Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002274

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64431/2023
LP/05141/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 30 August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE REEDS
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBNAL JUDGE SYMES

Between

REB
(ANONYMITY ORDER CONTINUED)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Bellara, Counsel instructed on behalf of the appellant
For the Respondent: Ms Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 23 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the determination of the First-tier Tribunal (Judge Courtney) promulgated on 10 April 2025. By its decision, the Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 10 May 2023 to refuse her protection and human rights claim made on 13 January 2022.
2. The FtTJ made an anonymity order, and no grounds were submitted during the hearing for such an order to be discharged. Anonymity is granted because the facts of the appeal involve a protection claim and a claim and made under the NRM such that her rights protected under Article 8 outweigh the right of the public to know her identity as a party to these proceedings, the latter being protected by Article 10 of the ECHR. The anonymity order is detailed above.
The procedural background:
3. The factual background can be briefly summarised as follows. The appellant is a national of the Philippines and entered the United Kingdom on 1 August 2018. Her visa expired in February 2019. She made a claim for asylum on 13 January 2022. The basis of claim was that she had met her ex-partner in the Philippines in 2007 and he had started being abusive to her in the Philippines in 2010. She came to the UK in 2018 on a work visa with her employer from Hong Kong and that if returned to the Philippines, she was in fear her ex-partner.
4. The respondent refused the claim in a decision taken on 4 December 2023. The respondent accepted that the appellant had received abuse from her ex-partner but was not satisfied that she would be at real risk of harm if returned to the Philippines and that the appellant had not sought help from the authorities in the Philippines even though the external evidence suggested that the authorities were both willing and able to help women experiencing domestic violence. It was further considered that the appellant could relocate in a different part of the Philippines. It was also not accepted that there were very significant obstacles to her return or that there were any exceptional circumstances in her case to justify a grant of leave.
5. On 4th December 2023 a referral was made on her behalf to the National Referral Mechanism in order for the Competent Authorities (CA) to make a decision as to whether she was a victim of modern slavery. The FtTJ recorded that the basis for that claim was that she had stated that she was a victim of modern slavery, having been brought by her employer from Hong Kong to the UK in August 2018 as a domestic worker. She claims to have run away from her employer due to underpayment and poor working conditions. She received a positive reasonable grounds decision on 22 January 2024, but it does not appear that any conclusive grounds decision had been made at the time of the hearing before the FtTJ.
6. The appellant appealed the decision which led to the appeal before the FtT. In accordance with the FtT procedure, an appeal skeleton argument was filed (“ASA”) on 16 March 2024.It sought to raise a new matter that the appellant has been in a relationship with a British citizen, AP for over 5 years and they have been living together since February 2019 and that she sought to rely on her relationship as part of her Article 8 claim.
7. In his decision the FtTJ set out what issues were in dispute at paragraphs 4,8 and 9. Whilst the appellant had made a protection claim and that she would be at risk of harm on return to the Philippines, it is recorded that the protection claim was no longer pursued (see paragraph 4), it was acknowledged at the hearing that contrary to the ASA the appellant was never married to her former partner and therefore the claim that the appellant would be prosecuted for adultery would also fall away.
8. In a decision promulgated on 10 April 2025, the FtTJ dismissed the appeal. The FtTJ was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant and AP were in a genuine and subsisting relationship nor that they intend to live together permanently in the UK. The FtTJ found that the appellant lived with AP in the capacity of carer rather than unmarried partner and as such did not enjoy family life together for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR.
9. The appellant did not seek to rely on a protection claim. The FtTJ made a finding on the evidence that she had last spoken to her partner in 2018 although he was still in contact with their son who lived in the Philippines and there was no reason to believe that he would have the means to locate, and eve mistreat her even if he was motivated to do so and that she could return to live with her family in the Philippines and in safety (see paragraph 24). For the reasons given at paragraph 24 the FtTJ found that there was no cogent evidence to establish that she would not be able to obtain employment, nor did he find that there was any suggestion that she would be at risk in the Philippines from her former employer (see paragraph 25). The FtTJ concluded at paragraph 33 there were no very significant obstacles to her integration.
