Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002271

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50704/2024
LH/07903/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23rd April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

TINASHE CHINOSENGWA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant in UT: Ms R Arif, Senior Presenting Officer.
For the Respondent in UT: Mr A Islam, Counsel instructed by Tulia Group Community Interest Company.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 10 February 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in Mr Chinosengwa’s appeal. This follows the earlier decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Beach to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’) allowing Mr Chinosengwa’s appeal on human rights grounds because this contained material error(s) of law. Judge Beach’s decision (‘the error of law decision’) was promulgated on 11th November 2025.
2. The Secretary of State for the Home Department (‘the Secretary of State’) is the Appellant in these proceedings. This is because Mr Chinosengwa succeeded in his appeal before the FtT and the Secretary of State was granted permission to appeal against that decision. For ease of reference, however, I will refer to the parties as they were before the FtT. All further references to ‘the Appellant’ will therefore be to Mr Chinosengwa and references to ‘the Respondent’ will be to the Secretary of State.
3. Following a transfer order, I heard the re-making appeal on 10th February 2026.
4. As was recorded in the error of law decision, the decision of the FtT involved the making of an error of law in the assessment of sole responsibility and in the assessment of adequacy of maintenance. Those parts of the FtT’s decision were set aside. Judge Beach preserved the FtT’s credibility findings save for those regarding the issue of adequacy of maintenance.
5. The Respondent’s decision refusing the Appellant’s entry clearance and human rights application is dated 16th January 2024.
Factual and procedural history
6. The Appellant is a national of Zimbabwe who applied, on 10th November 2023, for entry clearance as the child of a relative, who is present and settled in the UK. That application was refused on 16th January 2024 by the Respondent and the Appellant appealed against the decision. At the time of the Appellant’s application for entry clearance to the Respondent, the Appellant was aged 17 years old, due to turn 18 years old the day after. At the time of his appeal in the FtT, the Appellant is aged 19 years old and he is now aged 20 years old.
7. The Respondent refused the Appellant’s application on the basis that she was not satisfied that the Appellant and his Sponsor were related as claimed, nor that the Appellant met the requirements of para 297 of the Immigration Rules.
The hearing
8. The Appellant’s relative, the Sponsor in the application, Ms Dubekile Zibanayi, attended the hearing on the Appellant’s behalf. Both parties agreed that the hearing could be conducted on the basis of submissions only. Both parties also agreed that the issue of whether the Appellant and the Sponsor were related as claimed was no longer in dispute. The Appellant and Sponsor have claimed that they are related as cousins – the Appellant’s paternal grandfather and the Sponsor’s, Ms Zibanayi’s mother – were siblings. I have proceeded to consider the Appellant’s appeal on that basis.
9. It was also identified in the error of law decision that the Appellant may be pursuing a discrimination argument based on the wording and construction of para 297 of the Immigration Rules. This was not an argument that was permitted to proceed at error of law stage as it had not been raised in good time. Whilst not directed to do so, the Respondent addressed this fully in her skeleton argument for the hearing before me, which was settled by Ms Arif’s predecessor. In the end, Mr Islam confirmed on behalf of the Appellant that no such discrimination argument was being pursued. I consider that this was entirely appropriate of Mr Islam as such an argument had no real prospects of success. Para 297 of the Immigration Rules has been in force in the same terms for a very significant period of time and the distinctions between the requirements that a ‘parent’s vs a ‘relative’ have to satisfy are well-established for the reasons addressed in the Respondent’s skeleton argument at paras 9-10 and 11(3).
10. Mr Islam confirmed that the Appellant wished to pursue his appeal, on re-making, on the basis that he met the ‘serious and compelling reasons’ test, which warranted a grant of leave, namely para 297(i)(f) of the Immigration Rules. Together with the adequate maintenance and accommodation test, which the Appellant also argues that he meets, this means – on his case – that the decision of the Respondent to refuse him entry clearance is disproportionate under Article 8 ECHR.
11. I heard legal submissions from both parties, after which I confirmed that I would be reserving my decision. I have addressed both parties’ competing evidence and submissions below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
The evidence
12. I had before me the consolidated bundle (‘TB’) prepared, filed and served by the Respondent in advance of the error of law hearing on 13th October 2025, consisting of 500 pages.
13. In advance of the re-making hearing on 10th February 2026 and in reply to the directions set out in the error of law decision, the parties filed and served their respective skeleton arguments. Neither party however sought to adduce any further updating evidence.
14. I have given careful consideration to all of the written materials and evidence contained in the composite bundle and to the parties’ oral submissions. I do not summarise the contents of the evidence and submissions separately but refer to these, where necessary and relevant, in my analysis below.
Findings of fact and Conclusions
15. I first consider, as I am required to, the Appellant’s ability to meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules. As I have summarised above, the Respondent no longer contested the fact that the Appellant and Sponsor are related as claimed. As the Sponsor is not the Appellant’s parent and is his relative, the only substantive requirement (other than the adequate maintenance and accommodation test) that falls to be considered is that contained in para 297(i)(f), namely the ‘serious and compelling reasons’ threshold.
16. At the error of law hearing and in the error of law decision, Judge Beach noted that the Appellant had not lodged any separate response under Rule 24 of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules against the FtT’s findings at para 22 of the FtT decision. Those findings were as follows:
