Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002202
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50902/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2nd March 2026

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
SI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr R Spurling, Counsel, instructed by Thompson & Co
For the respondent: Mr M Pugh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

RE-MAKING DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the appellant’s appeal following my error of law decision, sent out on 3 November 2025, in which I found that the First-tier Tribunal had materially erred in law when dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims.

The error of law decision
2. The error of law decision is annexed to this re-making decision and the two should be read together.

3. The following findings made by the First-tier Tribunal have been preserved:

(a) The appellant was not active for the KDPI whilst in Iran and did not come to the attention of the authorities prior to his departure for any reason;

(b) The appellant is in contact with his family;

(c) The appellant has posted material on Facebook, albeit that this was facilitated by friends/associates; and

(d) The appellant has attended demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London, albeit in a passive role.

4. No freestanding Article 8 claim is pursued.

The live issues
5. The agreed live issues at the re-making stage are as follows:

(a) Whether the appellant genuinely holds any political beliefs which are reasonably likely to be perceived as constituting pro-Kurdish and/or anti-regime sentiments;

(b) If he does, whether he would wish to openly express any such beliefs on return to Iran;

(c) If he did openly express such views, what consequences are reasonably likely to follow;

(d) If would not openly express such views, what with the reasons be for this;

(e) Whether or not the appellant has any genuine political beliefs, would he be at risk on return in light of a comprehensive application of the country guidance set out in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430.

6. The respondent accepts that if the appellant does hold genuine political beliefs and would wish to openly express these on return (and, by implication, if he would not do so because of the fear of the consequences), there would be a real risk and the appeal should be allowed.

7. For the avoidance of any doubt, this is a pre-NABA 2022 case.

The evidence
8. The appellant has provided a consolidated bundle, indexed and paginated 1-342.

9. There was a discussion at the outset of the hearing as to whether the parties wished to provide further country evidence in light of the recent unrest in Iran. Both representatives were agreed that I had to consider the situation as of now, but neither sought an adjournment to provide further evidence, nor did they seek a direction for the provision of such evidence post-hearing. The case was ready to proceed and both agreed that they were content to make submissions on what was before me and in light of the guidance provided in HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 00430 (IAC).

10. The appellant attended the hearing and gave evidence with the assistance of a Kurdish Sorani interpreter. I was satisfied that there were no difficulties in communication between the two. The oral evidence is a matter of record and I also took a careful note. I will refer to relevant aspects of this evidence when setting out my findings of fact, below.

The hearing
11. Mr Pugh relied on his skeleton argument and made oral submissions. In summary, he submitted that the appellant was not a credible witness and held no genuine political beliefs. He was of and would not be so on return to that country, notwithstanding the current situation.

12. Mr Spurling relied on his skeleton argument and made additional submissions. In summary, he submitted that the appellant was credible and did hold genuine political beliefs. If such beliefs were openly expressed in Iran, the appellant would be at risk. If he did not do so, it would be because of a fear of the consequences. Either way, the appellant should succeed in his appeal. Even if the appellant did not hold genuine beliefs, the “hair trigger” approach referred to in HB (Kurds), seen in the context of the current country situation, would place the appellant at risk. It was submitted that the appellant would be at risk even if he could truthfully tell the authorities that his asylum claim the United Kingdom was made on a false basis. If asked about what he had done in this country, he should be expected to answer truthfully and the mere fact that he had demonstrated and/or posted anti-regime material on Facebook would be sufficient to make him of adverse interest at the “pinch point” of return.

13. At the end of the hearing, I announced to the parties that I would reserve my decision.

Self-directions
14. I remind myself that the burden of proof rests with the appellant, but that the standard of proof is low: he need only establish that it is reasonably likely that facts are true and that he would be at risk of persecution and/or Article 3 ill-treatment on return.

15. Neither party has suggested that the guidance in HB (Kurds) should not be followed and I apply that guidance.

Findings and conclusions
16. I apply the preserved findings of fact to my re-making decision and go on to make the following findings in light of the live issues set out previously.

Does the appellant hold genuine political beliefs?
17. For the following reasons, all of which must be read cumulatively, I find that the appellant has been untruthful in respect of his claimed political beliefs.

18. First, the fact that he has previously been found to be untruthful in respect of a central aspect of his claim (i.e. activities on behalf of the KDPI) is a relevant, although clearly not a decisive, consideration. The same applies to the judge’s rejection of the appellant’s claim to have lost contact with family members in Iran. I remind myself that a person may lie about one matter, but be truthful in respect of others. The preserved adverse findings cannot however simply be ignored when assessing the appellant’s overall credibility. The converse would also apply: if the appellant had been believed in respect of events in Iran it would have had a favourable impact on overall credibility.

19. Secondly, the appellant’s oral evidence before me contained several significant difficulties.

20. He told me that his political beliefs had been integral to his identity for “nearly four years”, but was unable to provide any satisfactory answers to why he been unable to describe those beliefs at the First-tier Tribunal hearing in January 2025: I found his response - that he had not been asked directly what the extent of those beliefs were - to be wholly unsatisfactory.

21. He told me that he came to “fully understand” the situation for Kurds in Iran and for his political views to be “ultimately solidified” in August 2021 when he and his friend S undertook activities in the country (presumably with reference to the KDPI). This of course does not sit well with the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of his evidence and the consequent (preserved) adverse credibility findings. Whilst the appellant then sought to row back on his initial answer somewhat, I find that this did nothing to dispel my serious concerns as to the reliability and truthfulness of what he was saying.

22. Thirdly, when asked about his Facebook posts and his ability to write in English and/or understand what was written in English, the appellant told me that his language ability had “developed” over time. He mentioned having help from a friend, P, who had come to United Kingdom with him. P apparently helped the appellant to make posts on Facebook. P is not mentioned at all in the appellant’s witness statements. The appellant told me that he remained in contact with P, but had not asked for him to attend as a supporting witness because he had not been asked to do so by his solicitors. I do not accept that explanation. Even if his solicitors had not directly asked him (they would not have known about P because the appellant had not mentioned this individual), it would clearly have been open to the appellant to have mentioned this person to the solicitors during the preparation of his appeal to the First-tier Tribunal and/or at the re-making stage.

23. I note also that when asked if S had helped him to post material on Facebook, the appellant replied in the negative.

24. Fourthly, the appellant was asked about evidence he had given at the First-tier Tribunal hearing, with particular reference to [51], [53], and [54] of the decision. In those passages the judge recorded that the appellant accepted that he allowed third parties to use his social media account (i.e. his Facebook account) in order to make posts. He was, as described by the judge, simply a “conduit for the opinions of others”. It is also recorded that the appellant had not claimed to have any contact with those third parties. Before me, the appellant stated that he had mentioned that he had used online translation applications to put his own posts on Facebook.

25. Three particular difficulties arise in respect of the preceding paragraph. The involvement of P in assisting the appellant to make Facebook posts is inconsistent with what was said to the judge about who was creating the content of the Facebook posts: was it solely third parties, or did the appellant himself contribute? The claimed ongoing contact with P is inconsistent with the appellant having previously said that he has no further contact with the third parties (reasonably assuming that P might have been one of those individuals). Finally, the appellant had said nothing previously about using online translation applications in order to post his own content on Facebook and his evidence before me was also inconsistent with what had been said to the judge.

26. Fifthly, it is clearly not inherently implausible that the appellant would have pro-Kurdish/anti-regime views. He is Kurdish and the position of Kurds in Iran is well-known. Many Kurds from north-western Iran undoubtedly hold political/anti-regime views. Thus, on a general level the appellant’s claim is supported by the wider context and I have taken account of that. However, cases are fact-specific and I have considered the evidence in the round; ranging from the general to the particular. In this case, the numerous and significant concerns I have as to the appellant’s own evidence outweighs the broader contextual factors which point in his favour.

27. Sixthly, having regard to the evidence as a whole I find that the appellant’s attendance at some demonstrations in London was simply an attempt to create a façade of genuine political beliefs. On his own evidence, his role was entirely passive and whilst that not of itself does not negate the possibility of a genuine belief, it is consistent with the overall evidential picture of a person who has taken steps he believes will have created a risk profile, albeit one not based on underlying substance.

28. Seventhly, my serious concerns with the appellant’s evidence relating to the Facebook account, combined with all other matters, reinforces the preserved finding that the appellant did not in fact create his own content, but allowed his account to be used as nothing more than a conduit by others. I am not in a position to make a finding as to whether these third parties held genuine beliefs, but the core point is that the account itself is/was in the name of someone who did not hold such beliefs, namely the appellant.

29. For the sake of completeness, even if the appellant had created some content himself, it was not done out of any genuine belief on his part.

30. As to the content of the Facebook posts in general, I accept that it is reasonably likely that the Iranian authorities would (if they were ever made aware of it) regarded as being pro-Kurdish and/or anti-regime. There are images of the Kurdish flag, pictures of the Supreme Leader with images of blood-stained handprints next to it, and references to individuals who have been killed by the regime.

31. In light of everything I have said above, I find that it is not reasonably likely that the Iranian authorities have conducted targeted surveillance of the appellant in the United Kingdom, whether in respect of attendance at demonstrations or Facebook activity. On my findings, the appellant was not known to the authorities whilst in Iran and thus there was no pre-existing profile which might have excited the interest of the Iranian authorities in this country. His attendance at demonstrations has been entirely passive and is not reasonably likely to have led to any material level of interest. In terms of the Facebook activity, I bear in mind what is said at [121] of XX to the effect that the Iranian authorities do not conduct wholesale monitoring of Facebook accounts. The evidence of the appellant’s Facebook activity is not indicative of any level of political involvement (in its wider sense) which is reasonably likely to have led the authorities to conduct targeted monitoring. On the evidence before me, the Facebook account does not seem to have had a large following/number of “likes”. The great majority of the posts concern photographs of the appellant and, I find, it is highly likely that the authorities would (even if they had seen it at all, which I find that they had not) have seen this for what it was; a disingenuous attempt to create an adverse profile for the sake of obtaining permission to stay in the United Kingdom. Whilst the Iranian regime is brutal and highly intolerant, the country evidence and country guidance decisions over time suggest that they are not unsophisticated. As stated in BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 00036 (IAC) and alluded to in XX, resources are a limiting factor to the breadth of surveillance. In all the circumstances, the appellant is not someone whose (contrived) activities in United Kingdom are reasonably likely to have generated “significant adverse interest” (XX, at [121]).

Is the appellant at risk on return to Iran?
32. I now transpose all of the above into my assessment of whether the appellant is at risk on return. What follows is to be seen in the context of an application of the lower standard of proof, as discussed in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216, at [49]-[56].

33. There is no risk to the appellant as a result of any extant adverse interest in him by the Iranian authorities because on my findings it is not reasonably likely that any such interest exists.

34. I find that the appellant has failed to show that he holds genuine political beliefs and that includes pro-Kurdish and/or anti-regime beliefs which constitute a material element of his identity. In consequence, it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would wish to verbally/physically express any (non-genuine) views in Iran, nor is it reasonably likely that he would wish to post any (non-genuine) views on Facebook or any other social media platform.

35. The appellant is not therefore reasonably likely to be at risk on return by virtue of the well-known HJ (Iran)/RT (Zimbabwe) principles. He has no genuine beliefs which he would wish to openly express in any form, or would otherwise conceal because of adverse consequences of doing so.

36. Following on from the above, I do not accept the appellant’s indication that he would not delete his Facebook account prior to the pre-removal process in the United Kingdom (the first “pinch point” in the returns process). Given the absence of any genuine political beliefs behind what he has so far done on Facebook, there is nothing objectionable about him being expected to delete the account. Deleting the account in advance would neutralise any potential risk of being perceived as having a “critical” Facebook presence and it is highly likely that the applicant will be aware of this and/or would receive clear legal advice to that effect before the pre-removal process began. In my judgment, it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would not take this step and do so would not infringe the HJ (Iran)/ZT (Zimbabwe) principles.

37. In light of my findings and assessment thus far, it is not reasonably likely that the pre-removal process will disclose anything to put the appellant at risk on return. That still leaves the second “pinch point”, namely the position following return itself.

38. It is common ground that the appellant will be questioned at the point of return. It is common ground that the appropriate prism through which to assess the nature and possible consequences of that initial questioning is the “hair trigger” attitude on the part of the Iranian authorities, as confirmed by HB (Kurds). Notwithstanding the recent turmoil in Iran, it has not been suggested to me that the “hair trigger” approach has been overtaken by events such that the “trigger” requires nothing more than the simple facts of being Kurdish and/or a failed asylum-seeker, and/or having left the country illegally. In any event, the situation in Iran, whilst obviously very serious, does not, on the materials and submissions before me, represent a sufficient basis for departing from the country guidance contained in the various country guidance cases.

39. I conclude that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would volunteer disclosure of activities undertaken whilst in the United Kingdom. As with the deletion of his Facebook account, I infer that it is reasonably likely the appellant would take appropriate steps to neutralise or mitigate a potential risk and not volunteering information of which the authorities would not already be aware is one obvious and unobjectionable step for him to take. That is the effect of the conclusion reached by the Upper Tribunal and subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal in S v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 at [55]-[56], which in turn referred to [98]-[99] of XX (I would add in a reference to [100]. Both decisions addressed what was said in RT (Zimbabwe) and both drew the distinction between on the one hand an individual having to prove loyalty to a particular cause (i.e. satisfactorily demonstrating active support - the RT (Zimbabwe) scenario) and on the other simply not volunteering information about non-genuine activities carried out abroad when asked questions by the authorities of a “highly organised state” (i.e. satisfactorily demonstrating neutrality - the scenario relating to returnees to Iran). Similarly, in OM v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1585, the Court concluded that it was inevitable that, on its findings, the Upper Tribunal would have found that the appellant in that case would not have volunteered the fact of his attendance at demonstrations in the United Kingdom when questioned on return: [54]. Whilst of course every case is fact-specific, the point arising from S, XX, and OM is that voluntary non-disclosure is in principle a permissible inference to draw. On the facts of the present case and in light of my findings, I draw that inference.

40. On this scenario, there would be no risk to the appellant being sent for second-stage interrogation (and the concomitant risk of persecution/ill-treatment) because: (a) he would have no pre-existing adverse profile relating to his past in Iran and his time in the United Kingdom; (b) there would be no Facebook account to interrogate because it would have already been deleted prior to the first “pinch point” in the United Kingdom; (c) the absence of a Facebook account and/or the deletion thereof will not raise material suspicions (XX, at [97]); (d) the appellant would not volunteer any activities undertaken in the United Kingdom; (e) the fact of being Kurdish and/or a failed asylum-seeker and/or someone who had exited the country legally would be insufficient to generate sufficient adverse interest; and (f) even applying the “hair trigger” approach and applying all potential risk factors cumulatively, it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would be sent for further interrogation and therefore he would not be exposed to the concomitant risk of persecution/Article 3 ill-treatment.

41. It is apparent from the foregoing that the term “volunteer” plays a material part in the analysis. At first glance, the use of the term “volunteer” might involve some ambiguity: was it intended to mean only the proactive offering up information in the absence of any particular questions? Or, did it cover that scenario and the non-disclosure/withholding of information even if questions were asked?

42. The better interpretation is the latter. I say that for three principal reasons. First, the relevant passages in XX do not suggest limiting it to proactive disclosure. Indeed, it would be somewhat odd if such a limitation had been intended: after all, it was accepted that a returnee would be questioned and that questioning would obviously be in the context of them being a failed asylum-seeker. In that context, the term “volunteer” is much more likely to mean not providing information when questioned. Secondly, this interpretation appears to be one adopted by the Court of Appeal in OM, at [54], where the term “volunteer” is effectively used interchangeably with “disclose”: again, neither were suggestive of a limited (and somewhat artificial) meaning. Thirdly, nothing in S or the country guidance cases indicates that a limited interpretation of the term is warranted.

43. The next point to address is the type of questions which are reasonably likely to be asked of the appellant on return. This is not an engagement in impermissible speculation. The fact that questioning would take place is not in dispute. We know too that the Iranian authorities are sophisticated and have “well-established methods of questioning [which are] well-documented and therefore predictable”: XX at [102]. It is, I find, reasonably likely that the authorities would ask the basic screening question(s) of why he had claimed asylum in the United Kingdom.

44. Before turning to what the appellant might say in response to that initial questioning, it is important to appreciate the context in which those questions would be asked: (a) the authorities would already know that he was a failed asylum-seeker; (b) by definition, that status entailed the appellant having told the United Kingdom authorities that he feared returning to Iran; (c) the sophisticated Iranian authorities would be well-aware that many people make asylum claims abroad based on common themes such as Kurdish ethnicity and/or political dissent; (d) the authorities will also know that many people make false asylum claims; (e ) Iran is not a country in which an individual must demonstrate positive loyalty to the regime, as is made clear in the country guidance decisions.

45. The appellant can truthfully say that he made an asylum claim in this country based on his Kurdish ethnicity and that it had been rejected. That truthful statement, even when combined with his ethnicity, status as a failed asylum-seeker, and being a person who had left Iran illegally, is not reasonably likely to create a risk. The “hair trigger” attitude of the authorities, even at the present time, does not create a risk per se. On the extremely limited information available to them, it is not reasonably likely that the authorities would wish to interrogate the appellant further.

46. The appellant’s appeal fails on this basis.

47. In any event, I go on to address Mr Spurling’s submission that the appellant would be asked specific questions by the authorities as to what exactly he did here. He submitted that the appellant would have to tell the truth in response to such questions and that the answers would be reasonably likely to create an adverse interest sufficient to put him at risk of further interrogation.

48. I do not accept that there is a reasonable likelihood of such additional detailed questioning taking place. That is because (a) of everything I have already said about the absence of any pre-existing adverse profile; and (b) the country guidance in HB (Kurds), which distinguishes between first and second stage questioning on return. It is in respect of the latter where more in-depth questioning is reasonably likely to take place, with an accompanying risk of ill-treatment. But, to get to that stage there must be already sufficient interest in the appellant (applying the “hair trigger” approach). On my assessment, no such interest is reasonably likely to arise.

49. Therefore, the premise of Mr Spurling’s submission is not established, even on the lower standard of proof. The appellant’s appeal fails on this basis as well.

50. Even if the appellant were to be asked more specific questions at the first stage, I find as a fact that the appellant would withhold (not volunteer) information about his attendance at demonstrations and the content of his Facebook account. This finding is based on the following considerations. First, in principle there is nothing impermissible in considering whether the appellant would withhold information: as alluded to previously, it is a legitimate question, as established in the decided cases. Secondly, the appellant has been untruthful throughout his asylum claim: he has been untruthful in respect of claimed activities whilst in Iran and in the United Kingdom. This is relevant to whether he would in fact conceal information on return: XX at [102]. Thirdly, as with the deletion of his Facebook account, the appellant can be expected to try and neutralise or at least mitigate any risk to him. Not disclosing his attendance at demonstrations and details about his (deleted) Facebook account would clearly have that effect and the appellant would appreciate that. If he were suggesting that he would nonetheless disclose everything, I find that that is not reasonably likely to occur. Fourthly, on the facts of this case, the authorities would simply have nothing in their possession to contradict or otherwise dispute anything the appellant told them or, importantly, did not tell them. For example, they would have no surveillance material from the United Kingdom and no ability to look at a Facebook account (it having been deleted before the re-documentation process in this country). In this way, it is not reasonably likely that the appellant would be in danger of getting caught in a lie, as it were.

51. The appellant’s appeal fails on this basis as well.

52. Taking the hypothetical scenario to its very furthest point, I would still conclude that there was no reasonable likelihood of the appellant being sent for further interrogation. Taking everything I have said previously into account and even if the appellant told the authorities that he had attended a few demonstrations in this country and had had a Facebook account, the following considerations go to preclude the existence of a real risk. First, he could truthfully say that he had been to a handful of demonstrations but had done so without genuine political beliefs and only in order to fabricate an asylum claim for himself. Secondly, he could truthfully say that he was, to all intents and purposes, illiterate, and the Facebook account had been a further attempt to fabricate an asylum claim. I reiterate that the authorities would have no means of seeing any of the contents of that account for themselves. If pressed, the appellant could truthfully say that there were pictures of him holding a Kurdish flag on the street. It is inconceivable that he would disclose any information about pictures of the Supreme Leader or any other content. Thirdly, I do not lose sight of the fact that this hypothetical scenario would be at the first stage of questioning and at that point the country guidance indicates that the nature of the questioning would not lead to a risk of being ill-treated. In other words, it is not a situation in which the appellant was being threatened with ill-treatment to disclose further details about any activities in this country. Fifthly, it is not reasonably likely that, even on the “hair trigger” approach, a disclosure by the applicant that he had posted photographs of him holding a Kurdish flag would excite the interest of the authorities to the extent that they would send him for second stage interrogation.

53. The appellant’s appeal also fails on this final analysis.

54. In summary, the appellant has no genuine political beliefs, has no existing adverse profile, and would not on return be at risk of persecution and/or ill-treatment, notwithstanding the “hair trigger” attitude of the Iranian authorities. It is not reasonably likely that he would be detained for further questioning on return. He would not in fact reveal any information which might otherwise place him at risk. Even if he did provide certain information, he would not be at risk. His status as a Kurd who would return as a failed asylum-seeker and someone who had left Iran illegally would not combine to create a risk. HB (Kurds) does not provide a basis on which this particular appellant can succeed.

Anonymity
55. The anonymity direction previously made is maintained and for the same reasons.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law and that decision has been set aside.

The decision in this appeal is re-made and the appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 18 February 2026

ANNEX: THE ERROR OF LAW DECISION

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002202
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52402/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
…………………………………

Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between
SI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr R Spurling, Counsel, instructed by Thompson & Co Solicitors
For the respondent: Ms J Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 14 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant, a citizen of Iran, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Fox (the judge), promulgated on 17 February 2025. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims.

2. There were two strands to the appellant’s case before the judge. First, he relied on claimed (very limited) involvement with the KDPI whilst in Iran. Secondly, he relied on sur place activities (attending demonstrations and engaging in social media posts). These two elements, in isolation or taken together, was said to demonstrate a risk on return. There was no freestanding Article 8 claim.

3. The judge disbelieved the appellant’s account of events in Iran: [40]-[49]. The judge accepted that the appellant had attended a number of demonstrations outside the Iranian embassy in London and had acted as a “conduit” for others to post anti-regime posts on social media. However, the judge found that these activities were not the result of genuine: [50], [54], [60], and [66]-[67]. Ultimately, the judge concluded that the appellant did not have a “political profile” and that there was no risk on return, having regard to HB (Kurds) Iran CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC). The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

The grounds of appeal and grant of permission
4. The appellant was not legally represented when he submitted his application for permission and accompanying grounds of appeal (although it appears as though he had some assistance with drafting those grounds). Three grounds put forward: first, it is said that the judge applied a higher standard of proof than a reasonable likelihood; secondly, it is said that the judge failed to properly apply HB (Kurds); thirdly, it is said that the judge failed to properly consider the HJ (Iran) principles.

5. The First-tier Tribunal refused permission. On renewal, Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman refused permission on first ground, but granted on the second and third. He was satisfied that it was arguable the judge had failed to make adequate findings in respect of the sur place activities, the country guidance had not been fully engage with, that the findings on the ability of the Iranian authorities to monitor in this country were potentially flawed, and had failed to explain accept that the appellant was nothing more than a conduit for the anti-regime social media posts. Judge Hoffman was less persuaded by the third ground, but quite sensibly saw the HJ (Iran) point as being interlinked with the second ground.

Rule 24
6. The respondent has not provided a rule 24 response.

The hearing
7. Mr Spurling relied on the grounds. In essence, he submitted that the judge had failed to apply the whole of the country guidance set out in HB (Kurds) to the facts of the appellant’s case. In particular, the judge had failed to assess the content of the Facebook posts and the perception of the Iranian authorities in respect of what the appellant had done. In respect of the HJ (Iran) point, he submitted that whilst the judge had disbelieved much of the appellant’s account, he had not made a finding on what views the appellant in fact held as regards the rights of Kurds and his attitude towards the authorities. This meant that they had not been a proper assessment of the extent to which the appellant could express any views on return at risk.

8. Ms Isherwood referred me to [66] of FA (Iran) v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 149 and acknowledged that there was some merit in the second ground of appeal (although she did not concede the point). As to the third ground, she submitted that the judge made a number of adverse findings and these were tantamount to rejection of everything the appellant had said about possible political beliefs.

9. In reply, Mr Spurling acknowledged that any beliefs held by the appellant would not have been sophisticated, but the adverse findings did not inevitably lead to a conclusion that the appellant held no pro-Kurdish and/or anti-regime views.

10. At the end of the hearing I announced my conclusion that there was a material error of law in respect of the second ground, but that I would reserve my position on the third ground.

Reasons and conclusions
11. I remind myself of the need to exercise appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with a decision of the First-tier Tribunal. I have considered the judge’s decision sensibly and holistically, bearing in mind that he read and heard evidence on the relevant issues, but he was not required to set out every step of his reasoning process, and that decision should not be forensically analysed.

12. The reason why the judge erred in respect of HB (Kurds) is that he failed to adequately apply the whole of the country guidance set out in the judicial headnote to the facts of this case. The relevant passages of the headnote are as follows:

“(7) Kurds involved in Kurdish political groups or activity are at risk of arrest, prolonged detention and physical abuse by the Iranian authorities. Even Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.

(8) Activities that can be perceived to be political by the Iranian authorities include social welfare and charitable activities on behalf of Kurds. Indeed, involvement with any organised activity on behalf of or in support of Kurds can be perceived as political and thus involve a risk of adverse attention by the Iranian authorities with the consequent risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.

(9) Even 'low-level' political activity, or activity that is perceived to be political, such as, by way of example only, mere possession of leaflets espousing or supporting Kurdish rights, if discovered, involves the same risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. Each case, however, depends on its own facts and an assessment will need to be made as to the nature of the material possessed and how it would be likely to be viewed by the Iranian authorities in the context of the foregoing guidance.

(10) The Iranian authorities demonstrate what could be described as a 'hair-trigger' approach to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights. By 'hair-trigger' it means that the threshold for suspicion is low and the reaction of the authorities is reasonably likely to be extreme.”
[Underling added]

13. I acknowledge that the judge did refer to HB (Kurds) in general and specific reference is made by the judge to [9] of headnote: see [69] and [70]. I also take into account the need for real caution before concluding that relevant considerations have not been taken into account where a general reference has been made to the source of those considerations (in this case, HB (Kurds)). Having said that, the important point arising from [7], [8], and [10] of the headnote is that the determination of risk is not simply a question of whether an individual has a “political profile” as such: it is concerned with the perception of the Iranian authorities as to what an individual has in fact said and/or done and whether that is considered to be hostile to the regime (in the context of the “hair trigger” approach). Thus, an individual without any “political profile” (as that term would ordinarily be understood) might nonetheless be at risk because of the content of what has been posted on a social media site, or participation in demonstrations. This is the case even if the level of the activity was not borne out of genuine political beliefs. As I read it, that was the sentiment being expressed at [66] of FA (Iran).

14. In the present case, the judge’s finding that the appellant had no “political profile” should not have been the end of the risk assessment. What was required was a consideration of the content of the Facebook posts (i.e. did they contain anti-regime material), together with the attendance at multiple demonstrations. These matters then had to be put together with the fact that the appellant is Kurdish, left Iran illegally, and would be returning from the United Kingdom. Upon questioning on return, the appellant could not be expected to lie about what he had done whilst in this country (even if he did not genuinely hold firm political beliefs). That was the proper context in which risk had to be assessed. In my judgment, the judge failed to undertake that task. I appreciate that it may seem somewhat unattractive that in fact an individual who has been untruthful and appears to have undertaken activities in order to bolster a protection claim might nonetheless succeed in that claim, but that is a possibility which arises as a result of the extant country guidance.

15. Ground two is made out and that sufficient for the judge’s decision to be set aside.

16. I have found the consideration of the third ground to be more difficult. The judge was entitled to disbelieve the appellant’s account of the particular claimed incident in Iran. The judge was entitled to conclude that the particular activities carried out in the United Kingdom were in order to bolster the protection claim.

17. However, in the end I have concluded that there is a material error. The judge concluded that the activities undertaken were “not genuine”, but he failed to make a finding on whether the appellant in fact held pro-Kurdish and/or anti-regime beliefs, albeit at an unsophisticated level. There is a distinction between the carrying out of certain activities (which may simply be to bolster a protection claim) and the possibility that an individual has genuine underlying beliefs. A finding that the former took place on a non-genuine basis does not preclude the latter. The judge should have, but did not, make a finding on this particular point. This is an additional issue on which the judge’s decision must be set aside.

Disposal
18. Having carefully considered what should happen next, I conclude that this case should remain in the Upper Tribunal for a re-making decision to take place in due course. There was no unfairness in the First-tier Tribunal proceedings, the applicable legal framework is clear, and extent of any further fact-finding is not extensive.

19. The following findings made by the judge are to be preserved:

(a) The appellant was not active for the KDPI whilst in Iran and did not come to the attention of the authorities: [43]-[49] and the reference to activities in Iran in [69];

(b) The appellant is in contact with his family: [61];

(c) The appellant has posted material on his Facebook account, albeit that this was facilitated by friends/associates: [54];

(d) The has attended demonstrations outside the Iranian Embassy in London, albeit in a passive role: [60].

20. The live issues to be addressed at the resumed hearing and in the re-making decision are:

(a) Whether the appellant genuinely holds any beliefs which are reasonably likely to be perceived as constituting pro-Kurdish and/or anti-regime sentiments;

(b) If he does, whether he would wish to openly express any such beliefs on return to Iran;

(c) If he did, what consequences are reasonably likely to follow;

(d) If he would not openly express such beliefs, what would be the reasons for this;

(e) Whether or not the appellant holds any genuine beliefs, would he be at risk on return in light of a comprehensive application of the country guidance set out in HB (Kurds).

21. There is no freestanding Article 8 claim in play.

Anonymity
22. I maintain the anonymity direction made by the judge. This is a protection case and that currently outweighs the important principle of open justice.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law and that decision is set aside.

This appeal is retained in the Upper Tribunal for the decision to be re-made in due course.

Directions to the parties
1. No later than 10 days from the date this error of law decision is sent out, the appellant shall confirm whether oral evidence is to be called at the resumed hearing and, if it is, whether an interpreter will be required;

2. No later than 28 days from the date this error of law decision is sent out, the appellant shall file and serve a consolidated bundle of all evidence relied on;

3. No later than 14 days thereafter, the respondent shall file and serve any further evidence relied on;

4. No later than 10 days before the resumed hearing, the appellant shall file and serve a skeleton argument;

5. No later than 5 days before the resumed hearing, the respondent shall file and serve a skeleton argument;

6. Any application to vary these directions must be made promptly, copying in the other side.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Dated: 15 October 2025