Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002229
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/52716/2024
LP/09204/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

29th October 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RAE-REEVES

Between

FP (Bangladesh)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Simret, legal representative
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 October 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant (and/or any member of her family) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or any member of her family). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the First-tier Tribunal decision promulgated on 31 January 2025. First-tier Tribunal Judge Cartin (“the judge”) dismissed her appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her protection claim. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara on 19 June 2025.
Background 
2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. Her claim was based upon her criticism of the Rapid Action Battalion (“RAB”) and the former Awami League government, the publication of comments attributed to her, and criminal proceedings that have been commenced against her in Bangladesh. She maintained that she would be at risk of arrest, detention and persecutory treatment if returned.
3. The respondent accepted that the appellant had made negative remarks about RAB. The judge also accepted that criminal proceedings had been commenced in Bangladesh arising from published comments with which the appellant was associated. The judge did not, however, accept the appellant’s wider account of adverse interest, assaults, threats, visits to her family home or the continuing interest claimed on the part of RAB.
4. The judge concluded that the appellant had not established, on the balance of probabilities, that she genuinely feared persecution because of her political opinion. The judge nevertheless proceeded to consider, in the alternative, aspects of the criminal proceedings, the possibility of arrest and remand, the availability of bail and the operation of the Bangladeshi courts.
5. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara. The grounds concerned the judge’s assessment of credibility and the treatment of the legal or expert evidence relating to the criminal proceedings and the risk on return.
Anonymity Direction
6. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice because of the potential risk to the appellant.
Preliminary matters
7. Mr Simret appeared on behalf of the appellant and Ms McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer, appeared on behalf of the respondent.
8. At the outset of the hearing, Mr Simret applied for permission to rely upon a bundle which had been served late. I gave Ms McKenzie time to consider it. She did not oppose its admission and agreed with my indication that the appellant should be permitted to rely upon it. I admitted the bundle in the interests of justice.
9. Mr Simret also sought to extend the grounds by reference to three skeleton arguments prepared on behalf of the appellant, including three recent skeleton arguments. Having considered all three documents, I determined that the grounds would remain those upon which Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara had granted permission.
10. I did not permit the introduction of freestanding new grounds. I did, however, permit the most recent and most detailed skeleton argument to stand as the appellant’s full written submissions in support of the permitted grounds.
11. Mr Simret confirmed that the section beginning at paragraph 61 of the latest skeleton argument was not relied upon. He also confirmed that section H, including paragraph 84, was not relied upon.
12. I have considered all the materials placed before me, including the original First-tier Tribunal bundle, the later Upper Tribunal bundle, the grounds, the grant of permission and the skeleton arguments. The fact that I do not refer expressly to every item of evidence or every submission does not mean that it has not been considered.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal 
13. The judge recorded the respondent’s acceptance that the appellant had made negative remarks concerning RAB. The judge considered the appellant’s account of encounters with RAB, the alleged visits to her family home, the evidence concerning her daughter, the publication of the comments and the criminal proceedings in Bangladesh.
14. At [15], in seven detailed subparagraphs, the judge set out a considered assessment of the appellant’s credibility. He identified inconsistencies concerning the presence of the appellant’s relatives in the United Kingdom, the proposed kidney donation, her reasons for returning to the United Kingdom, her journeys to Bangladesh, the nature of her alleged encounters with RAB, the alleged visits to her home and the evidence concerning who was present during those visits.
15. At [16 to 19], the judge considered the documentary evidence relating to the criminal proceedings and the reports from Bangladeshi lawyers. He addressed the continuation of the proceedings, the prospect of surrender or arrest, the possibility of remand, the availability of bail and the operation of the Bangladeshi courts.
16. At [20], the judge concluded that the appellant’s claim engaged a Convention reason. The judge found that the relevant characteristic was the appellant’s political opinion as someone opposed to the Awami League and RAB. The first question at the first stage was therefore answered in the appellant’s favour.
17. At [21], the judge concluded that the appellant had not shown, on the balance of probabilities, that she genuinely feared persecution because of her political opinion. The second question at the first stage was therefore answered in the negative.