10. In terms of family life, and in light of his primary findings of fact that the relationship was not genuine and subsisting the FtTJ found that they did not enjoy family life together for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR (see paragraphs 29 and 30). In the alternative and on the basis that he was wrong in that assessment, he concluded that there were no unjustifiably harsh consequences for either party as there were no “exceptional circumstances” rendering refusal disproportionate. In reaching that conclusion the FtTJ took into account that whilst there was no question of AP be required to leave the UK he could choose to accompany the to the appellant to the Philippines. The FtTJ took account of his medical condition (summarised at paragraph 27) but found that his medical problems did not preclude him living in the Philippines. The FtTJ found there were no language difficulties as the Philippines operated using English. As to AP’s ties to the UK, the FtTJ took into account his evidence that he had retired from his off-licence business thus his claim that no one could manage the business in the UK fell away. As regards family ties, the FtTJ found that the appellant and AP gave evidence that he was not in contact with his son in the UK and found that there was nothing to suggest that AP has anything more than normal emotional ties with his brothers and in any event if he chose to remain in the UK he would remain in regular contact with the appellant by modern means of communication ( see paragraph 32). The FtTJ addressed the public interest considerations at paragraph 34 and ultimately concluded that the maintenance of effective immigration control should be accorded weight and that her removal from the UK was proportionate.
The hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
11. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in grounds dated 22 April 2025. The application was based on 4 grounds. Permission to appeal was granted by FtTJ Athwal on 23 May 2025 for the following reasons:
“The first ground asserts that the Judge erred at [16-21] by failing to provide adequate reasons for why the Appellant’s evidence was not plausible. The grounds argue that the Judge did not adequately engage with the evidence additional oral evidence provided. If that is correct, it is an arguable error of law.
The second ground asserts that the Judge went behind the Respondent’s investigation of the marriage and overlooked that the burden of proof was on the Respondent. This too raises an arguable error of law.
The third ground asserts that the Judge erred by making a misdirection in law. There is no cohabitation requirement as confirmed by the Respondent’s October 2024 Guidance. This raises an arguable error of law if the version of the Immigration Rules applicable at the time the Appellant applied for leave under Appendix FM, did not require cohabitation.
The fourth ground asserts that the findings at [30-32] were not adequately reasoned. This is intrinsically tied to the assessment of evidence, so permission is granted”.
12. The hearing took place on 23 July 2025. The appellant was represented by Mr Bellara, of Counsel and the respondent by Ms Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer. We were provided with a substantial bundle of documents consisting of 524 pages. The pagination is referred to in this decision as the relevant page of the CE File abbreviated to “CEF”.
13. We are grateful to the advocates for the helpful submissions made by each of them and how they have advanced their respective cases. The submissions are contained in the record of proceedings and in the written grounds and we will not rehearse them here. We will refer to them as relevant in the analysis of the issues raised.
Discussion:
14. Before undertaking an assessment of the grounds, we take into account the following propositions, which are not controversial, that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal, and that their decisions should be respected unless it is clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. The task of the Upper Tribunal is to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal made a material error of law. We are not determining the appeal against the decision of the respondent. When deciding whether the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of a material error of law we reminded ourselves of the principles governing the approaches to such decisions which have been reviewed in a number of cases including Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at paragraph 26, Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74 at paragraph 50, and Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410 paragraphs 46 – 47 and Volpi and Anor v Volpi [2022]EWCA Civ 464.
15. The constraints to which appellate tribunals and courts are subject in relation to appeals against findings of fact were recently (re)summarised by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 in these terms, per Lewison LJ:
"2. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb 'plainly' does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."
16. In summary, we must read the decision of the FtTJ sensibly and holistically and exercise appropriate restraint before interfering with it. Secondly, a brief decision does not mean necessarily that it is erroneous in law. Thirdly, what is required in a decision will be case specific and will depend on the nature of the issue (s) in play.
