Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002089

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02881/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT

Between

AWK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Pipi, Counsel instructed via Direct Access
For the Respondent: Ms H Gilmour, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is 57 years old and a citizen of Kenya. She was granted a visa to visit the United Kingdom and on 9 March 2017 entered the country using that visa. Having done so, she made an application for further leave to remain which was refused on 30 January 2018. She has remained in the United Kingdom since then without leave.
2. On 26 April 2019 she claimed asylum. In her claim the appellant said that in 2016 she moved with her family to Nyahururu, where her husband joined the Mungiki, a criminal group that is banned in Kenya. Her husband became a leader of the group and introduced the appellant to other leaders who wanted to undertake female genital mutilation (FGM) on her. The appellant was able to escape to the police station and report her attackers. The police however decided she was part of the Mungiki and mis-treated her, locking her in a cell until she paid to be released. Having been released the appellant went to live with her sister in Nakuru, before moving to Nairobi. From Nairobi she was able to obtain the visa to come to the United Kingdom with the help of others. Having arrived in the United Kingdom she has been working and established a private life including medical treatment for chronic illness. The appellant therefore also claimed that her return to Kenya would be inconsistent with her rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
3. The respondent refused the appellant’s asylum and human rights claims in a decision dated 7 December 2023. The respondent did not believe that the appellant’s husband is a leader of the Mungiki group or that the Mungiki group had tried to forcibly perform FGM on her, concluding that the appellant would not be at risk on return to Kenya. The respondent also found that if there were a risk to the appellant from the Mungiki group or her husband she could rely on a sufficiency of protection from the Kenyan authorities and she could relocate within Kenya to avoid them. Concerning the appellant’s human rights claim, the respondent found that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Kenya and that she could receive the medical attention she needs in her home country.
The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision to the First-tier Tribunal. In anticipation of the hearing of her appeal she served a bundle and a supplementary bundle of documentary evidence. The appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Dobe (the Judge) on 21 February 2025. The appellant attended the hearing at which she was represented as she was today, by Mr Pipi. The appellant gave evidence and both Mr Pipi and the Home Office Presenting Officer made submissions to the Judge.
5. The Judge’s decision was promulgated on 7 March 2025. Having set out the background to the appellant’s claim and a detailed review of some authorities concerning the assessment of a person’s credibility, the Judge stated at [27]:
However, I find that the appellant has not proven the assertions underlying her claim to the requisite standard, i.e. reasonable degree of likelihood. That is, she has failed to prove that she is genuinely in fear of persecution by her husband and/or the Mungiki. I do not find the appellant’s account to be credible.
6. The Judge explained that conclusion in six sub-paragraphs (a) – (f) which are the subject of criticism in the appellant's grounds of appeal and which I analyse later in this decision. He then concluded at [28] that:
Weighing everything and considering the case as a whole, I find the appellant’s claim to be lacking in credibility. In my judgement, looking all of the evidence in the round, it is not plausible or credible that the appellant encountered the difficulties she asserts as part of this claim. I find that she has not proven that she would be at risk of persecution from her husband and/or the Mungiki if returned to Kenya.
7. The Judge then turned to consider “state protection” and at [29] found that “Even if I am wrong about the appellant’s credibility, I find that there is sufficient state protection against the appellant’s husband and the Mungiki, who are all non-state actors”. Having identified relevant case law and quoted from the respondent’s Country Policy Information Note: FGM Kenya, the Judge explained that conclusion at [32] of his decision:
The objective material establishes that the Kenyan authorities do offer protection from non-state actors. There are laws against FGM in Kenya; furthermore, the police actively try to apply the law so that offenders are arrested, charged and processed through the courts. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that it is reasonably likely that her husband and/or the Mungiki, as non-state actors, have sufficient power or influence over the authorities in Kenya to circumvent laws proscribing the practice. Even on the appellant’s case the police tried to assist her, but she did not wish to take up their offers of help. Therefore, in the appellant’s case there would be sufficiency of state protection.
