Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002153

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01287/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 23rd of September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

CHARLES LUBONA LENGALENGA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr N Ahmed, Counsel, instructed by Peer & Co (Birmingham).
For the Respondent: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Field House on 15 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 19th March 2025. In this decision, a Judge of the Upper Tribunal, while sitting as a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 20th June 2024, in which the Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights claim and decided to deport him from the UK.

Factual and procedural background
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Zambia who was born in 1985. He was granted Indefinite Leave to Remain (‘ILR’) on 22nd July 2003. Insofar as is relevant to these proceedings, the Appellant was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, with a second sentence of two years to be served concurrently, for his involvement in a money laundering operation.
3. As a result of these convictions, the Respondent sent a notice of intention to deport to the Appellant on 26th October 2023 asking him to provide any reasons as to why he should not be removed to Zambia. The Appellant duly responded and provided written representations requesting that he be permitted to remain in the UK and it is that claim that was refused in the Respondent’s decision of 20th June 2024.
4. The Appellant appealed that decision to the FtT and his appeal was heard by the Judge on 14th March 2025.
The decision at first instance
5. At [8], the Judge recorded that the parties agreed that the issues in dispute were whether or not the Appellant met the requirements of the first statutory exception to deportation, set out in s.117C(4) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘the 2002 Act’). This is because this provision was relevant to whether the Appellant could ultimately demonstrate “very compelling circumstances” in his case over and above those set out in the statutory exceptions provided for in s.117C(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act, pursuant to s.117C(6) of the same Act.
6. At [12] to [14], the Judge correctly directed themselves to the relevant statutory framework and to the burden of proof resting on the Appellant on the balance of probabilities. The Judge further directed themselves correctly to the relevant case law and principles that apply in deportation appeals when applying the ‘very compelling circumstances’ test to the Appellant’s appeal.
7. In dismissing the appeal and insofar as is relevant to these proceedings, the Judge’s findings of fact and conclusions were as follows:
(a) It was not in dispute that the Appellant has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life having been granted ILR in 2003 and so he met the first limb of the test set out in s.117C(4) – [18];
(b) The Judge concluded that the Appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the UK (the second limb under s.117C(4)) and did not accept the Respondent’s submissions to the contrary giving detailed reasons at [19] to [22];
(c) The Judge went on to consider whether or not the Appellant could meet the third and final limb set out in s.117C(4), namely whether there were very significant obstacles to integration in Zambia. The Judge found against the Appellant on this issue giving detailed reasons for that conclusion at [23] to [33];
(d) Specifically at [33], the Judge reminded themselves that they must carry out a broad evaluative judgment as to whether the Appellant will be enough of an insider to participate in Zambian society in a meaningful way and accepted that establishing himself there would involve several obstacles for the Appellant but this was not sufficient to meet the relevant threshold. The Judge continued that they were not satisfied that such obstacles can be described as “very significant”, especially taking into consideration the Appellant’s own personal characteristics, achievements and the potential short term support that he is likely to obtain from his own mother and other relatives;
(e) At [36] onwards, the Judge then went on to consider whether or not the Appellant could show “very compelling circumstances” under s.117C(6). At [36], the Judge reminded themselves of the relevant considerations set out in the judgments of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 and OH (Algeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1763 and went on to consider the relevant factors including the seriousness of the offence, the time elapsed since the offence was committed, rehabilitation, the length of the Appellant’s stay in the UK, the Appellant’s family in the UK, the Appellant’s ties in the UK and Zambia. The Judge drew this together at [53] to [56].
8. The Judge set out their conclusions on the very compelling circumstances test using a balance sheet approach, ultimately concluding that the Appellant had not shown very compelling circumstances.
9. Accordingly, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal
10. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal raising four grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision and findings. These grounds can be summarised as follows:
(i) Ground 1 – that the Judge misdirected themselves in considering the Appellant’s appeal against an exceptionality requirement, which in turn infected the Judge’s findings and decision on proportionality;
(ii) Ground 2 – the Judge erred in his consideration of the public interest failing to take relevant matters into consideration when assessing the Appellant’s involvement in the offence committed. Other submissions were made under this heading asserting that the Judge failed to take into consideration the Appellant’s rehabilitation, the length of his residence in the UK and the duration of any exclusion order against him;
(iii) Ground 3 – the Judge misdirected themselves when considering the test of “very significant obstacles to integration” in Zambia;
(iv) Ground 4 – the Judge misdirected themselves in conducting the proportionality assessment.
11. A different judge of the FtT granted permission to appeal to the Appellant noting that the grounds of appeal passed the test of being arguable, which the judge granting permission also described as being a “very low” test. The judge observed that the grounds of appeal were well explained and needed no further elucidation from them.
12. In response, the Respondent did not seek to file and serve a reply under Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules.
13. At the hearing, both parties’ advocates made further oral submissions on each of the grounds of appeal pursued by the Appellant and Mr Wain, on behalf of the Respondent, defended the FtT’s decision. I have addressed the Appellant’s written pleadings and the parties’ respective oral submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
14. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision and provide this below with my reasons.
Analysis and conclusions
The Appellant’s first ground of appeal
15. Addressing the Appellant’s first ground of appeal first, I am satisfied that this ground amounts to no more than a mere disagreement with the Judge’s conclusions. Contrary to the Appellant’s submissions, the Judge did not adopt the citation from NA (Pakistan) at [53] as a legal test and did not impose a test of exceptionality.
16. At para (c) of the Appellant’s second ground, the Appellant submitted that s.117C(6) of the 2002 “requires a full proportionality assessment, weighing the interference with the Article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. The relevant factors to be taken into consideration being those under s.117C (4) and s.117C(5) NIAA 2002 and those identified by ECtHR as being relevant to the proportionality assessment under Article 8 ECHR. See: Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR 24 the ECtHR, ; [sic] Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and Üner v The Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14, HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22: at 51.” That is indeed correct and that is what the Judge did.
17. The Appellant does not otherwise particularise how the Judge is said to have limited their consideration of the Appellant’s appeal to the citation from NA (Pakistan) and how this is said to have infected the proportionality assessment conducted, as was submitted at (d).
18. As I have already referred to above at para 8, the Judge drew together all relevant considerations in a balance sheet with the factors in favour of the Appellant at [56] and the factors weighing in favour of the strong public interest and the Respondent’s decision at [37]-[41]. The factors at [56] also followed a more detailed consideration of the Appellant’s circumstances at [42]-[52], which is in addition to the Judge’s consideration of the Appellant’s case under the first exception contained in s.117C(4) at [17]-[33]. It is also clear that the Judge directed themselves correctly to the relevant guidance and case-law on the threshold of ‘very compelling circumstances’. The Appellant’s submissions under Ground 1 appear to take the Judge’s correct and appropriate citation of NA (Pakistan) at [53] of their decision in isolation.
19. I agree entirely with Mr Wain, who submitted in response that the Judge has very carefully gone through all of the relevant factors that they were required to consider within the proportionality assessment and has reached very clear and well-reasoned findings in respect of the competing interests in this appeal.
The Appellant’s second ground of appeal
20. Under this ground, the Appellant first set out extracts from the criminal judge’s sentencing remarks, which record the Appellant not being involved in the “predicate crimes”, which “took the form of sophisticated computer hacking, frauds on individuals and companies both in the UK and internationally”. Further that the Appellant’s culpability was to be assessed (within the criminal trial) under the relevant guidelines as “medium”, which was a matter that was agreed to between both the prosecution and the defence. The sentencing judge further added that the Appellant “played a very important role with the administration of the money laundering enterprise. However, I accept that does not fall within the highest end of the ranges.”
21. In this context, the Appellant argued in this ground that the Judge failed to take the above into consideration when assessing the seriousness of the offence, which amounts to a material error in law since these matters were mitigation in favour of the Appellant. In addition, the Appellant submitted that the Appellant’s rehabilitation and his assessment of being at low risk of re-offending were matters which clearly carried “some weight” and should have formed part of the Judge’s proportionality assessment.
22. Firstly, with regards to the nature of the Appellant’s offending, this is considered in detail by the Judge at [37]-[41]. It is clear from a fair reading of this passage that the Judge had very plainly understood the Appellant’s role in the offending and that this concerned the “laundering of the proceeds” as opposed to the hacking of the computers and so on. The sentencing remarks relied upon by the Appellant at para (a) under ground 2 are again cited in isolation without noting the sentencing judge’s other remarks, quite properly considered by the Judge, at [38] and [41], and which include that “no doubt that (the Appellant) was expecting large rewards at some stage in return for his knowing and important assistance to the enterprise”, that he played a “very important role with the administration of a money laundering enterprise” and that the Appellant’s participation was “long”.
23. In addition, the Judge has also plainly taken into consideration the factors in mitigation, which had also been considered by the sentencing judge, and which the Judge summarised at the end of [38].
24. Secondly, with regards to the Appellant’s rehabilitation, as the Appellant himself noted at (d), the Judge was unequivocal in accepting that the Appellant had both rehabilitated and was also at a low risk of re-offending. The Judge noted at [43] that the Appellant had rehabilitated. The Judge returned to this at [56] where they stated as follows:
“I therefore accept that the appellant is rehabilitated, although this does not attract significant weight in the proportionality balance: see HA (Iraq) at [58].”
25. Mr Ahmed, on behalf of the Appellant, submitted, both in the written grounds of appeal and orally, that in stating that the Appellant’s rehabilitation did “not attract significant weight” fell into error since this was contrary to Lord Hamblen’s observation at [58] in HA (Iraq).
