Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002195

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/01108/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE L K GIBBS

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
And

AMY LILLIAN LOWIS (AKA STRACHAN)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: None
For the Respondent: Mr. Wain, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 January 2026

ANONYMITY ORDER

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or any family members. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This is because the appellant is a victim of trafficking and the details of the appeal also involve disclose of mental health problems and abuse.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is my remaking decision in respect of the appeal by the appellant against the respondent’s decision to refuse her human rights claim against deportation to Australia. The appellant’s appeal had been allowed by the First-tier Tribunal, but this decision was set aside by myself and Upper Tribunal Judge Rimington following our finding that the decision contained an error of law. I attach the decision of that decision as an Appendix to this decision for ease of reference.
2. In accordance with section 12(2)(b)(ii) of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 we decided to retain the appeal in the Upper Tribunal in order to re-make the decision concerning Ms. Lowis’ appeal against the refusal of her human rights claim.
3. After careful consideration, and having given this case anxious scrutiny I have decided that there are not very compelling circumstances that outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s deportation. Accordingly, I have dismissed her appeal. The full reasons for this decision follow.
Factual Background
4. The appellant is 23 years of age. She is a citizen of Australia. The appellant arrived in the UK when she was 13 months. It is agreed that she has lived in the UK lawfully for over half of her life, having been granted Limited Leave to Remain in 2005 and Indefinite Leave to Remain in 2007.
5. It is not disputed that the appellant has been subjected to a highly dysfunctional upbringing. The appellant’s mother (“R”) suffered from chronic, serious mental health problems and substance abuse disorder. In Australia she was treated by two British Citizens who became close to her and following the appellant’s birth invited mother and child to live with them. When they returned to the UK for family reasons they sponsored the appellant and her mother to travel to the UK on a 2 year visa. The appellant has grown up treating these two individuals as her grandparents (“GPs”).
6. In the UK, R started a relationship with GPs’ son (“RD”), and the appellant grew up calling him “daddy”. This relationship later broke down and R started a new relationship with “B”. Notwithstanding the breakdown of the relationship with RD he and his parents continued to support the appellant and her mother, and the family remained close. When the appellant was 9 years of age her mother had a second child. The appellant grew close to B and his parents. Throughout this period R’s mental health was unstable but through the support of her family the appellant managed well at junior school where she was a popular and successful student.
7. However, once the appellant started secondary school her behaviour began to deteriorate. She was referred to Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services where she was diagnosed with Attention-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The appellant’s extended family were so concerned by her mental health and behavioural problems that they organised for her to obtain private psychological treatment. R’s relationship with B broke down and it is her evidence that the breakdown of this nine year relationship led to her drug relapse at a time when the appellant “desperately needed stability and support our relationship became fraught with volatility.”
8. The appellant’s extended family did their best to help R and the appellant but matters deteriorated. The appellant’s evidence is that she started stealing, at her mother’s behest, because they did not have food, and her mother would also sell what she stole to buy drugs. The police and social services became involved but, aged 15, the appellant was permanently excluded from school and a year later was taken into care. Thereafter her life became even more difficult because she became the victim of abuse and exploitation. Her drug use continued, her mental health significantly deteriorated and she received her first criminal conviction. The evidence of R is that “While in the care system she was shuffled between multiple homes, and at one point, she went missing for two weeks – a period during which she was groomed and exploited by individuals involved in Country Lines, exposing her to even greater danger and vulnerability.”
9. The National Referral Mechanism (NRM) has made a positive conclusive grounds decision that the appellant was a victim of trafficking.
10. In 2020, despite ongoing extended family support the appellant became homeless and by this stage was addicted to heroin and crack cocaine. In 2022 the appellant went through a period of stability but this once again broke down because of the her substance abuse disorder.
11. Since 2018 the appellant has amassed a criminal history which includes 3 offences against the person, 11 theft and kindred offences, 9 offences relating to police/prisons and one drug offence (between 2018-2023). The appellant’s most recent offence took place on 13 April 2023. On 9 October 2023 she was sentenced at York Crown Court to 56 months imprisonment for attempted robbery. She was released on licence 29 August 2025 and was recalled to prison on 6 September 2025 for breach of licence. The appellant is currently detained to complete her sentence.
Most Recent Offending
12. The offence of 13 April 2023 was an attempt by the appellant and at least one other person to rob a vulnerable individual. The facts, as set out by the sentencing judge, are that the victim was in her own home when the appellant’s co-defendant placed her in a headlock and held a knife to her throat demanding that she give them money. Then,
“He found her bank statement and then telephoned the bank pretending to be X but when various answers were not given or questions were not answered by the bank, the phone was passed to you E who initially let go of X and went into the bedroom to talk on the phone but you would periodically come out and point the knife at X as well as slapping her in the face which now, of course (appellant) you must have seen a must have realised what was going on. The words” it doesn't have to be like this”, if, of course X handed over her bank details but she was threatened with being “seriously hurt” and then both of you put X on the phone to her bank but thought better of that and took the phone away because, no doubt, she would have screamed out or said something in terror. She tried to shout at that stage but you restrained her (appellant) by setting on her and then putting your hands over her mouth. She said she was unable to breathe and said “Let me go.””
13. In sentencing the appellant, the Judge said;
“You're even younger. You're only 21. 7 convictions for 21 offences. Relevant convictions, of course, and aggravating your position, like your co-accused, or previous offences for violence assault occasioning actual bodily harm and 2018, battery and numerous shop thefts in 2021, further shoplifting convictions in 20/22/2023 and your most recent conviction, stealing from her shop, where you were fined in February…