8. The Judge further found at [37] that the appellant “has the option of internal relocation to Mombasa or Malindi” concluding at [38] that relocation would be reasonable given her age, education, employment history, experience of life and culture in Kenya and family support. For all these reasons the Judge dismissed the appellant’s protection appeal.
9. The Judge then considered the appellant’s human rights appeal. He assessed the medical evidence that had been adduced and found at [48] that “the documents submitted in support are poor copies, highly selective and of questionable or unknown provenance. Those documents, itemised above are wholly unreliable.” The Judge’s conclusion was at [47] that the appellant had “failed to prove the genuineness of the documents she has submitted in support of her claim” “failed to establish that the documents submitted are reliable” and that the appellant was not credible on this aspect of her case. The Judge found at [48] that “the appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proving to a reasonable degree of likelihood that she suffers from hyperthyroidism or any other serious health condition.” On this basis the Judge concluded that the appellant’s removal would not breach the appellant’s rights under Article 3 ECHR.
10. Finally, the Judge considered the appellant’s Article 8 ECHR rights. He found that the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Kenya and that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control outweighed the appellant’s established private life, noting that the appellant would be well placed to reintegrate in Kenya with the support of her family.
Onward appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The appellant was granted permission to appeal to this tribunal by Upper Tribunal Judge Keith. The appellant’s grounds of appeal challenged the Judge’s reasoning at [27] of his decision for finding the appellant’s account not to be credible. They complain that the Judge: (i) failed to consider the explanation the appellant gave for not making an asylum claim until she had been in the United Kingdom for two years, (ii) unfairly relied on inconsistencies in the appellant’s application for a visa without the point being raised by the respondent, (iii) unfairly expected corroborative evidence of the appellant’s role in the Mungiki, (iv) failed to consider the appellant’s account of events when she went to the police in Kenya and mistakenly referred to the police offering her protection, (v) unfairly disregarded the appellant’s account of fearing FGM on the basis of her age and religion.
12. The grounds also complain about the Judge’s assessment of the sufficiency of protection available in Kenya and the possibility of internal relocation. They repeat the submission that the Judge failed to consider the appellant’s account of events at the police station and argue that the Juge failed to address her claim that she would not be safe anywhere in Kenya. Finally the grounds complain about the Judge’s treatment of the medical evidence adduced, particularly evidence from the East Berkshire Primary Care Team which was considered unreliable despite coming from a reliable organisation. Whilst he recognised that some grounds were weaker than others Judge Keith gave permission to appeal on all grounds.
13. The respondent did not serve a written response to the appeal in accordance with rule 24 of the Tribunal’s Procedure Rules. Nevertheless Ms Gilmour capably sought to uphold the Judge’s decision arguing in her submissions that the Judge was not required to explicitly address in his decision every point raised by the appellant, that the explanation the Judge gave for finding the appellant’s account not to be credible was adequate and that even if there were faults in the Judge’s assessment of credibility they were not material because the Judge considered sufficiency of protection and internal relocation taking the appellant’s case at its highest i.e. as if the appellant’s account were true. In relation to the appellant's human rights appeal, Ms Gilmour argued that the Judge was entitled to find that the appellant had not established that she could not get medication she needs in Kenya.
Analysis
14. As Mr Pipi made clear in his submissions, the primary legal errors it is asserted that the Judge made was to (i) fail to take into account or resolve conflicts of fact on material matters and (ii) fail to give adequate reasons for findings on material matters connected with the substance of the claim. Mr Pipi argued that the Judge appears to have ignored key parts of the appellant’s account or if he has not ignored them failed to explain what he made of those aspects of the evidence. Whilst I find some of the appellant’s complaints about the Judge’s decision to be unmerited, I am persuaded that key aspects of the appellant’s account have not been adequately addressed by the Judge in his assessment of the credibility of that account at [27] of his decision. I find that this amounts to a material error of law such that the decision must be set aside. I set out my reasons for that conclusion in the following paragraphs which address the complaints as they are made in the grounds of appeal.
