Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002204

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/02116/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 22 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

Mahta Sohna
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S. Hingora, Counsel, instructed by Siddique Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A. Tam, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 21 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (“the judge”) dated 27th of March 2025 (“the decision”) in which the judge dismissed his appeal against the respondent's decision to refuse his human rights claim made on the 27 February 2024 in response to a stage 1 deportation decision of the 25 January 2024. The respondent refused the human rights claim on the 17 October 2024 and made a decision to deport the appellant.
2. The appellant challenges the decision on 4 grounds as follows;
Ground 1: material mistake of fact- failure to correctly assess rehabilitation;
Ground 2: failure to take into account material evidence relating to (a) inadequate treatment of the children's best interests and evidence and (b) inadequate engagement with the evidence of the appellant’s partner's vulnerability and dependency;
Ground 3: misdirection in law in assessing very significant obstacles;
Ground 4: irrationality and failure to conduct a holistic Article 8 assessment.
3. On 13 May 2025 First-tier Tribunal Judge Adio granted permission on all grounds, although noted that Ground 1 was particularly arguable.
4. I was provided with a 291 page bundle (“HB”) for the error of law hearing plus a skeleton argument which Mr Hingora had prepared. Mr Tan drew to my attention that the OASys report and an updating statement of the appellant’s partner, Ms Winwood was missing from the hearing bundle, so arranged for a copy to be emailed to me. I heard submissions on behalf of both parties and at the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give together with my reasons.
Background
5. The appellant is a national of the Gambia who has resided in the United Kingdom since 1996. He has three children and is currently in a relationship with a British partner. Until his conviction on 13 December 2023, the appellant was of good character. However on 13 December 2023 the appellant entered guilty pleas to four offences of being concerned in the supply of drugs, three of those charges relating to Class A drugs namely cocaine, heroin and ketamine and the fourth being in relation to a Class B drug namely MDMA. The appellant entered his guilty plea on a basis which was not accepted by the prosecution. Following a hearing, the judge did not accept the basis on which the appellant entered his guilty plea, but neither did the judge accept the prosecution case that the appellant played a leading role. The judge found he played a significant role in the drug dealing enterprise and sentenced him to a total custodial period of six years, reduced by 25% for his guilty plea (HB269). The appellant remains in prison serving that sentence and is due for release at the halfway stage in December 2026.
6. Once the respondent made the stage 1 deportation decision, the appellant submitted his human rights claim maintaining that his deportation would breach his Article 8 right to respect for his family and private life. He relied on the fact that he had reconnected with his two eldest children, then aged 14 and 16 years old and continued to be in a relationship with Ms Winwood his British partner who is neurodivergent. He supports her. He maintained that his deportation would be unduly harsh on both his children and his partner. He also relied on the length of his residence in the United Kingdom since 1996, most of which was lawful. He was granted indefinite leave to remain in 2009. All his remaining family live in the United Kingdom and he has no family ties left in the Gambia. He has lost all his ties there, so there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration into the Gambia. Taken together, his circumstances should be treated as being very compelling such as to outweigh the public interest in his deportation.
7. The respondent refused this claim, citing the significant public interest in the appellant’s deportation in light, not just of the length of his sentence, but the seriousness of his offending including the impact that dealing drugs has on society as a whole.
The Legal Framework
8. The appeal to the First-tier Tribunal arose in the context of the appellant as a foreign criminal. Due to the length of the appellant's sentence, he is liable to deportation pursuant to section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971 and section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007.
9. There was no right of appeal against the deportation decision, but the refusal of the appellant’s human rights claim carried a right of appeal pursuant to section 821) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) The First-tier Tribunal's jurisdiction was to determine whether the removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom was unlawful because it represented a breach of the United Kingdom's obligations under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (see section 84(1)(a) and (c) of the 2002 Act).
10. Insofar as any assessment was required under Article 8, the First-tier Tribunal was obliged to decide to the appeal with reference to the framework contained within section 117A-D of the 2002 Act, but in particular section 117C which deals with human rights appeals for foreign criminals. Section 117 C says as follows:

“Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals

(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (“C”) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4) Exception 1 applies where—
(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.”
The Judge’s Decision
11. By way of the decision dated 27 March 2025, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal. At [7], the judge noted the issue for him to resolve as being whether there are very compelling circumstances which outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s deportation. The judge evaluated the public interest in the appellant’s deportation from [10]-[16]. In so doing, the judge relied upon the summary of the appellant's offending as contained within the judge’s sentencing remarks [12] and considered what was said about the seriousness of the offending in the OASys report and the reasons for refusal letter. The judge concluded at [13] that the appellant's offending has resulted in harm.
12. At [14], as part of the assessment of the public interest, the judge considered the appellant’s claimed rehabilitation. The judge said this:

“there is relatively little before me indicating the appellant has taken any steps to address his own use of cocaine, which was clearly something which was ongoing for at least a year, with him taking cocaine on a ‘daily basis’ as pointed out in the sentencing remarks. The OASys assessment identifies ‘taking drugs’ as a problem for the appellant. The only evidence the appellant has taken any steps to address his own use of drugs is a certificate (p.79, AB) for completion of a drug awareness workshop in July 2024. Whilst this is admirable, I attach limited weight to the appellant’s rehabilitation, as all that is relied on is the completion of one workshop and no further offending since his incarceration.”
13. At [15], the judge referred to the risk of reoffending as contained within the OASys report namely that there is a 7% likelihood of the appellant reoffending over the next two years which the judge accepted to be a low risk of reoffending to which weight should attach. The judge also noted that the appellant's offending was over a relatively short period of time and that he was a man of good character beforehand. The judge also noted some personal mitigation to do with separation from his children at the time the offending took place. Finally in this section, the judge concluded at [16] that there was a need to mark the public's revulsion at the appellant's conduct and, when that was combined with the rest of the circumstances referred to, the judge found there to be a significant public interest in the appellant’s deportation.
14. The judge then turned to consider Exception 1 (section 117C(4) of the 2002 Act), but found the appellant had been in the UK lawfully for 18 years and 8 months which, given that he was 51 years old at the date of the decision, was not most of his life as required by Exception 1. At [19] the judge accepted the appellant was socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdom and at [20] noted aspects of the appellant's private life here. At [21], the judge did not find the appellant’s imprisonment to have broken his integration. Having directed himself to the test in the Secretary of State for the Home Department v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, at [23] the judge evaluated the appellant’s account about the lack of ties in the Gambia together with reference to his connections in the Gambia as contained within the sentencing remarks [24]. At [25] the judge decided that the appellant’s absence from the Gambia is not a factor which would prevent his integration; that the appellant’s character points to him being capable of reintegrating there [27], that his strong support network in the United Kingdom is likely to support him through the initial stages of his adjustment to life in the Gambia and therefore there is nothing that, in reality, constitutes an obstacle to his integration there [28].
15. The judge then went on to consider Exception 2 (section 117C(5)). The judge was satisfied that Ms Winwood is a qualifying partner for these purposes, but decided it would not be unduly harsh upon her to be separated from the appellant if he were deported to the Gambia. At [31] the judge noted a lack of medical evidence to support Ms Winwood's description of herself as being autistic with ADHD and dyslexia. At [32] he noted her evidence as to the support which the appellant provides to her but given the lack of supporting evidence about her diagnosis and due to the availability of other forms of support for her, together with Ms Winwood's own evidence that she is a regular visitor to the Gambia, he did not find that her remaining in the United Kingdom without the appellant would be unduly harsh [37]. The judge also found her to have exaggerated her evidence as to why she could not go to the Gambia with the appellant [38].
16. Moving on to the appellant's relationship with his children, the judge found the eldest two children to be qualifying children as their passports appeared in the bundle, unlike the appellant's youngest child. At [42] the judge did not find the appellant to have a subsisting parental relationship with the youngest child. At [44] the judge considered the chronology of the relationship between the appellant and his two eldest children and noted that they had written letters in support of the appellant’s case. However, the judge noted that at the time of the 1st letter in February 2024 the appellant had not seen either child for about 6 years. Nonetheless, the judge appeared to accept that the appellant had resumed contact with the children since then and there was a record of prison visits by both of the eldest children [44]. At [45] the judge found the relationship with the appellant's two eldest children had been sporadic but notwithstanding its reinstatement, the impact of the appellant’s deportation would not be unduly harsh upon them given his involvement with them had been limited until relevantly relatively recently and there was no evidence of any medical conditions or any particular dependency upon him. At [46] the judge noted the children's preference that the appellant stay in the United Kingdom and that they had both written letters in support of the appellant and he described those letters in summary. The judge accepted there would be some level of emotional difficulty and disappointment for them but it did not reach the threshold of undue harshness. He concluded at [46] by saying that even if it did, the test he had to apply is’ over and above’ undue harshness. At [47] the judge accepted the children could not relocate to the Gambia with the appellant.
17. Having found neither of the statutory Exceptions to apply, the judge moved on to consider whether there were ‘very compelling circumstances’ which outweigh the public interest. The judge reminded himself at [48] that the appellant’s offending, albeit over a short time, was serious as illustrated by the length of his sentence and therefore the weight of the public interest in his deportation is high. At [49] the judge considered the appellant's relationship with his partner and children and that they were formed whilst the appellant was here with indefinite leave to remain. The judge noted that the appellant’s removal would have an impact upon them albeit not sufficient to amount to undue hardship. He further accepted that it would be difficult to replicate those relationships by visits and electronic means of communication. He also took into account the references to the appellant having some medical conditions although noted a lack of documentary evidence about them or about how they would affect the appellant upon return to the Gambia. Finally, at [50], the judge noted that the factors he had identified in the appellant's favour cannot be said to amount to ‘very compelling circumstances’ as required by section 117C(6) which would render the decision disproportionate to the Article 8 rights of either the appellant, his partner or his children.
Discussion
18. In support of Ground 1, the appellant relies on what the judge said at [14] of the decision (see [12] above). In the grounds of appeal, the skeleton argument which Mr Hingora prepared for the Upper Tribunal and in oral submissions, Mr Hingora appeared to suggest that the judge had fallen into error within [14] by finding that only one workshop has been completed. In the skeleton argument, Mr Hingora stated of that paragraph:

“this statement is demonstrably false and reflects a misreading or failure to consider core documents within the appellants bundle”
19. I clarified this at the hearing because it was not clear to me whether the appellant relied on additional documents to show that the appellant had completed more than one workshop specifically relating to addressing his drug use in contrast to what the judge had said at [14]. Mr Hingora confirmed there were no other documents specifically on that issue but there were other documents pointing to the appellant’s rehabilitation more generally. Therefore, when pushed, Mr Hingora conceded that on a strict reading of [14], the judge was correct to say that there was only one certificate on the issue of drug misuse.
20. Turning to the evidence of rehabilitation more generally, Mr Hingora’s submissions were that the judge failed to have regard to the additional documents which he helpfully listed at para. 12 of the skeleton argument and which he submitted showed the appellant had taken significant steps towards positive rehabilitation. This evidence included courses in Maths and English and that he completed work on victim awareness, alcohol misuse and substance misuse. Mr Hingora relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, particularly [58] and [59], which said that a lack of further offending would generally attract little or no weight as evidence of rehabilitation, but if:

“there is evidence of positive rehabilitation which reduces the risk of further offending, then that may have some weight as it bears on one element of the public interest in deportation, namely the protection of the public from further offending”.
21. In support of his submission, Mr Hingora also relied on page 16 of the OASys report which set out the basic sentencing plan for the appellant showing five areas said to be linked to the appellant’s offending behaviour with recommendations of how such areas were to be addressed including by way of various courses. Mr Hingara pointed to the correlation between that and the evidence of the courses the appellant completed.
22. In contrast, Mr Tam relied upon page 9 of the OASys report which only noted one (out of a possible 27) factors said to link to the appellant’s offending, that being ’taking drugs’. Mr Tam also identified that prior to his offending, the appellant was somebody of good character, who had been in regular employment, speaks and writes English and could do some Maths, so it was difficult to see what areas aside from the drug use the appellant needed assistance with in order to mitigate the risk of reoffending. In any event, he submitted that given the limitations on rehabilitation as a factor relating to seriousness, the various certificates on which the appellant relied were very unlikely to lead to any material change in the judge’s assessment of the seriousness of the appellant’s offending and, therefore, in turn the balancing exercise necessitated by section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act.
23. I find there to be considerable merit in Mr Tam's submissions. Firstly, the judge was factually correct at [14] of his decision as discussed at [19] above. Secondly, the remaining courses and workshops which the appellant has attended in prison throughout 2024 as listed at para. 12 of the skeleton argument do not directly address the primary reason noted by the appellant himself within the OASys report (page 9) as being the reason he offended in the first place. The appellant has been consistent in attributing his offending to his use of cocaine. Whilst the sentencing judge found against the appellant as he found the appellant to be a user of cocaine rather than a cocaine addict, his use of the drug has never really been in dispute. Therefore, it is to some credit that the appellant has completed one course in relation to drug use, but there is no error in the judge finding at [14] that only limited weight can attach to the appellant’s rehabilitation. There is no reason to assume that the judge overlooked the other evidence of courses and workshops. The appellant has failed to demonstrate why they might increase the apportionment of weight to be attached to his rehabilitation to more than limited weight thereby rendering unsafe the judge’s finding to that effect. That is particularly so given the limitations on the weight to be attached to rehabilitation, even where there is positive evidence of rehabilitation as demonstrated by reliance on [58] of (HA) Iraq.
24. For the reasons I have given, I am not satisfied the judge fell into error in the way he dealt with rehabilitation in the decision. Even if I am wrong about that, I do not find any such error to be material because, taken at its highest, the combined evidence of the steps the appellant has taken to address any issues, is of minimal significance in the context of the unchallenged assessment made by the judge of the seriousness of the appellant's offending bearing in mind the nature of that offending, the length of the sentence, the appellant’s role within it, and the extent of harm the judge found to follow from drug dealing.
25. Turning to Ground 2, although the appellant relies both on the judge’s evaluation of the position of the appellant's partner and children of him leaving the United Kingdom, in oral submissions, Mr Hingora focused entirely on the position relating to the children and in particular said the judge should have placed much more weight on the evidence contained within the letters from the appellant’s two eldest children.
26. I have set out at [16] above a summary of how the judge dealt with the position relating to the children. Firstly, I note there is no challenge to the judge’s decision that it is only the two eldest children who are qualifying children and with whom the appellant has subsisting parental relationship. I also note that there is no challenge, and it appears to be entirely accepted, that for a period of six years prior to the appellant’s incarceration he was not in contact with his children. Finally, it is not disputed that the only resumption of contact has been within the custodial setting.
27. In my judgement, the appellant is asking quite a lot of the letters the children wrote to support the appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal. The letters were both dated 23 November 2024. The thrust of both is a moral objection to the concept of deportation, or the impact of deportation upon the appellant rather than themselves. Nevertheless, the letter written by the appellant’s son, which comprises a total of 11 lines, does include reference to him not wanting his father to be deported because “I would like to develop my relationship with him further, as he means a lot to me. I wish to spend quality time with him, and get much closer to him”. The letter from the appellant's daughter is longer, nearly 2 pages, but within that there is only one paragraph which relates to the impact of the appellant’s deportation upon her and she says this “I ask that you do not ship him away, that you do not take away from his young English born children, my siblings and myself, the choice of getting to know him. I do not believe that should be a choice someone can enforce for another human being without their consent”.
28. Returning to the judge’s decision, I find that the judge’s summary of the children's letters at [46] to be an entirely accurate one and that he quite properly accepted there would be a level of emotional difficulty and disappointment from for both of them if the appellant were deported. I am not persuaded that the judge overlooked any aspect of the impact upon the appellant’s children of his deportation as contained within evidence before him.
29. I turn next to whether this was sufficient, or whether the judge should have set out expressly what was in the children's best interests, before moving on to consider whether the appellant’s deportation amounted to undue hardship for one or both of their children. In oral submissions, Mr Tam relied upon HA (Iraq) and in turn KO Nigeria v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53 to submit that the framework contained within section 117C of the 2002 Act is compliant with the duty to consider the best interests of a child. In any event, Mr Tam submitted that the evidence before the judge as to the impact of the appellant’s deportation on the children was not sufficient to resist the public interest in the appellant’s deportation so, even were the judge found to have erred in his assessment of the impact upon the children, it would not be a material error when the ultimate balancing exercise required by section 117C(6) is undertaken.
30. At paragraph 19 of KO Nigeria, when discussing the general approach to section 11 7A- D of the 2002 Act, Lord Carnwath said:

“I also start from the presumption, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, that the provisions are intended to be consistent with the general principles relating to the “best interests” of children, including the principle that “a child must not be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent"”.
31. At 37 of HA (Iraq), Lord Hamblen reiterated that when interpreting section 117C of the 2002 Act, the presumption is that the statutory provisions are intended to be consistent with the general principles relating to the:

“best interests” of children. His comments here, were in the context of deciding whether or not there should be a national comparator but Lord Hamblen observed that such a comparator would be potentially inconsistent with the duty to have regard to the best interests of the child in question as the primary consideration in accordance with section 55 of the Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 (“the 2009 Act”).
32. He continued that the section 55 duty requires:

“having a clear idea of a child's circumstances and of what is in a child's best interests and carrying out a careful examination of all relevant factors when the interests of a child are involved- see Zoumbas at para 10. The focus needs to be on the individual child, but the discounting of what are said to be the normal or ordinary affects of deportation by reference to a notional comparative child risks the court or tribunal ignoring the actual impact of deportation on the particular child in a search for features which are outside the supposed norm”.
33. I have set this out, not because there is any suggestion here that the judge fell foul of this and applied a notional comparative test, but to outline the view of the superior courts as to what is required in order to comply with the duty contained within section 55 of the 2009 Act.
34. Section 117C(5) of the 2002 Act requires the judge to consider both whether relocation of the children with the appellant would be unduly harsh and whether remaining in the UK without him would meet that threshold. Whilst it may have been the intention of the drafters of section 117C that the legislative framework is consistent with the duty to consider the best interests of a child as a primary consideration, neither KO Nigeria nor HA (Iraq) say, in terms, that a judge is excused from identifying what is, in fact, in the children's best interests before moving on to decide whether the threshold of undue harshness is met.
35. In this particular appeal, as the judge recognised at [46], even that is not enough, as the appellant would need to demonstrate very compelling circumstances over and above Exception 1 and 2 in light of the length of the appellant’s sentence. This was addressed at [51] of HA (Iraq) when Lord Hamblen summarised the factors identified by the European Court of Human Rights in Boultif v Switzerland (2001) 33 EHRR 50 and Uner v the Netherlands (2006) 45 EHRR 14 to be relevant to the assessment of very compelling circumstances. One such factor is stated as being:

“the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled".
36. It follows from the above consideration of the leading case law relating to the unduly harsh test, that judges are still required to identify what is in a child's best interests and evaluate the impact upon them of the two scenarios contemplated within the statutory framework at Exception 2.
37. It is clear from the judge’s decision that there is no express or implied reference to section 55 or the requirements to identify and then treat the children's best interests as a primary consideration. In my judgement, that is an error of law.
38. However, the question that follows is whether or not such an error is material. Returning to the facts of this case, it can be implied that the judge found it was not in the best interests of the children to relocate to the Gambia with the appellant because (although it was not suggested to him that such a course would be reasonable) he noted there was no prospect of this given the relationship with their mother [47]. It follows, therefore, that the children must remain in the United Kingdom. Given that at all material times the children have been in the care of their mother and not the appellant (who remains in prison) it is uncontroversial to say that their best interests require them to remain in the care of their primary carer in the United Kingdom. The only question then is whether their best interests also require the appellant to remain in the United Kingdom. I have considered carefully whether it is appropriate at this error of law stage for me to consider this for myself. However, in so doing I am not purporting to speculate as to what the judge would have found had he expressly considered what was in the children's best interests. Rather I am considering whether the appellant’s case, taken at its highest, might result in a decision that the children's best interests required the appellant to stay in the United Kingdom. If so, treating their best interests as a primary consideration, might that properly result in a finding that the appellant’s removal would be unduly harsh upon them? If so, might such a finding either alone or cumulatively with other factors, properly result in a different decision, namely that the appellant could properly meet the very compelling circumstances test set out in section 117C6 of the 2002 Act and render his deportation disproportionate.
39. In my judgement, the evidence on which the appellant relies as regards his two eldest children falls very far short of resulting in such an outcome being possible. I do not find it falls into the realms of speculation to say so. In circumstances when there has been a significant fracture in the relationship between the children and the appellant for a period of six years and where the only resumed contact has taken place within a prison setting and therefore very sporadically and based on the very limited evidence contained within each of the children's letters, I simply find there to be no basis whatsoever that any assessment of their children's best interests would result in a finding that the appellant’s presence is required in the United Kingdom or that his deportation would be unduly harsh upon them or that it would amount to very compelling circumstances to outweigh the high public interest in the appellant’s deportation. For that reason, despite the judge falling into error by not specifically identifying what was in the children's best interests, I do not find that error to be material and therefore I do not find Ground 2, as it relates to the children, to be made out.
40. I turn next to Ground 2 as it relates to the appellant’s partner. As stated, this was not a factor on which Mr Hingora made oral submissions. Nevertheless, it featured in the grounds and in his skeleton argument.
41. The grounds challenge the judge’s assessment of the impact of the respondent’s decision upon Ms Winwood on the basis that the judge inadequately engaged with the evidence of Ms Winwood’s vulnerability and dependency.
42. In my judgement, this criticism has no merit. The judge quite properly noted the lack of medical evidence to support the appellant’s claims about Ms Winwood’s medical conditions and her need for care and support [31/33]. The judge also noted the presence of other forms of support for Ms Winwood in the form of her own adult children, friends and social services [34/35]. The judge also noted the appellant’s incarceration and the lack of evidence about the impact of lack of support from the appellant now that he is incarcerated [31/33]. Finally the judge noted her regular trips to the Gambia [36].
43. In my judgement, the judge was entitled to identify, then rely on, these factors in order to arrive at his conclusion that neither the stay nor leave scenario was unduly harsh upon Ms Winwood.
44. Turning to Ground 3, the written and oral submissions both challenged [23] of the decision on the basis that it did not represent a Kamara compliant approach to the assessment of whether or not ‘very significant obstacles’ to the appellant’s reintegration into the Gambia existed. I do not find the submissions to have merit. Whilst the judge might not have expressed himself in the terms set out in the Grounds (paras. 15-19) that does not mean to say he overlooked the test to be applied, particularly given that he correctly referred to Kamara at [22] or that he overlooked the factors to be considered. The judge evaluated the appellant’s previous and more recent connections to the Gambia [23/28] and evaluated the appellant’s specific evidence about what problems he would have when asked at the hearing [24], although the judge rejected this as amounting to a very significant obstacle [25] (a finding entirely open to the judge and not challenged in the grounds). The judge quite properly considered Ms Winwood’s evidence about the impact upon the appellant but noted the lack of any medical evidence as to the appellant’s neurodiversity and Ms Winwood’s lack of expertise in this area [26]. The decision is also to be considered in the round and elsewhere in the decision the judge dealt with the situation regarding the appellant returning to the Gambia without his partner and children. The fact is, at its highest, the appellant’s evidence falls short of amounting to very significant obstacles and the judge was correct to identify that within the last sentence at [28] of the decision.
45. In his oral submission, Mr Hingora accepted that Ground 4 was parasitic to Grounds 1-3. I have not found any of those Grounds to be made out so it follows that neither is Ground 4. For completeness, the judge’s assessment of the test at section 117C(6) of the 2002 Act in respect of which a proportionality assessment is required adequately weighed into the balance those factors on which the appellant relied cumulatively [49] but decided they did not meet the section 117C(6) test given the weight which attached to the public interest in the appellant’s deportation. There is no error of law identified by Ground 4.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain an error on a point of law so it stands.

SJ Rastogi
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 August 2025