Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002238

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55427/2022
LP/00277/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 13th of November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE CANAVAN

Between

R A M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms R. Evans of Broudie Jackson & Canter
For the Respondent: Mrs A. Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity because the case involves a protection claim. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Upper Tribunal’). The Upper Tribunal is an independent decision-making body. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (‘TCEA 2007’).
2. If the Upper Tribunal decides that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.
Background
3. The appellant appealed the respondent’s decision dated 11 November 2022 to refuse a protection and human rights claim.
4. First-tier Tribunal Judge O.R. Williams (‘the judge’) dismissed the appeal in a decision sent on 17 April 2025. The judge began by setting out the summary of the appellant’s case from the respondent’s decision letter [6]. In turn, the decision letter summarised the evidence that had been given by the appellant in interviews. The appellant helped his cousin ‘S’ to attend a health centre for mental health treatment from August 2018. Alternatively, he had begun working at the centre from August 2018 and began driving his cousin to appointments from January 2019. The appellant said that he and his cousin had gone out on multiple occasions in public places. They began a relationship in April 2019. They slept together in June 2019. Neither family knew about this. The appellant’s family made a marriage proposal to his cousin’s father on 20 June 2019, which was rejected. Following a second proposal S’s father told the appellant’s mother than he would kill him if he made any further proposals. Alternatively, threats were made following a telephone call that the appellant made to his uncle in which he asked for a third time to marry S. Following the proposals his cousin’s family restricted her movements. The appellant and S continued to maintain contact through text and occasional phone calls until they left Iraq together. He also went to his cousin’s house to collect her passport.
5. The judge found that, in principle, the claim engaged one of the Convention reasons contained in the Refugee Convention [9]. He then went on to consider ‘Evidence which does not support credibility’ [10]-[18]. The judge began this section by citing extracts from the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) on Iraq ‘Kurdish ‘honour’ crimes’ (Version 1.0) (August 2017). He concluded that aspects of the appellant’s account were implausible in light of the appellant’s own evidence relating to the course of events and in light of the background evidence relating to societal norms and the treatment of women in the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI). He did so with reference to specific aspects of the appellant’s evidence given in interview and with reference to the respondent’s CPIN reports [10]-[18]. The judge subsequently concluded that there were no matters that supported the credibility of the appellant’s account [23].
6. In between those findings the judge inserted a heading entitled ‘Is the appellant and (sic) contact with his family and is there a reasonable prospect that the appellant would be able to obtain a CSID/INID within a reasonable period of time?’. Immediately after that heading was a further heading entitled ‘Risk on return?’. The subsequent findings at [19]-[22] appear to deal with both issues. At [19] the judge considered the country guidance in SMO & Others (Article 15(c); identity documents) Iraq CG [2019] UKUT 00400 (IAC) (‘SMO (1)’). For the reasons given after this finding, he concluded that the appellant was likely to be in contact with his family. At [20] he noted that the appellant said in interview that he had taken all of his identity cards with him and used his passport to leave the country. The judge did not accept that he disposed of them. Alternatively, at [21] the judge found that it was likely that the appellant was still in contact with family members in Iraq who could post any identity documents to him or could meet him at the airport. At [22], the judge found that the appellant had contacted friends since leaving Iraq. He could use his Facebook or Instagram accounts to ‘reconnect with them and family’.
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The grounds argue that the First-tier Tribunal made errors of fact when assessing the credibility of the appellant’s account. This single point is followed by a series of submissions in relation to individual findings made in the First-tier Tribunal decision. Unfortunately, the grant of permission by First-tier Tribunal Judge I.D. Boyes, does not give any reasons to explain why he considered the grounds to be arguable. The list of asserted errors of fact included:
(i) The First-tier Tribunal erred in referring to S’s father as an ‘a strict, Islamic extremist’ [12]. This undermined the judge’s finding that it was not plausible that the couple ‘sought to establish a romantic relationship in plain sight’.
(ii) The First-tier Tribunal erred in finding that it was not credible that S’s mother broke the cultural ‘taboo on … men speaking to women about mental health’ with reference to the CPIN on Iraq ‘Healthcare and medical treatment’ (Version 3.0)(August 2024) [13]. The CPIN did not refer to any such taboo. In any event, it was the appellant’s evidence that he raised the issue with his mother who then talked to S’s mother. Nor was it correct to say that S’s mother allowed an inappropriate relationship. It was the appellant’s evidence that she was unaware of the relationship.
(iii) The First-tier Tribunal misstated the basis of the appellant’s asylum claim in recording that his ‘core claim was his (supposed) employment as a driver for mental health patients, which gave rise to his difficulties’ [14]. The First-tier Tribunal erred in placing weight on an issue that did not form the core of the claim. The First-tier Tribunal was mistaken in finding that the appellant failed to mention that he left Iraq with S ‘in the relevant sections of the screening interview’ because there were no such sections.
