UI-2025-002261

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 22 Aug 2025
• Promulgation date: 17 Nov 2025
• Publication date: 2 Dec 2025
• Last updated on: 2 Dec 2025

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002261

First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/00218/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

DUNG MANH NGUYEN
(No Anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E. Fripp of Counsel, instructed by Danielle Cohen Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms R. Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 August 2025


DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant, a national of Vietnam, appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Robinson (“the Judge”) who in a decision dated 12 February 2025 had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal based on human rights grounds in connection with a decision of the Respondent to deport the Appellant.
2. Permission to appeal had been refused by the First-tier Tribunal itself but was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Ruddick by way of a decision dated 9 July 2025.
Background
3. The matter has come for hearing before me pursuant to that grant of permission to appeal and my task is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If there is no material error of law then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the appeal will stand. If I find that there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision, then I will have to consider whether the matter ought to remain here at the Upper Tribunal for re-making or whether it ought to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
The Proper Approach to Appeals by Appellate Tribunals

4. I remind myself at the outset that there has to be appropriate judicial restraint in relation the assessment of an appeal from the specialist First-tier Tribunal. I also remind myself that the authorities date back to Baroness Hale’s clear judgment in AH Sudan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; ]2009] 1 AC 678 in respect of that expertise.

5. More recently the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 revisited the proper approach to appeals. Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed, explained that the role of the Appellate Court or Tribunal must be exercised with restraint. His Lordship said at paragraph 29:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:

‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
6. The correct approach to assessing whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision was explained in R (Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm A.R. 535. Brooke LJ, giving the judgment on behalf of the Court of Appeal summarised as follows:

“90.  It may now be convenient to draw together the main threads of this long judgment in this way. During the period before its demise when the IAT's powers were restricted to appeals on points of law:
1.  Before the IAT could set aside a decision of an adjudicator on the grounds of error of law, it had to be satisfied that the correction of the error would have made a material difference to the outcome, or to the fairness of the proceedings. This principle applied equally to decisions of adjudicators on proportionality in connection with human rights issues;
2.  A finding might only be set aside for error of law on the grounds of perversity if it was irrational or unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, or one that was wholly unsupported by the evidence.
3.  A decision should not be set aside for inadequacy of reasons unless the adjudicator failed to identify and record the matters that were critical to his decision on material issues, in such a way that the IAT was unable to understand why he reached that decision.
4.  A failure without good reason to apply a relevant country guidance decision might constitute an error of law.
5.  At the hearing of an appeal the IAT had to identify an error of law in relation to one or more of the issues raised on the notice of appeal before it could lawfully exercise any of its powers set out in s 102(1) of the 2002 Act (other than affirming the adjudicator's decision).
6.  Once it had identified an error of law, such that the adjudicator's decision could not stand, the IAT might, if it saw fit, exercise its power to admit up-to-date evidence or it might remit the appeal to the adjudicator with such directions as it thought fit.
7.  If the IAT failed to consider an obvious point of Convention jurisprudence which would have availed an applicant, the Court of Appeal might intervene to set aside the IAT's decision on the grounds of error of law even though the point was not raised in the grounds of appeal to the IAT.”
7. It is therefore with the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal firmly in mind and the nature of basis of appeals from first instance decisions set out in R (Iran) that I assess the appeal before me. I am well aware that there have been various iterations of the way in which R (Iran) has subsequently been explained in higher court and Upper Tribunal decisions. I need not refer to them because they are well known.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
8. In her decision at paragraphs 1 to 16 the Judge referred to the background, including that the Appellant was born in 1993 and that he had arrived in the United Kingdom in 2002 with his mother when he was a child aged 9 (said to be aged 8 in some documents). His and his mother’s earlier asylum applications had been refused, but in 2008 the Applicant had been granted discretionary leave to remain because he was a child.

9. The Judge referred to the Appellant’s record of offending, including on 24 October 2014 when he had been convicted of two counts of wounding with intent to commit grievous bodily harm for which he was sentenced to a total period of 16 years which comprised a custodial term of 12 years and an extension period of 4 years.

10. Thereafter, on 7 December 2015 the Appellant was convicted of an offence of possession of class A drugs with intent to supply and he was sentenced to a concurrent sentence of 8 months imprisonment.

11. The Judge had also listed the Appellant’s criminal offending prior to 2014 which had commenced when the Appellant was convicted in November 2008 for possession of cannabis. In September 2011 the Appellant was convicted of possession cannabis with intent to supply and further offences in 2011 and 2012.

