Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002222
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59210/2024
LP/05912/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of May 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

AG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Ms A Ahmed, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge K Gray (“the judge”) promulgated on 22 January 2026. In that decision, the judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 18 March 2024 to refuse his asylum claim.

Anonymity

2. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in respect of the appellant. There has been no application to set aside that order. While I recognise the strong factors in favour of open justice, in the present case I am satisfied that it is appropriate to continue the anonymity order given that the appellant seeks international protection.

Background

3. The appellant is a national of Afghanistan. He arrived in the United Kingdom on 24 August 2022 and claimed asylum on 16 September 2022. The basis of his claim is that his brothers were enlisted in the Afghan armed forces and he was employed by the government in an intelligence role and, consequently, he is at risk from the Taliban.

4. In her decision dated 18 March 2024, the respondent refused the appellant’s asylum claim on the basis that she did not accept that he worked for the government in a national security role or that he was of adverse attention of the Taliban. In dismissing the appellant’s appeal against that decision, the judge found that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent and vague, and that he had failed to raise important matters earlier than he had.

The appeal to the Upper Tribunal

5. The appellant was granted permission to appeal by Upper Tribunal Judge Loughran on 28 February 2026, primarily in respect of Ground 1, although she did not restrict the grant.

6. The appellant therefore relies on the following grounds of appeal:

a. Ground 1: The judge erred in law by failing to properly assess the appellant’s vulnerability as a person suffering from stress and anxiety. In particular, the judge failed to apply the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, vulnerable adult and sensitive appellant guidance (“the Guidance Note”), which emphasises the need to make reasonable adjustments when assessing the credibility of individuals with mental health conditions. Further, it is contended that the judge failed to consider whether the appellant’s mental health affected his ability to provide consistent evidence.

b. Ground 2: The judge failed to properly assess the appellant’s asylum claim in the context of the current security situation in Afghanistan and, especially with regard to the Taliban targeting individuals associated with the former government.

c. Ground 3: The judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s humanitarian protection claim solely on the basis of the adverse credibility findings made in respect of his asylum claim. The judge was also required to consider whether the appellant faced a risk of harm as a result of indiscriminate violence arising from armed conflict.

d. Ground 4: The judge’s decision is tainted by procedural unfairness because her approach to the appellant’s evidence was “unduly harsh” and she failed to take into account the appellant’s vulnerability.

The hearing

7. I had before me: the 186-page consolidated bundle prepared by the Tribunal.

8. As the appellant was acting in person, I first confirmed that he and the interpreter understood each other. I then explained to him the purpose and structure of the hearing as well as the possible outcomes. Because the appellant cannot read English, I read out to him his grounds of appeal as drafted by his former representatives and asked if he would like to add anything to each of them. Once that had been completed, I asked Ms Ahmed to clearly set out the respondent’s position, pausing after her submissions on each ground to allow the appellant to reply.

9. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.

Discussion – Error of Law

Grounds 1 and 4

10. I deal with both of these grounds together as they involve an overlapping issue of whether the judge properly took into account that the appellant is a vulnerable person.

11. Ultimately, neither ground is made out.

12. The Guidance Note does not impose a free-standing legal requirement on judges to comply with its contents; its purpose is to assist the First-tier Tribunal in dealing with cases justly and fairly: see Ferdous Alam Khan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 148. The real question is whether the proceedings were procedurally fair, such that there was a proper opportunity for the appellant to give evidence and have that evidence properly and fairly assessed. That is unarguably what happened in the present appeal. There is no suggestion in the grounds of appeal that anything specific occurred during the hearing that prevented the appellant from being able to adequately set out his case. Instead, it is asserted that the judge should have considered whether the appellant’s mental health issues – namely, his depression and anxiety – could account for the deficiencies in his evidence.

13. However, as the respondent submits, the appellant was legally represented before the First-tier Tribunal yet no application was made for him to be treated as a vulnerable witness. Neither did the appeal skeleton argument raise anything to do with the appellant’s purported vulnerability.

14. Importantly, at [38]-[40], the judge made the following findings regarding the appellant’s mental health:

“38. I accept that the Appellant has been prescribed Sertraline (50mg) and Zopiclone (3.75mg). I also accept that Sertraline is generally prescribed to treat depression, stress and anxiety and that Zopiclone is generally prescribed to treat bouts of insomnia.

39. However, I also note that depression, stress and anxiety may be experienced with varying degrees of severity. There was no medical evidence before me of the severity of the Appellant’s mental health conditions nor of his symptoms nor of his prognosis. Likewise, insomnia may be short or long-term and may be caused by a number of factors or other medical conditions. There was no medical evidence before me of the severity of the Appellant’s insomnia, nor of his prognosis or treatment plan.

40. There was also no medical evidence relating to the potential effect on the Appellant’s mental health should he be unable to access treatment and medication on return to Afghanistan. Neither was there any medical evidence of the nature or extent of any potential deterioration in his mental health, nor what treatment the Appellant might require if he were to suffer any such deterioration, nor of the Appellant’s prognosis with or without that treatment.”

15. Therefore, the judge did in fact have regard to the appellant’s claim to suffer from depression, anxiety and insomnia but found that there was no evidence as to the symptoms or severity of those conditions. While those findings were made in respect of the appellant’s Article 8 ECHR claim, I am satisfied from reading those paragraphs that there was insufficient evidence before the First-tier Tribunal to demonstrate either that the appellant was suffering from serious mental health conditions that made him vulnerable, still less that those conditions affected his memory of events in Afghanistan.

16. A clear example of the appellant’s inconsistent account is set out at [16]. During his asylum screening interview, the interviewing officers asked him whether he had ever worked for the government or in security, to which he answered, “No, I was only a student.” However, by the time of his substantive asylum interview he claimed to have been working for the government in national security. I am unable to accept that, in the absence of any supporting medical evidence, the judge should have concluded that the appellant’s depression and anxiety were the cause of such a fundamental error. In any event, when this discrepancy was put to him in cross-examination, the appellant did not use his mental health as an excuse; his explanation was that when he was asked whether he had worked for the government, he thought the interviewing officers were referring to terrorist organisations and that it was his boat journey to the United Kingdom that had affected his ability to answer the questions: see [17]. The judge, in my view reasonably, rejected that explanation and found that the appellant’s failure to mention that he worked in national security during the screening stage was seriously damaging to his credibility: see [18]-[20].

17. Furthermore, that the judge approached the appellant’s case properly and fairly is also evident from the fact that, on at least three occasions, she found in the appellant’s favour in respect of credibility issues raised by the respondent: see [22]-[24].

Ground 2

18. This ground is without merit.

19. The judge unquestionably had regard to the country situation in Afghanistan and was aware that the basis of the appellant’s claim was that he feared the Taliban because of his and his brothers’ involvement with the security apparatus of the previous government: see, for example, [4] and [9]. However, in accordance with s.32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, the judge was required to consider whether, on the balance of probabilities, the appellant had a genuine fear of persecution in Afghanistan. Because she rejected core parts of his claim as lacking credibility, she found that he did not have a genuinely held subjective fear of the Taliban. That finding was determinative of his asylum appeal, and I am satisfied that it was one that was reasonably open to the judge on the evidence before her.

Ground 3

20. While the grounds of appeal contend that the judge erred by rejecting the appellant’s humanitarian protection claim on the same basis as his asylum claim, as Ms Ahmed submitted, at [8] of the decision the appellant’s representative is recorded as having “confirmed that the Appellant’s humanitarian protection claim is put on the same factual basis as his asylum claim”. Furthermore, there is no indication from any of the papers before me, including the appeal skeleton argument, that the appellant advanced an argument that he would be at risk of serious harm on return resulting from indiscriminate violence in armed conflict or provided any country evidence in support of such a claim.

21. The judge was, therefore, entitled to consider the appellant’s humanitarian protection claim on the same factual basis as his asylum claim. Having done so, this time applying the lower standard of proof, the judge was entitled to find that, given the credibility issues she had identified earlier in her decision, the appellant was also not entitled to subsidiary protection: see [34].

Conclusion – Error of Law

22. For the reasons given above, I find that there is no error of law in the judge’s decision and I dismiss the appeal on all four grounds.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

1st May 2026