Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos:
UI-2025-002226, UI-2025-002227
UI-2025-002228, UI-2025-002230

First-tier Tribunal Nos:
HU/64533/2023, HU/64534/2023
HU/64537/2023, HU/64536/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

14th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE McWILLIAM

Between

SM
AS (1)
AS (2)
OS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr I Halliday, Counsel instructed by Maguire Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs A Nolan, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

The Appellants have been granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellants were granted permission by the First-tier Tribunal (FTT) to appeal against the decision of the FTT (Judge Gillespie) to dismiss their appeals under Article 8 ECHR. They were granted anonymity by the FTT and there is no reason for me to interfere with this. I note that the Appellant has various health conditions. It is the norm in the UT for Appellants and witnesses to be anonymised using two initials. However, I shall refer to them using the same reference as the FTT.
2. SM, (date of birth 14 February 1982), is the mother of AS (1), AS (2) and OS who were at the date of the hearing before the FTT aged 20, 18 and 14. I shall refer to SM as the Appellant.
3. The Appellants are seeking family reunion with the Sponsor, OM, who is the Appellant’s sister and a refugee. She has not seen the Appellant since 2013. There are a number of family members in the UK who supported the Appellant’s appeal and who are British citizens.
4. The Sponsor gave evidence before the FTT. The Appellant’s two adult daughters, RS (1) and RS (2) gave evidence. They last saw the Appellant in 2021 and 2023 respectively when they came to the UK to join their husbands. The Appellant’s brother MAM Al-M, a British citizen, gave evidence. He last saw the Appellant in Cairo in 2024. Before then he last saw her in 2011. There were witness statements before the judge from the Appellant’s brother, SA, who has not seen the Appellant since 2011; the Appellant’s brother, KA, who has not seen the Appellant since 2012, the Appellant’s mother, HS, who has not seen the Appellant since 2012; the Appellant’s brother, IA, who has not seen the Appellant since 2012; and the Appellant’s sister, DM, who has not seen the Appellant since 2012.
5. There was an appeal before the FTT in 2023 and the judge had before her a decision of Judge Doyle (the first judge). The first judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal under Article 8 ECHR. The judge at [15]–[23] set out the conclusions of the first judge and the evidence before him. Before the first judge RS (1) and RS (2) were Appellants; however, RS (1) appeal was withdrawn as she had been granted entry clearance to join her husband. A different family member was the Sponsor.
6. The judge set out the findings of the first judge as follows:-
i. The Appellants had lived separately from the Sponsor since 2013.
ii. Neither the Sponsor nor any of the other relatives including the Appellant’s parents have seen her since 2013 (at the latest).
iii. Since between 2011 and 2013 the only contact between the Appellants and their Glasgow-based relatives had been telephone and internet contact.
iv. The Appellant had established an independent life as a married woman more than twenty years ago.
v. The Appellant may have lived in the same family compound as her parents and siblings until 2013 but the Appellant and her children formed an independent, separate family unit.
vi. The Appellant’s siblings and parents fled to Jordan in 2013 while the Appellant and her family remained in Syria.
vii. A choice was made ten years previously. The Appellants had not formed part of the same family unit as her parents and siblings for at least a decade.
viii. Internet and telephone contact with financial contributions made amounted to nothing more than normal emotional ties.
ix. There was insufficient evidence of either dependency or of efforts to continue an established family life.
x. Judge Gillespie said that the first judge had noted that one of the Appellant’s adult daughters (presumably RS (1) or RS (2)) was about to migrate to the UK to marry in order to establish her own family.
xi. None of the witness statements from the Glasgow-based relatives addressed the Appellant’s circumstances in Syria.
xii. There was no reliable evidence about accommodation available to the Appellant and the first judge did not know whether the Appellant was working or had a source of income.
xiii. There was sufficient evidence to show that the Glasgow-based relatives had sent money to the Appellants for their maintenance, but little of the evidence of financial contribution from the Appellant’s family in the UK.
7. Judge Gillespie said that the arguments advanced before her by the Appellant were:
i. the Appellant and her Glasgow-based family have been and continue to be in a co-dependent and interlinked family relationship.
ii. that there is no practical distinction between one family and the next, and
iii. the Appellant is dependent on her Glasgow-based relatives for financial and emotional support. .