12. I note that the Appellant had succeeded in an earlier appeal on 5 April 2013 whereby his appeal against deportation had been allowed by the First-tier Tribunal on human rights grounds. The serious wounding offences had occurred after the Appellant’s earlier successful appeal.

13. The Respondent’s decision is dated 1 February 2024 whereby she had taken a deportation order refusing the Appellant’s human rights claim.

14. At paragraph 20 of her decision, the Judge set out the issues which she had to decide. At paragraphs 24 to 28 the Judge set out the law which she had to apply.

15. At paragraphs 29 to 59 the Judges set out findings and decision, including with reference to the earlier decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

16. The Judge had concluded at paragraph 59 that the Appellant had not demonstrated that there were very compelling circumstances in the matter to outweigh the public interest in deportation of the Appellant and she thereby dismissed the Appellant’s appeal.
The Hearing Before Me and the Appellant’s Grounds of Appeal
17. I have been assisted by a skeleton argument dated 14 August 2025 drafted by Mr Fripp which sets out the matters that he invites me to consider. I have also been assisted by oral submissions from Mr Fripp and from Ms Tariq. I am grateful to both of them. The Appellant’s solicitors had provided a 700-paged bundle for this hearing.
18. Mr Fripp had appeared before the First-tier Tribunal and he had drafted the grounds of appeal and which he then advanced before me.
19. In summary, Mr Fripp submitted in oral and written submissions that the Appellant has not left the UK since his arrival to this country when he was aged 8 or 9. The Appellant had been taken into care at the age of 11. The Appellant had predominantly lived in West Wiltshire. When in care, the contact the Appellant that he had was with British people and he had no contact with Vietnamese language or social mores. The Appellant is said to have no family or friends in Vietnam. The Appellant periodically contacts his mother who has remained in the UK, but her status and situation were said to be unknown. The Appellant’s mother was said to have declined to assist or is unable to assist the Appellant.
20. Ground 1 contends in summary that the Judge erred in her application of the previous determination of 5 April 2013 which had allowed the Appellant’s appeal by misapplying Devaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department*[2002] UKIAT 702; [2003] Imm A.R. 1. The previous determination is a starting point. Paragraph 38 states,

“38. The second Adjudicator must, however, be careful to recognise that the issue before him is not the issue that was before the first Adjudicator. In particular, time has passed; and the situation at the time of the second Adjudicator's determination may be shown to be different from that which obtained previously. Appellants may want to ask the second Adjudicator to consider arguments on issues that were not - or could not be - raised before the first Adjudicator; or evidence that was not - or could not have been - presented to the first Adjudicator.”

21. Mr Fripp also referred to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] Civ 1358; [2019] WLR 111. I refer to paragraph 38 in full where Rose LJ (with whom Baker and Floyd LJJ agreed) said,

“38.  The ability of a tribunal to depart, after careful examination, from a previous conclusion on the facts does not always operate in favour of the appellant. For example in Ocampo v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1276; [2007] INLR 49 , the Court of Appeal upheld a decision by the tribunal rejecting the asylum claim of the claimant. This was despite the fact that before a different tribunal, his daughter had been granted asylum on the basis of her father's flight from Colombia. The further evidence which the tribunal hearing the father's appeal had considered would not have met the Ladd v Marshall ([1954] 1 WLR 1489 ) criteria because it could have been put before the adjudicator in the daughter's appeal. The court held however that it was right that the tribunal as a matter of common sense and fairness took the evidence into account. Auld LJ (with whom Rix and Hooper LJJ agreed) stressed at para 26 that the daughter's status as a refugee was not affected by any finding in reliance on new and cogent evidence that the father had lied in supporting her successful appeal against refusal of asylum. The flexibility for the tribunal to take a fresh decision allowed proper regard to be given to the public interest giving effect to a consistent and fair immigration policy—the matter should be judged, Auld LJ said, at para 27, “as one of fairness and maintenance of proper immigration control”.”

22. Mr Fripp submitted that more than 11 years had passed since the first determination. The Judge had therefore erred in that she had failed to acknowledge that the basis for the findings, for instance, as to the language or cultural assimilation, may have changed since that substantial time had passed. The previous findings had to be treated with caution. The Judge had relied on findings which were unhelpful to the Appellant but had ignored those which were helpful. There needed to be care by the Judge to demonstrate her contemporaneous grounding and the degree of weight could bear almost 12 years later.
23. The focus here by Mr Fripp was the comparison with paragraph 31 of the earlier decision of 2013 in which the Appellant was said not to have abandoned all ties with Vietnam because “…he speaks the language and spent at least a large of life there” and that the Judge was not satisfied that the Appellant had no relatives in Vietnam in that earlier determination.
24. Mr Fripp set out at some length in his grounds of appeal, in the skeleton argument in his oral submissions before me that the Judge had unfairly, in effect, simply transposed the findings from the earlier decision into her decision. In any event, said Mr Fripp, the Appellant’s mother did not appear to have visited the Appellant in prison, and the links to the Appellant’s grandmother being in Vietnam required consideration of there being a 21 year gap. It was also submitted that the Judge had seemed to take ‘a negative flavoured slice’ of the findings from that earlier 2013 decision.
25. Ground 2 contends that the Judge erred in her treatment of assimilation/social and cultural ties to the UK when considering s117C(4)(b) and s117C (6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
26. Again, Mr Fripp set this ground at some length in the original grounds, within his more recent skeleton argument and during his oral submissions. I summarise his submissions which contend that whilst the Appellant accepts that his offending and imprisonment cannot be treated as indicative of relevant assimilation, the Judge erred in treating the Appellant’s offending and imprisonment as effectively excluding the scope for relevant positive integration. He submitted that the impact of offending and imprisonment upon a person’s integration in the UK will depend not only on the nature and frequency of the offending, the length and time over which it takes place and the length of time in prison, but also whether and how deeply the individual was socially and culturally integrated in the UK to begin with. A person who has lived almost all of his life in the UK and who has been educated here and speaks no other language other than English will start with much deeper roots in the UK compared with someone who has moved to the UK at a later age.
27. The Judge was also said to have erred in respect of the social and cultural ties because the prisoner visitors’ log was conceded by the Respondent’s Presenting Officer not to show that the persons were anti social. Mr Fripp thereby contends that the Judge was wrong to state that she had “…seen no evidence which specifically links these visitors to the Appellant’s criminal past”. This was an elision of the fact that many of those persons were not linked to the Appellant’s past criminality.
28. Ground 3 contends that the Judge materially erred in law in regard to the possibility of the Appellant reoffending. The OASys report stated a high risk to the public or to unknown adults from the Appellant’s reoffending. Mr Fripp said that the suspicion that the risk depended on antisocial associates or former associates, had not been tested and the visitors’ logs had not made this good. The Probation Officer had referred to the risk of re-offending but that this substantially depended on the outcome of the appeal before the Judge.
29. Ground 4 contends that the Judge’s decision that where would not be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Vietnam was minimally reasoned and seemed to be based substantially on factors such as the Appellant’s familiarity with having lived in Vietnam since he was aged 8. The Judge stating that it would be difficult emphasised the shallowness of the weakness of the Judge’s decision. Case law, such as CI (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 showed that it was necessary to stand back and to look at the circumstances of the Appellant’s case.
30. Ground 5 contends that the Judge erred in respect of the relevance of the Appellant’s early life in the UK. The Appellant’s background of being taken into care at an early age, separated from his mother, has grown up in a British milieu and not Vietnamese was relied upon by Mr Fripp, as was Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the decision in Nystrom v Australia CCPR/C/102/D/1157/2007). Once again Mr Fripp relied in this ground on the decision in CI (Nigeria) that it is necessary to look at the offending in the context of the abuse and neglect which had been suffered by the Appellant.
31. I will not rehearse all of Mr Fripp’s skeleton argument but it correctly identifies at paragraph 11 that the issue of most importance was for the Judge to consider section 117C (6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. That required that the Judge had to consider, “In the case of a foreign criminal who was has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation, unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exception 1 and 2”.
Consideration and Analysis
32. I remind myself of the rest of s117 and some of which Mr Fripp has mentioned. It states as follows:

"117C Article 8: additional considerations in cases involving foreign criminals
 
(“1)  The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.
(2)  The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.
(3)  In the case of a foreign criminal ("C") who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.
(4)  Exception 1 applies where—
(a)  C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,
(b)  C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and
(c)  there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.
(5)  Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.
(6)  In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.”
33. Mr Fripp also referred within his skeleton argument to Supreme Court’s decision in Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60; [2016] 1 WLR 4799 and HA (Iraq) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22; [2022] 1 WLR 3784. Although Mr Fripp refers to a different part of HA (Iraq) it is worth stressing that Lord Hamblen made clear at paragraph 72 that,

"72.  It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i)  They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii)  Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 All ER 65, para 45 per Sir John Dyson JSC.
(iii)  When it comes to reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] 2 AC 48, para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead DPSC”.

34. I also set out paragraph 51 of HA (Iraq) in full which refers to all of the relevant circumstances of the case:

"• the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;
• the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;
• the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant's conduct during that period;
• the nationalities of the various persons concerned;
• the applicant's family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple's family life;
• whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;
• whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and
• the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled …
• the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and
• the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination."

Consideration of the Grounds of Appeal in Detail

35. With due respect to Mr Fripp’s detailed oral and written submissions, I observe that I have found the Judge’s decision, when read as a whole, to be clear and well reasoned, and that it refers to and applies the correct law. Mr Fripp’s submissions are, in reality, no more than an attempt to reargue the appeal and are a mere disagreement with the Judge’s findings. It is simply not necessary for a Judge to deal with each and every document and with each and every submission or every reference within the evidence in his or her decision. The Judge’s decision is detailed and deals with the matters which were placed before. There is no legal or procedural error in the Judge’s decision. It is with that observation in mind that I deal with each of the 5 grounds, but these considerations apply to each of the Grounds of Appeal.

36. In respect of Ground 1, when read as a whole, the Judge’s decision clearly had well in mind the well known decision in Devalseelan because she referred to it and she also correctly provided a self-direction in respect of it that the earlier determination was the ‘starting point’. The Judge also correctly referred to the Court of Appeal’s decision in BK (Afghanistan) stating that she must give careful consideration to evidence that was not before the earlier Tribunal. It is with that in mind the Judge did accept the ‘positives’ from the earlier decision, including at paragraph 32 that Article 8 ECHR was engaged in view of the earlier decision. The Judge also correctly referred at paragraph 33 to those periods of leave which were lawful, as opposed to unlawful. In this case, the period of time that was lawful was significantly shorter than the length of time that the Appellant had been in the UK.

37. The Judge was obliged to refer to the public interest and she did so. The Judge further referred to the Appellant’s long- list of offending, including that the two most serious wounding with intent counts involved the use of a large knife by the Appellant and had led to a total sentence of 16 years imprisonment.

38. The Judge referred to and took into account the expert report at paragraph 37 of her decision. It was noted that the expert said that the Appellant continued to show a risk of re-offending. The Judge noted that the expert had not made reference to the GP’s records. This also referred to the Appellant’s background.

39. Ground 1, in the main, complains about paragraph 47 of the Judge’s decision, including in respect of whether or not the Appellant’s still had some Vietnamese language ability. The Judge had said,

“With regard to condition (c) of Exception 1, I have regard to the relevant caselaw regarding integration including the findings in Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813. I take into account that the Appellant was born in Vietnam, lived there until he was about 8 years old and speaks some of the language. Whilst the Appellant asserted in oral evidence that he does not speak Vietnamese, I bear in mind the findings of the previous Tribunal in this regard and no reason has been given why he would have lost that knowledge since then. He has family in Vietnam including his grandmother who the Appellant referred to in oral evidence. I have seen no evidence that he would not be able to obtain employment in Vietnam, nor any evidence of medical issues which would prevent him from working and he has some qualifications obtained in the UK which would assist with this. I have regard to a Response to an Information Request Vietnam: Economic and Social Context dated 24 October 2023 which states that Vietnam is a middle-income economy and that it had a lower unemployment rate to that of the UK in June 2023, with a housing option available for low income workers”.

40. In my judgment, there is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. Particularly when reminding myself of the clear judgment of Lord Hamblen in HA (Iraq) to which I referred earlier. Appropriate judicial restraint is essential by me, the appellate judge. In my judgment the specialist First-tier judge was entitled to reach the decision that was reached even with 11 years passing since the earlier decision. Additionally, in any event, as I explored with Mr Fripp, the Appellant’s ability or inability to speak Vietnamese must be considered alongside the Appellant’s ability to speak English. In my judgment it is fanciful to suggest that this fit and able Appellant would somehow be unable to culturally or otherwise to integrate in Vietnam ‘just because’ his ability in using the Vietnamese language was limited or even virtually non-existent.

41. Further, it was the Appellant’s own evidence that he had remined in touch with his mother, albeit there appeared to be no evidence that she had visited him in prison. This must therefore mean that there were telephone calls or similar between the Appellant and his mother. It is difficult to see how the Judge could have erred in law when the Appellant said that the continues to have contact with his mother. It remains unclear to me why therefore it can be legitimately claimed that he had lost touch with his language and/or culture.

42. It was also, after all, the Appellant’s own evidence that his grandmother might still be in Vietnam. It is not possible to see how it is an error of law for the Judge to take into account the evidence of the Appellant on this issue. Whilst one can see that the Appellant might not wish to leave the UK and will see deportation as something he does not wish to occur, the Judge was clearly correct to the refer to the relative ease with which the Appellant would be able to secure employment and the like in Vietnam. Integration, be that cultural or otherwise was clearly correctly decided by the Judge. The Judge referred to the evidence of employment and the like.

43. In my judgment in respect of Ground 2, including in respect of integration, the Judge dealt with this more than adequately from paragraphs 40 to 46. Again, read as a whole, the Judge dealt lawfully with these matters. The reference to the visitors’ logs does not somehow undermine the Judge’s decision. The Judge was perfectly entitled to take into account the very many and varied criminal offences recorded against the Appellant over a long period of time with continuing offences, even after the previous deportation proceedings against which the Appellant had succeeded in appealing against. The further offending thereafter was of a very serious kind, as identified by the Crown Court Judge in the sentencing remarks for the 2 counts of wounding with intent.

44. For completeness I refer to paragraphs 40 to 46 of the Judge’s decision and which must be read as a whole and not dissected in the manner which the Appellant’s appeal before me has sought to do:
“40. His limited life skills due to his lifestyle are also noted in the OASys assessment as well as his inability to recognise the impact his behaviour had on others and to maintaining links to “anti-social peers”. Whilst it describes the Appellant as “quite motivated to address offending behaviour”, I bear in mind that the OASys assessment refers to a search of his cell in 2018 where a wrap of drugs was found and in 2018 and 2021 it was believed he was involved in cannabis supply. It also refers to possession of unauthorised items in prison linked to drug activity, most recently on 24 October 2023 a modified computer was located hidden in a DVD player. Moreover, the Appellant “…continues to be affiliated with the drug lifestyle through the individuals he associates with. Those who Mr Nguyen claims are his good friends he associated with prior to custody he has continued to see and have contact with, he has not detached himself from that lifestyle and left the door open to possibly return to drugs on release…There is a magnitude of evidence which demonstrates Mr Nguyen's associated with substances has cause ROSH and offending behaviour. The fact Mr Nguyen has not removed himself from this lifestyle even whilst in custody demonstrates offence parallelling behaviour and is a serious cause for concern.”
41. I take into account the Appellant’s evidence on these points, in particular his oral evidence. Whilst there is no evidence contradicting his assertion that he has not himself taken drugs since 2016 and I find accordingly, I find less credible his denials regarding continued involvement with his previous criminal associates and drug dealing in light of the OASys assessment and the correspondence from Ms Brown. In oral evidence the Appellant he also denied that there was a computer in the DVD but I do not find this credible in light of the evidence on this point in the OASYs assessment, also referenced in the correspondence from Ms Brown and earlier in the Parole Board Oral Hearing Decision of 14 April 2023 on which I also place due weight. Ms Brown refers to intelligence held on the Appellant especially in relation to his connection to drugs and the very recent discovery of a computer in his possession and that he could very easily be engaging with drug related activity through this device and with his continued associates. Ms Brown finds it questionable that his friends are financially supporting him with no expectation of something in return.
42. I have had sight of a visitor’s log adduced by the Respondent dated between 26 June 2021 and 9 December 2024 which has not been disputed by the Appellant. I have seen no evidence which specifically links these visitors to the Appellant’s criminal past. I have also had regard to the substantial number of statements in support of the Appellant adduced, 12 in total, from people asserted to be friends or colleagues of the Appellant, though none of them attended the hearing to give evidence aside from Mr Satchell and I place less weight on those statements accordingly. The Appellant referred in his witness statement to friends from school keeping in touch with him and visiting him in prison, though none of them are named. The Appellant denied in oral evidence that any of the people visiting him in prison were linked to drugs and said that most people who visited him have got jobs and contribute to society and that they were trying to get him back into society. 43. With regard to the evidence of Mr Satchell, it is his consistent evidence that they went to the same secondary school and used to walk to school together; he asserts that the Appellant has learnt a lot about himself whilst being in prison and understands the choices he made were not the right ones. It is also his consistent evidence that he and his friends would give the Appellant the support he needs to reintegrate back into society. He stated in oral evidence that the Appellant’s legal fees were being funded by his friends. No evidence has been adduced in support of this statement regarding legal fees and I do not find accordingly although I do accept Mr Satchell’s consistent evidence that they have been friends since secondary school and that Mr Satchell would provide him with some support on release.
44. Weighing up all the evidence, in particular placing due weight on the OASys assessment and more recent correspondence from Probation, I am satisfied on balance that whilst there has been some rehabilitation on the Appellant’s part including in relation to his personal drug habit, it is overall limited and that he retains links to his former criminal lifestyle.
45. The Appellant’s personal early history in the UK has not been disputed, in particular leaving Vietnam aged 9 and his entry into care at the age of 11 due to being abandoned by his mother. The OASys assessment refers to the Appellant’s traumatic childhood being, experiencing an unstable upbringing, with his experience of the foster care system being “one of turmoil”. I find accordingly and I am also satisfied on the consistent evidence overall that the Appellant has limited contact with his mother re-commenced since she abandoned him when he was 11 years old (also referred to the in the OASys assessment and correspondence from Ms Brown) and therefore currently limited links with Vietnamese culture.
46. Drawing all these strands together and with regard to all the evidence, I do not find that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the UK, in particular whilst he has been in this country for over 20 years since he was about 8 years old with limited links to Vietnam, including being at school and in care in this country, with regard to the extremely serious nature of his index offences which follow a number of other offences, the level of risk he is currently considered to pose of reoffending and to the public and known adults, the limited rehabilitation, his continued association with his criminal life prior to prison and the limited evidence of relationships in this country which are not linked to criminality.”
45. I see no basis upon which the Judge erred in law by looking at the visitors’ logs and concluding that, “I have seen no evidence which specifically links these visitors to the Appellant’s criminal past.” There was indeed no evidence which specifically linked these visitors to the Appellant’s criminal past and the Judge was entitled to say what she did, having heard the evidence and having heard from Mr Fripp.

46. In respect of Ground 3, the weight to be attached to the OASys report, to the expert report and to the Probation Officer’s report were all matters for the Judge. The Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and from his witnesses to come to the decisions that she did. Additionally, the Judge had the benefit of hearing from Mr Fripp at the hearing. In my judgment, this ground is clearly nothing less than an attempt to re-argue the case. There is no merit to it.

47. Ground 4 is similar to Ground 1 and appears to be another way of raising the same matters raised in Ground 1 and which I have dealt with at length above. In any event, what the Judge said at paragraph 58 needed to be looked at with the whole decision in mind. The Judge had said at paragraph 58 that,

“It is necessary for me then to consider whether there are very compelling circumstances in the Appellant’s case which outweigh the public interest in deportation. I take into account that there is a high threshold to be satisfied and although there is no exceptionality requirement, it follows from the statutory regime that cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. I must consider all the relevant circumstances including those identified in Unuane v United Kingdom (2021) 72 EHRR (and as summarised in HA(Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 [51])”

48. The Judge specifically said at paragraph 29 of her decision that she had considered all matters in the round and that absence of reference to evidence did not mean that it had not been considered.

49. In my judgment, Ground 4 is mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision.

50. In respect of Ground 5 which refers to the relevance of Appellant’s early life, the grounds are without merit because the Judge plainly did have all of those factors in mind when considering the matter. The decision must be read as a whole, but the Judge, for example, referred to the Appellant’s early life at paragraph 58 as follows which specifically dealt with such matters:

“58. Whilst the Appellant has lawfully been in the UK over 20 years and has the background of a traumatic childhood in care with limited links to Vietnamese culture in this country (and I note the submissions made by Mr Fripp in this context) I have already found that Exception 1 does not apply to the Appellant. In particular, I note that his limited rehabilitation, the extremely serious nature of his index offences in particular, the level of risk posed and continued association with his criminal lifestyle and limited evidence otherwise of an established private life in the UK. I have found that there would not be very significant obstacles to his integration in light of his familiarity with the country having lived there until he was 8 years old, the continued presence of family, his employability and lack of medical issues preventing him from taking up work and the potential for support from a friend in this country. There is no evidence that though it would undoubtedly be difficult, the Appellant would not be able to re-integrate himself in time and relationships with any friends in the UK could be maintained by electronic means or visits.”

51. In my judgment, whether taken individually or cumulatively, none of the grounds evince a material error of law.

52. Therefore, although Mr Fripp was persuasive with his written and oral submissions, I am unable to agree with him.

53. Accordingly, I dismiss the Appellant’s appeal against the Judge’s decision.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error of law.
Therefore, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had dismissed the appeal on human rights grounds stands.
No anonymity direction is made.


Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


31 October 2025