17. We have considered grounds 1 and 2 together. Mr Bellara seeks to challenge the assessment made of the relationship between the appellant and AP and the conclusion reached at paragraph 29 that the FtTJ was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that they had a genuine and subsisting relationship nor that they intended to live together permanently in the UK.
18. Mr Bellara relies on the following matters. Firstly, the FtTJ fell into material error at paragraph 16 by failing to give adequate reasons as to why the appellant’s oral evidence was not plausible. Secondly the FtTJ overlooked the respondent’s investigation (and see ground 2). Thirdly where the FtTJ stated at paragraph 19 that the appellant had received food and accommodation as a form of payment, there been no basis for such a finding and furthermore the FtTJ arrived at the conclusion without proper reasoning and did not engage with the oral evidence of both the appellant and AP. Fourthly, the reasoning at paragraph 20 – 21 is not consistent with the evidence.
19. Having had the opportunity to hear these submissions and to consider them in the context of the decision of the FtTJ and the available evidence, we are satisfied that the FtTJ did not err in law in his assessment of the relationship. We shall set out our reasons for reaching that conclusion.
20. Contrary to the written grounds (at paragraph 5)the FtTJ’s reference to the respondent not accepting the relationship was genuine and subsisting was an issue raised in the respondent’s review ( see paragraph 5 ( p522CEF) and expressly paragraph 5 ( e) and reflected in paragraph 10). The FtTJ set out his findings between paragraphs 13 – 22 of the decision and we are satisfied that the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons for reaching the conclusion of paragraph 29 that he was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that had been demonstrated that this was a genuine subsisting relationship and that they intended to live together permanently in the UK.
21. The FtTJ was entitled to take into account and place weight on the inconsistent evidence provided by the parties in respect of claimed relationship. The FtTJ recorded the factual claim that the parties had met in November 2018 but by February 2019 they were living together as a couple (see paragraph 13). The FtTJ went on to address the evidence given by the appellant (see paragraphs 14 and 15 ). The appellant had made a protection claim and had been interviewed by the respondent in October 2023. The appellant stated that she did not have a partner ( see question 17;p475CEF) and that she was living with “the people who helped me”(see Q1). She stated she had “stayed with his family I am staying with now” after she ran away from a previous employer and they provided her with free accommodation and free food (Q 61;p487CEF). The appellant had indicated that she was staying with AP in a caring capacity and this was supported in the interview by her response that” the people that she lived with were “so they need help. The man had an operation with his legs” (see question 61).
22. The FtTJ also set out evidence provided to the respondent by AP ( see letter dated 21 October 2023 (page 494 CEF)). AP made no mention of being in a relationship with the appellant and stated, “she helps me in the home”. The FtTJ also took into account that there had been no reference to such a relationship in the appellant’s witness statement of 19 October 2023 (see page 507 CEF and as recorded at paragraph 15 of the FtTJ’s decision).
23. The FtTJ did not consider that evidence in isolation and the FtTJ assessed the appellant’s explanation for the clear inconsistencies in the evidence (see paragraph 16 of the decision). As Ms Clewley submitted the appellant gave a number of reasons for not disclosing the relationship earlier which the FtTJ addressed at paragraph 16 but for the reasons he gave was not persuaded by those explanations given. The FtTJ recorded her account that she had informed the solicitors that she was in a relationship but that they had said “it is irrelevant at this point “ and “they told me not to mention it.” In our judgement it was open to the FtTJ to make a finding that there was no confirmation from the solicitors that they had advocated the withholding of this information but also that there was no reason to do so by reference to the appellant’s responses in her interview. The FtTJ set out that not only did the appellant failed to volunteer the information prompted but that she also replied in the negative when expressly asked, “do you have a partner in the UK?”. The FtTJ considered her explanation that “she did not like to drag (AP’s) name into my case” but it was open to the FtTJ to reject that explanation on the basis that the appellant had already involved him by telling the interviewer she was taking care of an elderly person. We note in this respect the elderly person would only have been AP given the reference to problems with his legs. The appellant also claimed that she “did not know the rules about asylum” and it was open to the FtTJ when considering her witness statement 7/10/24 where it was said that “she did not want to put him in danger” was neither reason sufficiently explained or made clear.
