Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Cases Nos: UI-2025-002247
(HU/53842/24)
LH/00641/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

27th August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE

Between

AFSANA AKTAR + 1
(no anonymity order made)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellants: Mr Karim, Counsel instructed by Whitebridge Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Terrell, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on the 17 August 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh born in 1994. Her daughter, born in the UK in 2022, is dependent upon her claim. The Appellant has permission to appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss her appeal on human rights grounds.
Relevant History and Matters in Issue
2. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom on 17 March 2021 in possession of leave to enter as a Tier 4 (General) Student Migrant. Shortly after she arrived, she met and formed a relationship with another Bangladeshi national, Mr Chowdhary. Mr Chowdhary had arrived in the UK in 1999 and had subsequently claimed asylum. Although that claim had been unsuccessful, he was subsequently granted leave to remain on human rights grounds, and remains here with leave on that basis, valid until October 2026. The Appellant and Mr Chowdhary were married in accordance with Islamic law on 14 December 2021, and by English law on 14 December 2021. Their daughter was born on 3 March 2022. It is not in issue that theirs is a genuine and subsisting relationship or that they intend to live with one another permanently. It is that relationship which forms the basis of the Appellant’s claim that it would be a breach of her Article 8 rights to refuse to grant her leave in the UK.
3. The Respondent refused to grant leave because she found that the Appellant could not meet any of the requirements of the Immigration Rules and had failed to establish that there were any exceptional or compelling reasons why she should be granted leave to remain outwith that framework. By its decision of 31 May 2025, the First-tier Tribunal agreed with that assessment and dismissed the appeal. On 24 July 2025 the Upper Tribunal (Judge Frances) upheld that decision, finding it to contain no error of law. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted on 12 March 2026 by Lady Justice May, subsequent to which the parties agreed that the decisions of the Tribunals below should be set aside, and the appeal heard de novo.
4. On 29 May 2026 Upper Tribunal Judge Mandalia ordered that upon remaking the decision, the first task of the Tribunal would be to determine what, if any findings made by the First-tier Tribunal should be preserved. To that end, the parties were directed to draw up schedules, which they duly did.
5. Appearing before me on the morning of the hearing, Mr Karim and Mr Terrell were unfortunately unable to agree on what findings could be salvaged from the First-tier Tribunal.
6. Mr Terrell based his assessment on the terms in which May LJ granted permission to the Court of Appeal, the subsequent consent order and its accompanying ‘statement of reasons’. The grant of permission read as follows:
“Ground 1: I consider it arguable, with a reasonable prospect of success, that the FTT judge erred in failing to address the application of PL5(1)(b) and failing to reach any express conclusion on whether the Appellant would face “very significant obstacles to reintegration” if she went back to Bangladesh. There was arguably a gap in the reasoning leading to the FTT’s conclusion that the Sponsor would return to Bangladesh with the Appellant and that the Appellant would thus return as part of a family unit, rather than as a single female with a child.
Grounds 2 and 3: I consider it arguable, with a reasonable prospect of success, that the FTT judge’s assessment of Gen 3.2 and Article 8 failed adequately to take into account the Sponsor’s LTR status, his length of residence, his recent health issues and ongoing medical requirements.
Ground 4: I consider it arguable, with a reasonable prospect of success, that the FTT judge erred in the performance of the balancing exercise. I am satisfied that these grounds taken together arguably raise important points of principle or practice satisfying the test for a second appeal under CPR rule 52.7”
7. The Statement of Reasons agreed between the parties, and attached to the subsequent consent order, then said this:
“9) The parties accept that there are gaps in the FTT’s reasoning, in particular:
i) The FTT did not explain how it was concluded that Mr. Chowdhury would return to Bangladesh with the appellant, so that the appellant and her daughter would return to Bangladesh as a family unit.
ii) The FTT did not address in its reasons Mr. Chowdhury’s “LTR status, his length of residence, his recent health issues and ongoing medical requirement” when explaining how requiring the appellant to return to Bangladesh would not amount to a disproportionate interference with her family life with her husband.
iii) The FTT did not adequately explain how it was concluded that “The appellant has not been able to establish any particularly compelling features which would render her removal disproportionate” (FTT’s decision para. 24).
