Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002156

First-tier Tribunal No: EU/50718/2024;
LE/02356/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant in UT
and

GUILHERME BATISTA DUTRA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent in UT

Representation:

For the Appellant in UT: Mr E Terrell, Senior Presenting Officer.
For the Respondent in UT: Mr G B Dutra, in person and legally unrepresented.

Heard at Field House on 14 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This decision is the re-making, under s.12 (2) (b) (ii) Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, of a First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) decision promulgated on 31st March 2025 but set aside by the Upper Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 25th September 2025 (‘the error of law decision’).
2. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘the Secretary of State’) is the Appellant in these proceedings, because Mr Dutra succeeded in his appeal before the FtT and the Secretary of State was granted permission to appeal against that decision. For ease of reference, however, I will refer to the parties as they were before the FtT. All further references to ‘the Appellant’ will therefore be to Mr Dutra and to ‘the Respondent’ will be to the Secretary of State.
3. My earlier decision setting aside the FtT’s decision is appended to this decision as a separate annex.
4. The Respondent’s decision refusing the Appellant’s EU Settlement Scheme (‘EUSS’) application is dated 12th January 2024.
The hearing
5. Mr Dutra has represented himself throughout these proceedings and this remained the case before me on 14th November 2025. Mr Dutra was assisted by a court interpreter in the Portuguese language and no issues were raised as to Mr Dutra’s understanding of the proceedings, of the hearing and his ability to present his case before me.
6. After resolving a pre-liminary issue as to evidence that I have addressed in more detail below at para 10, the Appellant adopted his witness statement dated 6th March 2024 as his evidence-in-chief and confirmed the factual accuracy and truth of the same. He was then cross-examined by Mr Terrell and Mr Dutra confirmed at the end that he had understood all of the questions asked of him, that he did not wish to clarify or add anything further.
7. Following the Appellant’s oral evidence, I heard legal submissions from Mr Terrell and Mr Dutra in response, after which I confirmed that I would be reserving my decision. I have addressed both parties’ competing evidence and submissions below when setting out my analysis and conclusions. I am sorry for the time that it has taken me to issue this decision, which has been as a result of my professional and other commitments in the time that has passed since the hearing.
The evidence
8. I had before me the consolidated bundle (‘TB’) prepared, filed and served by the Respondent in advance of the error of law hearing on 15th July 2025, consisting of 123 pages.
9. In advance of the re-making hearing on 14th November 2025 and in reply to the directions set out at para 29 of my error of law decision, neither party sought to adduce any further updating evidence.
10. Mr Dutra at the hearing sought to adduce a copy of a death certificate, issued in the UK, which he confirmed related to his late partner (and sponsor in his EUSS application) and copies of medical letters confirming his late partner’s medical treatment prior to him passing. Mr Terrell opposed the admission of these documents into evidence. He did so on two basis: first, that these had only been produced on the day of the hearing, despite the directions providing ample time to the Appellant to file and serve any evidence upon which he wished to rely; and second, relevance. With regards to the latter, Mr Terrell submitted that the documents did not assist the Appellant on the issues in dispute.
11. After hearing brief submissions from Mr Terrell and Mr Dutra on this issue, I refused to admit the further documents produced by Mr Dutra on the morning of the hearing. This was because, as submitted by Mr Terrell, these did not relate to the issues in dispute, namely whether false documents had been submitted in support of Mr Dutra’s application to the Respondent for leave to remain under the EUSS. I noted with the parties however that the Appellant, through the copy death certificate, confirmed that his husband had died on 14th October 2025.
12. I have given careful consideration to all of the written materials contained in the composite bundle, to the Appellant’s oral evidence before me and to the parties’ oral submissions. I do not summarise the contents of the evidence and submissions separately but refer to these, where necessary and relevant, in my analysis below.
Findings of fact and Conclusions
13. On 7th December 2022, the Appellant applied to the Respondent for leave under the EUSS as the husband of an EEA citizen, residing in the UK as at 31st December 2020. This application was refused on 12th January 2024 and the only issue raised by the Respondent concerned the suitability criteria as a result of the Respondent being satisfied that the Appellant’s marriage certificate provided in support of his application was false.
14. The reasons for the Respondent’s assessment and allegation were set out in detail in the Respondent’s review document dated 19th July 2024. I have summarised the enquiries that the Respondent made at the time of the refusal decision in this appeal and the reasons grounding her allegation at paras 4-7 of my error of law decision (annexed to this decision). However, as these were considered again as part of the re-making hearing, I summarise and set these out again as follows:
(a) The marriage certificate submitted with the application to the Respondent (TB [103]) was verified by the Respondent, using two separate security features that are contained in the document itself;