24. Contrary to the grounds and submissions made we are satisfied that the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable reasons within those paragraphs.
25. We find no error in the assessment of the evidence at paragraph 19 and the finding made that the appellant was provided with free food and accommodation which the FtTJ found was a form of payment in kind for a performing the care duties. Whilst the written grounds assert that there was no basis for such a finding, that is incorrect. The evidence was in the appellant’s interview (see question 2 page 435) with reference to where she was living at AP’s address and that they provided her with free accommodation and also the letter provided by AP ( 21/10/23) which stated that, “I cannot do some duties in home and (A) helps me a lot of it. She stays on us free accommodation and food…”
26. Insofar the grounds and oral submissions seek to submit that the FtTJ failed to engage with the additional oral evidence of the appellant and the sponsor as set out in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the grounds), such submissions have not been supported by evidence. A number of the grounds rely on the assertion made that particular oral evidence was given. It is well established that without evidence of what took place below there is no evidential basis on which to make such a submission Where it is asserted that evidence was not taken account of, it is necessary to adduce evidence either in the form of a witness statement from the applicant and or a note of evidence or transcript. submission ( see Ortega (remittal: bias: parental relationship) [2018) UKUT and Wagner(advocates’ conduct – fair hearing)[2015] UKUT 655). It is worth reiterating the grounds of appeal do not prove themselves and are not evidence of their contents. Mr Bellara accepted that there had been no supporting evidence provided.
27. We are further satisfied that there was no error in the assessment of the evidence or reasoning set out between paragraphs 20-21. In those paragraphs the FtTJ addressed the supporting evidence that had been submitted in the form of WhatsApp messages between the parties which the FtTJ found to be very sporadic, and brief by reference to the content of the messages. The greetings cards set out in the bundle (page 281 – 311 CEF) are in their contents similarly brief and lacking in detail. At paragraph 21 the FtTJ addressed the testimonial letters. The FtTJ was entitled to place little weight on those letters for the reasons given, namely that none of those letters include statements of truth nor were the authors of those statements present at the hearing to give evidence which could be tested in cross-examination.
28. Mr Bellara further submitted that in the assessment made as to whether the relationship was genuine, the FtTJ went behind the respondent’s decision to permit the appellant and AP to enter into marriage. He submitted that the respondent had carried out a full and thorough investigation with both parties being interviewed. Reference is made in the written grounds (paragraph 11) to the respondent’s guidance ( see ground 2).
29. The FtTJ addressed this at paragraph 22 and recorded that the appellant and AP had separate face-to-face interviews and had submitted bank statements and council tax bills. However the submission made by Counsel this was a “full and robust investigation” was not accepted by the FtTJ in light of the lack of evidence that was before the tribunal, or as stated by the FtTJ, “in the absence of any material appertaining to this process that is speculative”.
30. An application had been made for them to marry on 30 September 2024, and a notice was sent to the appellant on 7 October 2024 (p 325 CEF). By 12 November 2024 it had been recorded that the parties had complied with the investigation (p333CEF). While there was no dispute that there had been investigation, as the FtTJ accurately recorded, there had been no documentation or material provided. The grounds refer to the interview as a “key part “of the investigation however the FtTJ was correct to note that no evidence in the form of interview notes or any other material was available.
31. We accept the submission made on behalf of the respondent that when assessing this issue the evaluative exercise undertaken by the FtTJ was of a different type to that likely to be undertaken by the investigation. The FtTJ was applying the civil standard of proof namely the balance of probabilities but also had the advantage of considering and evaluating all the available evidence. The fact that the parties complied with the investigation and that the marriage could take place did not by itself demonstrate that the relationship was genuine and subsisting or that the parties intended to live together permanently. This is also made clear in the documents from the respondent including the notice which reads, “please be aware that the certificate is limited to compliance with the investigation under the Proposed Marriages and Civil Partnership Scheme. It does not constitute a determination as to the genuineness of your relationship”. This was properly taken account of by the FtTJ at paragraph 22. The documents also set out that “if the marriage takes place an immigration decision taken on an application to stay made by you or your spouse under the Immigration Rules or otherwise on the basis of your relationship will still involve an assessment of the genuineness of the relationship by the Home Office”. We therefore conclude that the documents relating to the parties compliance with the investigation demonstrates that it is not conclusive evidence as to whether the relationship is genuine and again supports the point advanced on behalf of the respondent that there are different thresholds for different purposes.
