UI-2025-002092 & UI-2025-000445
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002092
Case No: UI-2025-000445
Ft T No: PA/56482/2023, LP/06150/2024
Ft T No: PA/56499/2023, LP/06151/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26 August 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAINI
Between
SA (FIRST APPELLANT)
SY (SECOND APPELLANT)
(ANONYMITY direction MADE)
Appellants
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr A. Offiah, Solicitor; JDS Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms N. Kerr, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 18 July 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellants, brothers and citizens of The Gambia, appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTT’) promulgated on 8 October 2024 (‘the decision’) upholding the Respondent’s decisions of 31 August 2023 to refuse their protection and human rights claims.
2. The Appellants’ protection claim arises from the activities of their father, MS, a former Member of Parliament for the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (AFPRC) from 2002 to 2007, but had switched allegiances to the opposing United Democratic Party (UDP) in 2021. Due to this, attacks had been made on the Appellants’ home in The Gambia in June 2021 and September 2021. Following the attacks, the Appellants were advised to claim asylum whilst they were visiting the UK since August 2021. They claimed asylum in November 2021.
The First-tier Tribunal’s Decision under Appeal
3. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellants’ claims finding inter alia that:
a. No documentary evidence was provided to show that the family home was severely or substantially damaged in the attacks in June and September 2021 nor were any police reports produced despite the Appellants’ father complaining to the police about the attack (§31);
b. The Freedom House Report on The Gambia of 2023 undermined the Appellant’s case showing, that there are no reports of attacks on UDP leaders or members, or of any attacks on politicians switching allegiance to the UDP; and the overall picture is that there is freedom of political participation and the NPP government is not in the business of targeting political opponents (§§32-33);
c. A new report of 4 October 2023 showed President Barrow accusing the UDP of being the biggest threat to national security, but the significance of this statement is unclear as the full quotation and context in which it was given is not disclosed, and this did not in any demonstrate that the NPP-led Government embarked on a campaign of persecution against leaders or members of the UDP (§34);
d. The political environment has improved under President Barrow but freedom of expression is restricted which is demonstrated by media outlets being subject to arbitrary suspension and journalists facing arrest or physical assault (§35);
e. The only example of a UDP member encountering difficulty was when a Campaign Manager was arrested in December 2022 but was subsequently released (§36);
f. The letters of support from the Appellants’ parents and an uncle are not corroborated (§37);
g. The Appellants’ uncle’s letter detailing an assault by a gang of men was supported by a medical report from April 2024 however the report does not record the uncle being attacked by a gang and does not reveal serious injuries as per the uncle’s account except that he was hit on the ankle with a stick (§§38-39);
h. The Appellants’ mother states in a letter that the father decided to join the UDP after the Presidential election in 2016, which is echoed in the father’s letter, but this runs counter to the Appellants’ core claim that the father only publicly announced switching allegiance to the UDP on June 2021, whereas the letters imply he switched allegiance earlier, so any adverse reaction to his switching party allegiance would have been in 2016, not 2021 (§40);
i. Neither of the parents have been forced to seek continuous or permanent refuge in Senegal as they return time to time to The Gambia; and rather than claim asylum with the Appellants in the UK, their mother returned home instead undermining their claim that risk arises through association with their father (§41);
j. The Appellants have become UDP members in the UK and attended one or more demonstrations however, their evidence does not establish risk on return arising from that sur place activity (§42);
k. There is no need to disbelieve the Appellants as they have not even established that the attack on their compound was sanctioned by the ruling party against the Appellants’ father or orchestrated by a loyalist faction within the AFPRC, establishing any persecution (§43);
l. There is no evidence that there is an insufficiency of protection or that the Appellants cannot safely relocate in The Gambia if unable to reside in the family compound (§44); and
m. The Appellants thus could not be recognised as political refugees (§45).
The Grounds and Permission to Appeal
4. The Appellants applied for permission to appeal both arguing the following verbatim ground of appeal:
“In Paragraph 40 of the determination, the learned judge has misinterpreted the appellant’s parents' letter, leading to an erroneous conclusion. The appellant’s father never stated that he joined the United Democratic Party (UDP) in 2016. Rather, he explicitly wrote that following the 2016 elections, he chose to leave the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC) and subsequently joined the UDP. He made no reference to joining the party in 2016; in fact, he became a member of the UDP in 2021, prior to the election. This is substantiated by the evidence in the Hearing Bundle (Page 134), which includes the appellant’s father’s UDP membership card dated 09/06/2021. His public affiliation with the UDP and active participation in political campaigning triggered the attacks on the appellant’s home—this forms the crux of the appellant’s asylum claim.
The case of R (Iran) v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 establishes that a material error of law can arise when erroneous or irrational findings, or a failure to make findings on core issues, have a decisive impact on the outcome of the original appeal. In the present case, the appellant contends that the adverse findings of the learned judge did indeed lead to such a material difference in the outcome of the appeal.
Furthermore, in Paragraph 44, the judge’s conclusions regarding the appellant’s safety in The Gambia are inconsistent with the evidence before the court. Even the appellant’s parents were compelled to relocate to Senegal due to the risks they faced. The appellant’s father’s letter explicitly outlined the dangers of remaining in The Gambia and the specific threats to his children. The judge, however, dismissed the substantial risk highlighted by the appellant’s father, failing to adequately account for this crucial aspect of the evidence.
The material errors in the judge's findings, particularly regarding the interpretation of the appellant's father’s letter and the failure to properly assess the evidence of risk, have resulted in a flawed decision. In light of the core issues raised, it is respectfully submitted that the appellant be granted permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.”
5. Permission to appeal was granted by UTJ Ruddick to the second Appellant in the following terms:
“…
6. The FTT dismissed the appeal. It noted that the appellants had provided no documentary evidence of the attacks on their family home, and that their account ran counter to the independent country evidence. This was said to show that:
“the UDP is the main opposition party with a substantial number of seats in Parliament, that there is freedom of political participation, and that the NPP government is not in the business of targeting political opponents.”
7. The FTT then considered the appellants’ personal evidence, and noted several inconsistencies therein. One of those inconsistencies is the basis of this application: the FTT said at [40] that the appellants’ parents had each written that their father had decided to “join the UDP after the Presidential election in 2016”. This was found to “run[…] counter to the core of the claim, which is that the appellants’ father only publicly announced his switch of allegiance to the UDP in June 2021.”
8. The appellant appeals on the ground that this particular finding is contrary to the evidence before the FTT. He says that his father’s letter did not say that he had joined the UDP in 2016, but rather that he had decided to join it after the 2016 elections. His letter was in fact silent as to when he had joined the UDP, but his membership card was dated 2021, consistent with the appellants’ account.
9. Having read the father’s letter, I consider that it is arguable that it does not say he joined the UDP in 2016, nor that (as suggested in the FTT’s reasoning) he announced his decision to do so in that year. It says he decided to join the UDP after the 2016 election, but does not say when he acted on that decision. In the next sentence, moreover, he says that “I redirected my political efforts to support the UDP’s leader’s bid for the 2021 Presidential Election”, which is arguably consistent with the brothers’ account. The mother’s letter is written in equally ambiguous terms.
10. Given the FTT’s other findings, the appellant may struggle to prove that this error is material. However, materiality is not the issue at this stage.
11. The appellant’s second ground is a generalised assertion that the Judge did not properly take into account the evidence of risk. This ground may be nothing more than a disagreement, but I do not restrict the grant of permission.”
6. Permission to appeal was granted to the first Appellant by UTJ Bulpitt at a later date (N.B. the a late application for permission to appeal was made by him but in identical terms), following which the appeals were consolidated and accordingly came before us.
Error of law hearing
7. There was no Rule 24 Response from the Respondent, but Ms. Kerr indicated that both linked appeals were resisted.
8. At the error of law hearing, we heard submissions from both representatives. We indicated at the conclusion of the hearing that we would reserve our decision, which we now provide with reasons.
Discussion and conclusions
9. As identified in the grant of permission, the grounds of appeal raise two points. The first relates to the argument that at §40 the judge misinterpreted the Appellants’ father’s and mother’s letters leading to perversity that would have had a material impact upon the outcome of the appeal. The second point challenges the judge’s conclusions regarding the Appellants’ safety in The Gambia which was inconsistent with the evidence before the court. We shall take these points in turn.
10. In relation to the first issue and §40 of the judge’s findings, it is helpful to first turn to the content of the father’s and mother’s letters that are at the heart of this matter. The father’s letter of 12 June 2024 , in so far as it pertains to his altering his allegiance to the UDP, reads as follows:
“Following the Presidential Election in 2016, I decided to leave the APRC and join the United Democratic Party (UDP). I redirected my political efforts to support the UDP leader’s bid for the 2021 Presidential Election, although this campaign was ultimately unsuccessful”.
11. The mother’s letter of 11 June 2024, in so far as it pertains to her husband altering his allegiance to the UDP, reads as follows:
“After the Presidential Election in 2016, he decided to decamp the party to join the United Democratic Party (UDP). And consequently, support their bid for the 2021 Presidential Election. This project was not, however, successful”.
12. In reaching his findings upon these two letters, the judge stated as follows at §40:
“40. In her letter, the appellants’ mother says that her husband decided to join the UDP after the Presidential election in 2016. This is also what is said by the appellants’ father in his letter. The parents’ account runs counter to the core claim, which is that the appellants’ father only publicly announced his switch of allegiance to the UDP in June 2021. If he switched allegiance much earlier, as both his letter and that of his wife implies, the attack in June 2021 cannot reasonably be attributed to a public declaration of support for the UDP a week earlier, since, as a well-known politician, it would have been generally known that he had switched allegiance to the UDP after the Presidential election in 2016. So, if there was going to be adverse reaction to this news, it is much more likely to have been shortly after 2016, not five years later.”
13. Comparing the original evidence against the above findings, we conclude that the judge’s findings were open to him to reach. First, it is fair to note that the content of both the father’s and mother’s letters appear to be written within a day of one another and bear a close resemblance to one another. Second, both passages place the father’s decision to leave the APRC at “following” or “after” the election in 2016. We pause to note that is consistent with the judge’s findings in the first two sentences of §40. Third, neither letter specifies when precisely the father began his support the UDP’s bid for the 2021 elections. The judge has clearly noted the father’s decision to support the UDP after the 2016 election to mean that he acted upon the decision in 2016 and not in 2021. This was plainly open to the judge to do, especially as the letters are not framed in the clearest terms. If the change in allegiance is what sparked the attacks in June and September 2021, this was not said in the letters. Consequently, the judge found that they were inconsistent with the Appellants’ account, which in turn contributed to their claims being dismissed.
14. Even if we were to have found that it was not open to the judge to read the letters as he did, or that there was perversity in his so doing, the first ground does not establish a material error of law requiring the entire decision be set aside, contrary to the assertion made in the grounds, because the Appellants have not challenged the judge’s findings at §§31-39 and §§41-43 that we have noted above. Several of those paragraphs detail omissions in the evidence before the judge that he was entitled to note could have been provided, especially as the Appellants were seemingly still in contact with family in The Gambia.
15. Nonetheless, we go no to consider the second issue in the event that it discloses a material error of law.
16. Considering the second, more succinctly framed issue, we do not find that §44 of the judge’s findings, which concludes that there is a sufficiency of protection and/or option of relocation, is infected by error. We note that Mr. Offiah did not take us to any passage within the Appellant’s Bundles and evidence before the First-tier Tribunal to make good the ground which alleges that the judge’s conclusions were “inconsistent” with the evidence that was before him. Equally, Mr Offiah stated that crossing the political carpet in a relatively peaceful part of West Africa would place a person at risk, but there was no material pointed to by him that was before the Tribunal in order to substantiate this assertion. As such, we find that the second issue amounts to mere disagreement with the conclusions reached by the judge, that were open to him on the evidence before him.
17. Before we conclude, we note that Mr. Offiah stated that the Appellants’ father fled The Gambia in September 2021, however there was no mention of any permanent flight to Senegal by the father or the mother that was before the First-tier Tribunal. Nor was there any material put forward to substantiate this by way of a Rule 15(2A) application with an explanation for why it was not placed before the First-tier Tribunal. Consequently, there being no evidence of this assertion, and it not being evidenced before the First-tier Tribunal either we make no findings in relation to this, but merely not the remark for the sake of completeness.
18. In conclusion, the grounds do not disclose any material errors of law in the judge’s decision.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
P. Saini
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
7 August 2025