Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002160

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56933/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 11 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KAMARA

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

B K
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S. Alvarez, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr E. Tufan, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
BACKGROUND
1. The Appellant, a citizen of Albania, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Mulholland dated 7 April 2025 (“the Decision”), which dismissed her appeal under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 8 September 2023, refusing her protection claim made on 21 April 2021.
2. The basis of the appellant’s protection claim is that she is a recognised victim of trafficking.
3. The appellant was born in Albania in 1996. In December 2018, she met her ex-boyfriend, who worked in Belgium and travelled between Belgium and Albania. She hid her relationship from her family. He eventually persuaded the appellant to travel to Belgium, which she did in June 2019, bringing her mother with her. The appellant then immediately journeyed to a different part of Belgium, abandoning her mother to live with her boyfriend. Her boyfriend told the appellant that he had obtained for her a job in a salon, and that her wages would be paid to him. In September 2019, the appellant complained to the salon manager that a client had made sexual advances towards her. When the boyfriend heard of this, he locked her up in their shared home and became violent. The appellant was forced to work as a prostitute at the salon until, in December 2019, she arrived clandestinely in a lorry in the UK.
4. The appellant claimed asylum on 20 May 2021. There was a positive reasonable grounds decision on 26 May 2021; and a positive conclusive grounds decision on 3 August 2023. However, asylum was refused on 8 September 2023.
5. The appellant’s only child was born in July 2024.
6. First-tier Judge Mulholland (“the judge”) dismissed the appellant’s appeal (“the decision”) on 7 April 2025. In her decision, she recorded at [7] the issues that were agreed by the parties as being live. They were:
“(a) Whether, as an accepted victim of trafficking, any person subject to a positive conclusive ground’s decision, the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Albania.
(b) Whether she can rely on the Albanian authorities for protection.
(c) Whether she can internally relocate.”
7. Significantly, the judge recorded at [6] the following areas of agreement:
“It has been accepted that the Appellant was a victim of exploitation and that she fears her family because of this and because she abandoned her mother in Belgium. It has not been accepted that her family have disowned her and would not offer support or that she is at risk on return as she left Albania and went to Belgium…”
8. The appellant’s grounds of appeal are dated 8 April 2025 and are considered in turn below. Permission to appeal was granted generally by First-tier Tribunal Judge Parkes on 16 May 2025.
9. We have before us a 729-page Bundle and have been assisted by oral submissions from both parties.
DISCUSSION
10. Ground 1 submits that the judge’s appearing to have made an adverse credibility finding against the appellant, on the basis that she did not discuss the possibility of reconciling with her family living in Albania, is (a) irrational, and/or (b) procedurally unfair. We set out the relevant findings made by the judge in this respect.
“…She [the appellant] has not discussed the possibility of a reconciliation with her family with her sister and they have made no attempt to contact each other. She had not asked her sister if she was in contact with her family in Albania. This lacks credibility. [9]
The Appellant asserts that her family have disowned her and will kill her if returned. It is difficult to accept that the Appellant who is facing the prospect of removal would have made no attempt, either herself or through her sister, in an attempt at reconciliation.” [10]
11. As set out above, [6] records that the respondent accepted that the appellant accepted that the appellant feared her family. It is further argued that, in the context of the refusal letter dated 8 September 2023, the finding is irrational on the common-sense basis that the appellant would not contact a family that she feared. Moreover, it is argued that the decision is procedurally unfair because, the issue of whether she feared her family appearing not to be a live one between the parties, the appellant was not given proper opportunity to address the judge’s concerns. On this latter point, the appellant relies upon AM (fair hearing) (Sudan) v SSHD [2015] UKUT 656, MM (Sudan) (unfairness E & R) v SSHD [2014] UKUT 105 and SA v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 357 for the proposition that, for the hearing to be fair, an issue which has not been ventilated by the parties should be flagged up by the judge, if the judge proposes to make a finding on that issue.
12. The refusal letter dated 8 September 2023 reflects closely the respondent’s position as set out at [6]: acceptance that the appellant fears her family, but not that her family would disown her or fail to support her. Paragraph 11 of that refusal letter specifically accepts that the appellant left her mother in Belgium. We have also been referred to the appellant’s asylum interview dated 17 March 2023 on the issue of the appellant’s fear of her family, where she says in her response to question 44 “I also fear my family. They have disowned me. I know for sure if I return to Albania I will be killed.”; and to question 45 “I fear my own family and the extended family”.
13. Returning to the decision, we note at [29] that the judge accepts the respondent’s distinction at [6]: accepting the appellant’s fear on the one hand, but not that her family will disown her on the other hand. Considering the country expert report prepared by Veby Kosumi on 20 September 2024 (“the Expert Report”), the judge writes that “The Expert proceeds on the basis of the Appellant having no support from her family which has not been accepted.” The judge goes on at [36] to agree with the respondent and find that “…it is reasonably likely that the Appellant’s family in Albania would offer her support…”. Putting all this together, it was abundantly clear to the appellant that the issue of whether she would be disowned by her family in Albania was live. The question is whether, on the basis that her fear was accepted by the respondent, she had adequate opportunity to address the judge’s concerns that led to the findings and comment at [9] and [10].
14. The appellant did not have that opportunity. There is nothing in the decision to indicate that, having been made aware that the respondent accepted that part of the appellant’s case, the judge then queried whether that fear of her family would prevent her reaching out to them. The appellant appears not to have been asked, nor her representatives called on to address, whether her fear fell short of a level that would preclude her engaging with her family. She had no opportunity to address such a distinction. Plainly, in our view, that amounts to procedural unfairness.
15. Moreover, the appellant’s fear is an entirely separate matter from her family’s attitude towards her. The family’s attitude is an objective matter. It was, at least on the basis of the parties’ positions, open to the judge to decide that the appellant’s family in Albania would support her. The appellant’s fear is a subjective matter, and the respondent accepted that the appellant held that fear, however reasonable it might be. The judge finding that the appellant’s family would support her does not on its face provide a bridge to a finding that the appellant does not hold a real fear of a family; nor does the judge provide any reasons why it should. Without such reasons, there is nothing in the decision explaining why the appellant, whose case is that she fears her family, should be the subject of an adverse credibility finding for failing to seek reconciliation with the relatives she fears.
16. We find that both aspects of Ground 1 are made out: that the adverse credibility finding is irrational; and that, without the parties having addressed this issue, it was procedurally unfair for the judge to have made the finding she made. This amounts to a material error of law.
17. Ground 2 pleads that the reasons given overall by the judge are inadequate. Specifically, the appellant states that the judge failed to give adequate reasons in respect of [12], which short paragraph we reproduce in its entirety:
“The Appellant’s sister and brother-in-law did not attend the hearing or provide letters in support of the appeal. No reasonable explanation was given to account for this.”
18. The judge gives some context to these two relatives, with whom the appellant resides in the UK, at [13]:
“She has support from her sister and brother-in-law who are in the United Kingdom. She stated orally that her sister knows of the difficulties she has encountered and supports her notwithstanding her family’s attitude.”
19. Putting [12] and [13] together, it is plain that the judge thought it remarkable that neither of these two otherwise helpful relatives provided evidential support. The judge recorded that there was no reasonable explanation for this. We agree, however, with the appellant’s submission that there are many legitimate reasons why a person may choose not to involve themselves in legal proceedings. The fact that the appellant’s sister and brother-in-law did not provide letters in support should not count against the appellant: rather, it is a lost opportunity for the appellant to provide evidence that may have supported her claim. The judge has not explained why these relatives’ non-engagement should be a particular cause for concern.
20. We consider that the significance of [12] is that it follows closely from the adverse credibility finding concerning the appellant’s family at [9], which we have already found to constitute a material error of law. While [12] does not explicitly contain an adverse credibility finding, we agree with the appellant that it appears the judge considered the lack of letters in support to be damaging to the appellant’s claim, though how damaging and why it is damaging is unclear. We take the respondent’s point that, in itself, this may not amount to a material error of law. Given, however, that the judge was so critical of the appellant’s evidence in respect of her relatives in Albania, was at least sceptical as to the position of her UK-based relatives, and her lack of further comment as to [12], we agree with the appellant that the judge should be taken to have considered the lack of evidence from these relatives to have been significantly damaging. Accordingly, this also amounts to a material error of law.
21. Ground 3 divides into three separate arguments, which we will take in turn.
22. Firstly, it is argued by the appellant that the judge’s finding as to the appellant’s age does not reflect the detailed analysis of TD and AD (trafficked women) [2016] UKUT 92 The appellant invites us to compare the finding with that Country Guidance case:
“…She [the appellant] would also fall outside the target age group for traffickers, which covers the period from the late teens to the early 20s.” [24]
“We bear in mind Mr Whitwell’s point that the target age group for traffickers is late teens/early twenties, and that this would reduce the risk presented to the first appellant. We have however also had regard to the figures in the UNP Needs Assessment. Approximately 20% of the VOTs [victims of trafficking] that featured in that study, and in the NCATS [National Coalition of Anti-Trafficking Shelters] annual report, had been re-trafficked having been through the shelters once before…” [TD V AD, paragraph 152]
23. We agree with the respondent’s submission that there is no error of law here. The appellant is correct that TD v AD does not place a cut-off age by which potential victims are no longer likely to be at risk, and identifies that women beyond the target age group are potentially at risk of re-trafficking. But the judge did not decide that the appellant was too old to be re-trafficked: she merely noted, as she was entitled to, that the appellant was not in the particular risk group occupied by women of the target age for traffickers.
24. Secondly, it is argued that in deciding that the appellant would be able to secure employment in Albania, the judge failed to take into account (a) that the appellant has a young child; and (b) has mental health issues.
25. We do not consider that either of these points are made out. The judge refers to the appellant’s child at several points in the judgment. The judge specifically finds at [31] that the appellant has a basic education and had previously found employment in Albania. The judge considers the appellant’s mental health difficulties at [32] to [35], where she notes that it has not been claimed that medical care would be unavailable in Albania. The judge considered the appellant’s medical records and came to the conclusion at [33] that she was “mentally doing well”. We do not accept that the judge’s reasoning here was flawed or inadequate.
26. Nor do we accept the more general contention that the judge adopted a “tick-box” approach to the factors set out at paragraph 119(h) of TD v AD. While her consideration of some of those factors is brief, and notwithstanding that we have found material errors of law in her decision as set out elsewhere in this judgment, we do consider that the judge sought to and did take a holistic approach to the appellant’s claim.
27. Thirdly, it is said by the appellant that the judge wrongly elevated the evidential burden to be placed on the appellant. We reproduce the relevant part of [29]:
“The Appellant has produced an Expert report dated 20 September 2024 and medical records. The Expert report does not state with any certainty that the Appellant will be at real risk upon return to Albana [sic], nor has it been sufficiently demonstrated within the context of the report how the Appellant’s traffickers have any power or influence over the authorities in Albania or any power and influence, whether locally or nationally to be able to locate her upon return to Albania…”
28. While it is said on behalf of the respondent that this is a slip that should not reflect on the decision overall, we agree with the appellant that the erroneous reference to “certainty” appears to have infected the whole decision. As the Expert Report in its 74 pages considers the appellant’s claim in practically every aspect, the judge’s assessment that the Expert Report does not state with any certainty that there is a real risk for the appellant on return to Albania is a wide-reaching one. Nor does the judge revisit the Expert Report in the decision after [29]; or qualify the words “any certainty” thereafter. Accordingly, we find a further material error of law.
29. Turning finally to Ground 4, it is argued on behalf of the appellant that the Judge’s risk analysis as to re-trafficking was wrongly restricted to the specific risk posed by the appellant’s ex-boyfriend. The appellant relies on TD v AD for the observation, at paragraph (g) of its headnote, that “re-trafficking is a reality”; and that “re-trafficking may be effected by individuals other than the original traffickers”.
30. The Judge’s summary finding in respect of the appellant’s ex-boyfriend is at [38]:
“…I am not satisfied that the Appellant has demonstrated that he has the intention or the connections to trace her on return. It is now nearly 5 years since the events that caused the Appellant to leave Albania and it is reasonably unlikely her ex-boyfriend and/or his friends are still actively looking for her. In my assessment, the risk is much reduced from when she left Albania in 2019.”
31. At [29], the judge refers to the Expert Report, which discusses the risk of re-trafficking by criminals generally. While it is true that the Judge does not state that she has considered the risk of re-trafficking beyond by the ex-boyfriend, we do not read that her judgment excludes the possibility of that risk; and are satisfied that in having considered the Expert Report, she had also turned her mind to the wider risks. We find no error of law on this Ground.
CONCLUSION
32. For the foregoing reasons, Grounds 1, 2 and 3 identify material errors of law that, taken individually and together, require that the decision is set aside.
Notice of Decision
1. The judge’s decision involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
2. We do not preserve any findings of the decision.
3. We remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 August 2025