32. Ground 3 challenges the conclusion at paragraph 29 on the basis that at the hearing it had been accepted by the Presenting Officer that the required 2 years of cohabitation had been removed from the requirement under the Rules as indicated by the relevant Guidance and that the FtTJ’s focus on lack of cohabitation was a misdirection in law and tainted his findings on the genuineness of the relationship.
33. We are satisfied that the FtTJ did not misdirect himself in law. The grounds fail to read paragraph 29 in its full context. Firstly paragraph 29 should be read in its entirety whereby the FtTJ set out that the appellant could not meet the requirements of Appendix FM based on his central finding that he was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there was a genuine and subsisting relationship and that the parties intended to live together permanently in the UK. Secondly there was no issue of cohabitation in the sense of either occupying the named property or living in the same house but that the FtTJ did not accept they were living together in a relationship akin to marriage which was a reflection of the finding he made that this was not a genuine and subsisting relationship. This is supported by his finding at paragraph 30 that the appellant lived with AP as a carer rather than as an unmarried partner and that they did not enjoy family life together for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR.
34. Taking all those considerations together, we are satisfied that the FtTJ gave adequate and sustainable evidence-based reasons to reach the conclusion at paragraph 29 that the relationship was not genuine and subsisting and that the parties did not intend to live together permanently and as a result neither ground 1,2 or 3 are established.
35. Turning to ground 4, Mr Bellara submits that the FtTJ erred in law between paragraph 30 – 32 in the assessment of whether there were “exceptional circumstances” when addressing the Article 8 claim. He submits the reasoning given was brief and does not engage with the oral evidence of the appellant’s partner. Further that the FtTJ did not deal with AP’s need for care in the UK and his medical health and that AP could not reside in the Philippines in light of his ties in the UK and medical care.
36. Whilst Mr Bellara in his submissions refers to the failure of the FtTJ to engage with the oral evidence of the AP we rely upon our earlier observation that no record has been provided as to what was said or not said before the FtTJ and that such a submission has not been evidenced.
37. Ms Clewley responded that in view of the primary findings made by the FtTJ that this was not a genuine or subsisting relationship, and his finding that Article 8 family life was therefore not engaged (see paragraph 30) demonstrates that this ground is immaterial to the outcome.
38. In the alternative she submits that whilst the assessment is brief, it is adequately reasoned and in accordance with the evidence. She directed the Tribunal to the ASA and also submitted that in respect of AP there was no documentary evidence that his medical health and /or care needs could not be treated in the Philippines therefore this argument could not succeed in any event.
39. In answer to the oral submission made by Mr Bellara that the appellant could not return to the Philippines either by herself or with AP, because she was a victim of domestic violence, she submitted that the protection claim was not pursued before the FtTJ therefore no assessment was made of either the appellant’s claim in this regard or issues of protection and internal relocation raised by the respondent. If there was no real risk to the appellant demonstrated to the lower threshold as it had not been not pursued before the FtT it must follow that such a claim would not have met the threshold on the balance of probabilities.
40. We have carefully considered the submissions provided by the advocates and having done so we are satisfied that the FtTJ did not err in his assessment of Article 8. For the reasons that we have set out previously in this decision, we have found that the FtTJ’s primary assessment that the relationship was not genuine or subsisting, was an assessment that was reasonably open to the FtTJ on the evidence, and one supported by adequate and sustainable reasons. That being the case, the FtTJ’s conclusion at paragraph 30 that family life was therefore not engaged accurately reflected that assessment and any complaints raised about Article 8 and proportionality are therefore immaterial to the outcome.