8. Judge Gillespie noted that the change in the circumstances before the Tribunal since the first judge’s decision was that RS (1) and RS (2), the Appellant’s daughters, had moved to the UK The judge found that there was no reason to depart from the findings of the first judge and she concluded that there was no family life between the Appellant and family in Glasgow so as to engage Article 8(1) of the ECHR.
9. The Appellant relied on the grounds of appeal. The Respondent relied on a Rule 24 response. I heard submissions from both representatives at the hearing with which I engage in my conclusions.
10. I remind myself of the following principles that the law says must apply when considering whether the FTT erred in law. I summarise those, having considered: KM v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 693, AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, AA (Nigeria) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1296, MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 49 and Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
i. The First-tier Tribunal is an expert tribunal, and an appellate court should not rush to find a misdirection an error of law merely because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently.
ii. The UT should not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
iii. The UT should not be astute to characterise as an error of law what, in truth, is no more than a disagreement with the Upper Tribunal’s assessment of the facts.
iv. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the First-tier Tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account.
v. The UT is an Appellate Court, and it is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the First-tier Tribunal judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that the First-tier Tribunal does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
vi. Experienced judges in this specialised tribunal are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically.
vii. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appellate court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
viii. Decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that the First-tier Tribunal has misdirected itself in law.
ix. The focus should be on the way the First-tier Tribunal performed the essence of the task required.
11. I make a general observation about the decision of the FTT and the grounds. The Appellant appealed on the grounds that the decision breaches her and her children’s rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. The judge found that there was no family life and therefore there was no need to go on to consider proportionality. The grounds, in my view, have lost sight of this.
12. There is a body of case law which gives guidance on the existence of family life: in Kugathas v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 31 (21 January 2003) [2003] I.N.L.R. 170, Singh (Pawandeep) v Entry Clearance Officer, New Delhi [2004] EWCA Civ 1075 (30 July 2004) [2005] QB 608, Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 38 (25 June 2008) [2009] 1 AC 115, Patel v Entry Clearance Officer, Mumbai [2010] EWCA Civ 17 (25 January 2010), PT (Sri Lanka) v Entry Clearance Officer, Chennai [2016] EWCA Civ 612 (27 June 2016), Secretary of State for the Home Department v Onuorah [2017] EWCA Civ 1757 (3 November 2017), Uddin v Secretary of State for the Home Department (12 March 2020) [2020] EWCA Civ 338. I summarise the following principles can be described from the authorities:
i. A fact sensitive approach is required.
ii. The question as to whether there is ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8(1) depends on the circumstances of the case but requires the existence of close personal ties’. ‘Consideration of the effect of the decision on all members of the family.
iii. To establish family life, necessary to show real, committed or effective support or relationship between adult family members and normal emotional ties would not, without more, be enough.
iv. The test for the establishment of Article 8 family life in the Kugathas sense is one of effective, real or committed support. There is no requirement to prove exceptional dependency.
v. The protection of family life under Article 8 generally involves cohabiting dependents, such as parents and their dependent, minor children. Relationships between adults will not necessarily acquire the protection of Article 8 without evidence of further elements of dependency, involving more than the normal emotional ties.
vi. A bare financial dependency between one adult party and another will not suffice.
i.i. To establish family life, necessary to show real, committed or effective support or relationship between adult family members and normal emotional ties would not, without more, be enough.
i.ii. The continued existence of family life after the attainment of majority is also a relevant question of fact. No negative inference should be drawn from the mere fact of the attainment of majority, while continuing cohabitation after adulthood will be suggestive of ongoing real, effective or committed support which is the hallmark of a family life.
i.iii. The continued existence of family life after the attainment of majority is also a relevant question of fact. No negative inference should be drawn from the mere fact of the attainment of majority, while continuing cohabitation after adulthood will be suggestive of ongoing real, effective or committed support which is the hallmark of a family life.
i.iv. The question as to whether there is ‘family life’ within the meaning of article 8(1) depends on the circumstances of the case but requires the existence of close personal ties’.