Failed to consider the appellant's explanation for the delayed asylum claim
15. The first thing the Judge identified as undermining the credibility of the appellants claim at [27(a) and (b)] of his decision was the fact the appellant misled the Home Office about her intention to return to Kenya, then failed to claim asylum on arrival in the United Kingdom and only made her protection claim once her application for leave to remains had been refused. As the Judge correctly recognised these are factors which, applying section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004, have the effect of damaging the appellant’s credibility. The complaint raised by the appellant however is that she gave an explanation for these actions in her witness statement – that she had concealed her intention to remain in the United Kingdom at the end of her visa because she followed instructions of others and delayed claiming asylum because she still believed her husband would come to his senses and was giving him time – and that he explanation does not appear to have been considered by the Judge or if it was considered she does not know what the Judge made of the explanation.
16. Ms Gilmour recognised that the Judge does not refer to the appellant’s explanation anywhere in his decision but pointed out that at [17] and at [22] the Judge twice refers to having considered all the evidence before making his decision and in those circumstances the clear inference must be that the Judge has taken the appellant’s explanation into consideration and rejected it. At first consideration that submission is attractive. The Judge plainly was not required to refer to every piece of evidence or every argument made in his decision (see Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2(iv)]) and he has expressly stated twice that he has considered all the evidence before reaching his conclusion. On reflection however, I cannot accept that the Judge’s reasoning on this point is adequate. As a Presidential Panel of this tribunal identified in Azizi (Succinct credibility findings; lies) [2024] UKUT 65 (IAC) “A determination in relation to an appeal must deal with the principal controversial issues presented to the judge, and it may be possible in some circumstances to provide adequate reasons in relation to those issues succinctly, provided they deal with the points raised by the party and enable the parties to understand why the decision has been reached” (my emphasis).
17. Here, the respondent identified in her decision that one of the reasons why the appellant’s account was not considered credible was her failure to claim asylum earlier. The appellant addressed that in her witness statement providing an explanation for that failure which, if believed, would mean the credibility of her account would not have been undermined by the failure. This was therefore a key issue for the Judge to resolve when considering the appellant’s credibility. In those circumstances there was a requirement that he expressly dealt with the issue and provided reasons (however succinct) to enable the appellant to understand why the Judge found against her on the issue.
18. At [22] the Judge says: “I have considered all of the evidence and submissions in the round, but I do not refer to each and every piece of evidence in this decision. I refer to what is material to my findings and where I have accepted or rejected a piece of evidence I give my reasons for doing so” (my emphasis). This paragraph is unobjectionable and had the Judge gone on to do what he states in the paragraph no criticism could fairly be made of his decision. However the reality is the Judge has not given reasons for (apparently) rejecting the appellant's account about why she made her asylum claim so late. I find that in this respect the Judge’s reasons were inadequate.
Unfairly considered the appellant’s inconsistent visa application
19. The Judge next identified at [27(c)] that the appellant’s credibility was undermined by her inconsistent account of where she lived prior to coming to the United Kingdom. The Judge identifies in this paragraph that, contrary to what she says in her asylum claim, in her application for a visit visa the appellant said that she had lived in Nairobi for the preceding 20 years. I do not accept Mr Pipi’s submission that it was procedurally unfair for the Judge to rely on this inconsistency when it had not been identified in the respondent’s decision letter and it was not put to the appellant. The appellant can be expected to be aware of what she said in her own visa application and the visa application was served as part of the evidence relied upon by the respondent, so the inconsistent content in her visa application will have been clear to the appellant by the time she came to serve her evidence even if she did not recall what she said when making the application. Contrary to the assertion in the grounds, the appellant did see the evidence against her and had a fair opportunity to address it in her own evidence.
20. The appellant chose not to directly address the inconsistency in her evidence. That was a tactical decision for her and her representatives to make. As Lord Justice Schiemann identified in SSHD v Maheshwaran [2002] EWCA Civ 173 at [5]:
“Where much depends on the credibility of a party and when that party makes several inconsistent statements which are before the decision maker, that party manifestly has a forensic problem. Some will choose to confront the inconsistencies straight on and make evidential or forensic submissions on them. Others will hope that ‘least said, soonest mended’ and consider that forensic concentration on the point will only make matters worse and that it would be better to try and switch the tribunal’s attention to some other aspect of the case. Undoubtedly it is open to the tribunal expressly to put a particular inconsistency to a witness because it considers that the witness may not be alerted to the point or because it fears that it may have perceived something as inconsistent with an earlier answer which in truth is not inconsistent. Fairness may in some circumstances require this to be done but this will not be the usual case. Usually the tribunal, particularly if the party is represented, will remain silent and see how the case unfolds.”
21. Here the appellant was plainly on notice that her inconsistent evidence about where she lived prior to coming to the United Kingdom was before the Judge. Fairness did not require the Judge to alert the appellant to what was a clear inconsistency, or to second guess why the appellant chose not to address the inconsistency directly. The Judge weas entitled to remain silent, see how the case unfolds and take the inconsistency into consideration when making his decision. I find that no procedural unfairness arises from the Judge’s consideration of this inconsistency.
22. I do however find that the Judge’s reasons regarding this inconsistency suffers from the same inadequacy as his reasons for finding that the delayed asylum claim undermined the appellant’s evidence. While she did not address the inconsistency in her visa application directly in her witness statement, she did, as already noted, say in that statement that when she applied for a visitor’s visa she “followed the instructions of the people who helped me to come here”. As already discussed there is nothing in the Judge’s decision to indicate that he has engaged with that explanation or why if as appears to be the case, he has rejected it as something that explains the inconsistency.
Unfairly required corroboration
23. At [27(d)] the Judge considered and rejected the appellant's claim that her husband is a powerful leader in the Mungiki. Some of the Judge’s assessment of the issue in this paragraph is unobjectionable. The Judge was unquestionably entitled to conclude that it was implausible for the appellant’s husband to rise to such a powerful position in such a short period of time. The Judge was also entitled to consider the appellant's oral evidence about her husband working as the manager of a petrol station although it is not clear from the decision exactly what was said about this employment. The Judge’s conclusion from this evidence, that it is not credible that the husband holds a lot of power and influence over politicians is a reasonable one and again one the Judge was entitled to reach.
24. I do however consider that there is merit in the appellant’s submissions that this paragraph of the Judge’s decision indicates that the Judge was impermissibly requiring corroborative evidence. The Judge refers to there being “no evidence that her husband is indeed a leader of the Mungiki.” This is clearly not literally correct. As the appellant points out in her grounds she gave evidence to this effect. The only inference that can be drawn from this sentence is that the Judge meant there is no corroborative evidence that the husband is a leader of the Muginki. That inference becomes stronger when later in the paragraph the Judge states that “It is also noted that the appellant has not adduced any evidence to substantiate these claims – that he is a leader, a petrol station manager, that he has influence over police and others” Quite what evidence the appellant was expected to have adduced to show that her husband was a leader of the outlawed criminal group the Mungiki is not explained.
25. I am conscious of the danger of subjecting the Judge’s decision to narrow textual analysis and am aware that it should not be picked over as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract. However, reading this paragraph as a whole, the unavoidable conclusion in my judgment is that in substance the Judge has unfairly required corroborative evidence to support the appellant’s claim.
The appellant’s report to the police in Kenya
26. In her asylum interview the appellant said at Q5 that she feared three groups of people - her husband and his family, the police and the Mungiki, stating at Q6 and Q7 that the “police will come for me” if she returned to Kenya because of what happened before she left. She was later asked at Q36 what she meant by that and she explained that when the Mungiki tried to enforce FGM on her she ran to the police and narrated the story to them:
“they were like oh, they have got the people they were looking for and if I am one of them, I will show them where the other Mungiki people are….so they locked me in the police cell and tried to get more information from me and harassed me, beat me up that day…They were touching me inappropriately and when the night staff came on that night and did not want to hear that I was a nurse, saying how I ended up in a group like that. When the morning came, the OCS in charge of the cell came, told me to go to his office and said I would be granted bail if I give them money. They were demanding 90 thousand shillings, like 600 pounds and did not have such money and told them if I can call my sister because I lent her some money so she brought 50 thousand shillings and I was to pay the remaining 40 thousand so that when I bring the balance, we will know from there what will happen”
27. The appellant does not mention the incident at the police station in her witness statement and the Judge does not record her giving any oral evidence about the incident in his decision. At [27(e)] the Judge records the following account of the incident with the police:
The appellant says that she reported the 10 December 2016 matter to the police. She goes onto say that she was herself detained and that the police asked her to assist them to trace Mungiki members. This suggests that even on her own account, there is state protection against the Mungiki and that the police actively tried to assist her and deal with the Mungiki. The reason the police did not in fact, on her account, intervene with those who attempted to perform FGM on her is not because they were unwilling to assist her or because there are no laws in place against FGM, it was because she was unwilling herself to co-operate with the police. This is at odds with the appellant’s claim that there is no state protection against the Mungiki. It also undermines her claim that the police are sympathetic to or under the influence of the Mungiki – it is unlikely that they were because they tried to help her in dealing with the Mungiki members that she complained of.
