Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002267

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55267/2024
LP/02648/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

10th November 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS

Between

S G
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Coen, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Mr Wayne, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard on 27 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or her family members. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Hillis) promulgated on 17 March 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal on all grounds against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 12 February 2024 to refuse her protection and human rights claim.
2. The FtTJ did make an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and that her rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know her identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
The background:
3. The factual background is summarised in the documents and is taken from various sources of evidence as follows. The appellant is a national of Nigeria. The appellant and her ex-husband lived in Nigeria with their six children until he left Nigeria for the UK in February 2020. The appellant divorced her husband in May 2020 and she and her children entered the UK in August 2021 having been granted visit visas to enter the UK. On 7 February 2023, the appellant claimed asylum. The basis for that claim was that her daughter would be at risk on return to Nigeria due to her father’s family wishing to perform FGM against their will.
4. The appellant’ claim for asylum was refused by the respondent in her decision letter dated 12 February 2024. The appeal came before the FtTJ and in a decision promulgated on 17 March 2025, the FtTJ dismissed her appeal. The FtTJ set out his findings of fact between paragraphs 12-33 and concluded that having taken all the evidence into account that the appellant had failed to show that she or any other of her family members would be at risk of FGM or that they would be at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Nigeria. Those findings are not challenged in the grounds.
5. As to Article 8 of the ECHR, the FtTJ recorded the issue in dispute at paragraph 6 (iv) and whether removal of the family would breach article 8. His assessment of the issue was set out between paragraphs 34 – 47 where he concluded that on the evidence taken as a whole, the refusal of the appellant’s claim was proportionate.
6. He therefore dismissed the appeal.
7. The appellant applied for permission to appeal the decision. Permission to was refused by a FtTJ but on renewal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens on 2 July 2025.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
8. The hearing took place on 27 October 2025. The appellant was represented by Ms Coen, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant and the respondent by Mr Wayne, Senior Presenting Officer. Both were able to provide their oral submissions to the tribunal at the hearing. I am grateful to both advocates for their helpful submissions.
9. Ms Coen indicated that she relied upon the grounds of challenge and explained them in her oral submissions and Mr Wayne, Senior Presenting Officer, referred to the reply provided to the grounds of appeal under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 dated 23 September 2025 where the appeal was opposed.
10. The submissions are contained in the record of proceedings and in the written grounds and it is not necessary to rehearse them here. I will refer to them as relevant in the analysis of the issues raised.
Discussion:
11. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, it is necessary to set out the following matters. First, I must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
12. As to the challenges made to the decision of the FtT, I also remind myself of the decision in Volpi v Volpi (supra) when reviewing a first instance judge's findings of fact as per Lewison LJ as follows:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
(i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
13. I remind myself that the Judge had the benefit of having heard the evidence and that there must be judicial restraint and respect of the decision of the expert First-tier Tribunal Judge. I must not interfere with the Judge's decision unless there is a material error of law.
14. In the recent decision of the Court of Appeal, in MH (Bangladesh) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688 (9 June 2025) Lord Justice Arnold, with whom Lord Justice Singh and Lady Justice King agreed, reiterated this and summarised,
“The role of an appellate court or tribunal”
29. There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen's summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:
'It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:
(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirection’s simply because they have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.
(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [ 2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.
(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [ 2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead."
15. Dealing with a preliminary issue, an application was made to submit an addendum to the report of Prof Dr Knorr dated 8 October 2025. The application stated that it was “an addendum to supplement the country expert report that was before the FtTJ. The FtTJ recorded that the country expert did not consider the witness statement of G. The country expert has now considered the witness statement and has confirmed that it does not change but confirms her assessment. The proposed new evidence was not before the FtTJ as G’s witness statement had been taken after the country expert report was prepared.”
16. Ms Coen sought to admit that evidence on the basis as recorded above. No further submissions were made or explanation given. Mr Wayne, on behalf of the respondent, opposed the application for its admission on the basis that it had not been established that this evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence at the time of the hearing and could not demonstrate any error of law in the decision.
