UI-2025-002279
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The decision
Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-002279
PA/65638/2024
LP/11606/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision and Reasons Issued:
On 3 November 2025
Before
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge MANUELL
Between
S Y
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Heard at FIELD HOUSE
on 17 October 2025
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr S Vokes, Counsel
(instructed by AB Legal Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appealed with permission granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville on 26 February 2025 against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge O R Williams who had dismissed the appeal of the Appellant against the refusal of his international protection claim. The decision and reasons was promulgated on 26 February 2025.
2. The Appellant is a national of Iraq, of Kurdish ethnicity, born on 9 November 1996. He claimed in summary that he feared return because he would be the subject of a revenge honour killing by the family of a young woman named Shene with whom he had a relationship. He had claimed that he spoke to her regularly and proposed marriage to her family, only to be rejected. He kept a secret relationship with her over the phone. He decided to meet her in person, when they had sexual intercourse. Shene told her mother. Her family came to the Appellant’s house and threatened to kill him. By then the Appellant had left for his uncle’s house in Erbil to seek shelter. His uncle arranged for him to leave Iraq. The Appellant said since he had been in the United Kingdom he had been attending demonstrations in Manchester and putting up Facebook posts against “honour” killing. If returned to Iraq, he feared he would be killed by Shene’s family, who were influential and well-connected in Iraq. Additionally the Appellant feared prosecution by the authorities as a result of his sur place activities.
3. After reviewing the evidence the Appellant presented and the account he provided, including his immigration history, Judge Williams accepted the Respondent’s concession that the Appellant had had a relationship with Shene in Iraq. That concession was limited – it was not accepted that there had been a relationship in person or sexual relations, nor that Shene’s family were pursuing the Appellant or were powerful and influential. The Judge found that various other elements of the Appellant’s story were not credible, and that he had no genuine political convictions. The Judge also found that the Appellant could have claimed asylum before reaching the United Kingdom and that such Section 8 considerations further detracted from his credibility.
4. The Judge’s central findings were set out by him in his decision at
[11] to [23], an extensive, reasoned list of adverse credibility points following examination of the claim founded on the relationship with Shene. These included vagueness, serious inconsistency, and implausibility viewed against the undisputed cultural and country background evidence. The Judge found no positive credibility points beyond the Respondent’s concessions.
5. As to the Appellant’s sur place claim, the Judge found that the Appellant was not a genuine opponent of the authorities in the IKR or in the rest of Iraq. The Appellant had attended a number of small demonstrations in the United Kingdom for the social aspect of meeting together under the guise of an organisation called Dakok. He was a relatively peripheral, opportunistic participant. The Appellant had failed to establish that the Iraqi and/or IKR authorities would be reasonably likely to have identified the Appellant or be able to identify him in the first place on the basis of his involvement in demonstrations, or had any interest in him, particularly when this was an issue viewed through the lens of someone of no prior adverse interest prior to leaving Iraq.
6. As the Judge found the Appellant’s case to be spurious, there was no reason why the Appellant would not be able to contact his family who had no reason to shun him. The Judge was satisfied that the Appellant remained in contact with family, and had his original documentation (INID and passport). The Appellant would be able to travel on his passport (if he did not have it, it could be posted to him by his family, along with his INID) and the Appellant could be met at the airport in the IKR. He could fly directly to the IKR. He would be at no risk on return and could start his life again in Iraq.
7. Permission to appeal was initially refused in the First-tier Tribunal, but was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville in the following terms:
“1. It is arguable that the refusal decision was unclear on what facts were accepted, not least the reference to the content of screening interview; none of the usual questions concerning the basis of claim were asked. While the refusal decision later states that “the material facts … are not accepted”, there is no attempt to reconcile this with the earlier acceptance that the Appellant had a relationship with a partner. Nor was the factual dispute clarified in the Respondent’s review.
“2. A fair hearing arguably required the Judge to clarify the factual dispute between the parties, so that the Appellant could respond to matters said to damage his credibility. There is no record in the decision of any such clarification, nor that any of the matters relied upon by the Judge as damaging the Appellant’s credibility were put to him in oral evidence for comment. The criticism that the Judge placed impermissible weight on cultural assumptions and plausibility also has arguable merit.
“3. All grounds may be argued. If the Respondent wishes to dispute that none of the questions at [16] were put to the Appellant, as asserted in the grounds, she must do so in her rule 24 response: Abdi v ECO [2023] EWCA Civ 1455.”
8. The Respondent filed a rule 24 notice opposing the appeal, in the following terms:
“The grant of permission at paragraph 3 states ‘that all grounds are arguable’. Unfortunately, paragraph 6 of the grounds states the following: ‘If permission is granted then it is submitted that the finding that the Appellant’s political activities are not for genuine reasons will also need to be revisited, as this finding was made when considering the Appellant’s claim in the round”.
“This paragraph is the first time the grounds rise the appellant’s political activities. This is a standalone issue based on attending a demonstration in the United Kingdom and the use of Facebook. This ground does not contain any reasons to support the assertion that the Judge erred in law and neither does the grant of permission give reasons for why this ground being granted permission. Therefore, the SSHD is unable to respond to this element of the grounds.
