UI-2025-002305
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002305
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/63806/2023
LP/10321/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3rd of November 2026
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANDES
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURNS
Between
M A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Nicholson, Counsel instructed by Liberty Legal Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Mrs R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 4 August 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity
1. An anonymity direction was made in the First-Tier Tribunal as it was considered that given the nature of the appellant’s claim for international protection on the basis he feared serious harm, his interest in keeping his details confidential outweighed the need for open justice. It seems to us that at this stage the appellant’s interests still prevail over the public interest in open justice. The contrary was not submitted to us, so the anonymity order is continued.
Background
2. The appellant, a national of Bangladesh, appeals, with the permission of the Upper Tribunal, the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal (“the FTTJ”) promulgated on 27 January 2025 dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of 15 November 2023 to refuse his international protection and human rights’ claim made on 2 July 2020.
3. The appellant came to the UK as a student in 2008. His asylum claim was based on his claim to be a member of the BNP student wing, Chhatra Dal and to have been accused in 2002 by the Awami League student wing of involvement with fighting against them and holding illegal weapons as a result of which he said an arrest warrant was issued and he went into hiding. The appellant said judgment had been entered against him in his absence in 2014 and 2015 and he had been sentenced to 5 years’ and 10 years’ imprisonment respectively. The respondent accepted that the appellant had been politically active, but not that an arrest warrant or judgments had been issued against him, or that the authorities were interested in him.
4. At the stage of the decision letter, the appellant had not provided documents to support the arrest warrant and judgments, and the respondent considered that his credibility was damaged because he had not produced evidence which it was considered would have been reasonably available to him.
5. In the amended skeleton argument of August 2024, the appellant pointed to the documents he had now produced to support his claim which were said to be independent corroborative support, and his account was said to be plausible against the background evidence (CPIN paragraphs were referred to).
6. The respondent’s review of September 2024 considered the documents the appellant had produced and relying on the case of Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439 said that case provided that it was for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he sought to rely could be relied on. The respondent did not consider that those documents were ones on which reliance could properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round “as detailed in the RFRL regarding the credibility of the appellant”. The respondent noted the appeal witness statement and said they would seek to test the credibility of that statement on cross-examination to show that the appellant was not at risk on return as it was not accepted an arrest warrant had been issued for him and that he had come to substantial adverse attention from the authorities and the opposition party.
7. The response to the review averred that the respondent’s approach to the documents was incorrect. Now the appellant had provided the documents the respondent could no longer say the appellant’s credibility was damaged as he had not produced evidence; nor could she simply say quoting Tanveer Ahmed that because the appellant was not regarded as credible the documents could not be relied upon. That case required all the evidence to be considered in the round, including the court documents. The response also specifically addressed the credibility points made in the refusal letter.
Grounds (including their development at the hearing) and our conclusions on them
Ground 1 – ground and argument
8. This ground avers that the FTTJ failed properly to consider the documents obtained by the appellant either “in the round” as required by Tanveer Ahmed or in the context of the background material. We consider five separate points are made.
9. Firstly, it is said that the FTTJ nowhere considered the background material referred to in the skeleton argument which highlighted the number of false charges and the prevalence of politically motivated prosecutions, in particular the FTTJ had ignored the Human Rights Watch report and the news articles provided at [115] and in any event should have considered the CPIN references relied upon.
10. Mr Nicholson maintained at the hearing that the November 2023 Human Rights Watch report was relevant even though it referred to mass arrests of political opposition ahead of the general elections; it showed that political enemies were targeted for false prosecution.
11. In any event, it was said that the old reports were only out of date given the change of government if there was evidence that those like the appellant, who had been convicted following false political prosecution, had been pardoned. We consider this point is more relevant to ground 6 and discuss it under that head.
12. Secondly, it was said that the FTTJ had failed to take account of the fact the appellant had been accepted as having told the truth about his political activity.
13. Thirdly, although the FTTJ had recorded the parties’ agreement for her to consider the CPINs, she did not take account of the contents of a fact-finding mission referred to in the November 2024 CPIN about documentation which referred to fraudulent police or court documents not being easily obtainable. Mr Nicholson added that the problem with the FTTJ going away and looking at the CPIN was that he did not have the opportunity to point out parts of the CPIN which might have allayed concerns of the FTTJ.
14. Fourthly, the FTTJ had taken account of a section of the documentation CPIN which disparaged notaries public but that could not be regarded as an authoritative statement and in any event did not relate to translations by notaries public such as that on which the appellant relied. We pointed out that there was more recent evidence (at footnote [53]) about fake notaries public and we queried whether in any event [89] was a passing comment by the FTTJ. Mr Nicholson said it was more than that.
