Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER

Case No: UI-2025-002297

First-tier Tribunal No: EU/55848/2023
LE/04961/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 2nd of October 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’CALLAGHAN

Between

MELISA ABIGAIL GRANIZO LOPEZ
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S Ferguson, Counsel, instructed by Direct Access
For the Respondent: Mrs A Nolan, Senior Presenting Office

Heard at Field House on 25 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals a decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing her appeal against a decision of the respondent to refuse her leave to remain under Appendix EU of the Immigration Rules. The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Ketteley was sent to the parties on 18 March 2025.
Brief Facts
2. The appellant is a citizen of Spain. Her sponsor is her father, Mr Manuel Ignacio Granizo Pinduisaca, who is also a Spanish national.
3. On 2 July 2023, the appellant applied for leave to remain under the European Union Settlement Scheme (EUSS). As an adult, she applied as a dependent of her father. The appellant reports that her own daughter has been granted pre-settled status on account of the child’s dependency upon the sponsor, her grandfather.
4. Her application was refused by the respondent by a decision dated 13 October 2023. The respondent reasoned, inter alia, that the appellant had not provided any evidence to confirm that she had ever resided in the United Kingdom. Additionally, as she was an applicant aged over 21, she had not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she was dependent on her sponsor.
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
5. The appellant’s appeal was conducted as a hybrid hearing on 12 March 2025 with the Judge sitting at Taylor House. The appellant attended with her father, and both gave evidence. The appellant was unrepresented.
6. When refusing the appellant’s appeal, the Judge’s focus was upon the existence of dependency as at 23.00 on 31 December 2020, see [21-22], [27], [29] and [31-32] of the decision.
Grounds of Appeal
7. The appellant drafted her grounds of appeal as a litigant in person.
8. Upper Tribunal Judge Landes granted the appellant permission to appeal by a decision sent to the parties on 31 July 2025. I cite the reasons for granting permission in full as they provide clarity as to the nature and scope of the appellant’s appeal.
“1. It is arguable that the judge decided the wrong issue. The judge says that the issue, taken from the respondent’s review, was whether the appellant had demonstrated that she was a dependent child of the sponsor, her father, at 31 December 2020. In fact the review does not appear to specify that date. Be that as it may, it is arguable that the relevant date for assessing dependency was the date of application (2 July 2023). This is because it is arguable that the appellant was the ‘joining family member of a relevant sponsor’ (EU14A) (as opposed to the ‘family member of a relevant EEA citizen’) and as such the relevant date for dependency is the date of application (see definition of ‘child’ in annex 1 to Appendix EU (b)(i)(cc) following references to ‘relevant sponsor’). See also the Withdrawal Agreement Article 10 (e) (ii) which provides that those who were directly related to a Union Citizen residing in the UK at the end of the transition period and were themselves living outside the UK then, are within scope as long as they fulfil the definition of direct family member in the 2004 Directive at the time they seek residence to join the Union Citizen. The Home Office guidance of July 2025 on the EU Settlement Scheme (p 133) also suggests that dependency on the relevant sponsor is at the date of application.
2. I appreciate that the judge’s finding which appears well reasoned was also that the appellant was not currently (i.e. as of March 2025) dependent on her father as she was working in the UK and was also repaying him certain household expenses. The judge makes many findings adverse to the appellant’s case on the evidence, but if the judge did indeed direct himself to the wrong issue, and he should have considered dependency as of July 2023, I cannot say that the result would have inevitably been the same. 6 2
3. The appellant’s grounds seek to reargue the case about dependency as of 31 December 2020 and also the judge’s findings that the appellant and her father did not continue to live together. The Barclays bank letter was not before the judge and that the appellant’s father updated his address with the bank on 8 May 2024 does not prove that he lived at that address at that date or indeed in 2023 (see [24] and [25] of the decision). Whilst the grounds settled by the appellant in person appear to be argument rather than material demonstrating any error of law, I do not seek to restrict the grounds.”
9. The respondent has filed a rule 24 response, dated 18 September 2025. An admission is made at paragraph 2:
“The Respondent opposes the Appellant’s appeal on all but one ground, namely that the FTTJ should have considered the appellant’s dependency at the date of application (2 July 2023) as the appellant was a Joining Family member of a relevant sponsor. Therefore, the FTT Judge should have considered the A’s dependency at the date of application rather than the specified date (31 December 2020).“
10. The respondent’s position in respect of this appeal is succinctly identified at paragraph 3 of the rule 24 response;
“Other grounds are disagreements with the Judge’s findings about dependency at the specified date (31 December 2020) and the findings about the A and her father not living together. It is submitted that the Judge’s findings pertaining to dependency and their living situation was adequate based on the evidence before them. The A had failed to demonstrate dependency on the sponsor, the documentation to evidence the dependency is considered insufficient to demonstrate dependency. In addition, the Judge was entitled to find at [24-25] that the A and the Sponsor were not living together. Nonetheless, it is submitted that the FTT Judge had considered the wrong date and should have considered dependency as of July 2023.”
Analysis
11. At the hearing, I allowed the appeal to the extent that the matter be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Though the respondent sought that I consider whether the evidence provided was sufficient to establish dependency, I concluded that on the papers before me, it could not be said that there was no chance of the appellant being successful on her appeal. Being mindful of the significant error made by the Judge as to the relevant date at which he was required to consider dependency, this is not a matter where it can be said that such error was not material.
12. In the circumstances, the nature of the error was such as to deny the appellant a fair hearing. The most appropriate course of action is to remit this appeal back to the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Taylor House for lawful consideration of the appellant’s appeal and the issue of dependency.
Notice of Decision
13. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal sent to the parties on 18 March 2025 is set aside in its entirety for material error of law.
14. This matter is remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal sitting at Taylor House to be heard by any judge other than Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Ketteley.

D O’Callaghan
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

26 September 2025