Tribunal decisions

The decision

IAC-AH- -V1

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002211
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/52404/2024
LH/00809/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIPLEY

Between

MINH HIEU TRAN
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Stuart King, Counsel, instructed by Quore Legal Ltd
For the Respondent: Ms Kerr, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 November 2025

DETERMINATION AND REASONS
The appellant and decision appealed against
1. The appellant is a Vietnamese national and his date of birth is 14 May 1996. He has appealed against the respondent’s decision dated 19 February 2024 to refuse his application to extend his stay as a partner and under Article 8 ECHR.
Background
2. The appellant first arrived in the UK in November 2019 with leave as a student until 31 May 2021. On 8 April 2021 he married a British national, hereafter referred to as the sponsor. He was granted 30 months leave as her partner expiring in November 2023. On 3 September 2022 the sponsor’s son was born. The appellant applied for an extension of his leave to remain but declined to attend a marriage interview. The respondent then went on to make the decision, which is the subject of this appeal, refusing the application for the following reasons:
(i) The appellant did not attend the marriage interview and thus did not satisfy the suitability provisions of Appendix FM
(ii) He did not satisfy the criteria of Appendix Private Life.
(iii) As he had not attended the interview, it was not accepted that his marriage was genuine and subsisting.
(iv) There were no exceptional circumstances.

3. In the review, the respondent also argued that it was not accepted that the appellant had a parental relationship with the sponsor’s son, hereafter referred to as JAC. The appeal was initially heard and dismissed on 5 March 2025. The decision was set aside by the Upper Tier Tribunal on 6 October 2025, as it was considered that there was an error of law in the failure to place weight on the documentary evidence supporting cohabitation. A copy of that decision is appended.
Documents
4. The appellant has filed a composite bundle of 294 pages, but this does not include the previous appeal decision, the error of law decision or the Home Office bundle. The latter was included in the previous bundle lodged by the appellant. The numbering in this decision refers to the pdf numbering of the composite bundle unless otherwise indicated. The appellant also separately filed the sponsor’s mother’s statement on the day of the hearing.
Oral Evidence
5. The evidence and submissions have been recorded. The appellant, the sponsor and the sponsor’s mother adopted their statements. In summary, in oral evidence, they were questioned regarding the relationship between the appellant and the sponsor, the appellant and JAC, and JAC with his biological father, hereafter referred to as Jed. This included questions regarding JAC’s medical records, the addresses where they have lived and Jed’s financial support.

6. Ms Kerr and Ms Stuart King made submissions on the oral evidence, relying additionally and respectively on the decision appealed against and the skeleton.
The Burden of Proof:
7. In relation to the appellant’s claim to be entitled to the protection of the ECHR, the onus is on the appellant to prove that the decision of the respondent would result in a breach of one or more of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the ECHR. It is for the appellant to establish on a balance of probabilities that he satisfies the Immigration Rules or should be granted leave pursuant to Article 8 ECHR.

The legal framework
8. For Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights the burden is on the appellant to establish family and/or private life rights that engage the Article, and the burden is then on the respondent to show that any interference resulting from the refusal would nevertheless be proportionate. The five-stage analysis of Article 8 is set out in Razgar [2004] 2 AC 386 (para 17, Lord Bingham). There is no additional requirement of ‘exceptionality’ (Huang et al [2007] UKHL 11, para 20). On 28 July 2014 section 19 of the Immigration Act 2014 (inserting part 5A into the 2002 Act) introduced public interest factors to be considered in Article 8 cases. The factors relevant to this appeal are set out at section 117B of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and include the following:
S117B (6) In the case of a person who is not liable to deportation, the public interest does not require the person's removal where—
(a)the person has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and
(b)it would not be reasonable to expect the child to leave the United Kingdom.
Findings and Reasons
Family Life
9. This is a human rights appeal relying on Article 8. The respondent does not accept that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with the sponsor or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with her son. It is thus understood that family life is disputed.