(b) In the top left corner of the marriage certificate there is stamp, which also contains a QR code. Alongside the QR code, there also appears the following sentence “Consulte a validade no site: https://selos.tjmg.jus.br” together with two other reference numbers. The first of these numbers is the SELO Digital reference (WOX33976) and the Cod Seg. (3659.6191.1913.3961). The marriage certificate itself contains the following ‘matricula’ reference number: 041749 55 2020 2 00084 076 0021243 26;
(c) The Respondent also set out in her review document that the ‘jus.br’ website domain address is run by the Brazilian judiciary – this has not been disputed by the Appellant;
(d) When using the QR code, the Respondent demonstrated in her review, and again with Mr Terrell during the hearing, that the code does not take the user to the website URL address https://selos.tjmg.jus.br, listed alongside the code, and referred to above. Nor does it take the user to any other address within the jus.br domain. Instead, the code directs the user to a website URL https://tjmg.consultaselo.com/sisnor/eselo/consultaSeloseAtos.php?selo=WOX33976&codigo=3397619119133961. A screenshot of this page was also helpfully annexed by the Respondent to her review document at annex 1 of that review (TB [117]);
(e) When accessing the second URL address referred to at (d) above, it can be seen that the SELO digital reference and Cod Seg. References (listed at (b) above) are in effect pre-filled in their relevant free-text boxes (TB [117]);
(f) When the user clicks on to the search tool box titled ‘consultar’, this takes the user to another page, which the Respondent stated purports to contain details regarding the Appellant’s marriage certificate (TB [118]). The Respondent submitted in her review document that this website page, also starting with the same address details as the second URL at (d) above (https://tjmg.consultaselo.com/sisnor/...), is a false website page, wholly designed to appear like the official website https://selos.tjmg.jus.br. She supports this with the submission that when a user tries to click on any of the other links or search boxes seemingly displayed on the first website page (accessed via the QR code, TB [117]), none of these actually work;
(g) The Respondent also explained that when a user accesses the main domain address of tjmg.consultaselo.com, a blank page ensues;
(h) The Respondent also accessed the official website of https://selos.tjmg.jus.br. She set out that when the same details (that appear already entered when the QR Code is used – see (e) above) are in-putted into that same website page, the search reveals no results or data held (TB [120]-[121]);
(i) Lastly, the Respondent also set out that it is possible to check to see whether the matricula registration number, which appears on the marriage certificate itself, is valid at the website:
https://funarpen.com.br/funarpen/menu_consulta/consultaCertidaoNova.php. When the Respondent did so, the result confirmed that the registration number entered “is invalid”. A screenshot of these two pages also appears annexed to the Respondent’s review (TB [122]-[123]);
15. All of the above steps carried out by the Respondent prior to her decision are detailed in her review document and include annexed screenshots displaying each page otherwise described and accessed by her. With Mr Terrell’s assistance, I was also able to go through each of these steps during the hearing, making my computer screen available and visible and explaining what I could see to both parties.
16. The Appellant was asked by Mr Terrell whether he agreed that the QR code in question (on the marriage certificate at TB [103] did not direct the user to the official Brazilian website that was otherwise listed on the marriage certificate, namely https://selos.tjmg.jus.br. The Appellant responded that he did not know, as he had not undertaken the verification of the QR code. When asked again, the Appellant stated that he thought that there had been a mistake at the time that this was being verified and when I asked him to clarify what he meant, he confirmed that he was not able to say whether he agreed or disagreed with what Mr Terrell was putting to him.
17. Mr Terrell very properly challenged Mr Dutra further on the QR code, explaining to him that this leads the user to a fake website, which was designed to look like the official Brazilian website used to verify official documents and matricula numbers. Mr Dutra stated in turn that he could not explain this; that he did not know; and that he did not accept that the marriage certificate was a false one.
18. When Mr Terrell asked Mr Dutra about the marriage certificate matricula number and other details contained in the certificate, specifically that when these are typed into the official Brazilian website the search does not produce any results, Mr Dutra responded as follows:
“I don’t know about that. I was paying an office to deal with my case but I never verified anything. I paid him to do everything that I needed to do”.
19. In answer to my questions in clarification, Mr Dutra confirmed that the office he referred to was on in the UK, that it was an office that his husband had liaised with and the marriage certificate at TB [103] was a document that had been obtained by the office as the Appellant himself did not have this in the UK. Mr Dutra confirmed that he had signed a power of attorney authorisation which permitted the office to obtain any documentation that they needed to send to the Home Office.
20. Whilst the Respondent has been very clear in her refusal decision and in her review document as to the nature of the allegations against the Appellant, the Appellant’s answers in oral evidence were avoidant and at times unclear. As was the case in his written statement, the Appellant maintained that the documents submitted in support of his appeal in the FtT and in response to the Respondent’s refusal decision confirmed the validity and lawfulness of his marriage to his husband. These documents and the Appellant’s evidence do not however, in my view, address the nature of the allegations raised by the Respondent nor the information that she put forward in relation to the version of the Appellant’s marriage certificate submitted in support of his application to the Respondent.