17. Having heard the submissions of the parties in the context of the appeal, I accept the submission made by Mr Wayne. The application does not state how the new evidence is relevant to the issue of establishing an error of law. Nor was this report referred to in the grounds when seeking permission to appeal. Furthermore, there has been no explanation as to why an addendum was not obtained before the hearing and after the witness statements of both the appellant and her ex-husband were available. The evidence plainly could have been provided with reasonable diligence before the hearing by way of an addendum at that stage. No explanation has been given in this regard and is no more than a disagreement with the findings made by the FtTJ when he assessed the evidence that was available to him.
18. I note that the addendum to the report does not provide any reasoning for what is stated, and I further note that the expert seeks to confirm her assessment concerning the risk of FGM which was expressly rejected by the FtTJ and is not challenged in the grounds. I therefore do not admit that evidence.
19. Turning to the grounds of challenge and ground 1, Ms Coen submitted that the FtTJ made a material mistake of fact in his assessment of the evidence at paragraph 39 and that the FtTJ was wrong to say that G was working in the UK since his arrival in February 2020 but that the evidence was that the appellant’s ex-husband was not supporting them financially until he was able to work in the UK which was in July 2024. That being the case, Ms Coen submitted that the basis upon which the FtTJ dismissed the expert report was flawed. She further submitted that it also infected the factors considered in the proportionality assessment. Thus, there was overlap in relation to ground 2.
20. Having considered the submissions made by each of the advocates and in the context of the decision of the FtTJ and the evidence I am satisfied that there is no material error of law in the decision of the FtTJ on the basis advanced on behalf of the appellant. On a careful reading of paragraph 39 and when read with paragraph 44, the FtTJ did not make a mistake of fact. Firstly, the FtTJ was correct to state that the expert did not have the witness statement from G (the appellant’s ex-husband) when she wrote her report as the report was dated 12 June 2024 and the witness statement was not signed until December 2024. It was not listed in the list of documents as the FtTJ correctly identified. Thus, the FtTJ was correct to say that when undertaking an assessment of the issue of whether the appellant would face destitution on return to Nigeria, it was based on incomplete information as to the extended family situation.
21. I reject the submission made that the expert did have knowledge of the appellant’s ex-husband as the reference made at paragraph 4 (page 60 Cef) “he continues to play an active part in the children’s lives” is not further explained or particularised as to what evidence that reference was based. The expert did not have either a witness statement from the appellant as this was dated October 2024 and it is common ground there was no witness statement from the ex-husband and in the interview the appellant provided little information about his circumstances and at its highest the available information was that he had seen the children when they had been resident in the UK.
22. Furthermore, there was evidence from both the appellant and her ex-husband that he had provided support when he was in the UK.
23. There is no transcript of the evidence given before the FTT but Counsel for the appellant provided her note of the evidence and Mr Wayne on behalf of the respondent has not sought to challenge this. The appellant’s evidence is recorded as follows:
“Came to UK living at same address belongs to husband? May 2020.
Husband been in UK since 2020? Yes
When living in Nigeria was husband supporting you? Because I had little business, at times he gives us money but not enough so the business collapse
When in the UK, supporting you? No when he was in UK
Able to support yourself? Too much of the business
Before you left, had own business and supporting yourself? Business collapse, I had business, but it collapsed I couldn’t continue.
Because in the UK? No because money was not enough for us
a later question was as follows:
When in Nigeria children’s going to school, still being supported and paid for? Yes
24. Later at page 3 of the transcript the following is recorded:
“Is ex-husband working now? Yes, bringing food items, bringing clothes.
At page 4; the appellant was asked when you applied to come to the UK, husband sponsored the application? Yes.
25. Under the heading “Re-X the following is stated, “now that he got job –given us money now – before that making contribution not enough to keep to,”
26. As to the evidence given by the appellant’s ex-husband in cross examination, the following evidence is recorded:
“Got divorced in May? It was Feb 2020
when here in 2020, supporting wife and kids in Nigeria? Yes
still supporting them in June 2020? Yes
it is further recorded:
“Been supporting her whilst in the UK? Yes I bring her food
support financially? No just started working last year, July, just by items for the kids.
