Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002209

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02745/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

5th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

RI
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Bhachu, Counsel instructed by Primus Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of Judge Hawden-Beal of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 21st March 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 28th September 2023, refusing his protection and human rights application.

Background to the appeal

2. RI is an Iraqi national who arrived in the UK on 7th August 2020 and claimed asylum on the same date.

3. The appellant states that he entered a relationship with a girl that he met at his sister’s house without the blessing of her family and that they would meet in secret. He states that he requested permission to marry her twice but was refused. The appellant states that her family discovered that he was still in a relationship with the girl and threatened him and on one occasion followed him in his car and shot at him. He states that the girl’s brothers were police officers working for the PDK. The appellant states that he fled to a friend’s house and whilst there he received a call from his sister who told him that men had come to the family home and spoken to his father who was very angry and wanted to kill the appellant stating that he had brought dishonour on the family. He states that he later discovered that the girl had been killed by her family for bringing dishonour on her family.

4. The appellant states that he left Iraq with the assistance of an agent. He initially states that he took his passport and CSID with him but that these were taken from him in Turkey but by the date of the hearing, his position was that he had his passport and driving licence with him which were taken from him and his CSID had remained at the family home. The appellant stated that, whilst in the UK, he had been politically active on social media and had attended demonstrations against the Iraq government.

5. The respondent accepted that the appellant was an Iraqi national of Kurdish ethnicity. The respondent also accepted that the appellant had been introduced to a girl at his sister’s house and had entered a relationship with her about which her family disapproved. The respondent did not accept that the brothers of the girl were police officers in the PDK and were influential, that the girl’s family wanted to kill the appellant or that the appellant’s father wanted to kill the appellant. The respondent also did not accept that the appellant was politically active in the UK. The respondent stated that the appellant could internally relocate to Erbil and that the appellant could return to Iraq with a laissez passer with a family member meeting him with the appropriate documents to allow him safe travel through Iraq.

6. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The judge noted that the respondent had taken 4 credibility points against the appellant [27] and considered each in turn. She found that some of those credibility points were not supported by the evidence [28] [29] [30] [34]. With regard to the appellant’s political activities in the UK, the judge found that his credibility was not damaged to the extent stated by the respondent [35]. The judge found that the relationship was accepted by the respondent and that the relationship was disapproved of by the girl’s family [36].

7. The judge found that the appellant did not fall within membership of a particular social group [37] and identified that the issues she had then to consider were whether the appellant was at risk from his own family, whether he was at risk from the girl’s family and whether there was a sufficiency of protection available to the appellant [38]. The judge found that the appellant was not at risk from his own family [39]. The judge did not accept that the appellant’s girlfriend’s brothers were involved in shooting at the appellant’s car [43]. Nor did she accept that there was sufficient evidence to show that the appellant’s girlfriend’s family had any connections, power or influence in Iraq [44]. In conclusion, the judge found that the appellant had been involved in a secret relationship which was discovered and which led to the death of his girlfriend but did not find that the appellant was at risk from his family or that of his girlfriend [45].

8. The judge also considered the sur place activities of the appellant and found that he would not be at risk on return as a result of these [52].

9. The judge went on to consider the feasibility of the appellant’s return to Iraq and whether he would be able to redocument himself in Iraq. She referred to the decision in SMO, KSP & IM (Article 15(c); identity documents) CG [2019] UKUT 400 (IAC) [53]. The judge found that the appellant remains in contact with his friend, that the friend had been in contact with the appellant’s sister and that it was likely that the sister would be prepared to assist the appellant on return albeit that the assistance was likely to be limited [57]. She found that the friend could assist the appellant through checkpoints [57].

10. The appellant sought permission to appeal. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge Lawrence of the First-tier Tribunal in a decision dated 14th May 2025 who granted permission on all grounds.

11. The appeal came before me at an error of law hearing on 13th October 2025. There were two issues:
a. Whether the judge had misdirected herself in failing to apply the most recent decision of SMO and KSP (Civil documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAT)
b. Whether the judge had failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant could internally relocate
The error of law hearing

12. At the hearing before me, the appellant was represented by Ms Bhachu, Counsel instructed by Primus Solicitors. The respondent was represented by Mr Terrell, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

13. In her submissions, Ms Bhachu informed me that there was some agreement between the parties. She said that the parties agreed that there was a flaw in the judge’s assessment of the feasibility of return and redocumentation.

14. In his submissions, Mr Terrell submitted that the real issue was approached at [57]of the decision. He said that the judge stated that it may be the case that the appellant’s sisters could assist in retrieving documents but did not make a concrete finding regarding this. He said that the judge then went on to say that the appellant could attend a CSA office and that his friend could arrange things for him. Mr Terrell said that the difficulty was that SMO and KSP (Civil documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC) stated that there was a need to move through checkpoints. He submitted that the consideration of the appellant’s ability to redocument himself did not quite fall within the guidance of SMO [2022]. Mr Terrell submitted that the findings of fact should be retained because there was no challenge to them by the appellant.

15. In her further submissions, Ms Bhachu submitted that there were erroneous findings in the decision and that ground 1 of the grounds of appeal was not just about whether the appellant could redocument himself but also whether there was a risk on return to Iraq. She said that the judge found that there was no risk from his family or that of his girlfriend because of an inability to trace the appellant on return but that there was no analysis of how he would resettle into Iraq without family support. Ms Bhachu submitted that the judge failed to properly consider the SMO [2022] factors. She submitted that the judge’s findings were not sufficient regarding risk on return from the appellant’s family or from his girlfriend’s family. Ms Bhachu further submitted that the findings should not be preserved other than the findings in paragraphs 27-34 where the judge made positive findings regarding the reasons for refusal letter. She submitted that all the other findings have not been factored into the issues which went to ground 2 relating to relocation. She also submitted that the judge had not considered whether the appellant was at risk from the girlfriend’s family even if they were not responsible for the shooting.

16. In his further submissions, Mr Terrell submitted that the judge had stated that she was not going to make a finding about whether the appellant was at risk in his home area as the finding that his family and the girlfriend’s family did not have sufficient power and influence to trace the appellant was sufficient and the appellant could internally relocate. He said that there was no attack on that finding in the grounds of appeal. He submitted that there was no evidence to show that the appellant’s family and his girlfriend’s family have reach outside the home area but acknowledged that some fact finding was necessary about whether they posed a risk to the appellant on return. Mr Terell said that the respondent would be keen to preserve paragraphs 56 and 57 of the decision. He submitted that there was no attack in the grounds of appeal regarding the appellant’s friend and sisters being willing to assist. He submitted that paragraphs 44 and 45 should also be maintained as the assessment of risk from the girlfriend’s family was more solid. Mr Terrell also submitted that the findings regarding online activity should be preserved. He submitted that if not all findings were preserved, then the matter should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh.

17. In response, Ms Bhachu acknowledged that there were mixed findings but said that at paragraphs 27-34, the judge looked at the reasons for refusal letter and made findings in relation to that. She submitted that following on from this, the judge then moved into a different realm and there were then contradictory findings. Ms Bhachu submitted that there were inconsistent findings and that this meant that it would be wrong to preserve the findings in paragraph 57. She further submitted that the difficulty was that the judge had not made concrete findings regarding the risk to the appellant from his or his girlfriend’s family and that this was problematic. Ms Bhachu submitted that the findings in paragraphs 27-34 should be preserved but if too many were preserved and it became confusing then the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh.

Error of law decision
18. I bear in mind that an appellate Tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower Tribunal. In doing so I apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. I further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
19. However, I find that there is a material error of law in the judge’s decision. The judge’s assessment of the feasibility of return and the ability to relocate was undertaken without making clear findings of fact on all of the relevant evidence. I have dealt with both grounds of appeal together as there is some overlap between them.
20. In assessing the feasibility of return, the judge has made reference to SMO [2019] and not to SMO [2022]. The judge found that the appellant may be able to access some support from his sisters (via his friend) to enable him to obtain sufficient information to obtain a laissez passer even if they could not retrieve the appellant’s CSID card which was said to be at the family home and that the appellant’s friend could then vouch for him to pass through checkpoints. It is unclear on what basis the judge finds that the appellant’s friend vouching for the appellant would be sufficient for the appellant to pass through checkpoints without any valid identity documentation. The decision in SMO [2022] confirms that it is likely that a laissez passer will be confiscated on arrival and would not necessarily be an acceptable form of identity in any event in respect of checkpoints [89] so the appellant would not have any form of identity document until he could be redocumented. That is not an issue which has been addressed by the judge other than to state that the appellant’s friend (not a family member) could vouch for him at checkpoints without any reference to the source of that being sufficient to enable the appellant to pass through checkpoints in order to redocument himself.
21. Furthermore, the judge does not make any clear finding about the ability of the appellant to make his way to the CSA office of his relevant area in order to redocument himself. This seems to rely on the appellant’s friend being able to vouch for the appellant at checkpoints and the appellant’s sisters potentially providing some family information. There was no concrete finding that the appellant would be able to retrieve his CSID and no concrete finding that the sisters would assist the appellant; the judge’s finding was that ‘it was not beyond the realms of possibility that the sisters would be prepared to assist him upon return albeit that I accept such assistance would be limited’ [57]. That finding reads more as a possibility that something may happen than a finding that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that it would happen. In any event, it is also unclear how the provision of such information would assist the appellant in making his way to his local CSA office in order to redocument himself. It would potentially assist him once he arrived at the CSA office but does not assist the appellant in making his way to the relevant CSA office.
22. The lack of clear findings regarding risk from the appellant’s family and that of his girlfriend also potentially has an impact on an assessment of the ability of the appellant to redocument himself on return to Iraq. The appellant would have to return to his local CSA in order to document himself which would bring him within the orbit of his family and the family of his girlfriend. In those circumstances, it was necessary for the judge to make clear findings regarding whether the appellant was at risk from his family and that of his girlfriend in the area to which he would need to return to visit his relevant CSA office to redocument himself. The judge has not made any clear finding with regard to risk in the appellant’s home area and has not made any clear finding as to where the appellant would have to return in order to redocument himself.
23. The judge has not made any clear findings about whether the appellant was at risk from his family or his girlfriend’s family in his home area because she found that the families did not have the necessary power or influence to be able to locate the appellant if he returned to Iraq and relocated to a different area. However, in failing to make an assessment of risk from his family in his own area, there was therefore a failure to make findings as to what risk may attach to the appellant in visiting his relevant CSA office in order to redocument himself. The implication in the findings is that the appellant is at risk from his family and from his girlfriend’s family because the judge finds that he could internally relocate but this is by no means clear as it may well simply be that the judge is saying even if the appellant is at risk, he could obviate that risk by internally relocating. That seems to be the suggestion at [40] where the judge states ‘First of all, if I accepted he was at risk from his family…’ but it is by no means clear from the findings. Nor is there a clear finding of whether the appellant is at risk from the girlfriend’s family although it is accepted that the relationship, in all likelihood, caused the death of the girlfriend [45]. Such findings are necessary in order to properly assess whether the appellant would be able to return to his home area to redocument himself. The judge makes no finding with regard to whether the appellant would (a) have to return to his home area in order to redocument himself and (b) if so, whether he would be at risk from his own family or that of his girlfriend if he had to return to his home area to redocument himself.
24. There was also a failure to make findings regarding the amount of assistance which would be available to the appellant if he relocated to another area (if that was necessary) and how that would affect his ability to relocate. In making her assessment of the appellant’s ability to relocate the judge did not consider the factors in [32] [33] [34] of SMO [2022] which considered issues which would arise where an individual would not have family support. The judge did not make a finding that the appellant would have any family support other than his sisters potentially being willing to provide him with his family details in order to redocument. The judge did not direct herself to the assessment to be made with regard to a young male of Kurdish ethnicity being able to relocate without family assistance even if he is able to redocument himself on return to Iraq.
25. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law.
26. I have considered whether to retain some of the findings in the First-tier Tribunal decision and retain the matter to be reheard before the Upper Tribunal. However, on consideration of the decision, it is clear that it is difficult to unpick the relevant findings with regard to redocumentation and internal relocation such as to retain some and set aside others. In those circumstances, I find that it is appropriate for the decision to be wholly set aside and for the appeal to be remitted to be reheard before the First-tier Tribunal afresh.

Notice of decision
1. The First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law and I set it aside.
2. I remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a judge other than Judge Hawden-Beal.

F Beach
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
24th October 2025