You are, because I've taken trouble to read all the references, particularly the lengthy reference written by your step grandparents, who give me a great insight into your character and your upbringing, that runs to some 9 pages. I've also read the community manager update from the prison but I bear in mind, of course that's dated 9 May 2023, saying at that stage you don't stick to your appointments, You turn up whenever you want, indeed you're slouching in the dock now. You display aggressive behaviour towards people who are trying to help but I balanced that against this, I've read your letter, I think it's a heartfelt letter. I've also read the various comments from those that have tried to bring you up and it's of note, with your record, whilst an aggravating feature, you effectively, to borrow the expression, went off the rails as your record starts in 2018, hence the psychiatric report and the findings by the psychiatrist and the problems, largely self-inflicted, I'm afraid. You're a young woman who is not stupid. You know what you we're doing and anybody in your position knows approaching A vulnerable lady and evolving yourself not quite to the extent of your co-accused, because you know the sentence he received, but you're going to receive a lengthy sentence.”
14. With regards to the appellant’s recall I have before me the evidence in her recall paperwork that:
“In my professional opinion(the appellant) is currently unmanageable in the community. (the appellant) Has immediately relapsed into using illicit substances immediately upon her release from prison on one September 2025 and admitted to smoking cannabis in her room on the night of her release. (the appellant) has breached several of her curfews at the approved premises and then ultimately failed to return to the approved premises which has led to her being recalled.

(the appellant’s) Index offensive robbery was committed whilst (the appellant) was heavily intoxicated and under the influence of substances. This offence was also motivated for financial gain, likely to fund (the appellant’s) addiction to drugs full stop therefore her immediate relapse into substances and her failure to comply with the approved premises regime comma demonstrates that she is likely to commit further serious harm as she has in the index offence.”
Decision to Deport
15. On 12 June 2024 a deportation was made by virtue of s.32(5) of the UK Borders Act 2007 and a decision was made to refuse a human rights claim.
16. In that decision the respondent concluded that the appellant’s deportation was conducive to the public good, found that she did not benefit from either the private life or the family life exceptions to the public interest in foreign criminals being deported and that there were no very compelling circumstances to outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s deportation.
The Law
17. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision by virtue of section 82(1)(b) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) which provides that a person may appeal to the Tribunal where the Secretary of State has decided to refuse a human rights claim. A human rights claim is defined in section 113 (1) of the 2002 Act as “a claim made by a person to the Secretary of State at a place designated by the Secretary of State that to remove the person from or require him to leave the United Kingdom, … would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998”. The grounds for her appeal are identified in s84(2) of the 2002 Act and are that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 which provides that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.
18. The relevant convention right under the European Convention on Human Rights in the appellant’s case is the right which everyone enjoys to "respect for his private and family life" under Article 8(1). Article 8(2) prohibits "interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right" except to the extent that the interference "is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society" for one or more legitimate purposes or aims. The list of legitimate purposes and aims includes "public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country … the prevention of disorder or crime …[and] the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."
19. Part 5A of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (the 2002 Act) applies when a tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts is unlawful because it breaches a person’s Article 8 rights. It requires the tribunal to have regard in all cases to s117B of the 2002 Act which provides:
Article 8: public interest considerations applicable in all cases
(1) The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.

(2) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English, because persons who can speak English—
(a) are less of a burden on taxpayers, and
(b) are better able to integrate into society.

(3) It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially independent, because such persons—
(a) are not a burden on taxpayers, and
(b) are better able to integrate into society.

(4) Little weight should be given to—
(a)a private life, or
(b)a relationship formed with a qualifying partner,
that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.

(5) Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.
20. Additionally, in cases involving a foreign criminal the tribunal must have regard to s117C of the 2002 Act. A foreign criminal is defined in s117D(2) as a person who is not a British citizen, has been convicted of an offence in the United Kingdom and “(i) has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least 12 months, (ii) has been convicted of an offence that has caused serious harm, or (iii) is a persistent offender.
21. Section 117C of the 2002 Act provides:
Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted
22. The respondent made her decision to deport the appellant by virtue of section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 (the 1971 Act) which provides that a person who is not a British citizen is liable to deportation if the Secretary of State deems her deportation conducive to the public good, and section 5(1) of the 1971 Act which provides that where a person is liable to deportation the Secretary of State may make a deportation order against her. There is no right to appeal against a decision to make a deportation order.
23. In Wilson (NIAA Part 5A; deportation decisions) [2020] UKUT 00350 (IAC) a presidential panel of this Tribunal considered the interplay between the decision to make a deportation order which does not carry a right of appeal and the refusal of a humans rights claim which does carry a right of appeal and said the following in headnote B to their decision:
(1) In a human rights appeal, the decision under appeal is the refusal by the Secretary of State of a human rights claim; that is to say, the refusal of a claim, defined by section 113(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, that removal from the United Kingdom or a requirement to leave it would be unlawful under section 6 of the 1998 Act. The First-tier Tribunal is, therefore, not deciding an appeal against the decision to make a deportation order and/or the decision that removal of the individual is, in the Secretary of State’s view, conducive to the public good. It is concerned only with whether removal etc in consequence of the refusal of the human rights claim is contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. If Article 8(1) is engaged, the answer to that question requires a finding on whether removal etc would be a disproportionate interference with Article 8 rights.

(2) The Secretary of State’s decisions under the Immigration Act 1971 that P’s deportation would be conducive to the public good and that a deportation order should be made in respect of P would have to be unlawful on public law grounds before that anterior aspect of the decision-making process could inform the conclusion to be reached by the First-tier Tribunal in a human rights appeal.
The Re-Hearing in the Upper Tribunal
24. The appellant appeared before me via CVP, unrepresented, but accompanied by her McKenzie friend. A prison officer was also in attendance and at the end of the hearing she asked if she could say a few words, which was not opposed by Mr. Wain.
25. The appellant told me that she had not received the error of law decision and had only been made aware of the hearing the night before, which is why none of her family were present. I explained to the appellant the error of law decision and the purpose of the current appeal hearing. I asked if she wanted an adjournment to enable her family to attend but the appellant was clearly frustrated by the situation and said that she wanted the appeal to go ahead. I was satisfied that the appellant understood the decision that she was making. Further, that I had before me the original appeal bundle with the family’s witness statements, that the appellant would be able to participate in the appeal hearing and that therefore it would not be unfair to proceed.
26. I explained the issues to the appellant; that she would need to persuade me that she is socially and culturally integrated in the UK, that she would face very significant obstacles to integration in Australia and that there are very compelling circumstances in her case over and above the exceptions to deportation. The appellant confirmed that she did not have a partner or child in the UK.
27. Aware of the appellant’s ADHD diagnosis and mental health issues I advised her that we could take a break whenever necessary and she did use opportunities to do so throughout the hearing. The appellant is an articulate and talkative individual, and I am satisfied that she was fully able to participate in the hearing.
28. The hearing was recorded. At the conclusion of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now provide together with my reasons.
Findings of Fact
29. The Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance was applied in the light of AM (Afghanistan) [2017] EWCA Civ 1123.
30. The appellant’s credibility was not challenged by Mr. Wain. He did however ask me to place less weight on the witness statements of the appellant’s family because they had not attended the appeal hearing. However, I am aware that they did previously attend and I accepted the reasons why they were not in attendance before me. Further, it seems to me that their evidence is not controversial or inconsistent. I am satisfied that the appellant has lived in the UK since she was 13 months of age, has had a very difficult upbringing, her family have always sought to support her but despite this the appellant has been unable to break out of the cycle of addiction and offending, which has escalated in seriousness. In reaching this conclusion I not only rely on the oral evidence and witness statements but also the documentary evidence before me including the OASys report which states:
“Ms Lowis is a young woman who has lacked a stable and secure upbringing, the lack of this has subsequently lead to Ms Lowis repeating similar traits to that of observed behaviours from childhood. Ms Lowis has failed to develop suitable and safe coping mechanisms, there is failure to recognise positive ways to address triggers. These triggers include, mental health, historic trauma and associates her relationships…

I believe there to be some unaddressed trauma that has led to Ms Lowis’s ill mental wellbeing. While suffering with her mental wellbeing, Ms Lowis becomes reliant on drugs, these being an unhealthy coping mechanism, of which substance misuse serves as catalyst to offending behaviours. Subsequent of observed relationships, Ms Lowis has difficulties building her own relationship with males, she also struggles to recognise those who are positive nature for her. It is my assessment that Ms Lowis seeks out older males with ideologies they can offer her stability and support, possibly due to her lack of a father like role. The nature of the risk is to the public, known adult, staff and children. Ms Lowis also poses a significant risk of harm to herself given her history of self-harm, and vulnerabilities that could lead to exploitation.”
31. I am satisfied that the appellant has not returned to Australia since she left as a baby. She has not seen her biological father since that time and the only contact that she has had with him is through messages which have included him sending her pictures of drug use and pornographic images. I am satisfied that the appellant’s father himself has a substance abuse disorder and does not represent a stable or good influence. Consequently I am satisfied that he would not be able to positively assist the appellant on her return to Australia.
32. I also find that despite the hopeful witness statements written by the appellant’s family for the first appeal hearing, this optimism has not been borne out, with the appellant being recalled to prison a few days after her release. I do accept the appellant’s evidence that she had asked not to go to the Approved Premises because it was near to people who she thought would be a bad influence and I also accept that she wanted to be sent to a rehabilitation centre but was not. Her evidence is that having been free of illicit drugs whilst in prison she thought that she would be able to cope on release, but she was not. She also explains her failure to return to the Approved Premises one evening was because she was in the grip of a psychotic episode brought on by the drugs and that she was terrified that people were going to kill her. I accept the appellant’s evidence in this regard.
33. I am satisfied that the medical evidence before me confirms that the appellant has a diagnosis of ADHD, Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder and Bi-Polar Disorder. I also find that the report of Dr. Prosser (Consultant Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist) further corroborates both the appellant’s and the family’s account of her childhood:
“ (the appellant) is a 16 year old young lady who is extremely likeable and has many protective factors around her including a very likeable personality, she is an attractive young lady who us articulate and bright and wishes to pursue a career in health and social care, hopefully looking after children. Unfortunately, (the appellant) has experienced some significant mental health difficulties since she started going to high school. She has some very significant risk factors in her life, in particular the predisposing factor of living a lot of the time with her mum who has struggled with multiple relapses of her own mental health difficulties, making it difficult for her to set clear boundaries down for (the appellant). (the appellant) has exhibited some episodes of what sounds like hypomania, they occur cyclically according to family…In terms of risk (the appellant) presents significant risk to both herself and others in particular herself as her mood today was so variable suicide risk could present itself at any point. In terms of risk to others, clearly this is also significant in that (the appellant) has been involved in many fights and has an ABH charge…”
34. I am satisfied that the appellant remains in contact with her family in the UK in the form of regular telephone calls and visits. Further, that the appellant’s mother has now turned her life around and has recently graduated from university. I find that the appellant’s family continue to want to support her and had she been allowed the appellant had wanted to live with her grandparents on release.
35. I am satisfied that the appellant is remorseful for her actions. She is also very frustrated by what she sees is the way in which she has been let down by “the system”; the care system, prison system and probation system, and I understand those feelings.
Application of the Facts to the Law
36. I remind myself that the burden of proof rests on the appellant and that the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities.
37. Throughout the hearing the appellant expressed her incredulity at being faced with deportation from the only country that she has ever known; to return to a country where she does not have any friends or reliable family. However, the appellant must understand that she has committed numerous and increasingly serious criminal offences in the UK. In these circumstances the respondent has the legal right to seek her deportation in order to protect the public, and the appellant’s length of residence is in itself insufficient to protect her, however unreasonable or unfair this may seem to her.
38. The conviction on which the decision to deport is based attracted a sentence of over 4 years in custody. It is not disputed that the appellant is a foreign criminal as an Australian national. Her appeal can only succeed if I am satisfied that there are very compelling circumstances over and above the Exceptions in s.117C(6) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as amended).
Exception 1
39. It is not disputed that the appellant has lived lawfully in the UK for more than half of her life.
Social and Cultural Integration
40. In CI (Nigeria) [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 Lord Justice Leggatt stated at [57] that when considering this limb of Exception 1, it is important to keep the rationale for this requirement in mind. The purpose of the limb is to determine whether the appellant has established a private life with a substantial claim to protection under article 8. At [58] of his judgment Leggatt LJ identified that a person’s social identity is “constituted at a deep level by familiarity with am participation in the shared customs, traditions, practises, beliefs, values, language idioms and other local knowledge which situate a person in a society or social group and generate a sense of belonging.” Quoting from the ECtHR decision in Maslov v Austria [2008] ECHR 1638/03 he notes at [59] that it makes a difference whether a person came to the country during his childhood or whether he only came as an adult. At [62] he notes that “It is hard to see how Criminal offending and imprisonment could ordinarily, by themselves and unless associated with the breakdown of relationships, destroy the social and cultural integration of someone whose entire social identity has been formed in the UK." At [77] of his judgment Leggatt LJ gives the following guidance (which was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme Court in SC (Jamaica) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 15) for determining the question of whether an appellant who is a foreign criminal is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom:
“The judge should simply have asked whether-having regard to his upbringing, education, employment history, history of criminal offending and imprisonment, relationships with family and friends, lifestyle and other relevant factors- [the appellant] was at the time of the hearing socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom ”
41. The appellant has not returned to Australia since her arrival in the UK at 13 months of age, and has undertaken all of her education and employment in this country. I am satisfied that the appellant has established both her family and private life, in their entirety in this country.
42. The respondent’s position is that the appellant has broken her integrative links with society by anti-social offending. I am not however persuaded by this submission. I find that the appellant is wholly immersed in life in the UK, both socially and culturally. She is, as she herself describes, in many ways a product of our care and prison system, and whilst this does not excuse her behaviour, or diminish the public interest in her deportation, it is, I find, relevant to my assessment of cultural and social integration.
43. The appellant’s links with her family (which include her mother, step-fathers, step-grandparents and sibling) remain strong. I am satisfied that having been educated in the UK she is familiar with and has participated in the customs, language and practices of life in this country; she has established a very strong sense of belonging to this country. Had someone applied for British Citizenship for her prior to the start of her offending she would have been granted citizenship. I am satisfied that the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK.
Very Significant Obstacles to Integration
44. At [52] of the judgment in SC (Jamaica) the Supreme Court endorsed a similar approach to the question of whether an appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in the country to which he is proposed to be deported, to that identified by Leggatt LJ at [66] above in relation to a person’s social and cultural integration in the United Kingdom. The question is whether, having regard to the appellant’s upbringing, education, etc she would face very significant obstacles to integration in Australia? When answering that question I remind myself that the phrase “very significant obstacles” connotes an elevated threshold that is not met by mere inconvenience or upheaval – see Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932.
45. I also remind myself that the idea of ‘integration’ calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life – see Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 quoted with approval in SC (Jamaica).
46. Although the appellant left Australia when she was 13 months old, I am satisfied that life there will not be significantly culturally or socially different to that in the UK. Australia is an English speaking democratic society, with a functioning healthcare and social support system; it is part of the Commonwealth. Other than not initially knowing anyone in the country I find that there is no identifiable very significant obstacle that will prevent the appellant being able to operate on a day to day basis and to build up human relationships. The appellant is an adult, she has been living separately to her family for some time and in many ways a move to Australia will provide her with a real chance at a fresh start.
47. There is no evidence before me as to why at least one member of the appellant’s family could not travel with her to Australia to assist in settling in, if she wants this. Further, there is no suggestion that they will not be able to visit her, and communication in its current form (telephone and video calls) can continue.
48. As an Australian citizen there is no evidence before me to suggest that the appellant will not be able to access the welfare system or healthcare. Additionally there is reference to the facilitated return scheme and re-integration package in the respondent’s documentary evidence which the appellant may also be able to rely on. Although the appellant’s evidence is that she will be forced to rely on her father, which will place her at risk, I am not persuaded that this will be her only option; this will be a choice that she makes.
49. I have given very careful consideration to the question of whether the appellant will be able to build a private life in the Kamara sense. I find that she will but this will depend on the choices that the appellant makes. Although she has chronic mental health problems and substance abuse disorder the appellant appeared before me determined to turn her life around. I am satisfied that she will be eligible for support and medical treatment in Australia which will help her on this journey. She will be away from the bad influences in her life and will have the prospect of a fresh start while she is young.
50. Although I accept that the appellant does not want to leave the UK and that the prospect of a move to Australia is daunting I am not satisfied that she faces very significant obstacles to integration. The appellant is young, intelligent, resilient and personable; although there may be initial hardships she will be able to overcome these.
51. The appellant has experienced significant challenges in the UK but, for the reasons set out above I find that these have not stopped her from forming both private and family life in this country. I am not therefore persuaded that she will be unable to achieve the same in Australia.
52. I am not therefore persuaded that the appellant meets the third limb of Exception 1 to deportation.
Very Compelling Circumstances
53. In considering this issue I must first consider the weight of the public interest in the appellant’s deportation.
54. The seriousness of the appellant’s most recent offence is, I find, indisputable. The appellant and a friend, forced their way into the home of a vulnerable woman where she was threatened with violence (both verbally and with a weapon) in order that she provide her bank details so that the appellant and her friend could steal money from her. This offence represented a significant escalation in the appellant’s offending and the seriousness is reflected both in the Judge’s sentencing remarks and the length of the sentence imposed.
55. Although the appellant has undertaken courses whilst in prison I cannot find that there is evidence of rehabilitation because of the recall to prison only a few days after her most recent release. Ultimately the appellant suffers from substance abuse disorder and, as she recognises, until she is able to effectively address this the likelihood of her re-offending is high. The OASys report records that the risk of serious harm to the community / a known adult is high with a medium risk of re-offending.
56. In any event HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 informs me that rehabilitation carries limited weight:
“[58]…The weight which it will bear will vary from case to case, but it will rarely be of great weight bearing in mind that, as Moore-Bick LJ says in Danso, the public interest in the deportation of criminals is not based only on the need to protect the public from further offending by the foreign criminal in question but also on wider policy considerations of deterrence and public concern.”
57. This is because deportation is not simply in the public interest in order to protect the public, but also to act as a deterrent and to reflect public concern, HA (Iraq) . With regards to these latter issues I find that the seriousness and nature of the appellant’s offending carries significant weight.
58. Balanced against the significant public interest in the appellant’s deportation is the fact that the appellant has lived for the majority of her life lawfully in the UK. Also that she is culturally and socially integrated. There is also the interference with her family life because although I am not persuaded that her family cannot visit I do accept that on a day to day basis contact will only be through modern means of communication. However, I remind myself that the appellant’s incarceration has also caused an interference in this family life, and the prospect of this did not stop her offending. Further, I am not persuaded that the appellant is dependent on her family in the UK; the evidence before me is that despite their constant support the appellant has made her own decisions regarding how she has lived her life and she has not lived with her family members for a significant period of time. I do not therefore find that the separation of the appellant from her family amounts to very compelling circumstances.
59. I have considered any likely decline in the appellant’s mental health, and a relapse with regards to her substance abuse disorder on deportation. Firstly, there is no specific medical evidence before me on this issue. Secondly it is clear from what happened when the appellant was released last year that she faces the same risk in this country as she would in Australia.
60. I am satisfied that the appellant’s family could help her on her immediate arrival in Australia by making arrangements in advance so that she would, at least for the short term, have accommodation available to her. Alternatively one or more of them could travel with her. Thereafter the appellant will be entitled, as an Australian citizen, to access available state support / find employment. The appellant says that she will be forced to turn to her biological father for support but as I have said above I am not persuaded that this is the case; it will be a matter for her.
61. There is very significant public interest in the appellant’s deportation. This is not sufficiently counter balanced by any of (or the totality of) the facts of the appellant’s appeal as set out above. The appellant does not therefore meet the requirements of s.117C (6) of the 2002 Act.
Notice of Decision
The appellant’s human rights appeal is REFUSED.

L K Gibbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 February 2026