Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002170

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51744/2024
LP/11940/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BARTLETT

Between

YA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY Of STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Panagiotopoulou
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo

Heard at Field House on 23 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant made a claim for asylum that was refused by the respondent in a decision letter dated 10 January 2024. The appellant appealed this decision to the First-tier tribunal who refused his appeal in a decision dated 18 March 2025. The appellant’s application for permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. The appellant made an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal which was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Jackson on 3 July 2025. Permission to appeal was granted on all three grounds which were:
a. Failing to give adequate reasons for the adverse credibility findings made;
b. requiring collaborative evidence, even where none was reasonably available in relation to “unofficial detentions” and not giving the appellant any opportunity to explain the lack of evidence from his parents
c. failing to properly consider and apply available background country evidence
2. On 8 September 2025 the respondent submitted a rule 24 response. The respondent’s submissions at the hearing largely followed this response.
Ground 1 and 2
3. I have taken these two grounds together as I consider that they are interlinked.
4. At paragraph 13 the Judge set out 3 reasons for not accepting the appellant’s account of what had happened in Turkey and the basis of his claim for asylum. These were:
a. The appellant was able to but did not provide a statement from his parent’s about the alleged police raid;
b. attempts come to the United Kingdom with a work Visa went to his credibility as to his true intention;
c. the delay in claiming asylum.
5. SB (Sri Lanka) 2019 EWCA Civ 160 gives guidance on the assessment of credibility at para 46:
“In cases (such as the present) where the credibility of the appellant is in issue courts adopt a variety of different evaluative techniques to assess the evidence. The court will for instance consider: (i) the consistency (or otherwise) of accounts given to investigators at different points in time; (ii) the consistency (or otherwise) of an appellant’s narrative case for asylum with his actual conduct at earlier stages and periods in time; (iii) whether, on facts found or agreed or which are incontrovertible, the appellant is a person who can be categorised as at risk if returned, and, if so, as to the nature and extent of that risk (taking account of applicable Country Guidance); (iv) the adequacy (or by contrast paucity) of evidence on relevant issues that, logically, the appellant should be able to adduce in order to support his or her case; and (v), the overall plausibility of an appellant’s account.”
6. In MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216 the Court of Appeal provided further guidance which includes the following at para 63:
“In that passage, Lord Brodie said that a tribunal of fact making an adverse finding on credibility must only do so on reasonably drawn inferences and not simply on conjecture or speculation. Inferences concerning the plausibility of evidence must have a basis in that evidence. An applicant’s testimony should not be lightly or readily dismissed and when it is reasons must be given. Nevertheless, the tribunal of fact need not necessarily accept an applicant’s account simply because it is not contradicted at the relevant hearing. The tribunal is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and may reject evidence if it is not consistent “with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole.” Because the reference to the word “probabilities” may be misunderstood in the present context, where the lower standard of proof applies, it is important to read that passage in context.”[emphasis added]
7. I do not accept that the judge fell into an error of law by requiring corroborative evidence. On the appellant’s own account he was in contact with his parents and it is easy to obtain documents via electronic means. The burden of proof lies on the appellant in the First-tier Tribunal and he can, in the circumstances of this case, be reasonably expected to establish his claim by more than mere assertion of alleged facts. In addition, the respondent’s review set out the following:
“the appellant has failed to establish the reason for the sudden claimed visit/visits to his family home by police. Especially as given the evidence of the appellant he was merely a support and not a member and did not have a high political profile when in Turkey.
Other than his oral and written statements the appellant has not provided any supporting evidence concerning police visits to his family home and continued harassment by the police.
Further other than his oral and written submissions the appellant has failed to provide any supporting evidence of being a supporter of the HDP despite claiming attendance at meetings distributing leaflets and contributing funds to the HDP”.
8. I find that the appellant was therefore on notice that the respondent took the position that he had failed to substantiate his claim and he had failed to provide evidence that would be available to him.
9. In relation to the findings at para 13, I find that these were findings that were open to the judge and that they could be sufficient.
10. At para 15 the judge considers the alleged detentions in 2022 and notes there is no evidence of them, his release or release conditions. The respondent’s rule 24 response is that the appellant claimed in the grounds of appeal for the first time that these detentions were unofficial and that his own evidence was that he was fingerprinted and his photograph was taken and that these cannot be correctly classified as unofficial detentions. I do not consider that the classification of those detentions is of much assistance. There is no background evidence that any documentation would arise from these sorts of detentions and therefore requiring documentary evidence of them is an error of law.
11. I find that the paragraph 15 findings must be taken with the paragraph 13 findings as they are an assessment of the appellant’s claim. Therefore, the error in relation to paragraph 15 when taken with paragraph 13 results in an inadequate assessment of the appellant’s claim which is material.
12. A submission has also been made that the issue of obtaining witness statements from his parents was not put to the appellant at the hearing. The rule 24 response sets out that the appellant has not established this submission because all that is relied on is an extract of the record of proceedings. I accept this part of the respondent’s submissions. It is insufficient to make a mere statement about what happened at a hearing when it is relied on as a grounds of appeal. This must be evidenced and all that has been provided is an extract of the record of proceedings which means I am not satisfied that it sets out the entirety of the questions that were put to the appellant at the hearing.
Ground 3
13. Much is made in the appellant’s grounds of appeal that the judge set out that the Newroz celebrations were not strictly political. As is clear from the extract of the record of proceedings these were the words of the appellant and therefore the judge cannot be criticised for quoting them in the correct context as she did.
14. The grounds of appeal also criticised the judgement for not referring to various parts of the CPIN October 2023. I find that in the context of this case there is no material error of law. The judge found that the appellant did not have a profile which placed him at risk. On her findings this was a conclusion open to her. Her interpretation that the CPIN October 2023 confirms that low level supporters are not at risk on return is sustainable. There is no requirement for a judge to extensively quote from a CPIN or another document.
15. I have found that the judge made a material error of law and the case is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing with no findings preserved.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 18 March 2025 contains a material error of law and the cases remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing with no findings preserved.

Judge Bartlett

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

31 October 2025