15. Fifthly, despite what the FTTJ had said at [87] – [91] she had in fact reached her conclusions about the documents at [86] in isolation from other matters and was simply reiterating the view she had already formed. When she came to assess the appellant’s credibility generally at [116] she had already rejected the documents as unreliable. Mr Nicholson reiterated at the hearing that this was prejudging and that, as he had submitted in the grounds, there were other examples.
16. The rule 24 response commented (in respect to the first three grounds of appeal) that the appellant would have been well aware that the reliability of the documents would be at issue in the appeal, so could not argue that he was taken by surprise that the relevant points were held against him, or that the provenance of the documents would be in issue in the appeal. The failure to consider the documents in the round had not been made out it was said, as the documents had been described, the background evidence considered and there was no presumption of the validity of foreign documents. Mrs Arif added that the FTTJ had properly directed herself in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed and had explained at [91] why the documents were not reliable. The general background situation in Bangladesh did not establish the reliability of the documents and no error was disclosed.
17. Mr Nicholson said that his points in reply were set out in his rule 25 response. We summarise the relevant points to this ground. The fact-finding mission received evidence relevant to court documents and the FTTJ had been selective in its reliance upon the CPINs, and the grounds had explained why that was problematic. He submitted that the FTTJ simply had not considered the evidence in the round and had not noted the prevalence of false charges against political opponents.
Ground 1 – discussion and conclusion
18. First point – It is right that the FTTJ did not make specific reference to the background material referred to in the appellant’s skeleton argument. It is trite law that a judge does not have to mention every feature of the evidence. Indeed, where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned, a court should be slow to assume that it has not been taken into account (see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49).
19. The FTTJ expressly indicated that she had regard to all the oral and documentary evidence [15]. She explained that she had not had access to the CPIN relating to journalists, the press and social media [108]. She did not specifically refer to paragraphs 2.4.13 – 2.4.15 of the 2020 CPIN on political parties and affiliation. An extract from that CPIN was not however in the stitched hearing bundle of 328 pages and it was no longer on the government website once the CPIN of December 2024 on the political situation was published after the change of government. If the reference was particularly important, it was the responsibility of the appellant to ensure that it was before the FTTJ. We do not consider that the FTTJ erred in law by not specifically considering an extract from a CPIN not available on the government website which was not before her in the background material.
20. In any event the relevant extract from the CPIN was in the supplementary bundle before us. It speaks about the prevalence of political violence in Bangladesh particularly between student groups. It refers to the Awami League’s dominance in the political arena meaning that there was reportedly close co-operation between the security agencies and the student wing of the Awami League, the BCL, with reports of police standing by when BCL members attacked and that BCL members sometimes committed acts of violence with impunity. It also highlighted that violence had shifted from inter-party to predominantly intra-Awami League clashes due to factional divisions in the BCL. The last paragraph referred to ruling party against the opposition violence often occurring during periods of heightened political unrest such as elections, and that it took place between youth and student wings with impunity, but the number of people affected remained low in proportion to the size of the major parties. The respondent was not suggesting that political violence did not take place or that it was implausible that the appellant might have been the subject of political violence. The extract does not specifically refer to the bringing of false cases against opponents. Even if the extract had been before the FTTJ it would not have been of such significance that she needed specifically to refer to it.
21. The extract from the Human Rights Watch Report of November 2023 was in the material before the FTTJ and was highlighted. The highlighted section read “Bangladesh authorities are carrying out mass arrests of political opposition in a clear attempt to quash the opposition and eliminate competition ahead of the general elections. According to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, about half of its five million members face politically motivated prosecution. “The arrests, they are not leaving anyone behind, from senior level to the ground level,” one activist told Human Rights Watch”. In his witness statement the appellant said that although the report was based on the most recent election period, the Awami League government had used the same tactics to persecute opposition leaders, members and supporters since taking power in 2009. It was not an error of law for the FTTJ not specifically to refer to the Human Rights Watch report other than at [115] as it related to politically motivated prosecutions in 2023 rather than at the time the arrest warrants or judgments were said to have been issued against the appellant. Neither the respondent nor the FTTJ suggested that a political prosecution was implausible at the time the appellant said judgment was reached in his absence. The background material is simply not such strong evidence supporting the appellant’s case that the FTTJ needed to refer to it specifically as so doing. Her discounting of it as out of date at [115] was in the context of her findings about the recent CPIN showing that not only the government but the machinery of state had changed with the government change in 2024.
22. Second – the FTTJ did not need to mention again when considering the appellant’s credibility in the round that the respondent had accepted he had been politically active in Bangladesh; she had mentioned it at [76]. The respondent did not accept however that the appellant was more than a “low-level” member of an opposition group (see the section about well-founded fear of persecution in the decision letter).
