Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002277

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51815/2024
LP/09596/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 12th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NEVILLE

Between

T D
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms N Nnamani, counsel instructed by Howe & Co
For the Respondent: Ms N Kerr, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 15 September 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. In its decision of 18 March 2025, the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dismissed the appellant‘s protection appeal. In his appeal against that decision to the Upper Tribunal, the grounds of appeal include that the FtT Judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant’s account was “wholly lacking credibility and consistency”, and erred by requiring him to provide corroborative evidence in order to meet the burden of proving the facts upon which he relied.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by UTJ Hirst, whose reasons include the following:
2. The Appellant asserts that the First-tier Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for its finding that the Appellant’s account was “wholly lacking credibility and consistency”, and that in any event that finding was not reasonably open to the First-tier Tribunal on the evidence before it. He asserts that the First-tier Tribunal erred by requiring the Appellant to provide corroborative evidence, and that the First-tier Tribunal failed to consider or apply the risk factors in IK (Turkey) CG [2004] UKAIT 312.
3. It is arguable that the judge’s reasons were not adequate to explain how he reached the conclusion at §12 that the Appellant’s account was “wholly lacking in credibility and consistency”. It is also arguable that that conclusion was materially based on the lack of corroborative evidence which the judge identified at §14.
3. That summary accords with the grounds of appeal and how they were then argued before me. I shall likewise approach the appeal by reference to adequacy of reasons and whether an impermissible requirement for corroborative evidence was imposed. In this case the two issues overlap and can be dealt with together.
Principles
4. When considering the reasoning expected from a FtT decision, the relevant principles are collated in the Senior President’s Practice Direction, Reasons for decisions. Reasons will be read fairly and not hypercritically. They must enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was and what conclusions were reached on the main issues in dispute, and an appellate body to assess whether the decision involved the making of an error on a point of law. Providing adequate reasons does not however require the Tribunal to identify all the evidence relied upon, elaborate upon the relevant issues at length, or express every step of the Tribunal’s reasoning. It will be assumed that the Tribunal took account of the relevant evidence, and applied the relevant legal principles, unless its reasoning shows otherwise.
5. Fact-finding in the context of a protection claim must recognise, as is correctly stated in relevant Home Office guidance, the difficulties some claimants face gathering evidence to support their claim, and the grave and potentially irreversible consequences if international protection is wrongly refused. Paragraph 339L of the Immigration Rules provides five conditions that, if met, mean that corroborative evidence is not required. Those conditions include that the claimant has made a genuine effort to substantiate their claim, and that all material factors at their disposal have been submitted (and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant material has been given). Nonetheless, as held in MAH (Egypt) v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 216 at [77], it does not follow that where all conditions are not met, corroborative evidence is required. Instead, the Tribunal:
…must still consider whether, on the facts of the case, it is appropriate to give the appellant the benefit of the doubt, bearing in mind the relatively low threshold of “reasonable degree of likelihood”.
6. In this case the applicable standard is higher, being the balance of probabilities, but a logical, contextual and holistic approach must be still taken when assessing whether, and to what extent, a failure to provide relevant material damages the appellant’s credibility.
7. Finally, but fundamentally, the appellant asks the Upper Tribunal to interfere with the FtT’s findings of fact. As held by Carr LJ (as she then was) in Clin v Walter Lilly & Co. Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 136 :
85. In essence the finding of fact must be plainly wrong if it is to be overturned. A simple distillation of the circumstances in which appellate interference may be justified, so far as material for present purposes, can be set out uncontroversially as follows:
i) Where the trial judge fundamentally misunderstood the issue or the evidence, plainly failed to take evidence in account, or arrived at a conclusion which the evidence could not on any view support;
ii) Where the finding is infected by some identifiable error, such as a material error of law;
iii) Where the finding lies outside the bounds within which reasonable disagreement is possible.
86. An evaluation of the facts is often a matter of degree upon which different judges can legitimately differ. Such cases may be closely analogous to the exercise of a discretion and appellate courts should approach them in a similar way. The appeal court does not carry out a balancing task afresh but must ask whether the decision of the judge was wrong by reason of some identifiable flaw in the trial judge's treatment of the question to be decided, such as a gap in logic, a lack of consistency, or a failure to take account of some material factor, which undermines the cogency of the conclusion.
87. The degree to which appellate restraint should be exercised in an individual case may be influenced by the nature of the conclusion and the extent to which it depended upon an advantage possessed by the trial judge, whether from a thorough immersion in all angles of the case, or from first-hand experience of the testing of the evidence, or because of particular relevant specialist expertise.
8. It is important that the Upper Tribunal recognises where a purported error of law is, on proper analysis, a disagreement of fact.
Discussion
9. At [11], the Judge correctly observed that the burden of proof fell upon the appellant to prove the relevant facts on the balance of probabilities. At [12] and [13], the Judge set out that the appellant relied upon his own political activity and that of his family, and being detained by the Turkish authorities at a demonstration, and later being arrested at his home and being tortured in detention. The entirety of his reasoning is then contained at [14]:
14. While it was submitted on his behalf that it was not necessary to provide corroborative evidence in an asylum claim, there is a lack of detail from the appellant regarding his alleged activities and his alleged detentions. There was no evidence from any member of his family, with whom he has remained in contact, or other parties who may have been arrested with him. He attempted to say in his witness statement that he no longer relied on his statement that only high-level supporters are at risk on return. I do not accept that he was even a low-level supporter. There is no evidence other than his own as to his alleged demonstrations and attendances and arrest. Furthermore, in respect of the alleged UK activities, I do not accept it was credible that he could not produce any photographic evidence, and the alleged meetings which he attends at his local community centre were locally organised. These meetings could not be viewed as support meetings on behalf of HDP rather than merely community meetings.