27. The evidence recorded above does provide an evidential background for the assessment made by the FtTJ at paragraphs 39 and 44 when taken together. The evidence given by the appellant and her ex-husband was not always consistent. The evidence given by the appellant’s ex-husband as recorded above does state that when he was in the UK in 2020 he was supporting his wife and children in Nigeria. In any event the evidence taken together was that the appellant’s ex-husband had provided support when all were in the UK and when he had obtained work. Contrary to the oral submission made by Ms Coen the FtTJ was not referring to “full support” but was entitled to find on the evidence that the appellant’s ex-husband had provided support when the family were in Nigeria and that was consistent with the assessment made at paragraph 44 that when working would provide support. As Mr Wayne submitted the issue of support is not only financial but encompasses other types of support.
28. It is also important to view that evidence in the context of the way the case had been advanced in the expert report. The paragraphs of the report dealing with the issue of destitution was premised on the basis that the appellant would have to live alone in hiding, by relocating to a place away from her former home and therefore would be without a network of family support (see paragraph 64 – 65 of the expert report).
29. The FtTJ’s factual findings on the issue of risk of FGM are not challenged in the grounds (see paragraphs 12 – 32) nor the conclusion reached that the appellant had failed to show that she or any other family members were at risk of persecution of serious harm due to FGM. The FtTJ also recorded that it was not part of the appellant’s account that her daughter would be at risk of FGM by being abducted by traditional or conservative members of the Yoruba community and subjected to FGM and there were no submissions before him that such a risk was pursued as a basis for the application (see paragraph 32).
30. The FtTJ’s assessment of the circumstances on return for the appellant and her family members were set against that factual matrix and that he had concluded from the evidence that neither she or her family members were at risk of serious harm or persecution by other members of the family or by any other means and therefore she would be able to return to the support of her wide extended family in Nigeria and it would not be necessary to relocate. That was a finding made by the FtTJ at paragraph 44 where the FtTJ found as a fact that the appellant could return to her former home and receive support from her family members, that was a finding irrespective of any support that her ex-husband could provide.
31. Consequently, it has not been established that the FtTJ made a mistake of fact to amount to a material error of law as the grounds assert. It therefore follows that his assessment of the expert report was not flawed when seen in the context of the full factual findings he made and ground one is not made out.
32. Dealing with ground 2, the grounds seek to challenge the “Best interests” assessment as flawed, and it is predicated on the mistake of fact relating to support available for the children.
33. The written grounds relied upon by Ms Coen submit that the FtTJ accepted the needs of the two youngest children (twins aged six) and that they had not received support prior to leaving Nigeria but that the FtTJ found that even if their father was not to return to Nigeria he could continue to support them alleviating the undue hardship they would encounter on return including their need for additional support. Ms Coen submitted that was a misunderstanding of the evidence. However as set out above in relation to ground one, I am satisfied that there has been no mistake of fact or error in his assessment of support on the basis of what had been provided or could be provided in the future, financial or otherwise.
34. The assessment of article 8 was set out between paragraphs 34 – 47 and expressly addressed the issue of the children’s best interests by reference to section 55 of the 2009 Act (see paragraph 34) and took into account the children’s specific individual circumstances, including the differing ages of the children aged 18, 16, 14 and 9 and 6 and their length of residence in the UK since August 2021 and their progress made in education (paragraph 36). The FtTJ expressly addressed the circumstances of the twins and took into account the evidence that they were said to have speech problems and were awaiting assessment in respect of autism spectrum and ADHD (see paragraph 34). The situation in respect of the twins was not the same (see paragraph 35).
35. Contrary to the oral submissions made, the findings at paragraph 38 were open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence. He was entitled to find that there was no reliable evidence that the children’s educational needs could not be adequately met on return to Nigeria in a state or private institution or that they would not settle on return in the same manner they did following their arrival in the UK. This was supported by the evidence of their progress set out and relied upon between paragraphs 35 – 36. It is also supported by the evidence given and as recorded in the ROP, where the applicant was asked, “when in Nigeria children still going to school, still being supported and paid for? The reply is “yes.” It is also consistent with the evidence in interview at question 79, where the appellant confirmed that the twins had gone to a particular nursery and primary school and at question 80 she was asked, “did you have to pay for the children to go to school in Nigeria? The appellant replied, “yes we had to pay for secondary school, everyone had to pay.” The eldest children were all in education before they came to the UK and the FtTJ was entitled to find that there was no reliable evidence or submission that their educational needs could not be met on return, or they could not settle as they had done previously.