23. Third – that the parties agreed to the FTTJ looking at up to date CPINs appertaining to Bangladesh [11] does not of course mean that the FTTJ was thereby at liberty to draw significant contentious conclusions adverse to one of the parties without drawing it to their attention and asking for submissions on the same. However, the material quoted in the grounds about fraudulent police or court documents not being easily obtainable may have appeared in the old (March 2020) Country Information Note but the only reference to the Home Office Fact-Finding Mission of 2017 in the 2024 CPIN is a foot-note in the bibliography, the material is not in fact cited in the 2024 CPIN despite what is said in the bibliography. It cannot possibly be an error for the FTTJ not to consider the contents of a footnote which is not cited in the main work, but the point remains that the FTTJ did not give the appellant the opportunity to comment on her conclusion that fraudulent documents including extracts from police records and court documents were easily obtainable in Bangladesh. However, the FTTJ only used this information from the CPIN to conclude that the documents might not be reliable, which is the point made in Tanveer Ahmed.
24. Fourth – as we pointed out to Mr Nicholson, whilst the quote at 5.3.2 did not entirely accurately summarise the article footnoted at 52, which on its own was clearly not capable of supporting the proposition relied on in the CPIN, the article footnoted at 52 is not the only source for the suggestion that fraudulent notary practices were common. More recent evidence was referred to at 5.3.3, so the FTTJ did not simply rely on the reference footnoted at 52 for her conclusion that fraudulent notary practices were common. Mr Nicholson is right that none of the references to fraudulent practices are to fraudulent translation (translation, according to the article footnoted at 52 is one of the functions a notary can undertake in Bangladesh). If the FTTJ was considering that the translation could be fraudulent or materially inaccurate in a way which undermined the appellant’s case that is certainly something which should have been put to the appellant or his representatives before she came to that conclusion. The FTTJ said at [89] “Section 5.3 discusses how Notaries Public commonly undertake fraudulent practices and so it does not assist the Appellant that his documents have been translated by a Notary Public. I cannot see that a certificate of translation attesting to accuracy of the translations has been provided, nor anything which confirms the credentials or qualifications of the translator”. Whilst that might not be simply a stray comment, on the face of it all that means is that it does not positively support the appellant’s case that his documents have been translated by a notary public (i.e. someone who was a state official which might otherwise without more provide positive support for the appellant’s case). The FTTJ does not appear to take this point adversely against the appellant.
25. Fifth – we do not consider that the FTTJ had already reached a conclusion about the documents at [86]. She said at [86] “Overall I do not understand when and how he found out about the existence of any of the documents, and I find this undermines both their reliability and the credibility of the appellant’s account”. Bearing in mind that the FTTJ then considered points which positively supported the documents such as they clearly referred to the appellant [87] and they conformed with background material about the content of FIRs [88] we find it is clear that the points which the FTTJ made at [86] were points which she saw simply as undermining reliability and credibility rather than being conclusive and she does not draw together her conclusions about the reliability of the documents until [91].
26. We do consider however that there is force in Mr Nicholson’s point that the FTTJ should not have come to a final conclusion that the documents were unreliable before she had come to conclusions about the appellant’s credibility. The principles set out in Tanveer Ahmed (at [38] are as follows:
“In summary the principles set out in this determination are:
1. In asylum and human rights cases it is for an individual claimant to show that a document on which he seeks to rely can be relied on.
2. The decision maker should consider whether a document is one on which reliance should properly be placed after looking at all the evidence in the round.
3. Only very rarely will there be the need to make an allegation of forgery, or evidence strong enough to support it. The allegation should not be made without such evidence. Failure to establish the allegation on the balance of probabilities to the higher civil standard does not show that a document is reliable. The decision maker still needs to apply principles 1 and 2”.
Looking at all the evidence in the round includes what is made of the appellant’s evidence. After all, even if there is no independent support for documents, if an appellant’s account is accepted as credible, then it may be accepted that documents he produces can be relied on and that their provenance is indeed as the appellant says. The FTTJ should not therefore have considered that the documents could not be relied upon before coming to a conclusion on the appellant’s evidence. The question is whether it matters. If the FTTJ’s conclusion as to the appellant’s credibility was soundly reached, then she would inevitably have come to the same conclusion. That takes us into grounds 2 and 3.
