Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002121
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/64318/2023
LH/07358/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 30 October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SAINI

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
And

EVANS AKUAMOAH-BOATENG
(aka EVANS AKUAKOAH-BOATENG, aka EVANS OWUSU)
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION NOT MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Ms N Kerr, Senior Presenting Officer
For the respondent: Mr Y Wahbi, Legal Representative from Lifeline Options Community Interest Company

Heard at Field House on 3 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. For the sake of continuity, we shall refer to the parties as they stood before the First-tier Tribunal: therefore, the Secretary of State is once more “the respondent” and Mr Akuamoah-Boateng is “the appellant.

2. The appellant is a national of Ghana, born on 15 May 1986. It seems that he arrived in United Kingdom in 2005 in order to join his father (a Dutch national) in this country. On entry and for a period thereafter, the appellant was in possession of a false Dutch passport which included the surname of Owusu. This document was apparently used to obtain a residence card under the EEA Regulations 2006 and then permanent residence under those Regulations at some point. On 11 January 2008, the appellant was convicted of possession of a false document (the Dutch passport) and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment. Deportation action was commenced. An appeal to what was then the Asylum Immigration Tribunal was dismissed in late 2008. On 9 January 2009, a deportation order was signed, and this was served on the appellant a few days later. After failed attempts to resist deportation, the applicant was eventually returned to Ghana on 16 August 2009. He then re-entered the United Kingdom in breach of the deportation order on 27 November 2009 and has resided here ever since.

3. On 3 September 2019, the appellant made a human rights claim, which was not decided until 30 November 2023. The claim was refused and the appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal.

The judge’s decision
4. The judge took time to set out in some detail the relevant background, the evidence before him, and the parties’ submissions: [3]-[45]. He made reference to Part 5A of the NIAA 2002 and in particular section 117C, noting that if neither of the Exceptions applied, consideration would be given to whether there were very compelling circumstances going beyond them: [47]-[48].

5. At [49], the judge confirmed that he was taking account of all the evidence presented, together with the parties’ submissions, before reaching conclusions on a “holistic basis”. He found the appellant to be “very straightforward” and a credible witness: [50]. The judge then set out significant concerns he had with the respondent’s preparation for the appeal. These included the failure to provide potentially relevant documentation and factual inaccuracies in her decision-making. The latter were described as “probably the most significant I have observed in my 25 years of service” and were “extremely serious”: [54]. He found that a Ghanaian birth certificate was authentic and reliable and that the appellant’s name and date of birth were as stated therein, and not a different identity, as had been asserted by the respondent: [55]. As to the factual inaccuracies, contrary to the respondent’s assertion, the appellant had been deported from United Kingdom on only one occasion, 2009, and not three: [56] and [60]-[62]. On the appellant’s re-entry to this country in November 2009, the judge found as a fact that he had done so through legitimate means, arriving at Birmingham airport and being granted leave to enter in his true identity: [62].

6. The judge addressed the two Exceptions under section 117C of the 2002 Act, concluding that neither applied. Specifically, the appellant had not spent the required lawful period of residence in United Kingdom and he had not been sufficiently integrated as result of his conviction. The judge stated that there were issues as to re-integration into Ghanaian society, although they were to be dealt with in the later assessment of very compelling circumstances: [64]. As to the second Exception, the judge accepted that the appellant had a relationship with his son, T, but it was not such as to make separation unduly harsh: [66]-[69].

7. As result of the conclusions on the Exceptions, the judge moved on to consider whether there were very compelling circumstances. He made reference to the public interest in removing foreign criminals. He also referred to section 117B of the 2002 Act: [70]-[72]. Reminding himself of the findings made in respect of the two Exceptions, he concluded that the appellant’s family life rights did not disclose very compelling circumstances: [73].

8. The judge assessed a number of considerations in respect of the appellant’s private life. He noted the re-entry in 2009, the fact that there had not been three re-entries (as erroneously alleged by the respondent) and that entry clearance had been granted: [74]. He recognised that the re-entry had been in breach of the deportation order: [74], [75], and [78]. He took account of the appellant’s stated “total unfamiliarity” with Ghana, having left there as a young child (he was 3 years old) and the absence of familial, economic, or social ties in that country: [75]. The judge referred himself to HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22: [76]. He considered the particular circumstances of the appellant’s single offence committed 17 years previously, noting that there had been no financial or other gain, or any loss to another party. The respondent had failed to provide Sentencing Remarks. The appellant had spent a considerable period of time in the United Kingdom. The judge recorded that the appellant had spent many years in this country “in limbo”. There were no further convictions against the appellant’s name: [77]-[78]. The appellant had established social and cultural ties in this country: [79]. The judge found that there would be “significantly challenging and detrimental” circumstances facing the appellant if he were to be deported to Ghana. He recognised that the appellant’s residence here had “undoubtedly been precarious in immigration terms”: [81].

9. At [82], the judge again acknowledged the precarious nature of the appellant’s residence in the United Kingdom and the “significant weight” attributable to the public interest. The judge then dealt with the issue of delay at [83]-[84]: he described the period between the appellant making his human rights claim in September 2019 and the refusal thereof on 30 November 2023 as being “long” and unexplained. He regarded this is a factor to be considered “on a cumulative basis” and that, having regard to EB (Kosovo) v SSHD [2008] UKHL 41 and the intervention of the Covid-19 pandemic, it would “carry weight”.

10. In conclusion, the judge re-stated that his approach had been cumulative. He had placed “significant weight” on the public interest, but having done so, and on the “very particular and somewhat unusual facts”, the appellant succeeded in demonstrating very compelling circumstances beyond the two Exceptions and was therefore entitled to succeed in his appeal: [85]-[86].

The grounds of appeal
11. There are two unamended grounds of appeal before us. The first comes under the heading “Making a misdirection of law on any material matter/Failing to provide reasons or adequate reasons for findings on material matters - “very compelling circumstances”. We consider it appropriate to set out the ground in full:

“5. It is respectfully submitted that Judge Buckwell has failed to adequately explain how the appellant’s circumstances surpass the elevated threshold within the very compelling circumstances test, when set against the public interest in his deportation as a foreign criminal, given the fact that he failed to satisfy either of the exceptions of s117C and the absence of compelling reasons that go over and above. By failing to apply this standard, with adequate findings, it is submitted Judge Buckwell’s decision to allow the appeal amounts to a material misdirection of law.
6. Judge referenced HA(Iraq) and Kamara, cited at [76] and [80], in providing a broad
evaluative assessment of the appellant’s circumstances, taking into account the appellant’s conviction, described as being at the ‘lowest level of sentence,’ and the time that has elapsed since his conviction which has left him ‘in limbo’ [78]. However, judge has failed to acknowledge that the appellant’s circumstances have been of his own making having entered the UK with a false document with which he attempted to open a bank account and was caught, and had failed to show any honesty about his true identity, given also the fact that having been issued a residence card as a dependant of his father in 2007, no reasons were given as to why he needed to use deception to enter the UK with a false document. Any private/family life has been established for the greater part of his residence unlawfully resulting from his deception and failure to be transparent about his identity
7. Furthermore, judge also concludes at [81], that ‘circumstances which would face the appellant, on return to Ghana, would be significantly challenging and detrimental,’ however has failed to provide any reasoning regarding the challenges he would face on return, or that his deportation meets the elevated threshold of the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test as per Hesham Ali v SSHD [2016] UKSC 60 at [38]) where it states: ‘ Where the statutory exceptions have not been met, “great weight should generally be given to the public interest in the deportation of such offenders, but … it can be outweighed, applying a proportionality test, by very compelling circumstances: in other words by a very strong claim indeed.’
8. It is also submitted in assessing the appellant’s article 8 claim as per Hesham Ali, there is little evidence to show the appellant has any significant private or family life. He is not presently leading an independent life or working, as asserted at [22], and relies on funds from ‘friends, relatives and his church,’ even though he had told his ex-partner that he was working. Further, it is stated that he sees his son every three weeks and no evidence has been presented that he is actively involved in his day-to-day care. Therefore, without more, it has not been shown that the decision would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences, given also in his favour his transferable skills as judge set out that he ‘speaks excellent English and, from his past record of employment, I find that the appellant will without doubt be able to secure meaningful employment’ [82].
9. It is submitted that judge has made a material error of law in the assessment of the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test and the findings should be set aside.”

12. The second ground is entitled “Making a material misdirection of law - delay in the consideration of the appellant’s further submissions of 3 September 2019”. Again, we set out the ground in full:

“10. At [83], judge refers to the delay in the consideration of the appellant’s human rights claim against the deportation decision with reference made to EB Kosovo [2008] and the finding of the House of Lords ‘that delay, in certain circumstances, might be found to reduce the weight favouring the public interest.’
11. However, in these circumstances the deportation decision was taken following the appellant’s conviction and was justified. His appeals against the decision were dismissed and he became appeals rights exhausted on 27/02/2009. So too, again in 2012 when the appellant was served with enforcement notices for entering the UK in breach of a deportation having been arrested for assault. His appeal against that decision was dismissed and he became appeals rights exhausted on 27/10/2012. The FTTJ has failed to consider this point which is material in the consideration of maintaining a firm and fair immigration control and which is in the public interest. It is submitted that any delay in the decision-making of the respondent does not diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest. 12. This is further supported in the decision of the Upper Tribunal in RLP (BAH revisited – expeditious justice) Jamaica [2017] UKUT 00330 (IAC), in which the Tribunal held that in cases where the public interest favouring deportation of a migrant is potent and pressing, even egregious and unjustified delay on the part of the Secretary of State in the underlying decision-making process is unlikely to tip the balance in the immigrant’s favour in the proportionality exercise under Article 8(2) ECHR.. The respondent was entitled to proceed on the basis that the appellant had practised deception and had broken the law and further had entered the UK again in the full knowledge that he was in breach of his deportation order and had no right to be in the UK. Therefore, his deportation is conducive to the public good and in the public interest.
13. It is submitted that judge has erred in law in the application of EB Kosovo [2008], in balancing the competing factors.”
13. Permission was granted on both grounds by the First-tier Tribunal.

Rule 24
14. A brief rule 24 response was provided by the appellant. In essence, it simply asserts that the judge had been entitled to conclude as he did.

The hearing
15. We raised a preliminary issue with Ms Kerr. Despite initial standard directions and then a ‘chasing’ email from the Upper Tribunal’s administrative staff, the respondent failed to provide a composite error of law bundle until four days before the hearing. That is not good enough. In the absence of any explanation for the non-compliance, we do not know whether this was a specific oversight, or whether there are systemic failures within the respondent’s processes. Either way, the Tribunal expects compliance with directions from all parties and repeated failures may lead to further action being taken.

16. We also referred the parties to the judgment of the Court of Appeal in MN-T (Colombia) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 896. This concerned the issue of delay in the context of deportation proceedings. It had not been referred to in RLP. We gave Ms Kerr and Mr Wahbi time to consider the judgment. On resumption, both confirmed that they were content to proceed.

17. Ms Kerr relied on the unamended grounds. She confirmed at the outset of, and during her submissions, that no perversity challenge was being put forward. She quite properly acknowledged the absence of any challenge to the judge’s favourable assessment of credibility and his particular findings of fact on the appellant’s identity and the respondent’s factual errors, as mentioned earlier in our decision. She accepted that the grounds did not contain any specific contention that the judge had erred in his consideration of the re-entry issue.

18. Ms Kerr submitted that the very compelling circumstances test had not been properly considered: the judge had not properly applied the elevated threshold and his reasons were not adequate. There were, she submitted, not enough reasons to show how the very compelling circumstances test had been passed. The judge had, “under weighted” certain factors and had “overstated” others. In respect of the delay issue, the judge had failed to have proper regard to the Covid-19 pandemic and its effects. Further, it was submitted that the judge had failed to consider the decision in RLP. In respect of MN-T (Colombia), the appellant had failed to show how his Article 8 rights had been enhanced during the period of delay.

19. Mr Wabhi’s concise submissions were to the effect that the judge had been entitled to make the findings he did, had applied the correct legal principles, and had reached an adequately reasoned and sustainable conclusion on the very compelling circumstances test. The judge had adopted a fact-sensitive approach. He had dealt with the issue of delay appropriately, regarding it as simply one factor amongst a number and not holding decisive weight.

20. At the end of the hearing we reserved our decision.

Conclusions
21. We remind ourselves that it is not our task to decide whether the appellant should or should not be deported. The First-tier Tribunal has made its decision that he should not, and it is now for us to determine whether that decision contains any material errors of law. In reaching that determination, we should exercise appropriate judicial restraint. We should be cautious before concluding that the judge misdirected himself in law if the appropriate legal principles are set out on the face of the decision or can be discerned from the substance of what has been said. There is no requirement for a judge to give reasons for reasons. Not every aspect of the evidence considered must be referred to, nor every step in the reasoning process demonstrated. Finally, we have read the judge’s decision sensibly and holistically.

22. Before considering the specific points raised in the unamended grounds, we make the following observations. First, we reiterate that there is no perversity challenge before us. Second, there is no challenge to the judge’s favourable assessment of the appellant’s credibility, nor to his findings on the respondent’s poor preparatory work in the appeal. One significant consequence of this is that the judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant is who he says he is and that he re-entered the United Kingdom in 2009 in his true identity, albeit in breach of the deportation order. Third, there is no assertion in the grounds that the judge failed to take account of the 2009 re-entry, or in some other way misdirected himself on this particular point.

Ground 1
23. We are satisfied that the judge properly directed himself to the very compelling circumstances test and was aware of its stringency. He made several references to the test itself: [48], [70], [72], and [86]. The references demonstrate that he was aware that the circumstances had to go beyond those applicable to the two Exceptions: [72] and [86]. At [76], he also directed himself to HA (Iraq), which of course addresses the very compelling circumstances test as well as the unduly harsh Exception. We are not prepared to accede to the respondent’s submission that, notwithstanding the numerous references to the test, the judge failed to appreciate its “elevated threshold”. To do so would run contrary to the repeated pronouncements from the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court reminding the Upper Tribunal to be slow before finding a legal misdirection where the applicable law (or at least its principles) has been set out.

24. It cannot be said that the judge failed to have regard to the public interest and indeed the grounds do not intend otherwise. He made numerous references to this, both in the context of section 117C and (in substance) section 117B: [71], [82], and [86].

25. We reject the respondent’s assertion that the judge failed to provide legally adequate reasons for his ultimate conclusion that the very compelling circumstances test was made out. We have already found that the judge applied the appropriate “elevated threshold” and was aware that the very compelling circumstances had to go beyond the matters addressed in the two Exceptions. With reference to what is specifically said in the first ground, we find that the judge’s reasons are apparent on the face of his decision and are legally adequate. He was clearly aware of the use of the false Dutch passport and the resulting conviction and sentence: [8], [48], and [51]. It is also clear that the judge was aware of the appellant’s precarious status in this country: [64], [81], and [82]. The reference to the appellant being “in limbo” must be read in the context of the judge’s overall appreciation of the case and the consequent assessment. Therefore, when read sensibly and holistically, we are satisfied that the judge was aware of the appellant’s circumstances and that these were properly taken into account. The reasons why this particular aspect of the appellant’s history was not regarded as weighing decisively against him are set out across the entirety of the judge’s cumulative assessment from [74]-[86] and it is artificial for the grounds to focus on isolated elements.

26. We reject the contention that the judge failed to provide “any reasoning” as to the challenges faced by the appellant if deported to Ghana. The reasons for those challenges are set out at [75] and are legally adequate. Indeed, there is no challenge to any of the factual matters relied on by the judge: the appellant left Ghana when he was 3 years old; he did not speak any Twi; he knew of no family there and had no contacts or potential residence or employment opportunities; and when deported in 2009, the appellant had essentially lived for three months within the public area of Accra airport. In addition, we have already stated that the judge was aware of the need for the very compelling circumstances to go beyond simply matters which might satisfy the Exceptions. It is clear that the judge regarded the appellant’s circumstances on return as being one consideration among many. This aspect of the first ground of appeal is also artificial in failing to acknowledge the judge’s cumulative assessment.

27. The final aspect of the first ground strongly indicates simple disagreement with the judge’s findings and assessment, without disclosing errors of law. As we have said previously, the judge was aware of the appellant’s circumstances in this country, both in respect of private and family life. The judge did not base his very compelling circumstances conclusion on the latter. Whilst the respondent takes the view that there would not be “unjustifiably harsh consequences” for the appellant, the judge reached a different conclusion and, on our analysis, he was entitled to do so (bearing in mind that his use of that phrase was in the alternative to his conclusion on the very compelling circumstances test: [86]).

28. We have not overlooked Ms Kerr’s oral submissions. Much of what she said is subsumed in what we have already set out. Beyond that, we reject her submissions that the judge “under weighted” certain factors and “overstated” others. Weight is a matter for the first-instance judge, subject to any successful legal misdirection and/or perversity challenge, neither of which apply here.

29. Ground 1 fails.

Ground 2
30. The second ground appears in part to overlook the particular delay which the judge took into account. It did not relate to previous appeals in this country. In fact, the period related to the time it took the respondent to make a decision on the appellant’s September 2019 human rights claim, a delay of 4 years and 7 months.

31. We find that the judge was entitled to regard the delay as a factor to be considered “on a cumulative basis”: [83]. The reliance on RLP is, in our view, questionable. That decision failed to have any regard to MN-T (Colombia). There are now at least two unreported decisions of the Upper Tribunal which have concluded that RLP should not be followed, at least to the extent that it is relied on to support a contention that any delay, however egregious, cannot assist an individual in deportation cases. MN-T (Colombia) makes it clear that delay cases are always fact-sensitive and that the principles set out in EB (Kosovo) should be applied. However, the correctness of RLP need not be analysed in this case. We are content to proceed on the basis that RLP does nothing more than state that a delay is “unlikely” to tip the balance in an individual’s favour.

32. The judge applied EB (Kosovo), as he was entitled (indeed, bound) to do. He took account of the absence of any explanation for the delay and the occurrence of the Covid-19 pandemic during part of the period in question. On a sensible reading of the judge’s analysis, he did not regard the delay as tipping the balance in the appellant’s favour. He did not state that it would carry “significant” or “great” weight. It was regarded as one factor among a number of others. It is clear from [83] that the judge regarded the delay as reducing the weight attributable to the public interest and there is no question that he erroneously double-counted that particular factor by also finding that it had enhanced the appellant’s private life, for example.

33. There was no question that the respondent had been entitled to pursue deportation action against the appellant on the basis that he had previously practised deception and had re-entered the United Kingdom in breach of the deportation order: the judge was well-aware of her position at the appeal and he addressed the relevant considerations resting on her side of the balance.

34. There is no legal misdirection on the delay issue and the judge’s reasons for relying on it are adequate.

35. Ground 2 fails.

Other matters
36. For the avoidance of any doubt, any perversity challenge which might have been mounted would have failed. As we have already said, the judge directed himself correctly in law, made relevant (and unchallenged) findings of fact, took proper account of the significant public interest, and considered a variety of matters on a fact-sensitive basis. The overall conclusion reached was not irrational.

37. Similarly, any contention that the judge had failed to take proper account of the re-entry in 2009 would have failed. The judge clearly considered this as part of his cumulative assessment. He was aware of the fact that it occurred in breach of the deportation order: [74], [75], and [78]. The particular circumstances surrounding the re-entry were the subject of factual findings which have not been challenged.

Summary
38. The grounds of appeal as pleaded do not disclose any material errors of law. Having exercised appropriate judicial restraint, we conclude that, “on the very particular and somewhat unusual facts” of this case, the judge was entitled to conclude that the appellant’s deportation would violate Article 8.

Anonymity
39. No anonymity direction has been made so far and we see no basis on which one is warranted, given the importance of open justice.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.

The Secretary of State’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 17 October 2025