Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002247

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53842/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On the 12 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE FRANCES

Between

AFSANA AKTAR
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms L Coerman, instructed by Whitebridge Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr S Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 18 July 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a national of Bangladesh born on 4 February 1994. She appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 31 March 2025 dismissing her appeal against the refusal of leave to remain on human rights grounds.
2. The appellant entered the UK as a student on 17 March 2021 with leave to enter valid until 23 January 2023. On 14 December 2021, she married the sponsor, Mr Chowdhury, a Bangladeshi national who has permission to stay in the UK until 11 October 2026 on a 10-year route to settlement. Her daughter was born on 3 March 2022 and is the appellant’s dependent in this appeal.
3. On 19 December 2022, the appellant made an application for leave to remain as a family member (private life). On 22 March 2024, the respondent refused the application on the grounds the appellant could not satisfy the eligibility requirements of Appendix FM. Her partner is not British, settled or in the UK with refugee or humanitarian protection leave, leave under Appendix EU or leave as a worker or business person under Appendix ECAA Extension of Stay. The appellant could not satisfy the requirements of Appendix Private Life because she had resided in the UK for less than 2 years and there were no very significant obstacles to re-integration in Bangladesh. It was in the best interest of the appellant’s daughter that she remain with the appellant and the sponsor could apply for a visa to visit them in Bangladesh.

The decision under challenge
4. The First-tier Tribunal judge (‘the judge’) set out the issues agreed by the parties at [2] of her decision, namely whether EX.1 of Appendix FM applied such that there were insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing outside the UK or whether return to Bangladesh would give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences so as to be disproportionate under Article 8.
5. It was the appellant’s case that she could not return to Bangladesh because the sponsor was an active member of the BNP before he arrived in the UK in 1999 and her family were active supporters of the Awami league. The appellant claimed her family had disowned her and she had lost contact with them due to the age gap between her and the sponsor and because the sponsor and his family supported the BNP. The sponsor was born on 2 February 1976 and had experienced serious ill-health. He had a heart attack in December 2023 and underwent open heart surgery in January 2024.
6. The judge found that the sponsor’s brother and his brother’s family are BNP supporters but the appellant was not currently or formally affiliated with the BNP. In 2020, the sponsor had visited his family in Bangladesh and there was no political reason why he could not return to Bangladesh. The appellant did not claim to be at risk on return because of her family’s support for the Awami league.
7. In considering the medical evidence the judge found there was insufficient evidence to show the sponsor was unable to attend to his normal daily living activities without the assistance of the appellant. The medical evidence did not show the sponsor was unable to travel and, having considered the CPIN dated July 2022, the judge found: “There is no evidence to suggest that any ongoing medication required by Mr Chowdhury is unavailable in Bangladesh.” The sponsor would not face unjustifiably harsh consequences on return by reason of his healthcare requirements.
8. The judge rejected the appellant’s claim to have lost contact with her family in Bangladesh. The judge found that her family’s alleged disapproval of the marriage was less likely given there was no direct connection between the sponsor and the BNP. In her application form the appellant claimed she had no contact with her family since she arrived in the UK. However, in oral evidence the appellant claimed to have lost contact with her family because they disapproved of the marriage. The judge found these matters damaged the appellant’s credibility and concluded the appellant had failed to show, on the balance of probabilities, that her family had disowned her.
9. At [20], the judge found:
“I consider it likely that the appellant, should she return to Bangladesh, would have retained or be able to rekindle her family, friendships and social contacts that she had prior to leaving Bangladesh as would Mr Chowdhury. The appellant has been away from Bangladesh for a relatively short period of time and has not shown on the balance of probability that she would be unable to rebuild her connections in the event of her return. It is the case that a return to Bangladesh would cause upheaval to the appellant and Mr Chowdhury’s life and would be an unwelcome change. The appellant is highly educated and accepts that should she return to Bangladesh, she is likely to be able to obtain employment. She would have the emotional support of Mr Chowdhury in rebuilding her and their family life in Bangladesh.”
10. At [21] the judge found that the appellant would not be returning to Bangladesh as a single woman and at [22] she concluded:
“I have considered the submission made in respect of the best interests of the appellant’s young daughter. It is common ground that the appellant’s daughter’s best interests lie primarily with remaining with the appellant. The submissions made were on the basis that any return to Bangladesh would break up the family unit, result in disadvantages of being separated from her father or living in a single mother household or unsupported by family/ social network in Bangladesh. In light of my findings above, the appellant has not shown that these circumstances are likely to materialise. The appellant’s daughter can be supported by her parents and I conclude that arguments relating to her best interests do not provide material weight to the appellant’s case.”