“In addition, the grounds do not challenge the finding that the Appellant is at risk because of a blood feud, paragraph 11 or Article 8, paragraph 27.
“The main focus of the grounds is on the Appellant’s relationship with Shene. For assistance, please find attached the PO’s record of proceedings (RoP). Please note that the highlighting is from the PO and not for the purposes of the Rule 24. To date no evidence apart from what is said in the grounds has been provided by the Appellant.
“The Appellant was on notice that the depth of the Appellant’s relationship with Shene was an issue because page 5 of the refusal letter and [6] of the decision state the following: “With your own admission you stated that you never had the opportunity to meet her in a public place later you stated that you had met her once and had slept with her (AIR 48-49) (AIR 60). Consideration is given to [19] of YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145, which outlines the expectation for you to provide a truthful account at SCR and that answers can be compared fairly with answers provided later. As such your overall credibility has been damaged.”
“This paragraph highlights the inconsistency in the Appellant’s evidence regarding the relationship and, therefore, credibility of the Appellant. Whether the Appellant slept with Shene is an issue that needed to be resolved.
“The PO’s ROP clearly records that the Appellant was asked about the sexual relationship with Shene, please see pages 3, 4 and 5 of the RoP which records the questioning on meeting Shene and the intercourse that is alleged to have happened. In addition, it is clearly recorded at page 11 of the RoP that the PO asked the Judge not to find this aspect of the Appellant’s claim credible. The representative did have an opportunity to respond to the PO’s submission in their submissions.
“Having considered the evidence and the refusal letter the Judge does accept that in public the appellant formed a friendship with Shene, [13] and [14] of the decision. Having accepted this element of the Appellant’s account the Judge continued to consider the Appellant’s claim. When considering the Appellant’s evidence alongside the background evidence, the Judge gave sufficient reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s behaviours after the second proposal, [15] and [16] of the decision. The Judge found the evidence vague and inconsistence with clear examples given in the decision. In addition, the Judge was entitled to reject that Shene was part of a powerful and influential family given the appellant’s ability to leave the country.
“Overall, the Judge was entitled to consider all the evidence, which included background evidence, oral evidence and written evidence and reach the decision such that the appeal falls to be dismissed.”
9. The Upper Tribunal hearing proceeded via a remote CVP link for the parties’ convenience.
Submissions
10. Mr Vokes for the Appellant relied on the grounds of appeal and grant of permission to appeal. Counsel referred to ground (1), which was that the Judge had erred in law in making adverse findings of fact on matters not put to the Appellant in the refusal letter, which breached principles of procedural fairness (R (on the application of Bourgass and another) (Appellants) v Secretary of State for Justice (Respondent) [2015] UKSC 54). The Judge found the Appellant did not have sexual intercourse with Shene and therefore there was no risk to him from her family. However the Respondent in her notice of decision had accepted the Appellant had experienced problems as a result of his relationship. It was therefore accepted by the Respondent that the Appellant had sexual intercourse with Shene, that she informed her mother, who informed the rest of the family and that the Appellant was at risk of honour-related violence as a result. The Respondent only questioned whether Shene’s family were influential people or whether they hurt any of his family and attacked his family home.
11. Counsel referred to [6] of the Judge’s decision:
“6. Schedule of issues: The Respondent had made concessions: ‘Material facts I accept. I am satisfied that you are of Kurdish Ethnicity. You experienced problems in Iraq due to a relationship with your partner Shene. You have taken part in demonstration in the UK against the PDK and PUK’.
“The Refusal letter contested that they ever met each other in person:
‘With your own admission you stated that you never had the opportunity to meet her in a public place later you stated that you had met her once and had slept with her (AIR 48-49) (AIR 60). Consideration is given to [19] of YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 (8 June 2004), which outlines the expectation for you to provide a truthful account at SCR and that answers can be compared fairly with answers provided later. As such your overall credibility has been damaged.’
“And contested that he had ever come into the claimed degree of conflict with Shene’s family: ‘You were lacking in specificity and sufficient detail concerning the specific details of the people who you claim to fear, no evidence has been provided to support your claim. Furthermore, you claimed that you feared Shene your partner’s family and that they were powerful and influential, no evidence has been provided to support this. In your AIR you stated that Shene’s family they didn’t do anything to your family they didn’t hurt anyone (AIR 67). In your ACQ you stated that they attacked the house.’
“As per ASA: “Given the scope of Respondent’s decision, the issues in this appeal can be summarised as follows:
i) Is the Appellant’s account within Iraq genuine and credible?
ii) Has the Appellant established a well-founded fear, on the lower standard of proof, of persecution or a significant risk of harm, due to his actions in Iraq?
iii) Would it be feasible for the Appellant to obtain appropriate documentation to return to Iraq?
iv) Would it be feasible for the Appellant to relocate?
v) Would the Appellant's sur place activities in the UK further warrant persecution? “
12. Counsel submitted that the Respondent’s concession had not been applied by the Judge. Its precise basis had not been clarified at the start of the hearing if there were doubt as it should have been. The relationship and the problems which resulted had been accepted by the Respondent and the Appellant was entitled to rely on the concession. The Judge had not maintained an issue-focussed approach.
