UI-2025-002259
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002259
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64590/2024 & IA/01043/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5th of December 2025
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DOYLE
Between
KH
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Forrest, counsel, instructed by Norman Lawson & Co, solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr A Mullen, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Melville Street, Edinburgh, on 2 December 2025
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
1. I make an anonymity direction because this appeal arises from the appellant’s protection claim.
2. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hutchinson, dated 06/03/2025, which dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
Background
3. The Appellant is a Kurdish citizen of Iraq. He claimed asylum in the UK on 21/12/2022. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s application on 26/02/2024.
The Judge’s Decision
4. The Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. On 06/03/2025 First-tier Tribunal Judge Hutchinson (“the Judge”) dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.
5. The Appellant lodged grounds of appeal, and, on 25/07/2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick granted permission to appeal. She said
The appellant challenges two of the FTT’s many reasons for rejecting the credibility of his account. It is arguable that neither of these reasons are cogent. The first is that it is implausible that the appellant would have recognised the letters “GPS” if he required an interpreter at his appeal: [19]. It is arguable that the FTT has given no reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim that these letters are ‘universal’. It is also arguable that the FTT has given no reasons for finding it implausible that a person who was being sought by the police would be able to hide in a relative’s summer house for a week. The FTT has given many other reasons for rejecting the credibility of the appellant’s account, and it will be for the appellant to show at the error of law hearing that these errors were material. However, the question of materiality does not arise at this stage.
The Hearing
6. (a) For the appellant, Mr Forrest moved the grounds of appeal. He formally adopted the terms of the appellant’s rule 25 reply and then took me to [19] and [21] of the decision.
(b) Mr Forrest told me that the Judge sets out one of the reasons that she found the appellant not to be a credible witness at [19] of the decision. There, the Judge relies on the appellant’s use of an interpreter at the tribunal hearing to find that the appellant cannot explain how he can read and understand the letters “GPS” written in English. Mr Forrest suggested that it is within judicial knowledge the letters “GPS” stands for “global positioning system” and that the Judge’s finding was irrational.
(c) Mr Forrest then turned to [21] of the decision, where the Judge rejects the appellant’s claim that the claimed agents of persecution will be able to find the appellant anywhere in Iraq just because the appellant had been able to avoid them for a week by hiding in his mother-in-law’s house before leaving Iraq. He said the Judge conflated concepts of risk on return and internal relocation
(d) Mr Forrest said that [19] and [21] of the decision are credibility findings which are inadequately reasoned, and that they infect the remaining credibility findings throughout the Judge’s decision.
(e) Mr Forrest wanted to expand further on the grounds of appeal, but he was reminded that there are only two narrowly focused grounds of appeal. He asked me to set the decision aside and remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal to be determined of new.
7. For the respondent, Mr Mullen adopted the terms of the rule 24 response. He told me that the Judge’s decision does not contain errors of law, material or otherwise. He said that [19] and [21] must be read in the context of the totality of the Judge’s findings, and that the decision must be read holistically and progressively. He asked me to dismiss the appeal and allow the Judge’s decision to stand.
Analysis
8. At [12] of the decision the Judge declares that she considered the evidence in the round and did not find the appellant to be a credible witness. The Judge records, there, that the appellant’s evidence was vague, evasive, lacking in specific detail and at times inconsistent. Between [13] and [28] the Judge fully explains why she reaches that conclusion.
9. At [19] the Judge does not simply say that because the appellant used an interpreter at the hearing he would not be able to read and understand the English letters “GPS”. At [19] the Judge explains why she does not accept the appellant’s explanation for identifying GPS devices. She considers his education, and finds that his attempts to link his education to knowledge of GPS devices was vague evidence before expressing doubts that the appellant would be able to read the letters GPS.
10. At [21] the Judge considers the appellant’s evidence that he was able to avoid agents of persecution by concealing himself in his mother-in-law’s house against the appellant’s insistence that the agents of persecution will be able to find him anywhere in Iraq.
11. Even if [19] and [21] of the decision are the weakest parts of the Judge’s credibility findings, they are only two of many adverse credibility findings. The Judge uses another 13 paragraphs to explain why she finds the appellant’s evidence to be evasive, lacking in specific detail, and at times inconsistent.
12. Neither [19] nor [21] contain errors of law. Both [19] and [21] contain the Judge’s candid reasoning finding two of the smallest parts of the appellant’s evidence to be incredible.
13. Even if [19] and [21] contained errors of law, those errors would not be material. They would not be material because both [19] and [21] could be deleted in their entirety and the Judge’s decision would still make sense. Even without [19] and [21], [13] to [28] of the decision contain sufficient, detailed, reasons for finding the appellant’s evidence not to be credible.
14. Questions of credibility and the weight to be given evidence are matters for the Judge at first instance.
15. There is no irrationality in the Judge’s findings. The Judge’s findings are adequately reasoned. It is clear from what is found between [13] and [28] of the decision that the Judge makes evidence-based findings in fact. The Judge applies the law to those findings in fact, and then comes to a conclusion well within the range of reasonable conclusions available to the Judge.
16. The decision does not contain a material error of law. The Judge’s decision stands.
DECISION
The appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 6 March 2025 stands.
Signed Paul Doyle Date 2 December 2025
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Doyle