36. As to the circumstances of the twins, the FtTJ was plainly aware about their specific needs which he had outlined at paragraphs 34 and 35. Contrary to the submission made, the FtTJ was also plainly aware of the expert report in this context. He was not in error in finding that speech therapy was available in Nigeria and this is consistent with the report at paragraph 70 (page 79 Cef) and the FtTJ was also aware of the report referring to the funding of speech therapy in the private sector (see paragraph 40). However, the FtTJ was entitled to consider the issue of funding of those needs in the context of the assessment of the evidence relating to the appellant and support she would have on return but also in the context of his findings of fact that she was not at risk of persecution or serious harm by any of her family members or anyone else. Thus, it was not necessary for the appellant to relocate which was the thrust of the assessment made by the expert and she would continue to have the support from the wider extended maternal family in Nigeria. That support was not factored into the report. Nor was the support that could reasonably be provided by her ex-husband whether financial or otherwise.
37. There is no error of law in the approach taken by the FtTJ by considering the support available from the ex-husband either in the context of him being able to return to Nigeria or by him remaining and obtaining work and thus providing some support for them alongside that the appellant would be able to access from her extended family in Nigeria.
38. Contrary to the grounds, the FtTJ was entitled to assess the circumstances on the evidence that the appellant’s ex-husband had no settled status in the UK. The evidence given by the appellant was vague about how he had come to the UK both in interview and was not addressed in the witness statement. G’s witness statement did not provide any details as to how he came in 2020. As to the applications made in the UK, the FtTJ was not mistaken or in error about their status. He had made an application under EUSS in 2021 which been refused; similarly, an application in 2022 had been refused. When asked about his understanding of the progress of the claim that was outstanding, it is recorded in the ROP of Counsel, “don’t know anything about it.” In cross-examination the evidence elicited was that he had not contacted the Home Office about his status or made any effort to find out. Consequently the FtTJ was not in error to take into account that the appellant’s ex-husband had no settled status in the UK (see paragraph 44) and the FtTJ was entitled to take into account that there was no evidence either from the appellant’s claimed EU citizen wife as to why she could not choose to relocate to Nigeria if the current application was refused (see paragraph 42) and there was no contention by G that he would not be able to obtain work in Nigeria so that he could adequately maintain his former wife and children by local standards. The FtTJ was entitled to rely upon the evidence of G that he was a businessman and that his family had their own businesses in Nigeria (see paragraph 43).
39. The FtTJ was also entitled to consider in the alternative that if he did not return to Nigeria that there would be nothing to inhibit him from providing support from the UK (see paragraph 44). As the FtTJ had already found the appellant and the children would not be returning alone but would have the support of the maternal family as she did prior to leaving Nigeria.
40. Drawing those matters together, none of those findings could be characterised as either perverse or irrational but were evidence-based and were open to the FtTJ to make on the evidence that was before him. As Mr Wayne submitted the best interests of the child are an integral part of the proportionality assessment and article 8 of the ECHR and the FtTJ plainly had regard to the best interests of children as a primary consideration and applied the correct test. He considered the evidence as a whole and gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons for reaching those conclusions and the grounds do not establish that the FtTJ’s reasoning was in error or did not take into account the evidence when reaching those conclusions.
41. In summary, I remind myself of the need for appropriate restraint before interfering with the decision of the FTT, particularly where the judge below was heard and assessed a range of evidential sources. Not every evidential issue need be specifically addressed and there is no requirement to provide reasons for reasons. The FtTJ had regard to the evidence before him and gave adequate reasons in support for his conclusions
42. Consequently, for those reasons the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision shall stand.
Notice of Decision:
The decision of the FtTJ did not involve the making of an error of law on a point of law and the decision of the FtTJ shall stand.

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

30 October 2025