28. In the absence of any further explanation, I find it impossible to reconcile the Judge’s record of events at the police station with the answer the appellant gave at Q36 of her interview. The Judge does not acknowledge the appellant’s account that the police harassed her, beat her up and touched her inappropriately, nor does he identify the basis on which he found that the appellant’s account was that police actively tried to help her. Reading the Judge’s decision it is not possible to see how the Judge came to find that the police actively tried to assist the appellant and deal with the Mungiki when that clearly was not the account the appellant gave in interview and no alternative account is referred to. In her grounds of appeal the appellant complains how is what she described happening at the police station supposed to be protection? I have sympathy with that complaint. It is simply not possible to discern from the Judge’s decision the basis for his finding that the police actively tried to assist the appellant in Kenya and that they tried to help her dealing with the Mungiki in the light of the contrary account given by the appellant at Q36 of her interview. I am satisfied therefore that the Judge has erred by failed to adequately explain this finding and / or failing to resolve a material matter in the hearing, namely the appellant’s claim to fear the police in Kenya.
Country Information about FGM
29. At [27(f)] of his decision the Judge records by reference to the respondent’s Country Policy Information Note on the subject, that as a 57 year old from a Christian background with a higher level of education, the appellant does not fit the profile of those at risk of FGM in Kenya, and states that this undermines her appellant’s claim. Contrary to the complaint made in the grounds of appeal, the Judge was unquestionably entitled to do so. Whether the appellant’s account was consistent with the country information that was adduced is plainly a relevant factor for the Judge to consider when assessing the veracity of the account given by the appellant. Despite the criticism of this paragraph of the Judge’s decision in the grounds of appeal I find it does not contain an error of law.
Conclusion about the Judge’s assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account.
30. Bringing these various complaints together and reviewing the decision as a whole I am satisfied that the Judge erred in law when assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account about events in Kenya. I find that the Judge has either failed to engage with the appellant’s explanation for her inconsistent visa application and her delayed asylum claim, or has failed to adequately explain why he has rejected that explanation. I find that the Judge has unfairly expected corroboration of the appellant’s account. Most significantly I find that the Judge made findings about the appellant’s encounter with the police which are either unsupported by evidence or inadequately explained in his decision. Whilst I do not accept other complaints made by the appellant, I do find that the effect of those errors of law made are such that the Judge’s conclusion at [27] that the appellant’s account was not credible cannot be upheld.
Was the error material?
31. Ms Gilmour argued that any errors the Judge made when finding that the appellant’s account about events in Kenya was not credible, was immaterial because the Judge went on at [29] to state that “even if I am wrong on the appellant’s credibility, I find that there is sufficient state protection against the appellant’s husband and the Mungiki, who are all non-state actors.” Further Mr Gilmour pointed out that at [33] the Judge recorded that even if the appellant’s factual case were accepted she could nonetheless reasonably be expected to relocate within Kenya away from those she fears. Her argument therefore was that even taking the appellant’s claim at its highest it would have been unsuccessful. At first sight this argument is attractive, however it is ultimately unsuccessful because I am not satisfied that when the Judge made his findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation he actually did so on the basis of the appellant’s factual account taken at its highest.
