Tribunal decisions

The decision

Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: UI-2025-002288
First-tier Tribunal Number: PA/58685/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued

14th November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WOODCRAFT

Between

AOM
(Anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms H Cosgrave of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms S Lecointe, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Heard at Field House on 4 November 2025
The Appellant
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq born on 1 August 1991. He appeals against a decision of Judge of the First tier Tribunal Greene which dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the refusal of international protection. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom and claimed asylum on 10 July 2017. His first appeal against refusal of leave to remain was dismissed as was a second appeal. This appeal (against the respondent’s decision dated 12 March 2024) is thus the third appeal the appellant has lodged.
Order Regarding Anonymity.
2. Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity and is to be referred to in these proceedings by the initials AOM. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
The Appellant’s Case
3. The appellant makes four main points. Firstly, he will be at risk of persecution on return to Iraq because he failed to obey the orders of his superiors in the police and passed information about corruption to an opposition party, the Gorran Movement. There had been threats to his family in Iraq, including assaults on his father and the issue of an arrest warrant.
4. Secondly, the Appellant’s father contacted the Freedom & Human Rights Organisation (FHRO), which issued a report corroborating these claims. This report was not before the two previous Tribunals.
5. Thirdly, the appellant does not have an INID document (essential for travelling and working in Iraq) and would be unable to obtain one.
6. Fourthly, since arriving in the United Kingdom the appellant has engaged in sur place political activities against the Kurdish and Iraqi authorities. The respondent accepts that the appellant was a member of the Kurdish police force but was only a low-level supporter of the Gorran movement. The respondent otherwise rejects the appellant’s credibility.
The Decision at First Instance
7. The judge held at [14] and [18a] of the determination that his starting point (pursuant to Devaseelan 2002 UKIAT 00702) were the findings in the appellant’s earlier appeals, that the appellant was not a credible witness when making claims of persecution. The appellant’s political involvement was only at a low-level, such as attending demonstrations or posting on social media. The country guidance authorities particularly SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 and XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC) confirm that persons in the appellant’s position did not face systematic targeting by the Kurdish or Iraqi authorities. XX although an authority on Iran underlines the point that one has to be of genuine interest to the authorities in order to become the subject of online surveillance
8. In relation to the FHRO report the judge stated at [18c]: “The FHRO report, relied upon heavily by the Appellant, lacks transparency and independence. Its methodology has not been clearly outlined, and its connection to the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which the Appellant claims to fear, raises concerns about its impartiality. The Respondent rightly questioned the reliability of this report, and I agree that it should be afforded little weight.”
9. The judge held that documentation challenges could be resolved through family assistance, embassy support, or contacting the German authorities (who appear to have held the appellant’s identity documents. The Appellant’s claim that obtaining documents was impossible, unsubstantiated and did not align with the available mechanisms for re-documentation outlined in SMO, see [42] to [44] of the determination. There was little if any supporting evidence for the appellant’s claims and the judge dismissed the appeal.
The Onward Appeal
10. The appellant appealed against this decision arguing that the judge had wrongly rejected the FHRO report. There was no connection between the FHRO and the KRI authorities as the judge appeared to suggest. The FHRO web site contained photographs and other evidence which supported the appellant’s case. Demonstrations attended by the appellant had featured in the content of a number of media outlets. Since March 2024 an Iraqi citizen had to be in possession of an INID not a CSID (which were no longer being issued).
11. The First-tier Tribunal granted permission finding the following points arguable: (i)The judge referred wrongly to the FHRO having links to the KRI authorities; (ii) the judge’s consideration of the appellant’s sur place claim appeared to be limited to the appellant’s attendance at demonstrations and facebook entries and ignored the widespread media coverage of those demonstrations; (iii) The judge had not addressed the need for an INID document. There was no Rule 24 response from the respondent.
The Hearing Before Me
12. In consequence of the grant of permission the matter came before me to determine in the first place where there was a material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal such that it fell to be set aside. If there was then I would make directions on the rehearing of the appeal. If there was not the decision at first instance would stand.
