Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002155

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/00737/2024
PA/00737/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WILLIAMS

Between

MK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Brown of Counsel, instructed by GMIAU
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 9 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, a national of Iraq, appeals with permission a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’) dismissing his asylum and human rights appeal. The decision of the Judge was sent to the parties on 14th February 2025.

Background

2. The appellant entered the United Kingdom in March 2017. He made a protection claim which was refused by the respondent and subsequently dismissed on appeal by First-tier Tribunal Judge Lloyd on 9th October 2019. Subsequently, the appellant made a further submissions claim to the respondent which was refused on 7th July 2023. The appellant exercised his right of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal, and his appeal came before the Judge on 5th February 2025.

The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

3. The appellant was represented by Mr Brown as he was before us. The respondent was represented by a Presenting Officer. The appellant did not attend the hearing because of illness. The hearing proceeded by way of submissions from both advocates only. In his reserved decision, the Judge identified the issues in dispute and made a number of salient findings.

4. As far as his protection claim was concerned, the Judge found the appellant had not shown he was at risk from the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Kirkuk, nor was he at risk from Mr SS. The Judge noted the findings of Judge Lloyd in relation to family members in Iraq and found they could assist the appellant by giving him his CSID which was in their possession.

5. The Judge also found the appellant had no political profile in Iraq before he left, and that his sur place activity would not place him at risk from the Iraqi authorities, the Popular Mobilisation Forces or the Government of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The Judge concluded the appellant had not discharged the burden in showing he was entitled to protection.

6. The Judge found that the appellant’s claim to have lost contact with his family in Iraq was undermined by his own evidence. A Covid‑19 Test Information Form from August 2021, bearing his father’s correct details, showed that his father had been to the IKR, was regarded as a citizen, and had accessed medical services. Taken together with the lack of adequate evidence regarding Red Cross tracing enquiries, the Judge found that the appellant has maintained contact with family members in Iraq.

7. The Judge then considered the medical evidence before him which included a letter from Mr Hendy CPN, describing significant psychotic and depressive symptoms requiring support, and a report from Dr Stevens diagnosing schizoaffective disorder. However, the Judge found deficiencies in Dr Stevens’ report, including unclear direct clinical contact, limited reference to supporting material, and failure to consider the Appellant’s wider family in Iraq who could provide care.

8. Applying the Article 3 test, the judge accepted the Appellant was a ‘seriously ill person’ but found that he had not demonstrated a real risk of inadequate treatment or inability to access treatment in Iraq. Despite weaknesses in the mental health system, relevant medications are available, and there was no persuasive evidence that treatment could not be accessed, particularly with the support of family both in Iraq and the UK.

9. Accordingly, the judge concluded that the Appellant had not established a prima facie Article 3 case and, in any event, adequate treatment would be accessible on return. The Judge then considered the appellant’s Article 8 claim. Whilst accepting the appellant had established family life with his father, and private life in the United Kingdom, the Judge noted the absence of any evidence from the appellant’s father.

10. The Judge considered the evidence of Mr Hendy, i.e. the needs the appellant had and how these were being met in the United Kingdom. Whilst the Judge indicated there was evidence before him (largely the appellant’s Facebook posts) showing a ‘very different picture’ to the medical evidence, he found the appellant’s needs could be met by his family in Iraq and that he could obtain treatment there. The Judge directed himself to the section 117B considerations of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and found the respondent’s decision was not a disproportionate interference with the appellant’s Article 8 rights.

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

11. The appellant sought permission to appeal on three grounds. First, the Judge had committed a procedural irregularity in his conclusions on the Covid-19 test of the appellant’s father without giving the representatives an opportunity to make submissions on the point. Secondly, the Judge had provided inadequate reasons for rejecting the medical evidence of Dr Stevens and Mr Hendy, and third, that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for his finding that the appellant could relocate within Iraq, taking into account his accepted poor mental health, against the test outlined in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813.

12. Permission was refused by First-tier Tribunal Judge Clarke on 23rd April 2025, but the appellant’s renewed application was granted on all grounds by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville. Judge Neville also gave permission for a letter of Dr Stevens dated 25th February 2025 to be relied on. It is on that basis that the appeal came before us sitting at Manchester Civil Justice Centre.

