Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002301

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68648/2023
LP/12287/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LEWIS

Between

H.A.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr F Aziz of Lei Dat & Baig
For the Respondent: Ms H Gilmour, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 10 October 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, [the Appellant] (and/or any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against a decision of First Tier Tribunal Judge Ruck promulgated on 26 March 2023 dismissing the Appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Respondent dated 13 December 2023 refusing a protection claim.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq whose date of birth is given as 1 January 2001. It is his case that in Iraq he had a sexual relationship with a young woman; the relationship was discovered after the woman became pregnant; in consequence she committed suicide and he became the subject of murderous threats from members of her family. In a ‘reasons for refusal’ letter dated 13 December 2023 the Respondent accepted the facts of the affair and that the Appellant had been the subject of threats from his girlfriend’s family. However, the Respondent did not accept the Appellant was entitled to protection on the basis that it was considered that there was an adequacy of protection in Iraq, and/or the availability of internal relocation.
3. Before the First-tier Tribunal the Appellant’s case was argued on the basis that he would be a victim of an honour killing: e.g. see paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Appellant’s Skeleton Argument. It was further argued, as relevant to protection and internal relocation, that his girlfriend’s family were members of an influential tribe, the Mirawdali (see ASA at paragraphs 5-7).
4. Amongst other things, both parties placed reliance upon the Respondent’s Country Policy and Information Notes, specifically ‘Iraq: Blood feuds, Honour crimes and Tribal violence’ of July 2024, and ‘Iraq: Honour-based violence in the Kurdistan region; state protection and support services available to victims’: e.g. see ASA at paragraphs 8-9, and the Respondents Review (which does not have numbered paragraphs). See further in this context paragraph 13 and 14 of the Decision and Reasons of the First-tier Tribunal – “I have been referred by both parties…”.
5. The passages from the CPIN quoted in the ASA, and referenced the First-tier Tribunal’s Decision, identify a distinction, in the context of heterosexual relationships, between male and female potential victims of so-called ‘honour’ crimes.
6. Is also be noted in this context that it was not the Appellant’s case that he was at risk from members of his own family for having brought dishonour on his own family, but rather that he was at risk from members of his girlfriend’s family. This is a significant distinction because, typically, in a case involving a potential or actual ‘honour crime’ against a female the risk emanates from her own family who perceive her conduct as dishonouring their own family.
7. The First-tier Tribunal Judge, echoing the words of the CPIN, made express reference to the “differing notions of male and female honour” at paragraph 14 of the Decision.
8. It is convenient to note at this juncture further passages from the CPIN of July 2024, in particular at section 3.2 headed ‘Honour crimes’:
“3.2.3 In general, a male who has engaged in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female is not at risk of serious harm or persecution from his own family. This is because a male who has engaged in a premarital or extramarital relationship with a female is not perceived to have stained the honour of the male or his family.
…
3.2.5 Available evidence indicates that males involved in premarital or extramarital relationships with a female may be targeted by the female’s family in acts of revenge. There have been cases where a male has been killed. However, there is limited data and evidence regarding the prevalence of such incidents (see Honour crimes against men). As such, it does not amount to a generalised risk. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.”
9. The CPIN also contains references to the notion of tribal dishonour – i.e. that conduct might not only dishonour the family but might also be considered to dishonour the tribe: e.g. paragraph 4.1.
10. Further references to the difficulty of underreporting, and the availability or effectiveness of state protection, in respect of honour crimes, must be considered in this context: i.e. that matters are often kept within the family or within the tribe – e.g. see paragraphs 11.6.12.
11. Section 11.7, ‘Honour crimes against men’, supports the notion that any risk arises not typically from the man’s own family, but as a matter of revenge (rather than honour) from the female partner’s family (see paragraphs 11.7.4 and 11.7.7). It is suggested that “normally” any killing is with the agreement of the man’s own family (paragraph 11.7.4): there is no suggestion of any such agreement on the part of the Appellant’s family herein. One source suggested violence might yet be used against the male partner by the woman’s family subject to the extent of their power and influence in the absence of any fear of repercussions and is family (paragraph 11.7.7).
12. It may be seen that the circumstances of the Appellant’s case in reality place any risk within the framework of inter-familial / inter-tribal revenge, and/or blood feuding, rather than as a potential victim of an ‘honour’ crime as such.
13. The First-tier Tribunal considered the Appellant’s claims made at interview in respect of continuing risk to the Appellant from his girlfriend’s family, but concluded in light of plausibility issues identified at paragraph 20, and “the fact that his family have not experienced any further problems with S’s family”, that the Appellant did not show that he was still at risk on return to Iraq: see paragraphs 19-21.
14. The Judge also gave consideration to the issue of sufficiency of state protection, with particular regard to the Appellant’s claims in respect of the influence and reach of his girlfriend’s family’s tribe, but rejected his case in this regard: see paragraph 23-31. The Judge similarly rejected the Appellant’s arguments in respect of internal relocation – “I find that the Appellant has not established the poer and influence of the Mirawdali Tribe across all the towns in the IKR nor that they would be able to locate him anywhere” (paragraph 35).
15. The Appellant pleads three grounds of challenge before the Upper Tribunal. Ground 1 addresses risk on return. As identified in the grant of permission to appeal, Grounds 2 and 3, which address sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, are essentially contingent upon the success of Ground 1.
16. In respect of Ground 1, permission to appeal was not granted on the basis upon which the ground had been pleaded. The grant of permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Hoffman dated 4 July 2025 makes the following observations:
“I am satisfied that it was unarguably open to the judge on the evidence to find at [20] that if, as the appellant claimed, the family of his girlfriend were so influential that they could locate him anywhere in the KRI, it was implausible that they would still be monitoring his family’s home given he had left Iraq three years previously. This ground as pleaded amounts to little more than a disagreement with the judge’s findings. However, it does seem to me to be Robinson obvious that the judge’s findings at [21] that the appellant would not be at risk on return because his family had not experienced any problems since his departure is arguably irrational and/or insufficiently reasoned.”
17. In circumstances where, for the reasons explained above, the reality of the Appellant’s claim was in substance a claim of inter-family or inter-tribal revenge rather than an issue of intra-family honour, it was – in my judgement – undoubtedly relevant that the Judge found that the Appellant’s family had not experienced any problems since his departure. In the absence of any direct pleading on this point, I am not persuaded that there is a ‘Robinson obvious’ ground identifiable here based on irrationality or insufficiency of reasoning or otherwise.
18. It necessarily follows that Ground 1 - in respect of which permission to appeal was not granted on the basis of its written pleading – is not made out, and no alternative ‘Robinson obvious’ ground is established. In turn, Grounds 2 and 3 cannot avail the Appellant because they are contingent upon establishing continuing risk.
19. The Appellant’s challenge fails accordingly.

Notice of Decision
20. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained no material error of law; the challenge herein fails; the Decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.
21. The Appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

I. Lewis
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
12 January 2026