10. It is not disputed that the appellant and the sponsor were married in April 2021 and that he was subsequently granted leave as a partner. It is also not disputed that JAC was born in September 2022 and the appellant was not his father. The appellant and the sponsor declined to attend a marriage interview. They have explained in their statements that the sponsor’s affair and subsequent pregnancy caused a great deal of strain on their relationship, and they did not want to be questioned in detail about the circumstances of the affair. The sponsor additionally relies on the lack of a separate address for JAC’s biological father, Jed, in the birth certificate (page 313 EOL bundle). In oral evidence in this appeal the sponsor stated that she could not recollect the Registrar asking them individually for their address. Nonetheless, the birth certificate records the same address twice, for each of them.

11. By way of evidence of joint cohabitation since their marriage, the appellant and the sponsor rely on a substantial amount of correspondence in the form of bank statements and bills at the three addresses that they claimed to have lived at together. They have also provided nine photographs and forty-four pages of text messages. As submitted by Ms Stuart King, the latter provide strong evidence of cohabitation including reference to messages about shopping, laundry, cooking, bathing JAC and the messages also include photographs of JAC. It is also noted that in this appeal the three witnesses all gave a consistent account of the appellant looking after JAC on Monday and Tuesday, the sponsor on Wednesday and Saturday and the sponsor’s mother on Thursday and Friday. In initial consideration, I would find that this evidence is all strongly supportive of cohabitation and a close relationship between the appellant, the sponsor and JAC.

12. However, there were a number of significant discrepancies in the evidence as follows:
(i) JAC’s medical record (pages 12 – 14) show that consent for his immunisation was given by his father in October and December 2022. There was an appointment on 30 September 2025 which records that JAC was seen by the doctor with his parents and had been unwell for the previous week with a high temperature, nasal bleeding and vomiting. This was the last GP appointment JAC had been to at the time the records were printed on 20 October 2025. The appellant stated that he had never been to the doctor with JAC. He was asked about JAC’s health since his birthday earlier in September and stated that it had been good. When these notes were drawn to his attention, he stated that he could not remember. The sponsor stated that Jed had not been to the doctors with JAC and it was the appellant who had attended. The sponsor’s mother also said that the appellant attended JAC's medical appointments and not his biological father. It is difficult to understand why the appellant would have denied going to the doctors with JAC, as this would be choosing not to disclose information that would support his claim that he was in a parental relationship with JAC. I therefore do not accept the sponsor’s evidence and find that her claim that the appellant attended the GP’s with JAC undermines her credibility. It also follows that I find that it was JAC’s biological father, Jed, who had attended the GP’s on at least two occasions and with the appellant on 30 September 2025. I also find the appellant’s failure to recollect that JAC had been seriously ill for a week approximately six weeks before the hearing undermines his claim that he was in a parental relationship with the child.

(ii) The appellant claimed to have attended antenatal appointments with the sponsor. The sponsor said she could only recollect one such appointment and it was online, as she was pregnant during Covid.

(iii) The witnesses gave a discrepant account of the arrangements as to the payment of rent for 32 Ashmore Road. It is claimed that this is where the appellant and the sponsor were living from June 2022 until October 2023. The appellant explained that the sponsor had arranged that accommodation, and the tenancy agreement was in her name and the rent was £1000 a month. The sponsor stated that the accommodation was arranged by her parents, there was no tenancy agreement, her parents knew the landlord and they paid the rent in cash, as far as she could remember. The sponsor’s mother stated that she did not know anything about the 32 Ashmore Road address, as she and the sponsor were not on good terms during the period the sponsor lived there. In re-examination the sponsor’s mother confirmed that she was separated from the sponsor’s father, and she did not know anything about the sponsor’s relationship with him. It therefore follows that it is possible that when the sponsor was referring to her parents, she meant her father and not her mother, although that is not what she said. Nonetheless, there is a lack of evidence to support these accounts. There is no evidence from the landlord and no evidence from the sponsor’s father. The sponsor thought that the appellant was aware that her parents were paying the rent, but that was not the evidence that he gave. It is accepted that there is evidence of phone and broadband bills, P60s and bank statements for the period it is claimed the sponsor and the appellant lived at 32 Ashmore Road, but I find that their oral evidence undermines the strength of that documentary evidence. As pointed out by Ms Kerr, Jed started to pay the sponsor £681.66 per month from June 2022, although this is before JAC was born, and Jed continues to make those payments, according to the sponsor’s bank statements. The sponsor stated she had split the expenses for JAC with Jed and that was his half. It was pointed out to her that was quite a lot of money for expenses for a baby. It is also noted that June 2022 is when the appellant and the sponsor claim to have started living at 32 Ashmore Road. Further, as noted above, 32 Ashmore Road is the address recorded for the both the sponsor and Jed on JAC’s birth certificate.

(iv) In oral evidence the appellant stated that JAC referred to his biological father as Jed and the sponsor stated that JAC referred to his biological father as “Dad”.

(v) The sponsor said in her written and oral evidence that Jed was an old friend. She initially stated that she did not explain this to the appellant, but later in evidence said she had told him. The appellant stated that Jed and the sponsor had not met before the night she fell pregnant.

13. The sponsor was questioned at length about the payments into her account from Jed and the payments from her account to his. The latter included a payment of over £2000 in March 2024 and a standing order for some months for £400. The sponsor stated that the former was her repaying Jed the sums of money that he had put inside cards for his son. She felt that he was overstepping boundaries by making these payments and, maybe, he was guilty for not consistently visiting his son. She stated that the £400 standing order that she set up was because Jed was sending her more money than she needed for their son and, as their relationship was not good, it was easier for her just to return the money rather than ask him to send less. It is unclear why both parents would not have paid excess funds into a savings account for JAC rather than send them backwards and forwards between themselves, if these payments were indeed intended for JAC, as claimed.

14. As set out above, there is documentary evidence in the form of bank statements and bills placing the appellant and the sponsor in Ashmore Road from June 2022 until September 2023 and with the sponsor’s mother from October 2023 to date. However, I have found the evidence of the witnesses to undermine the reliability of the evidence of cohabitation at Ashmore Road. I am not satisfied that any greater weight can be placed on the documentary evidence of cohabitation at Ripon Road. I do not accept that the appellant would have forgotten that JAC was seriously ill for a week at the end of September, if he had been living with JAC and the sponsor at that address at the time.

15. I accept that the appellant and the sponsor may have had a genuine marriage at the outset. It has not been argued that this was a marriage of convenience. I readily accept that they remain close friends. I am satisfied that the text messages show that the appellant and the sponsor stay in the same accommodation at times. However, I am not satisfied that this shows that they are living together as a couple. It may instead show that the appellant stays with the sponsor at times or vice-versa and that the appellant sometimes looks after the sponsor’s son.

16. I do not find the witnesses to have been credible. I am satisfied that the reason the appellant and the sponsor chose not to attend their interview was not because the sponsor would find it difficult to answer questions about her affair, but instead because they were not confident that they would give consistent evidence about their relationship or about the affair. I find on a balance of probabilities that the witnesses have not been honest about the extent of the relationship between the sponsor and Jed. I do not accept the funds that pass between the sponsor’s account and Jed’s account all relate to funds intended for JAC. I do not accept that the appellant and the sponsor have established that they are in a genuine and subsisting relationship as partners.

17. Ms Stuart-King relied on the case of R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (RK) IJR [2016] UKUT 31. The headnotes of that judicial review record as follows:

1. It is not necessary for an individual to have "parental responsibility" in law for there to exist a parental relationship.

2. Whether a person who is not a biological parent is in a "parental relationship" with a child for the purposes of s.117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 depends on the individual circumstances and whether the role that individual plays establishes he or she has "stepped into the shoes" of a parent.

3. Applying that approach, apart from the situation of split families where relationships between parents have broken down and an actual or de facto step-parent exists, it will be unusual, but not impossible, for more than 2 individuals to have a "parental relationship" with a child. However, the relationships between a child and professional or voluntary carers or family friends are not "parental relationships".

18. The decision in RK has been upheld by the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AB (Jamaica), AO (Nigeria) [2019] EWCA Civ 661. The court commented on the term parental relationship in paragraph 117B(6) and Singh LJ stated:
98. … In my view the words used in the Act with which we are now concerned are words of the ordinary English language and no further gloss should be put upon them. Their application will depend on an assessment by the relevant court or tribunal of the facts of the particular case before it. The exercise is a highly fact-sensitive one.

19. The independent documentary evidence shows that Jed is sending a significant amount of money to the sponsor every month. I am satisfied that the medical records show that Jed has attended medical appointments with his son and the only address on his son’s birth certificate was the same as the one provided for him. Overall, I am not satisfied that the witnesses were credible, and I find that JAC’s biological father plays a much greater role in his life than they have claimed.

20. I am satisfied that the independent documentary evidence shows that Jed continues to have a parental relationship with his son. According to the judicial review in RK, it would be unusual but not impossible for the appellant to also have a parental relationship with JAC. However, I find that there is a lack of reliable evidence that this is the case. For example, there is a lack of evidence that he was present at the birth of JAC and Jed was not. There is a lack of evidence that the appellant has stepped into the role of a parent. I find that the text messages and the limited photographic evidence do not show that the appellant is exercising a parental role for JAC. They show, instead, that he cares for him at times. The headnote in RK states that part-time care for a child would not, by itself, create a parental relationship

21. I am not satisfied that the appellant has established on the balance of probabilities that he has a parental relationship with JAC. He could not recollect JAC been very ill six weeks before the hearing. He has not provided details of any decisions he may have been expected to take in such a role, such as decisions regarding his medical treatment. I find that JAC regards Jed as his father and does not consider the appellant to have an equivalent relationship with him, even if he had been taught to call the appellant “Dad” in Vietnamese.

22. For all these reasons, I do not find that the appellant has shown that he has family life with either the sponsor or the sponsor’s son. However, the appellant has lived in the UK since 2019, and he therefore has a limited private life.
Immigration Rules
23. It is not disputed between the parties that Paragraph S-LTR.1.7(a) is engaged because the appellant and the sponsor decided not to attend their marriage interview. They therefore cannot satisfy the suitability provisions. For this reason, the appellant can also not satisfy the suitability provisions of Appendix Private Life.
GEN 3.2/Article 8 outside the Rules
24. Pursuant to Hesham Ali [2016] UKSC 60, I have weighed the factors in favour of the appellant remaining against the public interest in him demonstrating he satisfies the rules. I have placed considerable weight on the fact that the appellant was refused under the rules as confirmed appropriate in Mostafa [2015] UKUT 00112 (IAC).

25. Section 117B lists matters that the Tribunal must have regard to when considering Article 8. These include that the maintenance of affective immigration control is in the public interest as set out in section 117B(1). Section 117B((2) and (3) State that it is in the public interest if the appellant is able to speak English and can be accommodated and financially supported. I am satisfied that those criteria are met. These are neutral factors pursuant to Rhuppiah [2016] EWCA Civ 803. I have not found that the appellant currently has a relationship with a qualifying partner. Pursuant to s117B (5) little, but not no, weight is attributed to his private life as this was developed during ‘precarious’ residence.

26. The appellant relies on his relationship with the sponsor and his claimed parental relationship with JAC. I am not satisfied that he is in a genuine and subsisting relationship with the sponsor as her partner and I am not satisfied that he has a parental relationship with JAC. However, it is accepted that the appellant looks after the sponsor’s son at times. It is accepted that if he was no longer able to care for JAC, that the sponsor would need to reduce her hours or pay for alternative care. JAC is just three years old. It has not been suggested JAC has any particular vulnerability which should make it difficult for him to adjust, if the appellant is no longer able to care for him. It is accepted that the sponsor’s mother regular looks after him and it has not been suggested that this will cease. In those circumstances I am not satisfied that it has been demonstrated that it would not be in JAC’s best interests for him to remain in the UK with his mother and his biological father.

27. The appellant has lived in the UK for six years. He has studied here and is now working. It has not been claimed that he has any health issues. He lived in Vietnam until he was 25 years old. I am not satisfied that he has demonstrated that he would face particular difficulties finding employment. Although he is not particularly close to his parents in Vietnam he is still in contact, and he has not argued that they would not provide him with any support.

28. Considering all the factors in the round, I am not satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated that his return to Vietnam would be disproportionate.

29. No application was made for an anonymity direction, and I can see no reason to make any such direction in the circumstances of this case.
DECISION
39. The human rights appeal is dismissed.

40. No anonymity direction is made.
F Ripley
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 December 2025