Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No:
UI-2025-002090

First-tier Tribunal No:
PA/57927/2023
LP/12415/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

Between

JK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr T Wilding, counsel instructed by Waterstone Legal
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant has been granted permission to appeal the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing their appeal, following a hearing which took place on 6 February 2025.
Anonymity
2. Having taken into account the principle of open justice, the anonymity direction made previously is maintained because this appeal concerns a claim for international protection.
Factual Background
3. The appellant is a national of Albania now aged thirty-five. She arrived in the United Kingdom with leave to enter as a visitor during June 2022 and gave birth to a daughter the following month. The appellant’s husband and her son, then aged 5, arrived in the United Kingdom in September of the same year.
4. The appellant applied for asylum on 22 June 2022 on the basis that she had been forced into prostitution immediately preceding her arrival in the United Kingdom.
5. The Secretary of State refused the appellant’s protection claim in a decision dated 28 September 2023 on the basis that she would not be at risk on return, that there was a sufficiency of protection and that she could relocate to avoid further harm. In the Single Competent Authority’s conclusive ground decision dated 20 September 2022, it was accepted that the appellant was a victim of trafficking.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. The First-tier Tribunal placed little if any weight on the reports of a psychologist or country expert. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. The grounds were set out between paragraphs 10-28 but were not divided into separate areas of challenge. Nonetheless the overarching ground of appeal was that the judge erred in a large number of respects in their approach to the evidence relating to the appellant’s mental health.
8. Permission to appeal was granted on the basis sought, with the judge granting permission making the following remarks.
Two points are to my mind particularly worthy of consideration. The first is that the judge arguably applied the wrong standard of proof in deciding whether the appellant could receive treatment in Albania. The judge was arguably wrong in his observation at [59] that treatment is “reasonably likely to be available” and the first two sentences of [63] arguably compound that error.
The second point concerns the judge’s treatment of the expert report, at [27]-[36]. In light of Tui v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48; [2025] AC 374, it is arguable that these (prima facie valid) points were not open to the judge if they had not been taken by the respondent. I note the absence of any challenge to the expert report in the record of submissions at [15]-[16] 2
For the avoidance of doubt, I make no direction limiting the scope of this grant of permission; I have merely made reference above to the points which I consider to be the strongest.