21. As can be seen from my summary of the Appellant’s oral evidence before me, the Appellant was not able to provide any explanation for the Respondent’s verification checks nor did he take any responsibility for this. Neither has the Appellant provided any evidence, in any form, to dispute or otherwise correct what the Respondent has alleged. I acknowledge that the Appellant has been unrepresented legally but I drew his attention to the seriousness of the allegations raised against him at para 29 and 30 of my error of law decision and gave the Appellant a further opportunity to file and serve any evidence that he may wish to rely on in support of his position in response to the reasons for refusal raised by the Respondent. For whatever reason, the Appellant has decided not to avail himself of that opportunity.
22. For this reason and those above, I conclude that the Appellant has not been a reliable witness and I attach little weight to his written and oral evidence. I also agree with Mr Terrell that the Appellant was reluctant at the start of his oral evidence before me to answer questions about the marriage certificate, which appears at TB [103] and that much of his evidence was vague and lacked detail. This was particularly so when the questions asked were clear and in my view straight forward. Further, I conclude from the Appellant’s evidence, which emerged towards the end of his questioning - that it was not him who had obtained the marriage certificate at TB [103] – to indicate that the Appellant was likely seeking to distance himself from the document and falsehood in question.
23. Applying the relevant guidance and authorities, I am satisfied that the Respondent has demonstrated that the marriage certificate submitted to her in support of the Appellant’s application is false and that consequently deception was used.
24. As I have considered above, the Appellant has not provided any response of substance to the allegations raised by the Respondent. He has not offered any explanation. Following the detailed steps undertaken and demonstrated again during the hearing by the Respondent, I am entirely satisfied that there is no rational explanation as to why the marriage certificate contains the QR code that it does, that this results in the different website pages that I have summarised above, and why the marriage certificate matricula number could not be verified by the Respondent using the website https://selos.tjmg.jus.br.
25. The only explanation that I can possibly reach from all of this information, very diligently corroborated by screenshots and a detailed review document by the Respondent, is that the marriage certificate is not a valid and lawful one. On the balance of probabilities, I conclude that it is a false document, within the meaning explored in detail by the Court of Appeal in AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 773.
26. Mr Terrell also submitted that it is not likely that Mr Dutra would not know that the document that he submitted, or was submitted on his behalf, was a false one. Considering the centrality and importance of the document in question, I agree.
27. Whilst I acknowledge that Mr Dutra submitted different documents in response to the Respondent’s refusal, which he states demonstrate his lawful and valid marriage to his sponsor, none of these address, whether directly or indirectly, the marriage certificate previously submitted. The Respondent’s reasonable view was that this certificate was false and that this a view that I have upheld on my findings. None of this is addressed by the Appellant’s further documents. Nor, as I have already considered above, does the Appellant’s written or oral evidence address this either.
28. I should also add that the Appellant provided information at para 10 of his witness statement that he has included in his appeal bundle (before the FtT) “official evidence from the official Brazilian registers irpen.org.br that (his) certificate is genuine”. The website page that the Appellant referred to appears at TB [50] and does it would appear set out a result confirming that his marriage certificate with the same matricula number is valid. However, this is a different website (https://arpenpr.org.br/consultaCertidao.php) from that accessed by the Respondent. Furthermore, Mr Terrell submitted that this page could not be accessed when the Respondent attempted to do so and the Appellant has not provided evidence, or any explanation, to address this discrepancy. For this reason, Mr Terrell submitted that the evidence provided by the Respondent in support of her decision, and not addressed by the Appellant, should be preferred – I agree.
29. For all the reasons above, I am satisfied that the Respondent has demonstrated that the marriage certificate submitted by the Appellant, or on his behalf, to support his EUSS application is a false document and that deception was used accordingly. I have also considered the proportionality of the Respondent’s decision but agree with the Respondent that the seriousness of this deception and the lack of explanation provided by the Appellant, throughout his application and these proceedings, mean that the Respondent’s decision was proportionate.
30. It follows from the above that the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 12th January 2024 falls to be dismissed.
Notice of Decision
31. The decision of the FtT dated 31st March 2025 did involve the making of material error(s) of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the earlier decision of mine dated 25th September 2025, hereby annexed.
32. I re-make the decision by dismissing Mr Dutra’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 12th January 2024 on all grounds.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

02.02.2026

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002156

First-tier Tribunal Nos: EU/50718/2024
LE/02356/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

25/09/2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant in UT(IAC)
and

GUILHERME BATISTA DUTRA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent in UT(IAC)

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr N Wain, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
For the Respondent: Mr Dutra, in person and assisted by a court interpreter in the Portuguese (Brazilian) language.

Heard at Field House on 15 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. For ease of reference, I will refer to the parties as they appeared below, namely the Secretary of State for the Home Department as the Respondent, and the Mr Dutra as the Appellant.
2. The Respondent Secretary of State appeals the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 31st March 2025. In this decision, the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT / the Judge’) allowed the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 12th January 2024. The Appellant had applied to the Respondent on 7th December 2022 under Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules as the partner of a Portuguese national with settled status. The Appellant claims to have married his partner on 11th September 2020.
3. The Appellant’s appeal at first instance turned on the Respondent’s allegation that the Appellant’s marriage certificate was not a valid certificate but was a false document.
Factual and procedural background
4. The Appellant is a citizen of Brazil. As already referred to, the Respondent has alleged that the Appellant’s marriage certificate provided in support of his application is false. The Respondent stated in her Reasons for Refusal Letter that after conducting internal Home Office checks, the Home Office considered the document to be false. The Respondent sent on 14th March 2023 to the Appellant an email notifying him that they were considering refusing his application and setting out further details of those allegations. The appellant responded to this request but the Respondent considered that he had failed to adequately address the allegation of deception, nor had he provided sufficient reason why the respondent should not refuse his application. The Respondent concluded in her decision that she was satisfied that the refusal was appropriate and proportionate.
5. Further details of the Home Office enquiries referred to in the decision were then included in the Respondent’s review of their decision dated 19th July 2024. In summary, those enquiries included a verification conducted by members of the EUSS intelligence team at the Home Office using two separate security features contained within the marriage certificate. It is then explained that the document contains a QR code and two other reference numbers. Checks were conducted in respect of those QR codes and reference numbers, which are fully detailed as already referred to in the Respondent’s review and which I do not rehearse in full here.
6. In brief, the Respondent submitted that the QR codes detailed on the Appellant’s marriage certificate lead to a website that appears to be of the Brazilian Judiciary/relevant authority and which appears to confirm the authenticity of the marriage certificate. However, on closer inspection, the website address is not of the Brazilian authorities and is a different website address1 all together with the website pages accessed (and the URL) designed to look like that of the Brazilian Judiciary/authorities. Screenshots of these website pages were included with the Respondent’s review dated 19th July 2024.
7. The Respondent also submitted having checked the matricula registration number included on the marriage certificate provided by the Appellant against the Brazilian authorities’ website - https://selos.tjmg.jus.br - and the results of those enquiries confirmed that the registration number was invalid. Similarly, the Respondent disclosed the evidence relating to these checks when filing and serving their review and these now appear at pp.117-123 of the consolidated appeal bundle prepared for this hearing.
8. The Appellant’s appeal was heard by the Judge on 31st March 2025.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
9. In allowing the appeal and, insofar as is relevant to these proceedings, the Judge’s findings of fact and conclusions include the following:
a. The Judge found at [12] that the marriage certificate was genuine based on the documentation provided by the Appellant;
b. The Judge noted also at [12] that the refusal letter did not give reasons why the Respondent doubted the authenticity of his documents but in the same sentence, the Judge recorded that the Respondent’s review did set out the verification steps undertaken. The Judge then went on to summarise the aspects that raised concern with the Respondent, which I have briefly summarised above.
c. The Judge turned to the Appellant’s explanation at [13] recording as follows:
“Having considered the respondent’s position, I turn to the appellant’s explanation”.
The Judge then listed the documents provided by the Appellant, which included a copy of his marriage certificate, officially translated, and a sealed document entitled ‘Online Verification Status’, which he relied on to demonstrate the validity of the marriage certificate. The Judge also recorded that the Appellant had provided a screenshot showing that the matricula number was valid and this did not appear to be the same website link that the Respondent had relied upon. Further details of the Appellant’s documents were also included at [14].
d. At [15], the Judge confirmed that, having considered matters carefully and being very mindful of the obligation to take into account the Respondent’s evidence that the document was a forgery, on balance the Appellant had satisfied the burden of proof in demonstrating that the document was genuine. The Judge also stated as follows:
“Whilst the marriage certificate looks genuine to me, I accept that if doubt is cast upon it, further verification is necessary. I do not rely on my own view of this single document. The appellant has now provided a number of other supporting documents, such as evidence of the validity of the matriculation number, the apostille as well as the certificate from the state court. These documents lead me to the conclusion that the document is genuine. Based on this finding I need not consider the secondary issue, and the appeal succeeds”.
10. Accordingly, the Judge allowed the Appellant’s appeal.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
11. The Respondent applied for permission to appeal raising four grounds of appeal against the Judge’s findings, which all effectively go to the same issue, namely whether the Judge erred in law in failing to resolve the conflicts between the Respondent’s and the Appellant’s evidence and in the alternative, in failing to give adequate reasons for his findings reached in favour of the Appellant concerning that same documentation.
12. A different judge of the First-tier Tribunal granted permission to appeal to the Respondent on 14th May 2025 noting that the grounds were arguable for the reasons pursued and summarised above.
13. In response, the Appellant did not seek to send in to the Tribunal a reply under Rule 24 of the Procedure Rules.
14. At the hearing, the Appellant represented himself and was not legally represented. This had also been the case at first instance. In light of this, I took time to explain the procedures for the hearing to the Appellant and the issues that he needed to address. I took some time to summarise the issues taken by the Respondent in their appeal and the Appellant confirmed that he understood. The Appellant was assisted by a Portuguese (Brazilian) interpreter and after the necessary checks, he confirmed that he had no difficulty in understanding and speaking with/through the court interpreter.
15. I then heard oral submissions from Mr Wain elaborating on the grounds of appeal prepared by his predecessor and heard from the Appellant himself in response. The Appellant wished to emphasise that he had provided all of the necessary documents to the Judge at first instance and had answered all of the questions put to him, whether by the Home Office Presenting Officer or the Judge. I have addressed the Respondent’s written pleadings and the parties’ respective oral submissions in the section below when setting out my analysis and conclusions. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision and provide this below with my reasons.
Analysis and conclusions
16. I address all of the grounds pursued by the Respondent together since these overlap with each other and concern the same issue, namely whether or not the Judge resolved the issues in dispute before him, the conflicts in the parties’ respective evidence and/or gave adequate reasons for his findings.
17. Whilst the Judge noted the aspects of the Respondent’s evidence, which supported her position in alleging that the Appellant’s marriage certificate was false at [12], the Judge did not make any findings or make any observations on that evidence in his decision. I acknowledge that the Judge confirmed that he had considered the Respondent’s position but there is nothing further detailed about that consideration.
18. Almost immediately thereafter, the Judge turned to the Appellant’s evidence, which appeared to have consisted of mainly new documents, i.e. post-decision, not submitted to the Respondent with the initial application. In addition, the Judge set out at [13] that he turned to consider the Appellant’s explanation. However, there is no detail of that explanation nor any narrative in response to the allegations made by the Respondent from the Appellant either summarised or considered in the Judge’s decision.
19. It appears therefore that in addressing the Appellant’s “explanation”, the Judge in fact turned to further evidence that the Appellant had obtained and had submitted in support of his appeal at first instance. The Judge then went through that evidence at [13] to [14] reaching his conclusion at [15], which I have summarised above.
20. In light of the above, I agree with the Respondent that the Judge has failed to make findings on the verification checks conducted by the Home Office and whether those were sufficient first, to raise a reasonable suspicion, and second to discharge the burden of proof that rests with the Respondent to prove their allegation that the Appellant had submitted a false document. I also agree with the Respondent, in effect for the reasons pursued under the Respondent’s second ground of appeal, that what the Judge has done in his decision is merely prefer the Appellant’s subsequent evidence without addressing the earlier documentation and the Respondent’s concerns in respect of the same. That is not sufficient in a case raising allegations of false documents.
21. It was necessary of the Judge to consider the allegations made by the Respondent and whether these were well-founded and to consider any explanation forthcoming from the Appellant. In the absence of any explanation, whether this further supported the Respondent’s position.
22. Following this, it was incumbent upon the Judge to consider the Appellant’s subsequent evidence and whether this could be relied upon and was capable of displacing the allegation raised by the Respondent. The Judge did not do any of this and that, in my judgment, is sufficient for me to conclude that the Judge made material errors of law. The main issue in this case concerned the Respondent’s allegations of a false document having been submitted by the Appellant. Whilst the Judge recorded the enquiries made by the Respondent leading to her allegations, the Judge does not make any findings on the Respondent’s assessment and instead considers the Appellant’s further documentation in apparent isolation. In effect, the Judge has failed to make a finding on whether or not the document submitted by the Appellant to the Respondent with his application was false, the central issue in this appeal.
23. In light of the above, I am satisfied that material errors of law were made by the Judge as pursued by the Respondent in each of her grounds of appeal and I am therefore satisfied that the Judge’s decision to allow the appeal should be set aside pursuant to Section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
24. I have considered and applied the guidance in paragraph 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement as well as the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC). I am satisfied that it is appropriate to retain this appeal for re-making in the Upper Tribunal. This is because the issues raised in this appeal are relatively narrow and there is limited fact-finding that remains to be made.
25. Both parties are to pay particular attention to the directions set out below.
Notice of Decision and Directions
26. The decision of the FtT dated 31st March 2025 contained material errors of law and is set aside, with no findings of fact preserved.
27. The appeal will be listed for a further hearing, for re-making, in no earlier than six weeks from the date of this decision. A separate Notice of Hearing will be sent out to the parties. The time estimate for the appeal hearing will be three hours and will be heard by Judge Pinder.
28. A Portuguese (Brazilian) interpreter will be arranged for the next hearing for the Appellant.
29. Both parties are to send in to the Tribunal any further evidence upon which they wish to rely in support of their respective positions within 28 days of the date on which this decision is sent to the parties. This may include, but need not be limited to, any response or explanation from Mr Dutra on the matters recorded by the Home Office in the review document written by Mr Terrell dated 19th July 2024, annexing the evidence relied upon by the Respondent, and which was sent to the Appellant in advance of the appeal hearing in the FtT. This also appears at pp.112-123 of the consolidated appeal bundle prepared by the Home Office in preparation for the hearing in the Upper Tribunal on 15th July 2025.
30. This appeal raises serious allegations against Mr Dutra and Mr Dutra may wish to seek specialist legal representation to assist him with preparing for and in presenting the next appeal hearing.
31. I am sorry for the time that it has taken for me to prepare and send this decision, I was on leave shortly after the hearing and did not manage to get this finalised before-hand.

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10.09.2025