where she also lives, and another living in London. The appellant has two siblings who live in the UK. She has a close relationship with her widowed mother.
b) The judge found that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with his qualifying partner and two young children.
c) Whether the appellant’s deportation would have any unduly harsh effect on the appellant’s children was addressed in the following terms between [24] and [33]:
No decision I make compels P or the children to relocate to Algeria with the Appellant. However, I find it more likely that not that, despite P’s assertion to the contrary, they would remain as a family unit and would relocate together. It is accepted that she knew from the outset of their relationship that the Appellant did not have legal status in the United Kingdom and had been convicted of an offence that could result in his liability to deportation. As such, both the Appellant and P knew that they may have to live outside the United Kingdom if they wish to live together.
Whilst P would have to leave her job in the United Kingdom, I note that it is a job at Sky that pays £1,200 and there is no assertion that she would be unable to obtain similar or comparable work in Algeria. Whilst she states that she wishes to pursue further education to become a solicitor, there is no evidence that this is any more than an ambition. I accept that she has always lived in the United Kingdom and is not familiar with Algeria. There is nothing before me to indicate that she would be unable to learn French, the primary language in Algeria, if she were to commit to doing so. She could then seek to pursue education and employment in Algeria.
Being parted from her large family in the United Kingdom would be distressing but would not amount to undue harshness. Contact could be maintained by virtue of modern technology and visits.
[…]
The best interests of the two British children are a primary consideration. Whilst they have a good relationship with wider family in the United Kingdom, this can be maintained to a degree from afar. Given their young age, and the fact that they are not yet in education, the centre of their life is their parents and their best interests are to remain with their parents, which would be achieved by the family relocating as a unit to Algeria.
Children adapt quickly and I am satisfied that they would be able to learn French and take advantage of educational opportunities in Algeria. They would be able to develop relationships with the paternal side of their family.
Even if P and the children were to remain in the United Kingdom, and despite the Children’s best interest being for the family to remain as a unit, I find that the Appellant’s deportation would not have an unduly harsh affect. Contact could be maintained through use of technology and Visits to the Appellant.
I find it more likely than not that P could rely upon childcare or members of her large family for support with the Children. Whilst I am told that the Children found going to the Childminder ”traumatic” there is no external evidence to support that this was anything other than the reaction of many children to starting childcare / nursery / school. I have not been provided with any evidence of the children having additional needs. The older child will be due to start school in the near future in any event. They would continue to be cared for by their mother.
P would be able to pursue her employment and educational ambitions within the United Kingdom in P’s absence as do many single parents. She is in an advantageous position of having, locally, such a large family, and I am satisfied there will be support if needed. She will be able to retain contact with the Appellant through the use of technology and visits.
I am therefore satisfied that the effect of the Appellant’s deportation on P and the children would be not unduly harsh regardless of whether they were to join him or remain in the United Kingdom.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
5. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on the following grounds:
I. The judge did not provide lawfully adequate reasons for his decision.
II. The judge failed to undertake a detailed and individualised assessment of the undue harsh impact of the appellant’s family members on the footing that the family would relocate with him to Algeria.
III. The judge failed to undertake a detailed and individualised assessment of the undue harsh impact of the appellant’s family members on the footing that they would remain in the UK without him after his deportation.
6. In a decision dated 8 May 2025, First-tier Tribunal Boyes granted permission for all grounds to be argued. The reasoning in support of the grant was limited to the following observations:
The threshold at this stage is very low. I have considered the grounds and the judgment and permission is granted. The grounds are arguable for the reasons given therein. They need no amplification or elucidation from me.
7. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Discussion
8. It was agreed at the error of law hearing that all three grounds of appeal were different formulations of the same essential argument, that the judge had not adequately explained himself in law as to why he dismissed the appeal.
9. The touchstone for considering inadequacy of reasoning as an error of law remains R (Iran) & Others v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982. At [13]-[14] of the judgment of Brook LJ, it was emphasised that reasons must be sufficiently detailed to show the principles on which a decision was made and why the ultimate decision was reached. Reasons need not be elaborate nor is it necessary to address each and every matter which might have had a bearing on the overall decision if those which were material to the reasoning are articulated. In DPP Law Ltd v Paul Greenberg [2021] EWCA Civ 672, the Court of Appeal, in the context of employment proceedings, considered adequacy of reasoning as an error of law. Popplewell LJ, stressed, at [57] the need to consider judicial reasons fairly and as whole without being hypercritical. Appellate restraint is required to read reasons benevolently. “Simple, clear and concise” reasoning was to be encouraged to enable to parties to broadly understand why they had won or lost. Further, it should not be assumed that an element of the evidence which was not expressly discussed was left out of account. While these observations were made in the context of employment proceedings, they are of relevance in the immigration and asylum sphere because this is also a jurisdiction in which decisions are made by expert tribunals attenuated by the need to give appeals anxious scrutiny.
10. In his helpful oral submissions, Mr Brown crystallised the appellant’s case to two central points. Firstly, it was emphasised that the assessment of undue harshness disregarded the appellant’s partner’s cultural heritage from the perspective of the family relocating to Algeria as a unit. Secondly, the appellant’s partner’s evidence that the two children would be devastated by their father’s deportation was not meaningfully assessed.
11. I found neither of the appellant’s central arguments to be of substance. Mr Brown stressed features of the evidence which he argued should have carried greater weight, but that falls a considerable distance short of demonstrating that the judge was not mindful of these factors. The judge is not required to exhaustively and mechanically set out every facet and feature of the evidence before he can come to a lawful conclusion. Instead, the burden on him, in law, is to explain in clear terms why he reached the conclusion he did. The appellant can be in no doubt as to why he lost his appeal. He may disagree that certain features of the evidence did not attract greater prominence in the fact-finding process, but this does not amount to an error of law. The judge considered the partner’s employment and education prospects and the reality that the couple both knew that deportation may ultimately come to pass when they embarked on their relationship. The separation she would endure from her large family was taken into account. The notion that she would face unduly harsh consequences was rejected with reference to these reasons which were perfectly clear to understand.
12. In considering the impact on the children of either leaving the UK with their parents, or remaining in the UK without the appellant, the judge assessed their best interests at [28]. The judge was entitled to conclude that they would be able to adapt to life in Algeria should their parents make that choice. At [31], the judge noted that he had not been provided with any additional evidence touching on the children’s needs should they remain in the UK. Mr Brown recognised during the hearing that the evidence placed before the judge was limited in scope, but he relied heavily on paragraph [12] of the appellant’s partner’s witness statement where she said: “We cannot stand the thought of being separated as this will have a devastating effect on all of us, particularly the children”. It was suggested that the judge was required to grapple with this sense of devastation that the family would feel on his removal. I am not persuaded that the judge needed to say any more than he did. He took full account of the practical and emotional impact that separation would have on the family and recognised that the children would find it difficult to have to be cared for by professional carers. However, he found there to be limited support on the available evidence for the notion that these changes would be “traumatic”.
13. I must keep in mind that the legal test for sufficiency of reasoning is not whether more might have been said by the judge but whether, reading the decision fairly, enough was said to explain why the central conclusions were reached applying the correct legal principles. It is abundantly clear why the judge found that the appellant’s family would not suffer an unduly harsh impact from the appellant’s deportation either based on them joining him in Algeria or on the basis of them remaining in the UK without him.
14. The decision did not involve an error of law and shall stand undisturbed.
Notice of Decision
The decision did not involve an error of law, and I dismiss the appeal.

Paul Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 September 2025