13. Although counsel relied on all the grounds, he submitted that ground one was the key error of law which was established. It was not necessary to develop the other grounds. The first ground established a serious error of law. The decision should be set aside and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing before another judge.
14. Mr Ojo for the Respondent relied on the rule 24 notice. It had always been made clear that the Respondent’s acceptance of the relationship between the Appellant and Shene was heavily qualified, as the Judge explained at [6] of the decision. Other elements of the Appellant’s case were also contested, such as whether Shene’s family had power and influence as the Appellant had claimed. It had never been accepted by the Respondent that the Appellant had had a sexual relationship with the Appellant. The Respondent’s review had stated expressly that cross- examination would be required.
15. The accuracy of the RoP submitted by the Respondent had not been challenged. As set out in the rule 24 notice, there had been cross- examination on the adverse credibility points set out by the Judge in his decision, so that there had been no procedural unfairness. Examples included the Appellant’s lack of enquiry about what happened to Shene after his departure, the Appellant’s lack of political involvement in Iraq, the Facebook posts and his general inconsistency. The Appellant had been given a proper opportunity to respond.
16. The Judge’s findings were all based on the cultural context in the IKR, as explained in the country background evidence, not on Western cultural norms. The appeal had no merit and should be dismissed.
17. In reply, Mr Vokes confirmed that the grounds did not challenge the Judge’s sur place findings. The error of law relied on was the Judge’s failure to accept that the Respondent’s concession encompassed the romantic relationship which was the Appellant’s case.
No material error of law finding
18. The Tribunal reserved its decision, which now follows. The Tribunal is not persuaded by any of the submissions as to material error of law made on behalf of the Appellant, whether in the grounds of appeal or orally. In the Tribunal’s view, the errors asserted to exist in the decision are based on misapprehensions and a failure to read the decision with proper attention.
19. The Judge was not necessarily bound to accept the concessions made by the Respondent. The concessions were limited in scope, and fell considerably short of accepting that the Appellant faced a real risk on return to Iraq, as the reasons for refusal letter made plain. There was no acceptance by the Respondent that the Appellant had had sexual relations with Shene, which was obviously a crucial if not the crucial issue in what was what might be described as a typical “honour killing” case from the IKR. (Mr Vokes commented that he had appeared in hundreds of similar appeals.) In the event the Judge accepted the Respondent’s concessions.
20. In [6] of his decision the Judge set out a broad summary of the issues in the case and the respective positions adopted by the parties. Mr Vokes’s submission that the Respondent had accepted that the Appellant’s relationship had included sexual relations was not supported by that broad summary. The nature of the relationship was an issue which required further investigation, as stated in the Respondent’s review and as Appellant had grudgingly accepted in his witness statement:
“12. Overall, I feel the Home Office has been extremely unfair and has provided very weak refusal points. It seems they were determined to refuse my application despite accepting all other aspects of my case, including my relationship with Shene. If they accepted everything else, why have they given me a refusal based on such weak points, most of which I have addressed clearly. Additionally, one of the refusal points is a complete error by the Home Office. The refusal point about meeting in a public place has no basis and should not be a refusal point.”
Plainly (a) there had been no attempt to persuade the Respondent to widen or further clarify the concession at the First-tier Tribunal hearing and (b) the Appellant came to the hearing prepared to address the issue of the scope and extent of his relationship with Shene and was by no means taken by surprise.
21. There was no challenge to the accuracy of the RoP provided by the Respondent from the First-tier Tribunal hearing. As set out in the rule 24 notice, the Appellant was cross-examined in depth on points which had been taken against him in the reasons for refusal letter. When granting permission to appeal UTJ Neville had not had the benefit of seeing a copy of the RoP. Had that been available he would have been able to see that his concerns about potential unfairness because of lack of cross-examination or other lack of opportunity to respond were misplaced. There was no such unfairness.
22. It follows that the Tribunal finds that there was no error of law in the Judge’s decision. The Appellant was given full opportunity to present his case. The Judge gave the Appellant credit for the only elements of his claim which were accepted by the Home Office, which were the Judge’s starting point. But Home Office had not accepted that the Appellant faced any real risk on return because of any blood feud or political considerations and so the Appellant’s evidence required critical analysis with anxious scrutiny. The Judge identified with multiple sustainable reasons, based on the country background evidence, where he identified why the Appellant’s case was not credible. None of the Judge’s conclusions was in the least surprising. As the Judge found that the Appellant was able to contact his family and had no objectively founded reasons for fearing return to Iraq, it followed that he would have a home to which he could safely return.
23. In the Tribunal’s view, the submissions advanced on the Appellant’s behalf amount to no more than disagreement with the experienced Judge’s conclusions. The onwards appeal is dismissed.
DECISION
The appeal is dismissed
The making of the previous decision did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision stands unchanged, including the anonymity direction.
Signed R J Manuell Dated 20 October 2025
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Manuell