Submissions

13. Before us, Mr Brown relied on his grounds of appeal. In relation to ground one, the Judge had placed significant weight on the Covid-19 test result which had been provided in the respondent’s bundle. Whilst it was accepted the test result pertained to the appellant’s father, the Judge took the test (its salutation being ‘Dear Citizen’) as evidence of the Iraqi citizenship of the appellant’s father, and concluded the appellant was in contact with family in Iraq. The Judge had not ventilated the issues around the test at the hearing, and it was unfair to draw conclusions from it without giving an opportunity for the appellant, through Counsel, to respond.

14. Ground two was largely advanced on what appeared to be the Judge’s mistaken belief that Dr Stevens and the appellant had not in fact ever met. This was clarified by the letter of 25th February 2025, and it might have been that the Judge would have attached more weight to the medical evidence had he not laboured under a mistake of fact.

15. Ground three turned on the Judge’s inadequate reasons for finding, his poor mental health notwithstanding, that the appellant could return to Iraq. Judge Lloyd had found the appellant could not return to Kirkuk, which is where the appellant’s family were living. In those circumstances, he would be going to the IKR where he had no family support and would not be able to integrate as a result.

16. In reply, Mr Tan submitted that the Judge’s consideration of the Covid-19 test made no difference to the outcome of the appeal. The appellant lived with his father in the United Kingdom and so his father’s citizenship was irrelevant. It was the appellant who adduced the Covid-19 test to the respondent without any explanation as to how it helped his claim. Any error in the Judge’s treatment of this document could not be said to be material to the decision.

17. Looking at the second ground, it was accepted the Judge appeared to question whether or not Dr Stevens had met the appellant. It was difficult to see how this affected the Judge’s consideration of the evidence. There were issues with the medical evidence which would not have been addressed even if the Judge had not made the mistake as to their meeting. The Judge accepted, as the respondent did, that the appellant has mental health problems. The issue of causation is what the Judge was considering, at [56] he noted there were two possible reasons for the appellant’s poor mental health; trauma (the cause of which was not established) or heredity (the Judge noting his father did not seem to be as adversely affected).

18. As far as the final ground was concerned, there was limited evidence before the Judge of the appellant’s private life in the United Kingdom. There were clear reasons given at [57] as to why the appellant could reintegrate into Iraqi society. The appellant seemed to be arguing that the appellant should have a more involved private life in the country of origin than in the United Kingdom. The appellant’s life in the United Kingdom is focused on his father, largely staying at home. There would be no real difference between his present circumstances and those upon return to Iraq. Mr Brown briefly pointed out there was a support structure in the United Kingdom which would not be replicated in Iraq.

Analysis and Findings

19. Turning to ground one, we agree with Mr Brown’s submission that the Judge ought to have elicited further evidence about the relevance of the Covid-19 test which appeared in the papers. It is unclear what the relevance of the document was, as that was not explained by either party: the appellant had provided the document to the Home Office with his further submissions, and the respondent had then reproduced it in her bundle for the hearing.

20. Taken at its highest, the Covid-19 test indicated that the appellant’s father had travelled to Iraq in the summer of 2021. We agree that the salutation ‘Dear Citizen’ did not, without more, establish that the appellant’s father was a citizen of the IKR: we note in any event there is no discrete citizenship of the IKR, simply citizenship of Iraq. It was certainly not capable of demonstrating that he lives there: in fact, the same document described him as a ‘tourist’. Moreover, the Respondent had accepted that the appellant lives with his father in the United Kingdom. In those circumstances it is hard to see how this gentleman’s presence in the IKR in the summer of 2021 established that the applicant still has family in the region. All of these points could have been made by Mr Brown had the Tribunal properly put him on notice of its concerns. We are not however satisfied that this error is material. That is because there was already a finding by the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant had other family members in the region. The presence or otherwise of his father did not add or detract materially from that finding.

21. Looking at the second ground advanced by the appellant, the starting point is that the respondent conceded the appellant suffered with the mental health problems identified by the medical evidence. The Judge records this concession at [10]. One of the primary complaints made by the appellant is that the Judge at [38] appeared to be of the view that Dr Stevens and the appellant had not actually met in person. We agree that this was a mistake of fact. On its face the evidence from Dr Stevens did say that the appellant was under his care, and having now had regard to the further evidence provided by the appellant, in which Dr Stevens states in terms that he had met the appellant personally, the error is clearly established. Again, the difficulty is in seeing the materiality of that.