10) They accordingly accept that the FTT’s decision is undermined by legal error, as it is not adequately reasoned. The Upper Tribunal should therefore have set aside the FTT’s decision, and either remitted the appeal to the FTT for a re-hearing, or re-heard the appeal itself.
11) The parties agree that the appeal should be remitted to the Upper Tribunal to be re-heard there, rather than in the FTT.
12) The parties also agree that those findings of fact not affected by the inadequate reasoning identified at paragraph 8 above should be preserved. The parties will invite the Upper Tribunal to determine those findings that should be preserved as a preliminary issue at the re-hearing of the appeal following remittal”.
8. Relying on this information, Mr Terrell not unreasonably assumed that much of what the First-tier Tribunal had said, at its paragraphs 15-20, must be preserved. This included findings that it is not factually correct to say that Mr Chowdhury has lost all ties with Bangladesh, since he visited that country in 2020; there is no evidence that the Appellant’s family holds any significant position within the Awami League; the medical evidence does not establish that Mr Chowdhury is dependent upon the Appellant for his care; and there is no evidence that he would be unable to access the necessary medication in Bangladesh. It also, crucially, includes the following reasoning in respect of the Appellant’s position upon return to Bangladesh:
“18. I carefully examined the appellant’s evidence in relation to the alleged breakdown of her relationship with her family in Bangladesh. This breakdown was premised at least partly upon Mr Chowdhury’s BNP connection that does not exist. The absence of a direct connection between Mr Chowdhury and the BNP makes the alleged family disapproval of the appellant’s marriage to Mr Chowdhury for political reasons less likely. I note the inconsistency between the appellant’s application form where she says that she has not been in contact with her family since arriving in the UK and her evidence to the tribunal that she was in contact with her family but lost contact due to their disapproval of her marriage. These matters have damaged the appellant’s credibility. When viewing the entirety of the evidence provided, I conclude that the appellant has not shown on the balance of probability that her family have disowned her as she has claimed.
19. The appellant states within her witness statement that her life and the life of her daughter will be under threat should she return to Bangladesh. I am unable to identify any credible evidence or background information substantiating this assertion and the case was not argued by Ms Rea on this basis.
20. I consider it likely that the appellant, should she return to Bangladesh, would have retained or be able to rekindle her family, friendships and social contacts that she had prior to leaving Bangladesh as would Mr Chowdhury. The appellant has been away from Bangladesh for a relatively short period of time and has not shown on the balance of probability that she would be unable to rebuild her connections in the event of her return. It is the case that a return to Bangladesh would cause upheaval to the appellant and Mr Chowdhury’s life and would be an unwelcome change. The appellant is highly educated and accepts that should she return to Bangladesh, she is likely to be able to obtain employment. She would have the emotional support of Mr Chowdhury in rebuilding her and their family life in Bangladesh”.
9. Mr Terrell submitted that since none of that is referred to by May LJ, or the statement of reasons, it should all be preserved. The only issues requiring re-determination would be whether Mr Chowdhury would in fact return to Bangladesh with his family, whether there were very significant obstacles to integration for the Appellant and ultimately, whether the decision to refuse leave is proportionate.
10. Whilst I can understand why Mr Terrell proceeded on the basis that he did, I had some real reservations about this approach. That was because, it seemed to me, the Court of Appeal cannot sensibly be understood to have remitted the question of ‘very significant obstacles’ if it had intended to preserve the First-tier Tribunal’s finding that the Appellant has no problems with her family. It is very difficult to see how she would face obstacles to her integration if she can simply go back to her natal family home. What would be the point of the remittal?