The grounds were prepared at speed, and by counsel who was (quite understandably) deeply concerned that a failing in his chambers had resulted in this application being made late. It is undoubtedly for that reason that the grounds are not delineated into separate heads of challenge in the manner explained in Rai & DAM [2025] UKUT 00150 (IAC). It would be of assistance to the tribunal if the skeleton argument which is prepared for the hearing could articulate the existing grounds as separate, numbered complaints.
9. The respondent filed a Rule 24 response dated 21 July 2025, in which the appeal was opposed, with detailed comments being made.
The error of law hearing
10. The matter comes before the Upper Tribunal to determine whether the decision contains an error of law and, if it is so concluded, to either re-make the decision or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so. A bundle was submitted by the appellant containing, inter alia, the core documents in the appeal, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. Following that, further material was uploaded, in the form of a skeleton argument, authorities and a report from ‘UMatter,’ dated 26 February 2024 which had been omitted from the bundle but which was before the First-tier Tribunal.
11. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions where necessary.
Discussion
12. In Mr Wilding’s skeleton argument, the grounds of appeal were helpfully delineated into seven complaints.
Ground one: applying the wrong standard of proof as to availability of medical treatment
13. The appellant’s case includes the argument that it is not reasonable to expect her to relocate within Albania to avoid her traffickers. Part of that argument is based on the likely unavailability of medical treatment. Evidence before the judge which went to that issue included two psychological reports which set out the therapy the appellant was undergoing in the United Kingdom, TP records, the respondent’s CPIN and an expert country report by Dr James Korovilas.
14. At [59-62] the judge summarised relevant aspects of the CPIN before concluding at [63], ‘It follows that I cannot say the treatment the Appellant may need to return will not be available on return on the evidence before me.’ While it is not the most straightforward of sentences, the judge’s conclusion on the issue of treatment is apparent from the following. ‘The evidence is that treatment may well be available...In addition if the treatment she is currently receiving (whatever that is) is being conducted remotely there is no reason why that could (sic) be continued when the Appellant is removed. The position appears to be nowhere near as bleak as canvased…’
15. Rather than finding that the appellant has failed to prove that the treatment is unavailable as the grounds contend, the judge made a positive finding, that the background material showed that it was available. I find there to be no error in respect of the issue raised in the first ground, when considered alone.
16. The judge made a clear finding, however, owing to my conclusions on the remaining grounds, I am inclined to the view that the judge’s conclusion on treatment was infected by his findings on the evidence as a whole, many of which were not raised at the hearing but in the decision.
Ground two: irrational and/or procedurally unfair finding
17. This ground is concerned with the judge’s comment at [64],
The Appellant’s condition is not such that she has required compulsory or voluntary detention in a mental health facility in this country nor has her GP found it necessary to refer her for more advanced treatment other than therapy (which is now provided privately and not through the NHS). It would appear from the Appellant’s evidence that the NHS did not consider it necessary to continue with her counselling beyond 2023.
18. In reaching these findings, which are to the effect that the appellant’s mental health needs are not as serious as portrayed in the evidence, the judge rejected the opinion expressed in the psychological reports to the contrary. Counsel who drafted the grounds represented the appellant before the First-tier Tribunal. In the grounds it is contended that there was no argument advanced by the Secretary of State that the appellant’s condition was not serious and the judge did not alert the parties to the issue. I was referred to no evidence to the contrary. I accept Mr Wilding’s submission that the issue of whether or not the appellant had been detained says little about the severity of her illness. To make such a finding was both irrational and procedurally unfair. There is nothing inconsistent in a person having a serious mental health condition but not meeting the statutory criteria for detention under the Mental Health Act. Furthermore, the judge was wrong to suggest that the appellant had not received treatment beyond 2023. Indeed the second report from Umatter, which was before the judge, dates from 2024. I consider that these errors were material as not only was there unfairness, they infected the judge’s consideration of the psychological reports and the evidence as to the appellant’s treatment needs.
Ground three: material error of law in considering the expert evidence
19. The judge rightly identified concerns with the psychological reports on the appellant owing to the author’s commentary on the situation in Albania while not being suitably qualified to do so. Regrettably, these concerns led the judge to place little to no weight on the report in its entirety including in relation to matters which were within the expertise of the author. The opinion of the psychologist was that the appellant had symptoms of severe anxiety, severe depression, severe somatisation and met the criteria for PTSD. The most recent report spoke of an increase in the risk of suicidal ideation and self-harm were the appellant to be removed and also if she was unable to access specialised mental health services.
20. The judge’s view of the expertise of the author was not an issue which was ventilated at the hearing. While the respondent’s review raised issues about prospects of recovery and whether there had been a re-assessment of the appellant, there was no challenge to the expertise of the psychologist. There is obvious unfairness in the judge’s approach.
21. A further complaint concerns the judge’s finding ag [34] that there was a material inconsistency between the appellant’s medical records and the psychological report. Both the records and the reports refer to anxiety and depression and the opinion of the psychologist that the appellant was exhibiting symptoms of PTSD is far from out of the ordinary and cannot be said to amount to an inconsistency. Furthermore, the judge states at [36 ] that the reports did not address any improvements in the appellant’s condition. That finding does not take into consideration elements of the report which refer to the appellant’s commitment to therapy and to recovery. The judge made additional observations which I do not set out here, none of which were raised at the hearing or even subsequently which could have enabled the appellant an opportunity to address them.
22. I accept the argument made on behalf of the appellant that the judge’s approach was contrary to the decision in Tui v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48; [2025] AC 374, at [70], in that the expert psychologist was not given the opportunity to address the judge’s concerns.
Ground four: inadequate reasoning
23. There is some merit in this ground, as the judge appears to have assumed that the appellant ‘will have the benefit’ of a voluntary returns package. There is no reasoning to support this finding. That the appellant is pursuing this appeal indicates that she is not willing to return to Albania voluntarily. This error would not have been material by itself, but amounts to a further example of points being taken by the judge which were not discussed at the hearing.
Ground five: taking into account irrelevant material
24. The judge erred in making reference to a report from an expert which was not before him. I accept that this indicates an absence of care albeit not necessarily an absence of anxious scrutiny as there were no irrelevant references to the report of this named expert which might indicate that a report from another appeal was taken into account.
Ground six: material error of fact
25. The judge found at [58] that the appellant was likely to have the support of her husband in the event of her removal. The unchallenged evidence at the hearing was that the appellant and her husband were no longer in a relationship, albeit that he had come to the United Kingdom and co-parented the children. I was referred to no evidence having been adduced before the judge to suggest that it was likely that the husband would provide support to the appellant in Albania. This is yet a further issue which ought to have been raised at the hearing so that it could have been addressed.
Ground seven: failure to make a finding on material point
26. The material point was the appellant’s unchallenged account of her trafficker having blackmailed her with a video of her performing sex acts. This factor was relevant as to whether the appellant could reasonably be expected to approach the authorities with this threat hanging over her. While the judge referred to this point at [19] and [38], it was not taken into consideration as part of the judge’s findings on the issue of sufficiency of protection.
27. Given the foregoing, I am satisfied that the judge’s decision was vitiated by material errors of law and that his findings on the principle issues in dispute are unsafe. The decision is, therefore, set aside, with no retained findings.
28. I canvassed the views of the parties as to the venue of any remaking. Mr Wilding urged me to remit and Ms Ahmed did not have an opinion on the matter. Applying AEB [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC), I carefully considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statements. I took into consideration the history of this case, the nature and extent of the findings to be made as well as the fact that the nature of the errors of law in this case meant that the appellant was deprived of an adequate consideration of her protection appeal.
29. I further consider that it would be unfair for either party to be unable to avail themselves of the two-tier decision-making process and therefore remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside.
The appeal is remitted, de novo, to the First-tier Tribunal to be reheard by a different judge.

T Kamara

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

8 September 2025