(iv) The First-tier Tribunal misunderstood the chronology of the appellant’s account. The Tribunal found that it detracted from the credibility of his account that the appellant was able to continue the relationship after S’s family would have become aware of it due to his proposals [15]. The finding that S’s father would have been alerted to the relationship by the proposal was ‘not supported by country evidence or by common sense’. The judge was wrong to infer that others would have known that they had a sexual relationship. The appellant’s evidence was that they did not.
(v) The First-tier Tribunal misunderstood the appellant’s account as to the extent of the contact with S following the proposal [16]. His evidence was that her SIM card was taken away. They could only keep in contact through Facebook Messenger. The appellant did not ‘visit her house’ as implied by the judge. His account was that he stood below her window late at night for S to throw her passport out to him.
(vi) The First-tier Tribunal mistakenly found that the appellant ‘took all of his ID cards with him when he left the country’ as stated in the SEF interview [20]. The judge failed to take into account the fact that this was corrected in correspondence sent by his legal representatives after the interview. While not amounting to an error it was indicative of ‘a more general absence of due care and attention.’
(vii) The First-tier Tribunal did not refer to S’s name correctly also reflected an absence of due care and attention.
(viii) There appeared to be a missing section to the decision between [18] and [19]. The heading suggests that the judge might have intended to set out findings relating to the appellant’s contact with his family in Iraq, but then no findings were made.
8. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but I will refer to any relevant arguments in the decision.
9. I bear in mind that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of a specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings: see HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.
Decision and reasons
10. Certain aspects of the First-tier Tribunal decision do indicate some lack of care in the drafting. As pointed out in the grounds, albeit it was not elevated to an argument suggesting that it amounted to an error of law, the structure and the headings contained in the decision are in places rather unclear. There are also careless misspellings of S’s name as transliterated and some other minor typographical errors.
11. I observe that there is also some evidence to indicate the use of out of date paragraphs relating to the relevant legal framework. For example, the judge referred to SMO (1), but not the more up to date country guidance of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) (‘SMO (2)’), which was contained in the appellant’s bundle. The out of date reference to SMO (1) was not likely to make any material difference to the outcome if the judge’s findings relating to the likely availability of identity documents if those findings were sustainable. No clear arguments have been particularised as errors of law in relation to the points made about loose drafting.
12. Instead, the grounds of appeal make a series of submissions asserting that the judge’s adverse credibility findings were undermined by errors of fact to such an extent that it disclosed an error of law. In response, Mrs Nolan accepted that a couple of the points, but not all, might disclose slight inaccuracies. However, she argued that when the decision was considered as a whole, the grounds did not disclose any material errors of law.
13. Having considered the grounds of appeal and the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal I conclude that the submissions made in the grounds amount to no more than disagreements with the findings. Neither individually nor cumulatively do the grounds disclose a material error of law that might justify setting aside the First-tier Tribunal decision. In places the grounds border on making misleading submissions to the court. Those representing the appellant are reminded that that their primary professional duty is to the court.
14. The grounds seem to be premised on an assumption that the appellant’s case should have been considered at its highest. However, the respondent pointed out inconsistencies and implausible aspects of the appellant’s account in the decision letter. The credibility and consistency of the appellant’s account of past events was a disputed issue to be assessed by the First-tier Tribunal.
15. It is not arguable that the judge made an error of fact in describing S’s father as an ‘Islamic extremist’. The point is contradicted by the evidence and borders on misleading the Upper Tribunal. First, a judge does not need to use exactly the same wording as that used by an appellant in their evidence. Second, the judge’s use of the term was not outside a range of reasonable responses to the appellant’s evidence.
16. In the first interview the appellant described S’s father as ‘so religious’ [qu.68]. In the second interview he said: ‘she was from a very strict family, her father was from jund al-eslam so they imposed very strict rules for her to follow, fully covered’ [qu.62]. He also said that S’s father worked as a guard in ‘a compound related to this Islamic group’ [qu.79]. In his witness statement, the appellant repeated that S’s father was ‘a guard for the Islamic movement’.
17. The background evidence produced by the appellant in support of the appeal disclosed that Jund al-Islam is likely to be one of two former factions that merged to become Ansar al-Islam, which was designated as a terrorist group [pg.147 UT bundle]. Other very dated information described Jund al-Islam as an ‘extremist Islamic faction’ operating in the Halabja area, which may have had links with Osama bin Laden [pg.154]. In the circumstances, it is wholly unarguable that the use of the term ‘Islamic extremist’ gave rise to any error of fact. In this context, it was not outside a range of reasonable responses to the evidence for the judge to conclude that the appellant’s account of spending time with S unchaperoned in public places, whether they were near their homes or not, was implausible given that S was said to come from a such a strict religious family.
18. The assertion made at [9] of the grounds itself seems to misrepresent what the judge said at [13] of the decision. The judge did not find that the CPIN relating to healthcare in Iraq said that there was a ‘taboo on … men speaking to women about mental health’ issues. The judge made a general finding about the plausibility of this aspect of the appellant’s account with reference to two pieces of evidence that he cited in brackets after his finding.
19. The first was the appellant’s evidence in the second interview (qu.77). This formed part of a series of questions in which the appellant was asked how he came to know that S suffered from depression. The appellant said that he knew because they were relatives and visited each other. The appellant said ‘we talk about things she is a very close relative to me’ (qu.76). It is in this context that he was then asked whether S would be allowed to talk freely to other men if her father was so strict (qu.77). The appellant then appeared to change the emphasis of his answer by saying that ‘the issue of [S] her mother talked to my mother about it, there are certain things related to males cannot be discussed with females and vice versa’ (qu.77). It was this evidence, in combination with what was said in the CPIN about the general stigma associated with mental health issues (20.1.2), that formed the basis of the judge’s overall finding relating to the plausibility of this aspect of the appellant’s account.
20. It is clear that the finding made at [13] also took into account whether it was plausible in the context of a strict Islamic family, and the evidence relating to the treatment of women more generally, that S’s mother would let the appellant accompany her daughter unchaperoned to the clinic and then to various other places he said that they went to after the appointments. Nothing in [13] discloses an error of fact. The findings were open to the judge on the evidence.
21. Again, the point made about the judge’s reference at [14] to the core claim relating to his employment as a driver for the health centre is misleading. In the same sentence the judge made clear that this work eventually ‘gave rise to his difficulties’ with his cousin’s family. It is obvious from his findings that the judge considered the core issues raised in the claim.
22. It was open to the judge to find that the appellant’s failure to mention in the screening interview his later claim that he left Iraq with S was damaging to the credibility of his account even if he was not asked whether he travelled with another person. At section 4.1 of the screening interview the appellant made clear that the relationship with his cousin was the reason for him leaving Iraq. Despite giving a fairly detailed outline of his journey to the UK at section 3.3, the appellant failed to mention that he left Iraq with S and that they were then separated by an agent in Greece. This was a significant fact that the judge could reasonably expect the appellant to mention even within the limited context of a screening interview.
23. The point relating to the findings at [15] follows the same pattern of disagreement and general submissions on the appellant’s view of the evidence. It was within a range of reasonable responses to the evidence for the judge to infer that the proposal of marriage might have given S’s father some cause to believe that there was a relationship between the appellant and S. Although this paragraph of the decision seems to be based on an element of speculation, it is not sufficient, taken alone or with other points, to give rise to an error of law that was likely to make any material difference to the judge’s overall findings relating to the credibility of the account.
24. It was also open to the judge to find at [16] that the restrictions that the appellant said were imposed on S by her family following his proposal seemed to be inconsistent with his claim that they were able to keep in contact through calls and messages and that he visited her house to get her passport. The judge cited the specific answers given in interview in which the appellant explained that they kept in contact by text message and occasional calls. It is also clear that the judge took into account the relevant aspect of the interview where the appellant said that he went to S’s house at night to collect the passport, which she threw out of the window. It is not arguable that the judge did not understand the context.
25. The final points about the ID cards, the spelling errors in the transliteration of S’s name, and the assertion that a section appeared to be missing from the decision, do not purport to particularise any errors of law and amount to no more than general complaints about the decision. Although the headings between [18]-[19] did not flow particularly clearly, the subsequent findings at [19]-[22] dealt with both points highlighted in those headings (see [6] above). The appellant’s evidence as to what identity documents he had on him when he left Iraq was internally inconsistent even within the interview. Regardless of any corrections that were made after the interview, the judge considered the alternative possibilities that the appellant might still have identity documents with him or could obtain any that were left in Iraq from his family members. The spelling errors in the way S’s name was transliterated into English does not disclose any error of fact that would have made any material difference to the outcome of the appeal.
26. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error of law. The decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of a material error of law
The decision shall stand

M. Canavan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

05 November 2025