22. We asked Mr Brown to identify where in the decision the Judge’s error about whether or not the appellant had met Dr Stevens had led to an erroneous view of the evidence. He could not, despite his best efforts, identify any point where the medical evidence was improperly considered. It may be that this remark by the Tribunal was intended to convey some criticism of Dr Stevens’ evidence, but a fair reading of the decision indicates the Judge did largely accept it, and indeed the medical evidence as a whole. At [45], the Judge concludes, notwithstanding his various criticisms of the evidence, that the appellant is a ‘seriously ill person’ within the Article 3 context. Further at [57], the Judge’s assessment of the appellant’s ability to integrate is undertaken on the basis of the appellant’s needs ‘as cited by Mr Hendy CPN’.

23. We do agree with Mr Brown that there are several points where the Judge expressed views on the evidence which respectfully, led nowhere. The way in which these ‘asides’ were expressed throughout the decision was less than helpful and, in our view, undermined the clarity of his findings. At [56] for example, the Judge seems to indicate the medical evidence stood contrary to the appellant’s social engagement as displayed on his Facebook page. Mr Brown rightly submits that this was unfair criticism because the activities reflected on the Facebook page all pre-dated the decline in the appellant’s mental health, but again this was not reasoning material to the outcome of the appeal. The comment was unfounded, but the judge ultimately accepted that the appellant’s needs are as laid out in the medical evidence.

24. The final ground centres on the Judge’s reasons for finding that the appellant could reintegrate into Iraq. We sought to establish at the hearing whether the Judge was looking at internal relocation to the IKR only, or whether the appellant could return to his home area of Kirkuk. Judge Lloyd, at [54] of her decision, found the appellant could not return to Kirkuk because it was a ‘contested area’ following AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG [2015] UKUT 00544 (IAC). This was the only reason given for finding the appellant could not return to Kirkuk, Judge Lloyd having rejected there was any fear of persecution at [45] of her decision.

25. Kirkuk’s status as a contested area being the only reason the appellant could not return there at the time of Judge Lloyd’s decision in 2019, we think it clear from our reading of the Judge’s decision that he had in his mind the reality the appellant could now return to Kirkuk. At [19] of his decision, the Judge directs himself to the current country guidance case of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC), which makes clear that Kirkuk is no longer a contested area. At [59] of his decision, the Judge finds the appellant could be met by one of his family members in Iraq who could ‘assist him on his journey back to Kirkuk’.

26. The Judge also referred to the findings of Judge Lloyd at [30], and concludes the appellant still has family members living in Iraq who could provide support to him upon return. The Judge found the appellant would have access to treatment in Iraq at [42] and also found the appellant would have the support of his family upon return [41]. He further took into account the ability of his family both in the United Kingdom and in Iraq to support him financially and physically [57].

27. We are satisfied that the Judge provided adequate reasons for finding there would not be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Iraq. There is some force in Mr Tan’s submission about the paucity of evidence showing the appellant had any form of private life beyond the passage of time in the United Kingdom. The evidence before the Judge indicated that the appellant spent all of his time being cared for by his father (who is also said to be unwell) at home. It is difficult to discern why in those circumstances the appellant could not live a similar life with the care and support of his family members in the country he spent the first 19 years of his life living in.

28. We recognise that SMO, when looking at the issue of return to a Formerly Contested Area such as Kirkuk, requires a ‘fact-sensitive, "sliding scale" assessment’ of the impact of personal characteristics against the situation in the area to which return is contemplated. Mr Brown submitted the appellant was an individual with disabilities, a matter which was not the subject of individualised assessment. We agree the appellant would come within this characterisation. We do not find however, that there was any evidence before the Judge capable of supporting a finding that such a disabled individual, supported by family members, would face any enhanced risk of harm there. We do not consider it reasonably likely that the appellant’s return to Kirkuk would result in either a breach of Article 3 ECHR or Article 15(b) of the Qualification Directive. We do not find any error is made out by the third ground.

29. In conclusion, whilst there are elements of the decision which could have been better expressed, we do not find there is any material error of law in the decision of the Judge, such that it should be set aside.

Notice of Decision

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law and shall stand.

CJ Williams

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11th February 2026