41. However, and in any event the FtTJ did consider the issue in the alternative and on the basis of the relationship as one which was genuine and subsisting. While the assessment was brief we are satisfied it addressed the issues raised. The FtTJ expressly found that AP’s medical problems did not preclude him from accompanying the appellant to the Philippines. That finding was supported by the evidence recorded by the FtTJ at paragraph 27 confirming AP’s medical health. There was no diagnosis or opinion in the letter nor was there any documentary evidence to demonstrate that those medical needs could not be met in the Philippines. Consequently the finding made that AP’s medical problems did not preclude him from accompanying the appellant was a finding reasonably open to the FtTJ and sufficiently addressed the issue. Alongside this, the FtTJ addressed issues of language (see paragraph 32) and contrary to the grounds, also addressed his ties in the UK both in terms of his business and his family ties which accurately reflected the evidence which AP had given and as recorded by the FtTJ.
42. Whilst Mr Bellara submitted that the FtTJ failed to take into account that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence and that she was a potential victim of trafficking, it is important to set those issues in context. While the respondent accepted that she had been a victim of violence in the past, it was not accepted that she would be at risk on return. The appellant did not proceed with the protection claim before the FtT (see paragraph 4); the submission made in the ASA that she and AP would be at risk of prosecution for adultery was misplaced given that the appellant had never been married (see paragraph 8). The FtTJ also recorded that there was no suggestion that the appellant would be at risk from her employers nor was there anything in the ASA to suggest that the appellant would be inherently vulnerable to exploitation or trafficking if returned to the Philippines and further records that Counsel made no submissions to this effect (see paragraph 7 of decision). Consequently the FtTJ’s assessment at paragraph 33, which took into account the evidential assessment at paragraph 23 – 25, that there were no very significant obstacles to her integration was a relevant factual assessment made by the FtTJ that she could return there to re-establish her life. The FtTJ also took into account the section 117 public interest considerations (see paragraph 34) and whilst she was self-sufficient financially and speak English, those were neutral factors. Consequently the conclusion reached, in the alternative, that there were no unjustifiably harsh consequences for either party was an assessment open to the FtTJ on the evidence.
43. Whilst the appellant seeks to challenge the FtTJ’s assessment, the FtTJ was best placed to assess the evidence . The FtTJ was not bound to accept the evidence but gave reasons which were adequate in detail to enable the reader of the decision why he considered that the relationship was not genuine or subsisting and why there would be no breach of Article 8 of the ECHR.
44. We are satisfied that when properly analysed, the grounds of challenge are not made out and amount to no more than a disagreement with the decision. It might be said that a different Judge may have reached a different conclusion. However, it is not an error of law to make a finding of fact which the appellate tribunal might not make, or to draw an inference or reach a conclusion with which the UT disagrees. The temptation to dress up or re-package disagreement as a finding that there has been an error of law must be resisted. As Baroness Hale put it in SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49 [30]:-
"Appellate courts should not rush to find such misdirection’s simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently."
45. Mr Bellara advanced the grounds on the basis of inadequacy of reasons. However adequacy means no more nor less than that. It is not a counsel of perfection. Still less should it provide an opportunity to undertake a qualitative assessment of the reasons to see if they are wanting, perhaps even surprising, on their merits. The purpose of the duty to give reasons, is in part, to enable the losing party to know why he or she has lost, and it is also to enable an appellate court or tribunal to see what the reasons for the decision are so that they can be examined in case there has been an error of approach (see decision of the Court of Appeal in MD (Turkey) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1958).
46. Having considered the decision reached, the FtTJ was required to consider the evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal as a whole, and he plainly did so by giving adequate reasons for his decision and did not misdirect himself in law.
47. Consequently for the reasons set out above the appellant has not established that the FtTJ’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law, therefore the decision of the FtTJ shall stand. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Notice of Decision:
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law; the decision of the FtTJ shall stand. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

7 August 2025

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Upper Tribunal Judge Reeds

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber