Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002304
First-tier Tribunal No: EU/50444/2024
LE/00327/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

JITENDRAKUMAR HARESH
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Not applicable
For the Respondent: Not applicable

Heard at Field House on 27 May 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This decision was made without a hearing pursuant to rule 34 of the Upper Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2008, with the consent of the appellant and without objection from the respondent.

2. The appellant appeals against the decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) dated 14 March 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his application under the EUSS as the joining family member of an EU citizen dated 16 November 2023.

3. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Landes in a decision dated 23 July 2025. She considered it arguable that the judge had failed to assess dependency at the correct time. In her rule 24 response dated 21 August 2025, the respondent accepted that the judge had materially erred as asserted and that the single issue of dependency had to be reconsidered as at the date of application. She was equally content for the appeal to be remitted or retained.

4. On 10 September 2025, I gave notice of my preliminary view that it would be appropriate to set aside the judge’s decision and retain the matter for reconsideration in the Upper Tribunal without a hearing. The appellant consented to that disposal and no objection was received from the respondent.

5. Consequently, I formally record that the judge’s decision involved the making of an error of law. The appellant had applied after the relevant date for leave under the EUSS as a joining family member: a dependent (grand-)child over the age of 21. Thus, as the parties agree, he bore the burden of establishing dependency at the date of application. However, the judge proceeded on the basis that the appellant also had to show dependency on the specified date (31 December 2020) and held that he had failed so to do. Whilst the judge did in the alternative consider dependency at the date of application, he was persuaded by the respondent (it being so asserted in the refusal letter) that the appellant needed to establish dependency over the 6-month period up to the date of application, and again found that he had not. The judge therefore materially erred in each of the alternative approaches he took.

6. I therefore set aside the judge’s decision, and consider the issue of dependency for myself.

7. I have been provided with a composite bundle of 163 pages, including the application and supporting documentation, the refusal, the appellant’s and sponsor’s witness statements, and the respondent's review.

8. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on a visa valid from 6 April to 6 October 2023 to visit his grandmother. As noted by the judge, the date for entry given by the appellant in his witness statement, 22 April 2024, is an obvious typographical error. His passport confirms that he entered on 22 April 2023. Save for returning to India between 7 May and 23 September 2023, the appellant has remained in the United Kingdom.

9. His evidence, that he lives with and is supported by his grandmother, is confirmed by her witness statement. Whilst the statements do not make clear when he began to live with her, he has provided bank statements addressed to him at his grandmother's address covering the date of application. I am satisfied that they lived together before making the application. He is not one of the named tenants on the tenancy agreement; those are his grandmother and one of her other grandsons, Royan Rajesh Mitna. It is the latter two to whom the property’s energy bills are addressed.

10. There is no evidence in the appellant’s bank statements of his transferring money to his grandmother to contribute to the rent and utilities or of any cash withdrawals (to make a cash contribution). On the contrary, the witnesses’ respective bank statements show transfers from the grandmother to the appellant of £100 on 21 September 2023, £75 on 4 October 2023, £100 on 18 October 2023, £100 on 2 November 2023. Save for a £300 deposit on 8 September 2023 entitled ‘Bill Payment From Tandel M’ and a cash deposit of £300 at the Barclays Leicester Belgrave branch on 3 November 2023, the transfers from his grandmother are the appellant’s only apparent source of income. These continue after the application, at least until April 2024: £50 on 28 November 2023, £50 on 18 December 2023, £100 on 19 January 2024, £150 on 9 February 2024, £150 on 7 March 2024, and £150 on 19 April 2024.

11. The respondent did not in her refusal take issue with the two deposits which were not by way of bank transfer from the appellant’s mother but simply the totality of money transferred from her. It would be unfair of me in the circumstances to expect an explanation from the appellant for those deposits, which are not in any event of such size or regularity to suggest a regular alternative source of income. The appellant claims to be unemployed, and the documentary evidence is not inconsistent with that claim.

12. All in all, I am satisfied that the sponsor accommodated the appellant and provided him with modest financial support at the date of application. I accept on balance that the appellant was at the time unemployed and consequently that he relied on the sponsor for at least some of his essential needs (including in particular accommodation).

13. In short, I find that he was dependent on his sponsor at the date of the application, and so met the definition of joining family member of a relevant EEA citizen.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside.
2. I remake the decision and allow the appeal under the EUSS and under the Withdrawal Agreement.

Fee Award

As I have allowed the appeal, I have considered whether to make a fee award and have decided not to for the following reasons. I allowed the appeal on the basis of evidence not before the decision-maker.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29 May 2026