10. It can be seen that the adverse indicators of credibility relied upon by the Judge were as follows: (i) a lack of detail surrounding the appellant’s alleged activities and his alleged detention; (ii) a lack of any supporting evidence from his family or former associates in Turkey; (iii) a lack of any photographs showing his political activity in the UK; and (iv) that the meetings in the UK relied upon by the appellant were community-based rather than political in nature.
11. Ms Nnamani’s first point was appellant had set out his experiences in Turkey in detail in his witness statement. Why, she asked rhetorically, was this detail insufficient to meet his burden? What else could have been provided that was missing? Having considered the witness statement for myself, I am unsure that it is quite so detailed as all that, but I agree that it concisely sets out the background to the appellant’s involvement in HDP politics and the dates and facts of his two arrests. It also specifies the demonstration at which the appellant claims to have been first arrested.
12. Ms Kerr argued that the Judge’s decision was likely informed, and bolstered, by the respondent’s reliance on insufficiency of detail by reference to the asylum interview. That submission undermines rather than supports the Judge’s reasoning. First, it underlines that the parties are forced to speculate, rather than reasonably infer, where the insufficiency of detail arose. Such speculation may well indicate a failure to properly explain that finding. Second, I agree with Ms Nnamani that the account given in interview cannot be so easily seen as insufficiently reasoned that it can safely be taken as the source of the Judge’s concerns. While the appellant gave few details, nor did the questions asked permit him to do so. At least for the purpose of inferring the Judge’s reasons, I reject that the catch-all final pro forma question “Is there anything you would like to add or clarify?” should reasonably have been taken as an opportunity to provide details that could easily have been gathered much earlier in the interview by reasonable and obvious follow up questions. The appellant gave brief answers to questions, but they did still answer the questions posed. In circumstances where the reasons are silent on the interview, I cannot simply assume that the Judge thought a truthful interviewee would have given more detail. The reasoning is therefore inadequate; not only the appellant, but the lawyers and myself are left in the dark as to what aspects of the appellant’s account were insufficiently explained. Consideration of the documents sheds no light on the issue.
13. Whether the Judge imposed an impermissible requirement for corroboration is a different but related point; while it is listed as a separate indicator of credibility in his consideration, he was required to take all matters together in the round and (we are left to infer) may well have seen the failure to provide evidence from family and former associates as an aspect of the earlier-criticised insufficiency of detail.
14. Ms Nnamani argued, as did the author of the grounds at para 4, that the phrase “There was no evidence from any member of his family, with whom he has remained in contact” ran contrary to the appellant’s oral evidence recorded by the Judge earlier in the decision. I reject this argument. The evidence did record that the appellant had not been in contact with his family for 45 days prior to the hearing on 14 March 2025, but by then his appeal was a year old and he had been under a procedural obligation to provide evidence in support of his appeal since 22 April 2024. Not having contacted his family for 45 days before the hearing provided no explanation for not having done so beforehand. That said, judges in this jurisdiction will be aware that letters or statements from family members are neither independent nor verifiable, and may carry only limited weight in favour of an appellant’s account. By contrast, while a Judge might in a suitable case rationally find that their absence was sufficient to tip the scales against an account being truthful, this would likely require a brief explanation that survives application of the principles set out in MAH. None is present here.
15. It is also right that no reasons are given for finding that the appellant was still in touch – or had remained in touch – with those who were arrested alongside him. It is not in the evidence recorded by the Judge nor in the documentary evidence before him. Nor is it so obvious that the appellant would have remained in touch with his former associates as to require no explanation; he had attended a demonstration and was arrested with other members of the crowd. If an adverse inference was to be drawn, which in effect it was, then fairness required that the appellant be put on notice of it so that he could make representations in response.
16. Taking the above matters together, and mindful of the benevolent approach that should be taken to appeals of this type, I am driven to the conclusion that the negative credibility assessment was inadequately reasoned. Inferring the Judge’s reasons opens up the plausible possibility that he placed decisive relevance on the absence of corroborative evidence, which in the circumstances of this case as recorded in the reasons would stand as an error of law. The difficulty in assessing the weight placed by the Judge on that factor underlines that the reasoning is insufficient. This is not saved by the other factors relied upon by the Judge, as none is accompanied by any explanation as to the comparative weight they played in the analysis.
Conclusion
17. The FtT’s decision was therefore made in error of law, the findings made were unsafe, and I set it aside. The parties considered that the appropriate disposal in that case would be to remit the appeal to a differently constituted FtT with no facts preserved. Considering para 7.2(b) of the Practice Statements, in light of what is said in Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC), I agree; all relevant facts will have to be re-decided.
18. I need not deal with a separate ground of appeal concerning whether the Judge correctly applied the relevant country guidance, and the findings on risk fall away with the findings of fact on the appellant’s pre-flight account.
Anonymity
19. Despite the appeal concerning a claim for asylum – the appellant fearing state persecution on return to Turkey due to his links with Kurdish politics – the Judge made no anonymity order. It is impossible to tell from the decision whether the possibility even occurred to him. Given the potential risk to the appellant, and the importance attached by the UK Government to anonymity as part of its system for considering asylum, derogation from the principle of open justice is plainly justified. I make an anonymity order in the form appearing at the head of this document.
Notice of Decision
(i) The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
(ii) The case is remitted to a differently constituted First-tier Tribunal for re-hearing with no facts preserved.

J Neville
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

12 December 2025