Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002338
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56620/2024
LP/00552/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

PKTRP
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Kannangara, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Tan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 18 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Sri Lanka. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 1 April 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection grounds.
3. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant’s claim to have fallen under suspicion for assisting separatist actors after he was duped into transporting a weapon into Sri Lanka.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on 6 grounds of appeal. In a decision dated 13 July 2025, Upper Tribunal Judge Landes granted permission for all grounds to be argued. The following observations were made in granting permission:
It is arguable that when reaching some aspects of his conclusions on credibility the judge did not consider the appellant’s explanation for the apparent inconsistencies or implausible features of his claim. The appellant explained that he had not said that the parcel was inadvertently torn; the judge did not, arguably, consider the appellant’s explanation that he had never said in interview that he could not be protected because of his age (I note the answer to the relevant interview question appears to end in the middle of a word) and the judge did not, arguably, consider the appellant’s case that the evidence in the country guidance case of GJ showed that it was possible for someone who was wanted to depart Sri Lanka through the airport by bribing immigration officials (GJ predated the fact-finding mission but the evidence given to the Upper Tribunal in GJ suggests that the procedures on departing the airport have not changed significantly). The judge also did not appear to consider the appellant’s case that there would be an arrest warrant against him as he would be treated as having escaped from detention.
5. The respondent conceded the appeal in a rule 24 notice in which the following rationale was provided:
The respondent concedes the appeal.
Upon reviewing the determination as a whole it is accepted the Judge did not take into account the appellants explanations for some of the credibility points. It is also accepted upon reviewing the Presenting Officers hearing minute and determination that Judge erred in failing to consider country guidance case of GJ (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG (Rev 1) [2013] UKUT 319 (IAC) (5 July 2013) and the plausibility of the appellant departing from Sri Lanka without detection.
6. At the error of law hearing, I indicated that I would be allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to the First-tier Tribunal to be decided afresh without preserving any findings of fact. These are my reasons.

Discussion
7. I am satisfied that the respondent’s concession of the appeal is well-founded. Of primary concern are a series of factual findings going to the appellant’s credibility which were assertive and unreasoned. An example is at [22] of the decision where the judge stated that he did not accept the appellant’s account about being blindfolded and bundled into a van but did not explain why this aspect of the account was rejected. The pattern of unreasoned credibility findings continued at [23]:
[23] I have no hesitation in concluding that if the Appellant was given anything, what he was given was a coffee-machine. Gopalan and his wife then came around to his house to collect it shortly after his arrival back in Sri Lanka. The rest of the Appellant’s claim is simply not credible. It is not credible that the Appellant was carrying a suspicious item such as a weapon, or that he was arrested thereafter and tortured for seven days, or that he saw Gopalan, being tortured during his detention as well. None of this is credible. The Appellant left Sri Lanka on a visitor’s visa on his own passport, and prior to leaving had met with no difficulty whatsoever. I do not accept that he was in disguise. He gave evidence that his children and his grandchildren wanted him to stay in the UK. If the prevailing situation in Sri Lanka is disagreeable he is not singled out for ill-treatment in any way on that account.
8. At [24], the judge relied on concerns about the plausibility of the appellant’s account given in his substantive interview but did not address the appellant’s contention that he disputed the record of what he had said and had made determined efforts to obtain the audio recording.
9. While the judge did refer to GJ and Others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG [2013] UKUT 319 (IAC), he did not engage with the point that there was support in this decision for the proposition that a person who had fallen under suspicion might be able to leave the country through a Sri Lankan airport.
10. For these primary reasons, I am satisfied that the judge’s fact-finding analysis and overall risk assessment are materially flawed, striking as they do at the heart of the protection claim.
Disposal
11. The parties were agreed that the appropriate disposal was to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal without preserving any findings of fact. I agree that this is procedurally desirable given the need for a full fact-finding exercise which the FtT is best placed to undertake.
Notice of Decision
I am satisfied that the decision of the judge involved material errors of law. I set aside the decision without preserving any findings of fact. The appeal is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be decided de novo by a different judge.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

2 June 2026