13. For the appellant, counsel submitted that ground 1 related to the existence of the FHRO report which meant the appellant only then became aware of further evidence which supported his claim. The report was made after his father had complained to the FHRO about what had happened to the family. There was an initial report and more recently a supplementary one. The organisation itself was well established and there were screenshots from the FHRO website. Although the judge said that the report relied heavily on the testimony of the appellant's father both reports independently verified the father's testimony. The organisation's independence could be confirmed by looking at the screenshots taken from its website. The judge’s reference to the organisation being part of the Kurdish regional government was a mistake which arose from the fact that the there was a reference to the geographical location of the organisation. The language could be clearer, but the organisation did not support any party and the judge was told this.
14. In relation to ground 3, (the appellant's sur place activities) media attention was attracted to several demonstrations and there was an article showing the appellant had attended a demonstration. The judge appeared to confide his consideration of the appellant's activities to Facebook entries and attending demonstrations ignoring how widespread the coverage had been. One of the demonstrations appeared on a Facebook profile which had over 4 million followers. The judge's attention had also been taken to background evidence which showed that individuals were being targeted because of their connection to the outlets covering demonstrations. The judge did not consider that evidence before him regarding the broader visibility of the demonstrations. If the judge rejected that claim of visibility, he had not given clear reasons why he had rejected it.
15. As to ground 4 the judge was invited to consider whether the appellant had possession of an INID. There was no clear reason given why the evidence on this point was rejected.
16. In response the presenting officer stated that the appellant's appeal was no more than a disagreement with the decision of the First-tier. According to the two previous decisions the appellant had not given a credible account and that was the judge’s starting point. The FHRO report had not been seen at the time that the respondent issued her review of the appellant's claim. Although the report was not addressed by the respondent it was for the judge to make findings thereon. The report begged the question as to where the information came from that was in the report. The appellant's evidence of the threats made against him was inconsistent. The judge was justified in concluding that there was insufficient evidence to depart from the earlier decisions.
17. The judge had given a well reasoned decision and it was a matter for him what weight he gave to the appellant's claimed sur place activities. It was mainly Facebook evidence, the appellant's brother (who gave oral evidence to the judge but about whom the judge said at [26] his evidence added little to the case) had also attended demonstrations. The appellant was said to have given interviews to reporters. The judge was entitled to consider what weight should be attached to the FHRO report. Where did the website of the organisation come from? The appellant's evidence on the website came from family members of the appellant. The question of an identity document had not been in the appellant's skeleton argument before the first instance hearing. It was not open now for the appellant to raise it as a relevant issue.
18. There was no evidence which would lead the Upper Tribunal to assume the appellant had or would come to the attention of the authorities. The appellant was not high-profile. The appeal should be dismissed.
19. In conclusion counsel for the appellant made a brief submission that there had been an unusual amount of documentation in this case because the respondent had lodged an incorrect bundle. The respondent had then proceeded to lodge her own documents again. All the documents in the appellant's bundle had been before the judge. There was no issue around the absence of any documentation. At the conclusion of submissions I indicated that I would reserve my decision.
Discussion and Findings
20. This is the third appeal lodged by this appellant on the same grounds as his previous two appeals namely the exposed corruption in the Kurdish police force and a failure to obey orders. Those previous claims, still maintained by the appellant, were dismissed on both occasions. The judge in the instant appeal before me was correct to say that his starting point in assessing this appeal was those two earlier decisions following Devaseelan. It was well established authority that for a judge to depart from earlier findings there must be cogent evidence to support such a course.
21. The appellant argues that there is such evidence which shows that his original claims were not fabrications but were correct. This evidence is in the form of a report and supplementary report from an organisation called the FHRO. This organisation has a website and has posted on that website some information about the appellant which apparently was provided by the appellant's father. What there is not in the papers before me is any indication of what the status of this organisation is meant to be. At [8] the judge was clearly unimpressed by the reports or by the organisation generally.
22. His dismissal of the FHRO is attacked by the appellant on the basis that the judge erred in considering that there was a link or some form of connection with the KRI authorities. Even if the judge has misunderstood the reference in the report to the geographical area of the Kurdish government perhaps because as conceded by counsel the wording of the report could have been clearer, that is not a material error. It does not take the appellant's case any further. It matters little whether the FHRO is a wholly independent organisation quite separate and apart from the Kurdish authorities or whether it is indeed part of the Kurdish authorities if there is no evidence to suggest that it is a credible or genuine organisation.
23. The finding that the judge had to make about the report was whether it was from a reliable source. For the reasons he gave, including that the methodology was unclear, the judge did not find it to be a reliable source. Crucially there is still no evidence to suggest that the FHRO is a credible organisation whose claims on their website could be taken into account. There is for example no report from an independent expert to verify that this organisation is genuine and is reliable. All the judge had and indeed all that I have are references to the organisation's website which is said to confirm the appellant's account but if the organisation is afforded little weight, then so will be its website. That does not help the appellant. The basis for the appellant bringing a fresh claim while relying essentially on the same factual matrix as before was undermined by the fact that the new evidence he sought to rely upon, the report from the FHRO, did not take his case any further. The appellant’s argument is a circular one. He says that his claim can be verified by the organisation’s web site but their status is verified by the fact that they repeat his claim.
24. There are certain other aspects to the appellant's claim. The first is that since arriving in the United Kingdom the appellant has attended demonstrations which have been reported in a number of media outlets and have been seen by a large number of people. The judge’s point is not that the appellant had not attended demonstrations, the judge appears to accept that the appellant had done so see [46]. The judge’s point was that the country guidance authorities showed the that the Kurdish authorities were not interested in low-level supporters taking part in demonstrations in the United Kingdom. The appellant argues that there is evidence that some persons connected to the media outlets reporting on these demonstrations had come to harm but the judge found no evidence of any hostility towards the appellant. That was a finding of fact open to the judge on the evidence before him. The appellant may well have spent some time attending demonstrations, but he could not show a credible link between his attendance at demonstrations and any risk on return. The authorities did not take an interest in low level activities. This was also a point which did not assist the appellant or take his case any further. The judge was entitled to dismiss the appeal on that basis.
25. The final point raised by the appellant perhaps somewhat late in the day is that he cannot return to Iraq/Kurdish region because he does not have one of the new type of identity documents, the INID. It appears that at some point the appellant's CSID, the previous type of identity document, was taken from him by the German authorities. The appellant argues that it is therefore no longer relevant. Nevertheless, the burden was still on the appellant to show that he could not obtain an INID in circumstances where his family was still alive in Iraq and evidently still in communication with him. This must be so that his is in communication with his family since his father was able to raise the circumstances of the appellant's claim and tell the appellant he was doing this.
26. The judge indicated that documentation problems in and of themselves would not found a claim, see [18h]. With the assistance of the family or other contacts they could be overcome. The point was not extensively argued before me nor indeed was there much detail in the appellant’s skeleton argument, paragraph 26 thereof being the only mention in that document. The respondent complains that the question of identity documents is very much a late addition to the claim. Whether that is so does not of itself invalidate the claim if it can be shown that the appellant would face hardship. Nevertheless, the position remains that the burden of proof rests upon the appellant to show that he cannot obtain this documentation, and thus remove any potential hardship.
27. The grant of permission indicates that the judge may have made two contradictory findings in saying on the one hand it was accepted that the appellant could not ask his family to act as a proxy in obtaining an ID document but on the other hand saying that the appellant could get help from his family. I do not find a contradiction. The use of the appellant’s family as a proxy is one particular kind of assistance that could be given but in practice cannot be so used because of the need to give biometric details to obtain an INID. General help in obtaining the documentation required is of a much broader nature and this the judge found the appellant’s family could help with.
28. Even if it is the case that personal attendance (not a proxy) is required to obtain an INID because biometric evidence such as an iris scan is required, the appellant could still travel to Iraq on a document, a laisser passer issued by the Iraqi embassy. Once in Iraq the appellant could avail himself of the help of his family and others to attend in person at an appropriate office. For all these reasons I do not accept that the judge has made any material error of law in his determination. The judge has taken some care to set out the issues and rival contentions of the parties. He has indicated which contentions he finds favour with and which ones he does not and crucially his reasons for making those choices. I agree with the submission that the grounds of onward appeal are largely a disagreement with the cogent findings of the judge and as such do not demonstrate any material error of law on the judge’s part. I therefore dismiss the onward appeal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold the decision to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal
Appellant’s appeal dismissed

Signed this 6th day of November 2025

……………………………………………….
Judge Woodcraft
Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge