Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002151

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/70814/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

18th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOBBS

Between

SM
ANONYMITY ORDER MADE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr. S. Martin, Jain Neil Ruddy
For the respondent: Ms. L. Clewley, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Prudham (the “Judge”), dated 23 March 2025, in which he refused the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim. The appellant is a national of Iran who claimed asylum based on his political opinion.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Lindsley in a decision dated 27 June 2025 as follows:
“3. The grounds of appeal contend, in short summary, that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law by leaving out of account material matters which were relevant to the assessment of the claim to be at risk on return to Iran as a result of sur place activities as a supporter of Kurdish rights and opponent of the regime. Whilst it is accepted as being open to the First-tier Tribunal Judge to find the appellant’s activities were opportunistic and he could therefore delete his Facebook account prior to being returned it is argued that he was still found to have been near the Iranian embassy in a hi viz jacket, and it is argued that there has been interaction with the appellant’s Facebook posts which will mean that they will not all simply disappear if he deletes his account, and that therefore his material opposing the regime could therefore come to the attention of the Iranian authorities if he were being returned and a search against his name were done by the authorities. It is argued that it is likely such a search would be done as he would be viewed with suspicion as a failed Kurdish asylum seeker, in the context of the “hair trigger” approach of the Iranian authorities to a person with such a profile.
4. The grounds are arguable as it is accepted that if the Iranian authorities knew about the appellant’s sur place activities that he would be at real risk of serious harm on return; and it is also accepted that his posts had attracted some comments. The risk that he might come to the attention of the authorities through the liking and sharing of Facebook information, even if posted opportunistically, has arguably therefore not been considered and may be material to showing that the appellant is at real risk of serious harm on return to Iran.”
3. In the Rule 24 response the respondent opposed the appellant’s appeal.
The hearing
4. The hearing was a hybrid hearing with the parties attending remotely.
5. I heard submissions from both parties, following which I reserved my decision.
Error of law
6. The ground of appeal is a narrow one relating to the appellant’s sur place activities. It was submitted by Mr. Martin that it was accepted by the Judge that, if these sur place activities were discovered by the authorities, he would be at risk on return. The appellant’s motivation was not relevant, the issue was the likelihood of discovery of his activities. The first pinch point would be when he applied for an emergency travel document. Following headnote (4) of XX (PJAK- sur place activities- Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 23 a background search, including an internet search, would be carried out. The Judge found that deletion of his Facebook account would neutralise the risk, but it was submitted that this went too far as it would diminish the risk, not eliminate it, given that the appellant had lost control of his posts by virtue of them being liked and shared.
7. The Judge considered the second pinch point, the appellant’s return to Iran, at [38]. The appellant would be returning as a failed asylum seeker, of Kurdish ethnicity, who had left Iran illegally. He would be scrutinised on account of his ethnicity, with reference to [10] of HB (Kurds) Iran CG 2018 UKUT 00430 (IAC). The Judge found that, as his sur place activities were opportunistic, he would not have to disclose his beliefs as they were not genuinely held. It was submitted that, following JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC), on the balance of probabilities his fear would flow from any perceived anti-regime opinion. His motivation was irrelevant.
8. Mr. Martin referred to the updated CPIN Iran: Social media, surveillance and sur place activities, April 2025. He submitted that this reflected the 2022 version current at the time of the decision in relation to the Iranian regime’s cyber monitoring capabilities and general monitoring of dissidents. The appellant deleting his Facebook account would not cause the material to disappear. Further, his sur place activity was not limited to Facebook posts, he had demonstrated in front of the Embassy. I was referred to [10.2.2] of the 2025 CPIN which states:
“The same response to an information request also stated that the lawyer told their Research Directorate: ‘Those monitored in Canada by Iranian authorities “certainly” include people who are “very politically active,” but can also include ordinary people “who might not engage in politics every day but may do so from time to time”.’”
9. In summary Mr. Martin submitted that the Judge had failed to engage with the risk to the appellant which flowed from the established facts of his Kurdish ethnicity, his illegal exit, being a failed asylum seeker, having protested outside the Embassy and having posted anti-regime material which could be found, even if he deleted his Facebook account. He would be scrutinised when he applied for an emergency travel document, and the questions put to the appellant would render him at risk. There was a reasonable likelihood that he would be persecuted.
10. Ms. Clewley relied on the Rule 24 response. She submitted that the issue was whether the Judge had considered whether the interaction of others with the appellant’s Facebook posts indicated that he had lost control of the material such that it could come to the attention of the authorities at the pinch points. She submitted that the position that he had lost control of his posts because they had been shared was not made out in the background material, nor in the material made available to the First-tier Tribunal. There was no evidence to show that Facebook posts remained if they had been shared prior to deletion. I was referred to [3.3.9] of the 2025 CPIN which cites [84] of XX (PJAK).
“The evidence about Facebook account closure is unequivocal. It may be reversed before 30 days, but not after that time, and after deletion, the data on the person’s Facebook account is irretrievable, even if their password is later discovered. The only exceptions to this are two limited pieces of residual data - limited caches of data, for a temporary period, on internet search engines; and photographs (but not links) on other people’s Facebook accounts and messages sent to other people. Facebook account closure causes the data to be wholly inaccessible through or from Facebook or the user. However, if the data has been exported by a third party, that third party will continue to have access to the exported data, as stored.”
11. Ms. Clewley submitted that there was nothing to indicate that anyone had gone to the lengths of exporting the shared data, and the appellant had not shown that the data would exist after his account had been deleted. In relation to the photograph of the appellant protesting, he was some way from the Embassy.
12. Mr. Martin submitted that it boiled down to what was meant by exporting of data and whether the appellant would remain identifiable.
13. While the Judge did not expressly consider the accessibility of shared posts, paragraph [84] of XX (PJAK) makes clear that “Facebook account closure causes the data to be wholly inaccessible through or from Facebook or the user.” Following this, given that a shared post would be accessible through Facebook, once the account had been deleted, even if the data has been shared, it will be “wholly inaccessible through or from Facebook”. No evidence was provided either to the First-tier Tribunal or the Upper Tribunal to show that paragraph [84] is wrong, and that the appellant’s posts that had been shared would be available once he had deleted his account. Therefore, even if the Judge erred in failing to expressly consider shared and liked posts, it cannot be material.
14. In relation to the exporting of data, [84] states that “However, if the data has been exported by a third party, that third party will continue to have access to the exported data, as stored”. It was not submitted by the appellant that anyone had exported his data, only that they had shared it. I have found above that deletion of the account will remove all posts, even if shared. Exporting is not the same as sharing but involves a more active approach of saving the data into a separate file or taking a screenshot. It is then accessible by whoever has exported it. In order for the Iranian authorities to come across this data on Facebook when carrying out their searches, the exported file or screenshot would need to have been re-posted by whoever had exported it. It was not submitted that the few people who had shared the appellant’s posts had also exported them and posted them independently on Facebook or any other social media. There is no evidence that the appellant can be found on Facebook other than through his own account, and posts from this account which have been shared. These would all disappear when the account was deleted.
15. I accept that, if it were the case that the appellant’s posts had been exported by a third party who then chose to upload them to his or her own Facebook account, they would be accessible. However, that is not what is being submitted, and there is no evidence of this. It is submitted that it is the act of sharing the posts that means they are accessible, and following XX (PJAK), I find that is not the case.
16. The Judge made findings which were open to him regarding the appellant’s sur place activities. The appellant has acknowledged that these findings were open to the Judge. The challenge to the decision is narrow, on the basis that the Judge erred by “leaving out of account the risk flowing from others interacting with the materials he posted online”. I have found with reference to XX (PJAK) that any error in so doing cannot be material, given that it is not challenged that the appellant would and could delete his Facebook account, following which all of his data would disappear.
Notice of Decision    
17. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not involve the making of a material error of law and I do not set it aside.
18. The decision of First-tier Tribunal stands.

Kate Hobbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
16 November 2025