18. The judge nevertheless went on to consider the objective risk on return. He was not satisfied that the criminal proceedings, the possible operation of an arrest warrant or the prospect of appearing before a court established a real risk of persecution. The appeal was dismissed.
Grounds of Appeal 
19. The first ground challenges the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility. It is entitled ‘Irrational treatment of the Appellant’s evidence’. Its focus over the first seven paragraphs is on [15(ii)] dealing with treatment of the appellant’s evidence of trips to Bangladesh. Two paragraphs focus on [15(iii)] and treatment of her June 2023 witness statement intended to correct errors. It acknowledges ‘other credibility issues that troubled the judge’ but submits that no rational Tribunal would have reached the same conclusion.
20. Specifically, the appellant challenges the finding at paragraph 15(ii) that deliberate deception was the “only sensible inference” arising from her evidence about her return to Bangladesh. She relies upon her earlier disclosure of the journey, her subsequent answers during the substantive interview, her explanation that she had misunderstood the question, and the corrections contained in her witness statement dated 1 June 2023.
21. The second ground challenges the judge’s treatment of the legal evidence concerning the criminal proceedings in Bangladesh. It is submitted that the judge failed adequately to address the evidence concerning the appellant’s possible arrest, remand and imprisonment before any trial or grant of bail.
22. The appellant further contends that the judge’s reliance upon the possibility of bail and the operation of the Bangladeshi courts did not adequately answer the asserted risk of persecutory treatment during arrest or pre-trial detention. It is submitted that these errors were material to the assessment of both the appellant’s claimed subjective fear and the objective risk on return.
The appellant’s submissions
23. Mr Simret relied upon the grounds and the latest skeleton argument and took me through it. He submitted that the judge’s credibility assessment did not adequately engage with the appellant’s explanations or the documentary evidence supporting the existence of the criminal proceedings.
24. He relied particularly upon paragraph 15(ii) of the decision. He submitted that the judge had not properly considered the appellant’s earlier disclosure of her 2022 journey, her answers later in the substantive interview, her explanation that she had misunderstood the earlier question, and the corrective witness statement dated 1 June 2023. When asked to address the judge’s remaining credibility findings, Mr Simret submitted that the inconsistencies had not been used to bolster the appellant’s protection claim. He accepted that the judge was entitled to determine credibility, but maintained that credibility had to be considered together with the documentary evidence.
25. As I understood his further submission, the appellant’s case concerning RAB remained outstanding notwithstanding the change in the political context and notwithstanding the rejection of parts of her personal account. The judge had accepted the existence of criminal proceedings arising from her comments but had not adequately explained why the appellant did not genuinely fear persecution.
26. Mr Simret also submitted that the judge’s reference to bail did not adequately address the risk of arrest and pre-trial detention. The judge’s view concerning bail was said to be based upon an unsupported presumption rather than reasoned engagement with the legal evidence.
27. Mr Simret appeared to accept that, if the first stage was lawfully determined adversely to the appellant, the judge was not required to proceed to the second stage. He maintained, however, that the proceedings and the evidence concerning arrest and detention were relevant to the appellant’s claimed subjective fear and could not simply be confined to the second stage.

The respondent’s submissions
28. Ms McKenzie relied upon DS v Secretary of State for the Home Department UKUT 2026 UI-2025-004745, particularly paragraphs 36, 37 and 39. She submitted that the judge had followed the statutory structure and had assessed the evidence cumulatively when determining whether the appellant had established a genuine fear of persecution.
29. Ms McKenzie submitted that the credibility assessment did not depend upon a single discrepancy. The judge had identified numerous concerns, including matters directly related to the claimed RAB interest, the alleged visits, threats and assaults, and the developing evidence concerning the appellant’s daughter.
30. In relation to the legal evidence, Ms McKenzie questioned the objective evidential foundation for the proposition that the appellant would be unable to obtain an independent judicial determination or would be exposed to persecutory treatment. She submitted that any error confined to the second-stage assessment could not be material if the judge’s conclusion at the first stage was legally sustainable.
Discussion
Appellate approach 
31. I remind myself at the outset that there has to be appropriate judicial restraint in relation to the assessment of an appeal from the specialist First-tier Tribunal. As recently endorsed in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688, I acknowledge the approach in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 set out at [72].
32. I direct myself that the correct approach to assessing whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision was explained by Brooke LJ in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982 at [90] and I note the examples he sets out at [9].
33. Reasons must be sufficient to enable the losing party to understand why the case was lost and to permit effective appellate scrutiny. A judge is not required to rehearse every item of evidence but must engage with the principal controversial issues.
34. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal emphasised the restraint required when reviewing findings of fact. An appellate tribunal must not interfere merely because it might have reached a different conclusion and must read the decision fairly and as a whole. Such restraint was put as follows in Fage UK Ltd v Chobani UK Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 5 at [114]; ‘Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so’.
35. Section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 prescribes a structured approach to the determination of protection claims. That approach was considered in JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 100 (IAC) and subsequently clarified in DS v Secretary of State for the Home Department 2026 UKUT UI-2025-004745.
36. At the first stage, the Tribunal determines on the balance of probabilities whether the appellant has, or is attributed, a relevant Convention characteristic and whether the appellant in fact fears persecution because of that characteristic.
37. If both questions are answered positively, the Tribunal proceeds to the second stage. At that stage, it considers whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the appellant would be persecuted for the Convention reason, whether sufficient protection would be unavailable, and whether internal relocation would be available and reasonable.
38. DS makes clear that the balance of probabilities applies to the ultimate questions at the first stage. It does not require every disputed historical fact to be separately established on that standard before it can be taken into account. The evidence must be considered in the round and given such weight as is appropriate.
39. DS also confirms that the second stage is not engaged if either question at the first stage is answered negatively. A judge may nevertheless address the second stage as a belt-and-braces exercise but is not legally required to do so [paragraphs 52, 53].
Credibility findings
40. It is necessary to consider the detail of the judge’s credibility assessment before addressing the statutory structure. The negative answer to the second question at the first stage did not arise in isolation. It followed the findings made at [15] and the consideration of the documentary and legal evidence which followed.
41. The judge first considered the appellant’s evidence concerning relatives in the United Kingdom. The appellant had initially failed to disclose that her sister and niece were in this country. The explanation subsequently given was that the relationship with her sister had broken down because of pressure concerning the proposed donation of a kidney to the niece.
42. The judge also considered inconsistencies concerning the identity of the proposed recipient and the circumstances of the contemplated donation. The appellant had referred at different stages to a long-distance relative’s daughter and to her niece. The judge was entitled to examine the explanation subsequently provided and to consider whether the changing account affected the appellant’s general reliability.
43. He then considered the chronology and purpose of the appellant’s journeys. This included the relationship between the contemplated kidney donation, the date upon which the niece underwent a transplant, the appellant’s understanding that she was not medically suitable as a donor, and the reasons given for travelling to and returning from Bangladesh.
44. Those matters were not themselves determinative of the protection claim. The judge expressly recognised that untruthfulness or unreliability concerning one issue did not necessarily mean that the whole claim was false [15(i)]. The matters were nevertheless capable of informing the assessment of the appellant’s evidence and her credibility.
45. The judge also made findings concerning the alleged conduct of RAB. The appellant’s evidence varied as to whether she had been assaulted, threatened or harassed, the circumstances in which the alleged incidents occurred, whether physical force had been used, and whether the appellant had been travelling from work or accompanied by her children.
46. The judge considered the evidence concerning alleged visits by RAB to the family home. The appellant’s accounts differed as to the number and circumstances of the visits, whether her daughter had spoken to RAB or hidden from them, whether the daughter had been alone and whether another person had been present in the property. The judge stated ‘The appellant’s account very much appears to be a developing narrative designed to answer inconsistencies pointed out’ to her [15(vii)]. Those findings concerned the core allegation of continuing RAB interest and were not peripheral to the protection claim.
47. They were detailed findings based upon the written and oral evidence. The grounds do not establish that they were irrational, that they lacked an evidential foundation or that the judge failed to consider a material explanation capable of resolving them.
48. Mr Simret submitted that the inconsistencies had not been used to bolster the asylum claim. That does not make them irrelevant. An inconsistency need not have been deliberately advanced to strengthen a claim before it can properly affect the reliability of a witness’s evidence.
49. I accept Mr Simret’s general submission that the credibility findings had to be considered together with the documentary evidence. The judge did not conclude the case at paragraph 15 and disregard the remaining materials. The judge proceeded to consider the criminal proceedings and legal reports at paragraphs 16 to 19 before reaching the statutory conclusions at paragraphs 20 and 21.
Paragraph 15(ii)
50. Because the focus of the grounds and submissions is on paragraph 15(ii), I deal with it separately. The judge considered the appellant’s evidence about whether she had returned to Bangladesh after leaving in 2019. At question 61 of the substantive interview, the appellant answered that she had not returned. After a break, she disclosed that she had returned in April 2022.
51. There was a clear inconsistency. The appellant had returned to Bangladesh twice, and her most recent visit was central to the protection claim which she subsequently advanced.
52. The judge was entitled to identify and take account of that inconsistency. I accept, however, that the judge went too far in describing deliberate deception as the “only sensible inference” because that conclusion did not adequately engage with all the relevant evidence. The appellant had referred during her screening interview to her departure from Bangladesh in June 2022 and return to the United Kingdom. She disclosed the April 2022 journey later in the same substantive interview. She maintained that she had misunderstood the earlier question and addressed the matter in her witness statement dated 1 June 2023.
53. In those circumstances, misunderstanding, confusion or an erroneous answer had not been excluded so conclusively that deliberate deception could properly be described as the only sensible explanation. That does not deprive the point of all evidential significance. The contradictory answers remained. The error concerned the categorical attribution of deliberate deception, not the judge’s identification of the inconsistency itself.
54. More importantly, paragraph 15(ii) was only one part of the wider credibility assessment discussed above. Even if the finding of deliberate deception is removed entirely, the remaining findings concerning the appellant’s relatives, the kidney donation, the journeys, the alleged encounters with RAB, the visits to the family home and the developing evidence concerning her daughter remain. Several of those findings concerned the central allegations of past and continuing RAB interest. They were independently capable of supporting the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s credibility.
55. Applying the appellate restraint required by Volpi, I do not substitute my own assessment merely because another judge might have reached a different conclusion or attributed different weight to individual matters. I conclude that the remaining findings were rationally open to the judge. I therefore find that the overstatement at paragraph 15(ii) did not materially affect the overall credibility assessment. If it amounted to an error of law, it was not material.
The June 2023 witness statement
56. The appellant’s witness statement dated 1 June 2023 was before the First-tier Tribunal. Its stated purpose was to correct matters which the appellant said had been recorded inaccurately or answered incorrectly during the substantive interview.
57. The statement addressed the appellant’s sister and niece, the intended kidney recipient, her journeys to Bangladesh, the date of her return to the United Kingdom and whether the incidents involving RAB amounted to assaults rather than threats. The corrective purpose of the statement was relevant. A judge should not treat a subsequent account as an unexplained change where the witness has expressly presented it as a correction. Equally, describing an account as a correction does not require the Tribunal to accept it. The judge remained entitled to consider whether the later explanation satisfactorily reconciled the earlier and later evidence.
58. The differences identified by the judge were not confined to the use of the words “assault”, “harassment” and “threat”. They concerned the nature and circumstances of the asserted incidents, whether force had been used, where an incident occurred and the surrounding factual account. The judge could have referred more expressly to the corrective purpose of the June 2023 statement. Nevertheless, the judge considered that statement and was entitled to find that it did not satisfactorily reconcile all the differences.
59. I do not consider that any inadequacy in the expression of that conclusion was material when considered against the credibility findings as a whole.
The documentary evidence and criminal proceedings
60. The proceedings were also relevant to whether the appellant genuinely feared persecution. As recognised in JCK at [17], and expressly endorsed in DS at [48]–[50], the determination of whether an appellant does in fact fear persecution may be informed by findings concerning the likely truth of the account of past experiences and present circumstances. Evidence is not necessarily confined to one statutory question merely because it is also relevant to another. The existence of the criminal proceedings was therefore capable of providing objective support for the appellant’s assertion that she held a genuine fear, even though the likely consequences of those proceedings also fell to be considered at the second stage.
61. The judge accepted that the appellant had made comments concerning RAB and that criminal proceedings had been commenced. The existence of those proceedings was supported by documentary and legal evidence. Acceptance of the proceedings did not, however, compel a positive finding on subjective fear. The relevant statutory question at section 32(2)(b) was not simply whether the appellant feared being prosecuted, arrested or required to appear before a court. It was whether she genuinely feared persecution because of her relevant characteristic, namely political opinion.
62. It was open to the judge to accept that the appellant had made comments critical of RAB, that those comments had been published and that she was identified in criminal proceedings, while rejecting the claimed assaults, threats, visits to the family home and continuing personal interest on the part of RAB.
63. The judge did not treat the existence of the proceedings as establishing the truth of the appellant’s wider narrative or as demonstrating, without more, that the criminal process would be used as an instrument of persecution.
64. Read fairly and as a whole, the decision shows that the judge considered the proceedings and the lawyers’ reports. The negative finding on subjective fear rested principally upon the cumulative credibility assessment and, in particular, the rejection of the alleged personal and continuing RAB interest.
65. Mr Simret submitted that the judge failed to explain why the appellant did not have a subjective fear. I do not accept that submission. The conclusion at paragraph 21 expressly referred to the reasons already given. Those reasons included the detailed findings at paragraph 15 and the consideration of the documentary and legal evidence at paragraphs 16 to 19.
66. Paragraph 21 was therefore not an unexplained assertion. It stated the ultimate conclusion which followed from the judge’s preceding assessment.
Application of section 32, JCK and DS
67. Having considered the judge’s detailed findings and the evidence upon which they were based, I turn to whether the judge followed the statutory structure.
68. At paragraph 20, the judge concluded:
“Considering all matters in the round, I conclude that on balance, taking the Appellant’s claim at its highest, her claim is for a Convention reason, namely, her political opinion as someone opposed to the Awami League and the RAB.”
69. The judge therefore answered the first question at the first stage in the appellant’s favour.
70. The reference to taking the claim at its highest does not accord with the subsequent clarification in DS which post-dates the Tribunal decision. The first question requires a factual determination on the balance of probabilities. That error could not have prejudiced the appellant because the question was resolved in her favour. It was therefore immaterial.
71. At paragraph 21, the judge concluded:
“Considering all the evidence in the round, and for the reasons stated above, I conclude that the Appellant has not shown on balance that she in fact fears being persecuted as a result of her political opinion.”
72. That was a clear determination of the second question at the first stage. The judge expressly applied the balance of probabilities and concluded that the appellant had not established a genuine fear of persecution because of the relevant Convention characteristic.
73. Paragraphs 20 and 21 demonstrate that the judge identified and answered the two separate questions required at the first stage. The first was answered positively and the second negatively.
74. The judge’s approach was also consistent in substance with the clarification in DS concerning credibility. The judge did not simply exclude every historical allegation which had not individually been established on the balance of probabilities. The evidence was considered cumulatively and in the round for the purpose of answering the ultimate question concerning genuine fear.
75. The judge considered the appellant’s oral evidence, her earlier statements, the explanations provided, the June 2023 corrective statement, the documentary evidence, the criminal proceedings and the legal reports. The judge then reached the ultimate conclusion at paragraph 21.
76. The judge was not required to accept that the appellant genuinely feared persecution merely because proceedings had been commenced. Nor was the judge required to disregard the cumulative credibility findings because some aspects of the claim were supported by documents.
77. I consider that the negative answer at paragraph 21 was rationally open to the judge. Subject to the limited and immaterial overstatement at paragraph 15(ii), it did not involve an error of law.
The second stage and the risk of imprisonment
78. I have considered separately the criticism concerning the risk of arrest, remand and imprisonment.
79. The prospect of an eventual fair trial, or the possibility of obtaining bail, is not necessarily a complete answer to a claimed risk arising during arrest or pre-trial detention. The relevant issues might include whether the appellant would be arrested on return, whether she would be detained before a bail hearing, the duration and conditions of detention, and whether she would be exposed to persecutory treatment while detained.
80. The judge’s consideration of those matters was brief. There is force in the submission that the possibility of bail did not, without more, answer every aspect of the appellant’s case concerning pre-trial detention.
81. I also accept that the legal reports were not rejected in their entirety. The judge relied upon aspects of those reports when considering the continuation of the proceedings and the operation of the courts. Any departure from case-specific legal evidence concerning surrender, remand or bail required adequate reasoning.
82. It is unnecessary for me to determine whether each aspect of the judge’s alternative reasoning was correct. I proceed on the basis most favourable to the appellant and assume that the treatment of the possible risk during pre-trial detention was insufficiently detailed and may have involved an error of law.
83. However, the materiality of that assumed error must be considered by reference to the statutory sequence.
84. The judge had already answered the second question at the first stage negatively. For the reasons given above, that conclusion was legally sustainable.
85. It followed that the condition for proceeding to the second stage under section 32(3) was not met. As confirmed in DS [52], the judge was not required to determine the objective likelihood of persecution, the adequacy of state protection or internal relocation once the first stage had been determined adversely to the appellant.
86. The fact that the judge nevertheless considered some of those matters did not make them necessary parts of the legal basis for dismissing the protection appeal.
87. Any error confined to the objective likelihood of arrest, the prospect or duration of imprisonment, the grant of bail, the operation of the courts or the availability of protection could not affect the legally sufficient basis upon which the Refugee Convention claim had already failed.
88. I have not treated the evidence concerning imprisonment as irrelevant to subjective fear. The judge considered the charges and the legal evidence before reaching the conclusion at paragraph 21. The sustainable negative answer to the second question at the first stage nevertheless rested upon a considerably wider assessment of the appellant’s claim to have been assaulted, threatened, pursued and subjected to continuing adverse interest.
89. The assumed error concerning the objective likelihood or consequences of imprisonment does not undermine those earlier findings. Correcting an error at the second stage would not require the second question at the first stage to be answered positively.
90. Any error in the treatment of pre-trial detention, bail, imprisonment or the operation of the judicial process was therefore immaterial to the disposal of the protection ground.
Conclusion
91. The judge undertook a detailed assessment of the appellant’s credibility. The findings did not depend upon a single inconsistency and included matters directly related to the central allegations of RAB visits, assaults, threats and continuing interest.
92. At paragraph 15(ii), the judge went too far in describing deliberate deception as the only sensible inference. The judge did not expressly engage there with all the evidence capable of supporting an innocent explanation.
93. That overstatement did not eliminate the underlying inconsistency or materially undermine the remaining credibility findings. Even if it amounted to an error of law, it was not material.
94. The judge considered the June 2023 corrective witness statement. Although its corrective purpose could have been addressed more expressly, the judge was not required to accept it as satisfactorily reconciling the differences in the appellant’s evidence.
95. The accepted publication and criminal proceedings were relevant to subjective fear but did not compel a finding that the appellant genuinely feared Convention persecution. The judge considered the documentary and legal evidence together with the appellant’s account.
96. Paragraphs 20 and 21 demonstrate that the judge followed the statutory sequence. The first question at the first stage was answered in the appellant’s favour. The second question was answered adversely to her, applying the balance of probabilities and for reasons given in his detailed assessment.
97. Once the second question was lawfully answered negatively, the judge was not required to proceed to the second stage. Any error in the alternative assessment of arrest, remand, imprisonment, bail, judicial independence or protection was therefore not material to the dismissal of the Refugee Convention appeal.
98. Applying the appellate restraint required by R (Iran), Volpi, Fage and HA (Iraq), the grounds do not establish a material error of law.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.
The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal is dismissed.

V S Rae-Reeves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23/10/2026