The grounds of appeal
11. The appellant appealed and, permission was granted, on four grounds:
(i) The judge failed to determine whether the appellant faced very significant obstacles to integration in Bangladesh.
(ii) The judge’s assessment of exceptional circumstances under GEN 3.2 and EX.1 of Appendix FM was flawed because the judge failed to consider relevant factors.
(iii) The judge’s assessment of the availability of medical treatment in Bangladesh was flawed.
(iv) The proportionality assessment was premised on a misunderstanding of the facts.
12. It was submitted the judge failed to take into account the sponsor’s lengthy residence, his deteriorating health having been assessed as unfit to work by the DWP, the impact of the sponsor’s and their daughter’s loss of rights in the UK if they return to Bangladesh and that it was far more likely that the sponsor would remain in the UK thereby separating the family unit. The judge failed to acknowledge that the BNP and Janaat-e Islam are close allies and ignored the evidence that the sponsor’s family are BNP supporters. In assessing proportionality, the grounds submit the judge erred in fact in finding the appellant’s asylum claim was refused, finding there was no evidence of the appellant’s ability to speak English and finding the appellant and sponsor were reliant on public funds. In addition, the judge failed to consider that the appellant is highly intelligent and well educated and therefore is very likely to secure employment and contribute to the economy in the UK if granted leave to remain.

Submissions
13. Ms Coerman relied on her skeleton argument dated 16 July 2025. In summary, she submitted the judge had failed to direct herself on the test of ‘very significant obstacles’ and on the facts the appellant would be returning as a single mother. The judge erred in finding the appellant would not be returning as a single woman because medical treatment was not available and therefore the sponsor would remain in the UK. The judge had failed to attach weight to the sponsor’s immigration status in accordance with GM (Sri Lanka) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1630.
14. Ms Coerman submitted there was sufficient evidence in the CPIN to show the sponsor’s medication was not available in Bangladesh, in particular ramipril and lansoprazole. She submitted that no alternative treatment was available and the judge had failed to consider the significant time it would take to travel to Dhaka to obtain treatment. The appellant’s health was clearly deteriorating and he had been declared unfit for work in December 2024. These factors could properly lead to a conclusion that the sponsor would remain in the UK and the appellant would return to Bangladesh alone. The judge had failed to take this into account when considering the best interests of the child. The judge’s findings at [22] that the appellant would not return as a single mother was not open to the judge on the evidence before her.
15. Ms Coerman submitted that, in finding there was no evidence of English language ability and the appellant was reliant on public funds, the judge erred in law in weighing these factors against the appellant in the balancing exercise. Taken cumulatively, the factors in the appellant’s favour outweighed those in the public interest.
16. Mr Walker submitted any error in relation to public funds or language ability was not material because there was nothing to show that the judge had failed to take into account any relevant evidence. The judge covered all aspects relevant to the health concerns of the sponsor and there was no material error in the judge’s findings. The judge had considered the letter from the DWP and there was evidence the appellant could travel. It could not be said on the evidence before the judge that her finding that the appellant would not return as a single mother was not one which no reasonable judge could have come to.