32. I have already set out the appellant’s interview account of events at the police station and the apparent conflict between that account and the Judge’s statement that the police were actively seeking to assist the appellant. The Judge repeats that contradictory version of events when considering sufficiency of protection at [32] saying that “Even on the appellant’s case the police tried to assist her but she did not wish to take up their offers of help. Therefore, in the appellant’s case there would be sufficiency of state protection”. As already noted, the appellant’s account in interview was that she was mistreated by the police, harassed, beaten and inappropriately touched before only being released from police detention when she arranged payment of a large sum of money. It was her account in interview that she feared the police who treated her as if she was a member of the Mungiki. This cannot be sensibly be construed as being consistent with her account being that the police tried to assist her and she was unwilling to take up their offer of help. The Judge’s conclusion about the sufficiency of protection is simply not consistent with the appellant’s factual case being taken at its highest.
33. Likewise, despite indicating that his assessment of the possibility of the appellant relocating within Kenya is undertaken on the basis that the appellant’s factual claim is accepted, the Judge does not in that assessment take into the appellant’s claim that she was beaten, harassed and abused by police officers who treated her as one of the Mungiki. Whilst, therefore the Judge comprehensively addresses the opportunity for relocation within Kenya to avoid the risk of FGM and thereby addresses the appellant’s claim that she fears her husband and the Mungiki, the Judge does not address or deal with the appellant’s claim that one of the three groups of people she fears in Kenya are the police themselves, and whether internal relocation can adequately meet that concern.
34. There is a further issue with the suggestion that the Judge considered the possibility of internal relocation as if that the appellant’s factual case were accepted. As the Judge identifies in his decision there are two aspects to the consideration of internal relocation first whether the person would be safe in another area of the country and second whether the person could reasonably be expected to live there. The appellant’s factual case was that she could not reasonably be expected to relocate because of her health issues, including the fact that she suffers from hyperthyroidism. The Judge does not however assess whether it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Kenya on the basis that she is suffering from hyperthyroidism. In fact he makes no mention of her health when undertaking that assessment.
35. Later when considering the appellant’s human rights claim the Judge states at [48] that “On the basis of the material submitted and the evidence in the case generally including the appellant’s evidence I find that the appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proving to a reasonable degree of likelihood that she suffers from hypothyroidism or any other serious health condition” (my emphasis). In reaching this conclusion the Judge treated a letter from an ostensibly reliable source in the Chapel Medical Centre in East Berkshire, which refers to a diagnosis of hyperthyroidism which is being managed with monitoring and medication, as unreliable. This passage demonstrates the difficulty that arises when trying to unpick adverse credibility findings that are found to result from legal error from the rest of the decision. Here, the Judge found that it would be reasonable for the appellant to relocate because he appears to have disbelieved her claim to be in ill-health and he dis-believed her claim to be in ill-health at least in part because he found her not to be credible about events in Kenya – a finding which for all the reasons already explained is infected by legal error.
36. In summary therefore, it cannot be safely concluded that the Judge took the appellant’s factual case at its highest when considering the issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. Instead, notwithstanding the fact the appellant’s factual case was that she was abused, beaten and mistreated by the police in Nyahururu, the Judge conducted his assessment of the state’s willingness to protect the appellant and the possibility of internal relocation on the basis that the appellant was offered and declined help by the police in Nyahururu. Further, notwithstanding the fact the appellant’s case was that she was in ill-health, the Judge conducted his assessment of the reasonableness of internal relocation on the basis that she was not credible and not suffering from any serious health condition. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the errors identified in the Judge’s assessment of the credibility of the appellant’s account were immaterial to his decision on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.
Conclusion
37. It follows that the errors of law in the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s claim were material and are such that his decision must be set aside. This is not to say that the Judge was obliged to accept the appellant’s account or even that her claim is a particularly strong one. The appellant is however entitled to know that her account has been considered and if it has been rejected why it was rejected. Ultimately the Judge’s failure to do that is the reason why the decision must be set aside with no findings preserved.
38. As extensive finding of fact will be required both parties agreed it would be necessary to remit to First-tier Tribunal for rehearing.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge contains errors of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to be heard afresh by a different First-tier Tribunal Judge

Luke Bulpitt

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3 November 2025