11. Mr Karim was able to provide a complete answer to that question with the production of his grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal, which are to be read with the grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal, challenging the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
12. Following promulgation of the First-tier Tribunal decision, the Appellant sought permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. He relied upon grounds drafted by Frances Shaw of Counsel. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of Ms Shaw’s grounds specifically take issue with the First-tier Tribunal’s approach to the question of whether or not the Appellant’s family approved of her marriage to Mr Chowdhury, and why her family and his might be at odds with one another. In particular she submitted that the Tribunal had failed to consider the matter of the age gap between the couple (said to have caused consternation) and had failed to consider whether, on its own findings, it was likely that families from opposing political sides in Bangladesh might be antagonistic to a marriage such as this.
13. Following the grant of permission, the matter came before Upper Tribunal Judge Frances, who dismissed the appeal having found, inter alia, that “there was no challenge in the grounds to the finding that the Appellant had failed to show that her family had disowned her”.
14. On 9 October 2025 Mr Karim drafted grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal. At his paragraph 29 he submitted that Judge Frances was mistaken in thinking that the findings of fact regarding the Appellant’s standing with her family were not challenged. They were, and they are.
15. The Court of Appeal then granted permission to appeal in unrestricted terms.
16. Having had regard to all of that, taken with my observation summarised at §10 above, I am satisfied that the findings regarding the Appellant’s relationship with her family must be regarded as being set aside. Mr Terrell accepted that the information divulged by the production of the grounds (not, for reasons unknown, included in the bundle) did change things. In light of my indication he asked for more time to prepare his submissions. He had based his case preparation on the Court of Appeal materials and had not appreciated that the re-making would encompass this wider set of facts. At this point Mr Karim indicated that a further matter might warrant consideration. That was new medical evidence from Mr Chowdhury’s GP concerning his ability to travel. It was not in issue that he had suffered a heart attack in 2023 or that he later required a by-pass operation. This new evidence, not yet available to Mr Karim, but apparently on its way, was potentially determinative of the question of whether Mr Chowdhury could travel to Bangladesh with his wife. Faced with these matters, the parties agreed, and I determined, that the matter should be adjourned. This would give the Secretary of State the opportunity to consider the new evidence from the GP, and to prepare the case on the basis of the matters in issue now agreed. It was further agreed that the appropriate forum for the re-making would now be the First-tier Tribunal, in light of the extent of the fact finding required. Insofar as any findings made by the First-tier Tribunal could be preserved, these are all now uncontentious:
(i) The Appellant entered the UK as a student on 17 March 2021 and having made an in time application for further leave is currently on leave conferred by section 3C Immigration Act 1971;
(ii) Mr Chowdhury has leave to remain in the UK based on his family and private life that is due to expire on 11 October 2026;
(iii) The Appellant has a Masters in global human resource management;
(iv) The Appellant met Mr Chowdhury, and they married religiously on 29 June 2021 and under civil law on 14 December 2021;
(v) Their relationship is genuine and subsisting, and Article 8 is therefore engaged;
(vi) Their daughter was born on 3 March 2022;
(vii) Mr Chowdhury has experienced serious ill-health. He had a heart attack in December 2023 and subsequent heart surgery in January 2024;
(viii) Mr Chowdhury has been accepted as having limited capability for work or work-related activities and is currently in receipt of state benefits;
(ix) Mr Chowdhury is not currently or formally affiliated with the BNP. His brother and his brother’s family are BNP supporters;
(x) Mr Chowdhury last visited Bangladesh in 2020
17. These findings shall be preserved, subject to any new information that may be provided in accordance with any directions issued by the First-tier Tribunal.
Decisions
18. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside by order of the Court of Appeal.
19. The decision in the appeal is to be re-made afresh in the First-tier Tribunal, with the findings set out at my 16 (i)-(x) preserved.
20. There is no order for anonymity.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
18th August 2026