Conclusion and reasons
17. There was no challenge in the grounds to the judge’s findings at [18] that the appellant’s credibility was damaged and she failed to show that her family had disowned her. On that basis, the judge’s finding at [21] that the appellant had failed to show she would be returning to Bangladesh as single woman was open to the judge on the evidence before her and she gave adequate reasons for coming to that conclusion.
Ground 1
18. It does not appear to have been argued at the hearing that the appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration on return to Bangladesh from the issues agreed between the parties at the commencement of the hearing set out at [2]. In any event, the judge’s failure to mention PL 5.1 or refer to the test was not material because it is apparent from the judge’s findings of fact at [20] that the appellant could not satisfy the test in the Immigration Rules. The appellant would have the support of her family in Bangladesh and she accepted in oral evidence that she is a well-educated woman who is likely to be able to find employment on return to Bangladesh at [12]. The judge found there were no risk to the appellant or sponsor due to the political situation in Bangladesh at [15] and [16]. On the appellant’s own evidence, there were no very significant obstacles to integration and she could not succeed under Appendix Private Life.
Ground 2
19. The appellant cannot satisfy EX.1 because the sponsor has limited leave to remain on the basis of family and private life and her child is not a British citizen or resident in the UK for 7 years. For the reasons given below, the judge’s finding at [24], that there were no unjustifiably harsh consequences for any family member on return to Bangladesh, was open to the judge on the evidence before her.
20. At [10] the judge stated:
“The appellant says that she cannot return to Bangladesh because Mr Chowdhury was an active member of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) before his arrival in the UK in 1999 and her family are all active supporters of the Awami league. Mr Chowdhury said that he had no personal involvement with the BNP. He made a previous unsuccessful asylum claim in the UK relating to Janaat-e Islam. His family in Bangladesh, being his brother and his brother’s family are BNP supporters.”
21. Contrary to the grounds and submissions, it was the sponsor’s own evidence that his asylum claim was unsuccessful. There was no material error of fact. In oral evidence the sponsor stated he had no personal involvement with the BNP. There was no material error of law or fact in the finding that the sponsor was not currently or formally affiliated with the BNP at [15]. The judge took into account the political affiliation of the sponsor’s brother and his family at [10] and [15]. The judge took into account the sponsor’s immigration status at [8], his lengthy residence at [10], the age gap between the appellant and the sponsor at [11], the medical evidence at [13] and [17] and the letter from the DWP at [14]. The appellant’s daughter has no immigration status in the UK. She is dependent on the appellant’s application. Any loss of her future rights of settlement was not relevant. There was no material misapplication of GM (Sri Lanka) and the criticism that the judge failed to take into account relevant matters was not made out.
22. At [22], the judge considered whether return to Bangladesh would break up the family unit in the alternative to being unsupported by family/social network in Bangladesh. Given the unchallenged findings at [18] there was no material error of law in the judge’s finding that the appellant had failed to show that these circumstances were likely to materialise. In the event that the appellant and her daughter were separated from the sponsor they would have the support of family in Bangladesh and therefore there would be no unjustifiably harsh consequences. It is apparent from [5] and [22] that the judge properly directed herself in law on the best interests of the child and properly took them into account in coming to her conclusions.
Ground 3
23. The judge rejected the sponsor’s claim that he was unable to leave the UK because of his medical condition and because he was unable to travel. She found that it was not supported by the medical evidence. The judge recognised the sponsor would have had an assessment by the DWP but there was no error of law or fact in her conclusion that there was no medical evidence before her about the sponsor’s current medical needs.
24. The judge took into account the CPIN at [17] which states that cardiology treatment is available in Dhaka. I am not persuaded by Ms Coerman’s submission that paragraph 5.1.6 shows that two of the sponsor’s prescribed medicines are not available in Bangladesh because there was no evidence before the judge to show that those medications listed in the CPIN were not suitable alternative medicines for those prescribed. There was no material error of law in the judge’s finding that, “There is no evidence to suggest that any ongoing medication required by Mr Chowdhury was unavailable in Bangladesh” because there was insufficient evidence before the judge to show that the sponsor would be unable to access alternative treatment.
Ground 4
25. The appellant accepted in her witness statement that she was dependent on the sponsor. The sponsor is in receipt of public funds. The appellant was in the UK lawfully as a student and her immigration status was precarious. The appellant has completed a Masters’ degree and she gave evidence in English. Any misunderstanding of the facts was not material for the following reasons.
26. The appellant cannot satisfy the Immigration Rules and therefore the weight to be attached to the public interest is considerable. Any error in attaching weight to the matters referred to in [23] was not material because the appellant’s Article 8 rights cannot outweigh the public interest on the facts of this case. The fact that the appellant can speak English and is not reliant on public funds in addition to her lawful residence is insufficient to tip the balance in the appellant’s favour.
27. At [25] the judge’s made the following finding:
“I conclude, taking the entirety of the evidence into account, that the appellant’s circumstances do not fall within the very limited class of claims where the interference cannot be said to be proportionate to the respondent’s legitimate aim. For the reasons set out above, I conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.”
28. This finding was open to the judge on the evidence before her. There was no material error of law in the judge’s finding that the refusal of leave to remain was proportionate in all the circumstances. There was no material error of law in the decision of 31 March 2025 and I dismiss the appellant’s appeal.

Notice of Decision
Appeal dismissed

J Frances

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 July 2025