26. For ease, I re-produce this passage of Lord Hamblen’s guidance immediately below:
“58. Given that the weight to be given to any relevant factor in the proportionality assessment will be a matter for the fact finding tribunal, no definitive statement can be made as to what amount of weight should or should not be given to any particular factor. It will necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of the case. I do not, however, consider that there is any great difference between what was stated in Binbuga and by the Court of Appeal in this case. In a case where the only evidence of rehabilitation is the fact that no further offences have been committed then, in general, that is likely to be of little or no material weight in the proportionality balance. If, on the other hand, there is evidence of positive rehabilitation which reduces the risk of further offending then that may have some weight as it bears on one element of the public interest in deportation, namely the protection of the public from further offending. Subject to that clarification, I would agree with Underhill LJ’s summary of the position at para 141 of his judgment:
“What those authorities seem to me to establish is that the fact that a potential deportee has shown positive evidence of rehabilitation, and thus of a reduced risk of re-offending, cannot be excluded from the overall proportionality exercise. The authorities say so, and it must be right in principle in view of the holistic nature of that exercise. Where a tribunal is able to make an assessment that the foreign criminal is unlikely to re-offend, that is a factor which can carry some weight in the balance when considering very compelling circumstances. The weight which it will bear will vary from case to case, but it will rarely be of great weight bearing in mind that, as Moore-Bick LJ says in Danso, the public interest in the deportation of criminals is not based only on the need to protect the public from further offending by the foreign criminal in question but also on wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern. I would add that tribunals will properly be cautious about their ability to make findings on the risk of re-offending, and will usually be unable to do so with any confidence based on no more than the undertaking of prison courses or mere assertions of reform by the offender or the absence of subsequent offending for what will typically be a relatively short period.””
27. It cannot in any way be argued that the Judge did not heed the guidance handed down by the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq). That includes that where there is evidence of positive rehabilitation, which reduces the risk of further offending, as was the case in this appeal on the Judge’s findings at [43]-44] and [56(b)], that may have some weight as it bears on one element of the public interest in deportation, namely the protection of the public from further offending.
28. Lord Hamblen did not seek to define the approach to take any further or, for obvious reasons, what “some weight” might otherwise mean or entail. This is because of what Lord Hamblen very clearly stated at the start of para 58 of his judgment: the weight to be attached to a particular factor or piece of evidence is clearly a matter for the trial judge and will necessarily depend on the particular facts of the given case.
29. In stating that the Appellant’s rehabilitation and low risk of re-offending did not attract “significant weight” is therefore not an error of law. Plainly, the Judge attached some weight to this, as they were plainly required to do by a leading authority. Mr Ahmed submitted that the Judge’s approach was not clear as they did not expressly state what weight they had attached to this issue. I do not consider that such a forensic approach assists when plainly there were many competing factors for the Judge to consider and to weigh in the balance. The Judge took all relevant considerations into account and confirmed with sufficient reasoning what assisted the Appellant in that balancing exercise and what went against him or in favour of the Respondent. For the reasons above, I am satisfied that this ground of appeal does not disclose any error of law.
30. For completeness, I address briefly the Appellant’s submissions at (b)-(c) of ground 2 that the Judge failed to take into consideration that “very serious reasons were required to justify expulsion”, pursuant to the authority of Maslov, and in a context of an exclusion for an indefinite period. It is plainly the case from the Judge’s decision that they had at the forefront of their mind the statutory regime attached to deportation appeals and the seriousness of the offences committed by the Appellant. It would be perverse of the Appellant to argue that his offences were not sufficiently serious so as to justify deportation action being taken against him - the length of his sentence and the statutory regime underpins this. It is also trite to note that considerations of expulsion are not limited either to offences involving violence.
The Appellant’s third and fourth ground of appeal
31. I address these two remaining grounds of appeal together as these overlap with each other and with the earlier two first grounds. At (b) of the third ground, the Appellant reiterated the nature of his residence in the UK (since he was three years old) and his case in relation to whether he could re-integrate Zambia on return there. The Appellant submitted at (e) that “(h)ad these factors been properly considered in their entirety. [sic] The appellant’s circumstances were capable and went towards demonstrating that there would be “significant obstacles to integration” in Zambia. The finding reached by the FTTJ are therefore contrary / inconsistent with the evidence and the correct legal principles.”
32. This ground is otherwise unparticularised and I am satisfied that it amounts to no more than a mere disagreement with the Judge’s detailed and well reasoned findings set out at [23]-[33]. Those findings are not otherwise engaged with or addressed by the Appellant.
33. At (c), the Appellant argued that the Judge erred in failing to take into consideration that there is no published Home Office – Country Information Note on Zambia. It is not at all clear why that is said to amount to an error of law. Both parties had ample opportunity to submit the evidence upon which they wished to rely on before the FtT and it is not particularised why it is said that a lack of a CPIN has led the Judge into error.
34. Turning to the last remaining ground, this merely attempts to re-argue the same points made under Ground 3 in the context of the first statutory exception to deportation contained in s.117C(4) and the same points raised under the first two grounds relating to the taking of irrelevant factors into account or the failing of taking relevant matters into account. For the reasons set out above under the first three grounds of appeal, I am satisfied that there is nothing in this ground either and the Judge has not erred in law in dismissing the Appellant’s appeal.
Notice of Decision
35. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and the decision shall stand. The Appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17.09.2025