“22. In the instant case, the claim does not succeed on this basis as a matter of law. There is no evidence here of neglect or abuse, no evidence of unmet needs, and no evidence which I have accepted of the absence of existing stable arrangements for the Appellant’s physical care. The Appellant also has no social ties to the UK. He does not have any illness and there is no evidence that he would not have access to healthcare in his country. In the circumstances, I find that that this aspect of the claim is nothing more than the parties simply desiring a state of affairs to obtain and where there is no evidence of considerations that are persuasive and powerful.”
17. Mr Islam asked me to consider that as part of the ‘serious and compelling reasons’ threshold, it was relevant that the Sponsor had assumed sole responsibility for the Appellant, his care and his welfare, since the respective deaths of his parents. Mr Islam emphasised that throughout the Appellant’s life, since 2010, it has been the Sponsor who has been providing guidance and support to the Appellant, as his parent and as if he was her own child. Mr Islam also stressed that at the time of the entry clearance application, the Appellant was under 18 years old. At that time, and still now, he did not have any immediate family members looking after him other than the Sponsor from the UK. Mr Islam acknowledged that there had been domestic help arranged for by the Sponsor to look after the day-to-day care of the Appellant but those arrangements had since ceased. He has been living on his own and as a child, with no other relatives close to him and looking after him in Zimbabwe. This amounted to ‘serious and compelling reasons’.
18. Ms Arif relied on the preserved finding of the FtT set out at [22] of that decision and submitted that on that basis, the Appellant was unable to meet requirements of the Immigration Rules. She otherwise submitted that there was no other evidence to suggest that the Appellant’s living arrangements are anything but stable and that he has any unmet needs. Ms Arif argued that the Appellant is now over the age of 20 years old and there was no evidence to support the submission that the Respondent’s decision was disproportionate under Article 8 ECHR.
19. I have considered the parties’ competing submissions and evidence on this central issue very carefully. I have no doubt that the Appellant and Sponsor have established and maintained, over a considerable period of time, a close relationship, (arguably as de facto parent and child). It remains the case however that throughout the Appellant’s minority, he and the Sponsor have lived their arrangements and care of each other with the Sponsor remaining in the UK and the Appellant in Zimbabwe. The application for entry clearance was made only a day before the Appellant’s 18th birthday. Whilst I remind myself that the Respondent was required to continue to treat the Appellant as a minor when considering his application despite his 18th birthday having passed by then, the Sponsor had cared for the Appellant in the manner claimed by then for a period of approximately 13 years.
20. The Appellant has not submitted any evidence, whether before the FtT as confirmed at [22] of that decision, or by way of updating evidence pursuant to the directions issued within the error of law decision, to support his submission that he has been experiencing, and continues to experience, ‘serious and compelling reasons’, within the meaning set by the applicable and reported authorities.
21. Whilst a close relationship exists between the Appellant and the Sponsor, and I have no doubt that the Appellant and the Sponsor wish to be able to live together, I am not satisfied for the reasons above that there are ‘serious and compelling reasons’. The reality is that the Appellant and Sponsor have been living in this way, without evidencing any such serious and compelling reasons, for a period of approximately 13 years prior to applying for entry clearance.
22. In light of the above, it is not necessary for me to determine whether the Sponsor is able to adequately maintain and accommodate the Appellant since the he cannot meet the requirement contained in para 297(i)(f) of the Immigration Rules. This is also for the reasons addressed at para 15 of the Respondent’s skeleton argument. It does however appear that the Sponsor’s self-employed income, as evidenced at [TB 355] onwards, is sufficient to adequately maintain the Appellant. This is once deducted of income tax, national insurance contributions, rent/mortgage and council tax payments. Mr Islam was able to take me through the relevant calculations, following the guidance set out in KA and Others (Adequacy of maintenance) Pakistan [2006] UKAIT 00065 and these were not disputed by the Respondent.
23. Turning to the Appellant’s case more widely under Article 8 ECHR, it is of significant weight that the Appellant cannot meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules contained in para 297, which is the application that he asked the Respondent to consider. For the same reasons that I have set out above at paras 19-21, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has otherwise demonstrated very compelling or exceptional circumstances that would warrant a finding that his Article 8 rights have been breached so as to render the Respondent’s decision disproportionate.
24. Applying the statutory framework contained in s.117A-B of the 2002 Act, as required, the fact that the Appellant speaks English and would likely be self-sufficient financially thanks to the Sponsor’s support (s.117B(2)-(3), are neutral factors. The ‘limited weight’ factors contained in s.117B(4)-(5) have no application as the Appellant has not been residing in the UK. As I have already noted above at para 23, the maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.
25. With the Appellant not being able to satisfy the requirements of the Immigration Rules and considering the appeal as at the date of the hearing, as I am required to as far as Article 8 ECHR is concerned, the Appellant is now over the age of 20 years old and no evidence has been submitted to demonstrate that he is not of an age, or is otherwise unable, to look after himself. There is no also no evidence before me to demonstrate that the Sponsor cannot continue her support of the Appellant as she has done for so many years.
26. For all of the reasons above, Mr Chinosengwa’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 16th January 2024 falls to be dismissed on all grounds.
Notice of Decision
27. The decision of the FtT dated 31st March 2025 did involve the making of material error(s) of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Beach dated 11th November 2025.
28. I re-make the decision by dismissing Mr Chinosengwa’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 16th January 2924 on all grounds

Sarah Pinder

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20.04.2026