Ground 2 – ground and argument
27. This ground avers that it was unfair for the FTTJ to find the absence of information as to how the appellant obtained the court documents was detrimental to his credibility. It is averred that the submission was made at the hearing that it was not fair to advance that at this late stage as if the point had been taken in the review then the appellant could have obtained a statement as to how they were obtained. The FTTJ had said the respondent was relying on Tanveer Ahmed but in her review the respondent said she was relying on the points regarding the credibility of the appellant made in the decision letter. She said nothing about requiring evidence of provenance.
28. Mr Nicholson added that the FTTJ finding at [91] that more in the way of explanation was needed was linked to his points (which we have noted under the first ground of appeal as thirdly and fourthly) that the FTTJ had used her own post-hearing examination of the CPIN material to find that the documents were not reliable.
29. Mrs Arif responded that questions of provenance were central to Tanveer Ahmed and it was for the appellant to establish that documents were reliable. He had been represented and so those matters could have been addressed. The FTTJ was entitled to take the absence of evidence concerning provenance into account when assessing reliability. There was no specific challenge to the documents made at the hearing [83], but the burden was still on the appellant to establish they could be relied upon.
30. Mr Nicholson relied on his rule 25 response that the FTTJ had nowhere considered the points made in the appellant’s response to the review. It was simply too late for the respondent to take a point about provenance. We noted that the respondent’s submissions on provenance were set out at [51] and Mr Nicholson’s submissions on the point at [62] and this led to the FTTJ’s recording of the position at [83]. We checked how the point had been made in cross-examination and Mr Nicholson said that [33] was as far as it was taken.
Ground 2 – discussion and conclusion
31. It is important not to confuse credibility and reliability. In terms of the reliability of the documents, we reject Mr Nicholson’s argument that it was for the respondent specifically to question the provenance of the documents. That no specific challenge had been made to the authenticity of the documents matters not; the quote from Tanveer Ahmed above makes clear that it would and should be rare to make such an allegation without positive evidence that the documents may not be genuine. The respondent was making two points in the review; firstly, relying on Tanveer Ahmed, that it was for an appellant to prove that the documents he produces can properly be relied on, and secondly, that when looking at all the evidence in the round including the credibility of the appellant the documents could not be relied on. They are two different points. The appellant being on notice that now documents had been produced the respondent was still not accepting they could be relied upon, then, the burden of proof being on an appellant, if no independent evidence (i.e. evidence other than the appellant’s own word) that documents were sent to him at particular times by particular people was supplied, it was perfectly proper for the FTTJ to find that it told against the reliability of the documents that there was no such evidence.
32. It is however a different matter to take the absence of supporting evidence as a credibility point against the appellant. Of course, it is possible as TK (Burundi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 40 indicates. That case emphasises though that it is not simply the absence of supporting evidence, it is that there is no credible explanation for its absence. A judge is entitled to take into account the failure to provide supporting evidence but also must take into account any explanations which are given for failure to provide such evidence. It does not appear that the appellant was asked why he had not produced supporting evidence from the people he mentioned (see [33]) neither was it put to him (for example) that if he had really received the documents from the people he said had sent them to him he would have obtained a statement from them. Neither the review, nor the presenting officer’s submissions at the hearing which appeared to go to the weight to be given to the documents (i.e. to reliability rather than the credibility of the appellant’s account) [51] suggested that the absence of independent evidence of provenance of the documents undermined the appellant’s credibility.
33. The FTTJ took the lack of reliable evidence as one of the factors telling against the appellant’s credibility “I have found the credibility of the Appellant’s account to be undermined in several respects and that the documents he has produced from Bangladesh have not been proven to be reliable. Looking at everything in the round, including his conflicting and vague answers as well as the lack of reliable evidence, I find he is not a credible witness.” However as set out above the appellant does not appear to have been given an opportunity to comment on why he had not produced supporting evidence or if he was, this was not explicitly considered by the FTTJ and there is an element of “double counting” in that the fact that there are no reliable documents has been taken to count against the appellant’s credibility (in the same way we observe that it would obviously count against someone’s credibility if they had produced documents which were found not to be genuine). We find the FTTJ erred in this respect.
Ground 3 – ground and argument
34. Ground 3 avers that most points held against the appellant were not canvassed at the hearing of his appeal and so the appellant was denied the opportunity to comment or to provide an explanation. Authorities were referred to for the proposition that appellants or their representatives must be given the opportunity to comment on significant issues. It was said that the appellant was not given a sufficient opportunity to explain the matters referred to at [85]. The FTTJ said that she did not understand about when and how the appellant had found out about the existence of any of the documents and that his witness statement was ambiguous about when he learned of the judgments but she could have asked the appellant those matters at the hearing. Similarly the FTTJ had said at various places that she did not understand several other material matters, but case law indicated that to do justice if a judge herself considered that there were matters of credibility which the respondent had not referred to, they should be pointed out to the appellant.
35. We asked Mr Nicholson to take us through the relevant points. He said that at [85] the FTTJ had said that it was unclear what documents the appellant became aware of at what times; she could have asked the question of the appellant. She had said at [92] that she did not understand why if the BNP were in power in 2006 the appellant could not have sought the assistance of the authorities – that could have been clarified at the hearing. At [93] she did not understand how the appellant could apply for a student visa if he were in hiding and moving from place to place; she could have asked. She did not understand (see [94]) why the police would have been looking for the appellant in 2006 if no arrest warrant had yet been issued and the FIRs had been issued in 2004; she could have asked. At [97] and [98] she had referred to not understanding certain points – the point at [98] about the arrest warrant was linked with [99] which formed part of ground 5.
36. Mrs Arif responded that not every adverse inference needed to be put to an appellant, the points at [85] and [92] – [99] arose directly from the appellant’s own evidence and the interview record. It was for the FTTJ to assess whether the appellant’s account was coherent and plausible; credibility was plainly in issue throughout the proceedings and challenged in both the refusal decision and the review; the FTTJ was making evaluative findings and that did not disclose procedural unfairness.
37. Mr Nicholson said he reiterated in reply that when the FTTJ concluded “I don’t understand” she could have put the points to the appellant, and she may have received an explanation in reply. It was suggested that concluding “I don’t understand” was an evaluative finding, but that was simply not sufficient.
Ground 3 – discussion and conclusion
38. There were various points at which the FTTJ said that she did not understand certain matters. It was submitted that the FTTJ was making evaluative findings that the appellant’s account was not credible in that respect. We do not consider that we can dismiss that submission purely because the FTTJ used the words “I do not understand”. Whilst it is desirable that positive or negative findings are expressed using language about which there can be no ambiguity, we are reminded that we should not rush to find an error of law simply because we might have expressed ourselves differently from the FTTJ.
39. The FTTJ considered that it was unclear what documents the appellant became aware of at what times as she found the appellant’s evidence on this to be very vague. Overall she did not understand when and how the appellant found out about the existence of any of the documents, and she concluded that undermined not only their reliability but also the credibility of the appellant’s account.
40. If the FTTJ was saying simply that the appellant was vague and that undermined his credibility that in itself would not be objectionable, but she said she did not understand when and how he found out about the existence of the documents. However, the FTTJ has set out that the appellant said he learnt of the arrest warrant when the police came to his house and that in his asylum interview he said he found out about the cases straight away [85]. She said the two were at odds, but the two are not self-evidently at odds. There is a difference between finding out about an arrest warrant and finding out that FIRs have been laid. This was not a point taken by the respondent as a contradiction which of course does not stop the FTTJ taking the point, but it not being an obvious contradiction, if she thought there was or might be a matter which damaged the appellant’s credibility, she should have put her concerns to the appellant. One can see why the FTTJ said the witness statement was ambiguous about when the appellant learned of the judgment but his answer in asylum interview (question 53) appears to clarify that he meant he knew of the judgments in 2015. The appellant was not asked how he found out about the judgments (as opposed to how he found out about the cases filed against him) and the FTTJ should, we find, have asked him before she relied on the lack of information on the point as undermining his credibility. In other words if “I do not understand” at [86] means there is an inconsistency, there is not an obvious inconsistency; if the phrase means that the appellant’s evidence was vague, he was not asked how he found out about the judgments. If it really means that the FTTJ did not understand, then it is difficult to see how a judge’s failure to understand can undermine the credibility of a person’s account.
41. At [92] the FTTJ said she did not understand why the appellant could not have sought the assistance of the authorities in 2006. Given that this point is expressly taken in the refusal letter and the FTTJ considers the appellant’s explanation and finds it does not explain the matter, and indeed at [93] the FTTJ refers to inconsistent evidence given by the appellant, and at [94] she considers the appellant’s explanation in his witness statement and rejects it, she clearly means by saying “I do not understand” in [92] and [94] that she does not find the appellant credible on the matter.
42. At the end of [93] the FTTJ said she did not understand why the appellant was able to apply for his student visa in Bangladesh whilst also being in hiding and moving from place to place. If the FTTJ meant she did not find it credible, this was not a point which was raised by the respondent, and it should have been put to the appellant.
43. In [94], the FTTJ said that she did not understand how the Awami League were said to have been powerful enough to arrange the issue of false FIRs and arrest warrants when not in power but were not powerful enough to enforce such documents and prevent people from leaving the country. If she really meant she did not understand, she should have raised the point with Mr Nicholson. This is because Mr Nicholson had addressed the issue in his response, as the respondent had taken in the decision letter as an adverse credibility point that the appellant had been able to leave through the airport on his own passport, and Mr Nicholson had submitted that was based on an assumption as to the efficacy of the security services in Bangladesh and their communication with regional police stations in 2008. If the FTTJ meant that it was not credible (and there are good reasons for believing that she did mean this, bearing in mind her conclusion at [99]), then before so concluding she should have explained why she rejected Mr Nicholson’s answer to the point. It is not self-evident (particularly at a time when the caretaker government was in place) that if the appellant’s political opponents were able to arrange false charges and arrest warrants locally the same would mean that they would be able to prevent the appellant from leaving the country.
44. The FTTJ commented at [98] that she did not understand the appellant’s answer that he was able to leave but would not be able to make it through the airport on return, because he said there were greater checks on return and he now had the judgments against him. She said, “I do not understand this answer, because he had an arrest warrant at the time he left and was not stopped.” Once again, if she did not understand she should have asked either the appellant or Mr Nicholson for clarification and it is not obvious that this was just a comment, not taken against the appellant. If she meant that it was not credible, again she should have considered Mr Nicholson’s explanation referred to above, and his point in the response that it was unlikely that systems in place now resembled what was in place in 2008.
Ground 4 – ground and argument
45. It was averred that the FTTJ erred in failing to consider the appellant’s psychiatric condition and vulnerability in reaching her conclusions as to his credibility. At [74] the FTTJ recorded the appellant as a vulnerable witness but was said to have pre-emptively discounted the possibility that the condition would have any impact on his evidence. That was contrary to case-law and the Joint Presidential Guidance Note. The FTTJ had found that the circumstances of when the appellant made his asylum application indicated a lack of credibility but she had made no provision for his condition which was characterised by anxiety which the appellant had said in interview and witness statement was exacerbated by having been detained in 2013.
46. We asked Mr Nicholson whether we had evidence that the appellant had been diagnosed with a mental health condition in 2013. He referred us to the medical notes of the appellant’s therapy sessions in 2024 and that the appellant had been prescribed sertraline. He said that anxiety might be relevant to the points he had made at paragraphs 33 – 35 of the grounds. It was accepted the appellant was anxious now, and that anxiety was exacerbated by the fact of his having been detained.
47. The rule 24 response averred that in the absence of medical evidence to suggest anxiety and depression negatively impacted the appellant’s ability to give coherent evidence, the FTTJ was entitled to find that these conditions had no significant impact on his ability to give evidence. Mrs Arif added that the ground disclosed no failure to apply Presidential guidance or case law; that a matter had not been specifically referred to did not mean it had been overlooked; the FTTJ had properly addressed the appellant’s condition.
48. Mr Nicholson’s rule 25 reply submitted that once the FTTJ had accepted that the appellant was a vulnerable witness all the warnings set out in AM (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] 4 WLR 78 applied, including the need for greater emphasis on the background material which included the prevalence of FIRs being filed in respect of BNP activists. He repeated in reply at the hearing that the FTTJ had not taken account of the effects of anxiety on the appellant not claiming asylum earlier.
Ground 4 – discussion and conclusion
49. It is not right to say that the FTTJ pre-emptively discounted the possibility that the appellant’s mental health condition would have any impact on the way he gave evidence at the hearing. She did not. She explained that she had no evidence about the impact of the appellant’s conditions on his memory or his ability to give coherent evidence. The appellant was not at the time of the hearing taking medication and his condition did not prevent him working. The FTTJ recorded that he appeared to fully understand and to answer the questions asked of him. In the absence of specific evidence, the FTTJ was perfectly entitled to conclude as she did. The Presidential Guidance at paragraph 15 indicates that the FTTJ should record the effect she considered the vulnerability had in assessing the evidence before her. She did so record; she concluded the discrepancies or inadequacies in the appellant’s evidence were not explained by his mental health. It is simply not right to say that every time an appellant is recorded as vulnerable, no matter what his vulnerability, background material must have greater emphasis. The Court of Appeal explained in Khan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 148 that the guidance note does not impose a set of free-standing legal obligations on a tribunal, that the consequences of vulnerability differ and the issue will ultimately be whether the proceedings were procedurally fair so that there was a proper opportunity to give evidence and have that evidence properly and fairly assessed.
50. The FTTJ correctly recorded at [100] and [101] the explanations the appellant gave for the delays in claiming asylum. The appellant did not say it was due to a mental health problem, but one of the explanations he gave was that he was scared; it is perfectly possible to be scared without having an anxiety disorder. The medical evidence in the bundle is dated in 2024 and there is nothing to indicate that the appellant had mental health problems 10 years or more earlier when the respondent was criticising him for the delay in claiming asylum. Indeed, the FTTJ would have been engaging in improper speculation if she had theorised that the delay was due to mental health problems. The FTTJ’s findings in this respect were perfectly open to her.
51. The FTTJ did not err as averred in this ground.
Ground 5 – ground and argument
52. It was averred that it was irrational for the FTTJ to conclude at [98] (we observe in fact [99] although based on [98]) that 2.2.3 of the November 2024 CPIN “went against” the appellant’s account. The extract indicated that the ability to obtain a passport was not conclusive evidence that the person was not wanted by police or facing court matters. Bearing in mind the low standard of proof, this did not “go against” the appellant’s account. Mr Nicholson submitted at the hearing that if the FTTJ was saying this in a decision, it could not be a stray comment, she needed to explain why.
53. The rule 24 response submitted that there was no irrationality – the CPIN did not rule out the possibility of the issue of a passport indicating an absence of criminal charges. The passage did not say anything about whether those with outstanding criminal charges would be prevented from leaving Bangladesh.
54. Mrs Arif added that the FTTJ’s reasoning had been mischaracterised, the FTTJ had not found that possession of a passport meant that he was not wanted; it did not prevent the FTTJ from treating the evidence as relevant to credibility. She repeated that the finding about the arrest warrant and the airport was perfectly rational and open to the tribunal.
55. Mr Nicholson had said in his rule 25 reply that the judgments postdated the appellant’s departure. Getting a passport despite the existence of FIRs did not indicate a lack of interest from the authorities and so there was no evidence to prove any significance to the appellant’s unimpeded departure in 2008. He responded in oral submissions in reply that the passport point was not available to the FTTJ on the evidence she quoted; it did not say anything about getting out of the airport.
Ground 5 – discussion and conclusion
56. We have already concluded see [43] above, that the FTTJ should have explained why she rejected Mr Nicholson’s submission on the point before saying that it undermined the veracity of the appellant’s account that he was able to leave through the airport on his own passport.
57. We do not consider that anything is added by the FTTJ saying that the evidence about obtaining a passport “would appear to go against” the appellant’s account. It does appear to go against his account in the sense that although the document CPIN refers to it not being conclusive evidence it does say that the police verification process can lead to the denial of a passport for a person who is wanted by police. Whilst the FTTJ made the comment she did, did not tie it to any adverse credibility finding. If we are wrong and she did tie it to the going through the airport finding, then we have already concluded that finding was inadequately reasoned.
Ground 6 – ground and argument
58. The FTTJ concluded at [111] that even if the documents were reliable and the appellant was once sought for his activities, circumstances in Bangladesh had altered to the extent that the appellant would not now be at risk. Ground 6 avers that the sections of the CPIN to which the FTTJ refers do not cover those like the appellant who were the subject of criminal convictions and arrest warrants. The FTTJ had said at [113] that this could mean that the judgments against the appellant were reassessed. Putting the matter in this way reversed the burden of proof it was submitted.
59. The rule 24 response submitted that the finding at [111] could not be artificially isolated from the context at [112] – [115] about the steps which were being taken in general to unravel the actions of the previous government. Mr Nicholson had said in his reply that it was not open to dismiss an appeal on the basis that it was possible an appellant might not be persecuted. He maintained in submissions that in the absence of a clear indication that the judgments had been annulled, “could be” simply did not satisfy the burden of proof.
Ground 6 – discussion and conclusion
60. The FTTJ did not make the alternative finding, that the appellant would not be at risk even if judgments had been issued against him, to the appropriate standard. She said that politically motivated imprisonment was being looked at, which “could include” the appellant’s own judgments being made subject to scrutiny on return, but we agree that this reverses the burden of proof. We do not consider that there is enough in the other paragraphs of the decision to save this alternative finding. The FTTJ describes the background material that it is members of the Awami League who are being pursued and arrested and that the interim government had released longer-term political prisoners and announced a series of reforms, but this does not of itself mean that a judgment sentencing a person to imprisonment would not be enforced or that there is not a reasonable likelihood that it would be enforced. We agree the FTTJ was in error.
Ground 7 – ground and argument
61. The analysis of the requirements of Appendix Private Life was erroneous, it was averred. The appellant had lived in the UK for nearly 17 years and the ECHR had explained in Uner that the rationale behind making the duration of stay in the host country one of the elements to be taken into account lay in the assumption that the longer the person had been living in a country, the stronger his or her ties with that country and the weaker the ties with the country of nationality. The FTTJ had erred in failing to ask herself whether the decision resulted in unjustifiably harsh consequences. Mr Nicholson added at the hearing that the FTTJ had accepted the appellant had a private life in the UK and found that he did not meet the requirements of immigration rules, but she had not asked herself the question in the proportionality exercise whether there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences.
62. Mrs Arif repeated the submission in the rule 24 response that the FTTJ had conducted a proper proportionality exercise; she said she was not required to use the phrase “unjustifiably harsh consequences”.
63. Mr Nicholson had responded in his reply that if the FTTJ had asked herself the question of whether the decision had resulted in unjustifiably harsh consequences, the answer would have been informed by the judgment in Uner.
Ground 7 – discussion and conclusion
64. We consider the FTTJ properly analysed private life under paragraph 276ADE given the date of the application. In any event the relevant terms of paragraph 276ADE and Appendix Private Life are the same. It was perfectly open to the FTTJ to conclude that the appellant’s length of absence from Bangladesh did not mean that he had lost familiarity with that culture and society. She explained more than adequately why there were no very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration into Bangladesh. It is right that the FTTJ did not specifically ask herself the question whether the refusal would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant, but this matters not. The FTTJ as an experienced judge is taken to know the law. She addressed the Razgar test, and she considered the factors against the appellant and the factors in favour of the appellant perfectly appropriately and the balance came down against the appellant. It is evident from considering [128] and [129] why she came to that conclusion. That she found the decision was proportionate means it is not unjustifiably harsh. The FTTJ made no error of law.
Overall conclusions
65. We have found at least some errors as averred in grounds 1 – 3, ground 5 (if it adds anything) and ground 6.
66. Drawing the errors together, the FTTJ came to a final conclusion on the reliability of the documents prematurely (see ground 1 - paragraph 26 above). She erred in the way she took the lack of reliable evidence as one of the factors telling against the appellant’s credibility (see ground 2 – paragraphs 32 and 33 above). There were various points where she said she did not understand where she was making adverse credibility points which should have been put to the appellant or where she should have explained why she was rejecting his, or his counsel’s explanation (ground 3 and ground 5 paragraphs 40, 42, 43, 44 and 43 and 56 above). Taking everything together because there were errors in the FTTJ’s assessment of credibility, on the face of it these errors were material.
67. As the FTTJ erred as we found in ground 6, we cannot say that the appellant would not be at risk if there were judgments against him sentencing him in his absence to prison. We have noted [103] where the FTTJ says that there is insufficient evidence that the appellant is still being pursued by the police or the courts, but she did not go into that further and if there are arrest warrants and judgments against the appellant sentencing him to prison it is not self-evident that they would just go away.
68. When stepping back and coming to a final conclusion on materiality the test is whether it is clear on the materials before the First-Tier Tribunal that any rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion (see most recently Osei-Bonsu v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 1304 at [72]). Whilst the FTTJ took many credibility points against the appellant which have not been impeached, or we have found are unimpeachable, we cannot say that any rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion if, as we have found, there were points where the appellant should have had the opportunity to comment and he did not, or where the FTTJ came to a premature conclusion. For all we know, one explanation might have changed the whole picture painted. Again, whilst there was certainly evidence which could suggest that now the Awami League were no longer in power false charges laid on their behalf even those leading to criminal sentences might be withdrawn or no longer pursued, the picture was not so clear that any rational tribunal on the material before it must have come to the conclusion that even if the appellant were credible and his documents reliable, he would no longer be at risk.
69. Having considered the terms of the Practice Statements and Practice Direction as to venue, we conclude that the appeal should be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal as we have found that the effect of the error was to deprive the appellant of the opportunity for some of his explanations to be fully considered. There may also be extensive fact-finding.
70. We do not preserve any facts relating to the asylum claim. Whilst we have found no error in the FTTJ’s consideration of Article 8, whether there is any risk will also be relevant to the Article 8 claim so we cannot preserve the overall conclusion.
71. We preserve the facts the FTTJ found at [120], [123] – [126] as representing the position at the date of the hearing before her in January 2025.
72. Since the hearing before the FTTJ, the appellant has married a British citizen and has asked the respondent for consent to this new matter. We were told he has also made a separate application. Mr Nicholson asked us to consider giving directions that the respondent respond about consent to the new matter within 28 days.
73. We do not consider that it would be sensible to give directions on this one matter alone. There may be a need for directions generally as to the issues on remittal; we note that there is a very new CPIN on the political situation in Bangladesh. We consider it would be sensible for the parties to seek directions or a case management hearing from the First-Tier Tribunal after remittal.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision contains errors of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal (Birmingham/Nottingham) for hearing by another judge.
The judge’s findings at [120], [123] – [126] are preserved as representing the position at the date of the hearing before her.
A-R Landes
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
29 October 2026