Ground 1
13. This ground can be summarised as follows:
(1) The judge made adverse credibility findings independently of the assessment of the documentary evidence, and
(2) the adverse credibility findings were used to reject supportive evidence.
2. The Appellant relies on AR (Pakistan) v SSHD [2017] CS1H 52. This decision is consistent with Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 439 and Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367.
3. I take account of the Mibanga duty articulated by the Upper Tribunal in QC (verification of documents; Mibanga duty) China [2021] UKUT 33 (IAC):
“1. Credibility is not necessarily an essential component of a successful claim to be in need of international protection. Where credibility has a role to play, its relevance to the overall outcome will vary, depending on the nature of the case. What that relevance is to a particular claim needs to be established with some care by the judicial fact-finder. It is only once this is done that the practical application of the “Mibanga duty” to consider credibility “in the round” can be understood (Francois Mibanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367).
2. The significance of a piece of evidence that emanates from a third-party source may well depend upon what is at stake in terms of the individual’s credibility. What the case law reveals is that the judicial fact-finder has a duty to make his or her decision by reference to all the relevant evidence and needs to show in their decision that they have done so. The actual way in which the fact-finder goes about this task is a matter for them. As has been pointed out, one has to start somewhere. At the end of the day, what matters is whether the decision contains legally adequate reasons for the outcome. The greater the apparent cogency and relevance of a particular piece of evidence, the greater is the need for the judicial fact-finder to show that they have had due regard to that evidence; and, if the fact-finder’s overall conclusion is contrary to the apparent thrust of that evidence, the greater is the need to explain why that evidence has not brought about a different outcome”.
4. The judge dealt with the documentary evidence at [27]–[28]. The judge said as follows:-
“27. There are documents appearing at pages 77 to 94 of the stitched appeal bundle. There is what purports to be a written demand to the first appellant from the Damascus Province Police Command, Criminal Security Branch, dated 9 June 2023 and a further document dated 30 June 2023 from the General Intelligence Directorate requesting that a summons be issued against her in the event of non-attendance but it is entirely unclear as to what this is about. As noted there is no statement from her that would shed light on what lies behind this. The documents are on plain paper with no official heading and in my judgment are unlikely to be reliable.
28. There is what purports to be a medical report issued on the 2 July 2023 with the logo of the Syrian Medical Association headed ‘To Whom it May Concern’ recording that the first appellant was brought to an Emergency Department displaying bruises and contusions which she said were caused by torture and sexual assault. When she was advised to report the incident to the authorities, she developed a severe psychological panic and said ‘How can you report this to whom who did it?’ Again there is no account from the appellant herself that explains when and in what circumstances this event is alleged to have occurred. The documents have been presented in the expectation that they will prove themselves. I give the medical documents little weight”.
5. Mr Halliday specifically drew my attention to [29] of the judge’s decision where she said that “the Appellants’ credibility was seriously damaged” as a result of attempting to board a flight from Cairo with counterfeit entry permits. He also drew my attention to [31] where the judge said, “if the family is prepared to obtain false UK entry permits there is no basis on which I can trust any of the Syrian documents produced”. This, Mr Halliday contended, supported that the judge dismissed the documentary evidence because of a prior finding of credibility and did not consider the evidence holistically.
6. I do not accept that this ground is made out. The decision must be read as a whole. The judge started with an assessment of the documentary evidence at [27] and [28] but these findings should not be considered in isolation. She attached weight to the shortcomings in the evidence and concluded that they were unreliable for the reasons explained. The paragraphs do not stand alone. The judge could have better expressed herself at [31], but when read together with [27] and [28], I do not accept that [31] supports that the judge did not consider the evidence holistically. Taking the findings as a whole, I conclude that the judge attached weight to the Cairo incident when assessing the credibility generally including the reliability of the documents and that this was open to her.
7. The actual way in which the judge considered the evidence is a matter for her. The decision contains legally adequate reasons. I do not accept that the documents were excluded from the assessment of credibility.
Ground 3
8. I will consider ground 3 at this stage because there is a link with ground 1. It is contended at ground 3 that the judge failed to engage with the evidence of the Sponsor, RS (1) and RS (2) and the documentary evidence relating to the Appellant’s vulnerability.
9. RS (1) and RS (2) witness statements are lacking in necessary detail to support the engagement of Article 8(1) as are all the witness statements. The judge did not set out their oral evidence, but there is no need for her to do so. While Mr Halliday contended that this was an error, I was not told of any material evidence to the issue of family life given by the witnesses at the hearing which was not taken into account by the judge.
10. The judge acknowledged at [26] that there was a change in circumstances since the decision of the first judge insofar as RS (1) and (2) had left Syria in 2021 and 2023 respectively up until when they lived with their mother; however, she noted that it was not proposed that the Appellant would live with either if she came to the UK. They had formed independent family units in the UK.
11. The judge made observations at [25] that OM in cross-examination made reference to a cash transfer made through an agency of £180 on 20 June 2024. She said there were other transfers through a third party. She was unable to evidence a cash transfer of £800 which she said that she made on the day before the hearing. It is clear from a proper reading of the decision as a whole that the judge did not find that the Appellant or her family were credible witnesses and that the evidence was insufficient. Mr Halliday referred to the decision of the first judge where he accepted that there was some financial dependency between the Appellant and her family in the UK in 2023. This does not entirely reflect the finding of the first judge (see above at [6 (xiii}]. The judge did not go behind the finding of the first judge. She had to assess dependency at the date of the hearing. She accepted that OM had sent some funds to the Appellant but she did not accept her evidence about the amount of transfers. The evidence was on the whole unsupported. Moreover, the judge drew a reasonable inference from the Cairo incident and that this called into question the Appellant’s financial circumstances.
12. The ground refers to two pieces of evidence which the judge did not refer to in the decision. These were two medical documents. They post-date the decision of the first judge. There is a letter from Dr Ali of 7 October 2023 and another from Dr Khahil of 23 June 2024. Mr Halliday contended that the documents were not considered and that they are material to the issue of dependency.
13. I accept that the judge did mention these two documents. They were capable of supporting that the Appellant was suffering from severe insomnia, social isolation, mood disturbances and fears of loneliness, death and illness. The evidence says that she has been diagnosed with PTSD and severe depression, rejoining her family is a fundamental part of treatment to help her cope, she has recurring trauma because she lost her husband and brother, and that she is alone and cannot deal with daily life and cannot bear responsibility for her personal safety and the safety of her children.
14. While I accept that the evidence would have been material if the judge had found family life and had been required to consider proportionality, I do not accept that it is material to the issue of dependency. There was no witness statement from the Appellant. The evidence from her family in the UK on the issue of dependency was lacking. It is unreasonable to expect the judge to draw an inference of dependency from the Appellant’s poor health and circumstances in the absence of any evidence from the Appellant or cogent evidence from her family which could support dependency in the Kugathas sense so as to engage Article 8(1). The evidence of the witnesses supported that the Appellant’s circumstances in Syria were far from ideal, she has health problems and that understandably the family want her to join them in the UK, but there was very little evidence of the necessary level of dependency required to support family life. It is generally unnecessary and unhelpful for FTT judgments to rehearse every detail or issue raised in a case. This leads to judgments becoming overly long and confused and is not a proportionate approach to deciding cases: Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341.
15. I am not persuaded that the judge did not consider the evidence because she did not mention it. Taking into account the issue of dependency, I believe that she did not consider it to be material. I note that in the last sentence of [28], the judge makes references to documents in the plural. In any event, if I am wrong about that the error is not material.
Ground 2
16. Ground 2 says that there is apparent bias arising from [31] of the judge’s findings regarding the evidence of MAM Al-M. Paragraph [31] reads as follows:-
“31. I find the appellant’s brother to be unreliable. He did not have the sense to apologise and come clean with an acceptance that he had been trying to get his sister into the UK illegally but out of desperation and concern for her wellbeing and to enable her to escape the troubled country that Syria now is, had taken this course of action, and now regretted doing so. Nothing like that happened. If the family is prepared to obtain false UK entry permits there is no basis on which I can trust any of the Syrian documents produced. All of this was done when the current appeal was still ongoing and it shows that they are not prepared to respect a lawful process to obtain entry. Each of the four witnesses gave evidence separately. I rose and returned to hear final submissions and there were some nine family members present including the elderly patriarch, the appellant’s father. I do not know how they had the temerity to do this given what took place in Cairo and which I am quite sure they all knew about. It would also have taken resources which has not been explained and calls into doubt the appellant’s financial circumstances when her brother said she arranged the agent”.
17. While I accept that the wording of the judge is immoderate, I do not find that there is apparent bias.
18. The judge at [7] noted two documents upon which the Respondent relied. The first was an intelligence memorandum dated 14 May 2024, recording that:-
“The appellant and her children and M A M Al-M attempted to board a flight from Cairo to Heathrow on 13 March 2024 using British residence permits deemed to be counterfeits. The appellant’s brother is described as the British male facilitating them. Mr Middleton objected to this being produced but said M A M Al-M did not disagree with what occurred on 13 March 2024. In that case, I could see no prejudice to the appellants and told him that it was in the interests of justice that the document recording the precise details of what had taken place should be available for scrutiny and allowed this item of evidence to be admitted”.
19. The judge was entitled to take into account the evidence of the Appellant’s brother relating to the Cairo incident. The judge said that the Appellant’s credibility (and that of her family members) is seriously damaged as a result of her attempt to board the flight from Cairo with fake entry permits (see [29]). The judge noted that MAM Al-M was cross-examined about this. His evidence was that he was in Egypt in March 2024. He did not refer to the counterfeit documents in his witness statement. In cross-examination he was asked whether he was with the Appellant in the airport on 13 March 2024. He said that he was there and another person who was “running the documents”. He accepted that the Appellant and her children attempted to board a flight to Heathrow, and he was aware that her appeal had been dismissed at that time by the FTT. He said that he did not know whether the Appellant and her children’s passports contained counterfeit residence permits. He said that the stamps were official. His evidence was that he did not know that the permits were fraudulent because the Appellant had already used them to leave Syria and to travel to Egypt via Lebanon and therefore, he assumed that they were genuine. He said they were genuine and maybe the “IDs” were fake. In relation to the reference to “other person” he said that he was an agent whom his sister had engaged and who dealt with the papers and that he did not know him. It was put to him that there was no agent present and he was trying to get his sister into the UK illegally, however he denied this.
20. The judge was entitled to attach weight to the evidence of MAM Al-M which was contradictory to the intelligence memorandum which stated that he was the male facilitating the Appellant and her children leaving Cairo to Heathrow Airport. It does not mention the presence of an agent. The judge was entitled to attach weight to the intelligence document. The judge was not impressed by MAM-Al-M’s evidence. She was entitled to say that had he taken responsibility for this she may have considered his evidence more favourably. Whilst the penultimate and final sentence of [31] is intemperate, the judge was entitled to take into account that the family would have been aware of the incident but had not mentioned it in their evidence. In any event, the final two sentences are not determinative of the outcome of the appeal.
Ground 4
21. This ground says that the judge did not consider the position of the child Appellants and that it was not open to the judge to make adverse credibility findings against them. Two of the Appellant’s children were adults at the date of the hearing. Reliance on what was said at [29] is misconceived. I do not read the sentence as the judge finding that their credibility was in issue. It is clear when reading the sentence as a whole that the apostrophe should be put before the “s”. The reference to “her family” is to the family as a whole. There was in any event no evidence from the Appellants.
22. Most of the family members have not lived with the Appellant since 2011 or 2013 save for her two adult daughters who have not lived with her since 2021 and 2023. They have now formed their own family units. It is not the Appellant’s case that she would be living with them if she was permitted to enter the UK. The judge was entitled to conclude that there was no material change in the factual matrix case since the decision of the first judge. There was evidence before the judge that was not before the first judge which was properly identified by the judge. The judge had regard to all material evidence, resolved issues of conflict and properly applied Devaseelan [2002] UKAIT 702. The decision enables the parties to understand why the Appellant was unsuccessful in her appeal.
Notice of Decision
23. The Appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Joanna McWilliam

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 November 2025