Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002342
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03314/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LOUGHRAN

Between

CB
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In Person (via Cloud Video Platform)
For the Respondent: Mr Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The appellant appeals with the permission of Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Moon (‘the Judge’) dated 31 January 2025.
Background

2. The appellant is a citizen of Jamaica who was born in 1963. He first entered the United Kingdom (‘UK’) on 20 October 2001 and was granted leave to remain for six months as a visitor. He made an in-time application for leave to remain as a spouse of a settled person which was initially refused but allowed on appeal. He was granted indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom on 10 October 2005 on the same basis.

3. In August 2019, the appellant was encountered with 11.22 kg of cocaine concealed in a suitcase when he travelled back to the UK from Jamaica. He was found guilty of being knowingly concerned in the evasion of prohibition or restriction on the import of a Class A drug, for which he was sentenced to nine years imprisonment.

4. The appellant claimed asylum on 7 November 2023. On 18 January 2024, stage one of notice of a decision to deport the appellant was issued. Human rights submissions were made in response on 1 February 2024, in which the appellant outlined his claim.

5. The appellant claims he has a well-founded fear of persecution on return to Jamaica. His case is that he did not know drugs had been concealed in his suitcase and that he was taken advantage of by unknown individuals. He claims that if he is returned to Jamaica, he will be seriously harmed or killed by the people who hid cocaine in his suitcase in 2019 because the drugs were found and so those who organised the operation lost a lot of money. The appellant claims that his nephew was asking questions in Jamaica to try and find out who was responsible but subsequently disappeared and may have been killed.

6. The appellant claims that he had a very difficult upbringing because he lived as a child slave in Jamaica for many years. He claims to have family life in the UK with his partner, CD, and his three children who were, at the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing, aged 15, 9 and 4. It is the appellant's position that his partner is finding it very difficult to cope with the needs of the children in his absence whilst he is in prison. She grew up in foster care and has no family support network. In addition, the oldest child has a condition affecting his bowel which requires regular hospital attendances and the youngest child has special educational needs which is difficult for CD to manage.

The Respondent's Decision

7. On 19 July 2024, the respondent issued a stage 2 decision to deport the appellant and refused his protection and human rights claim. The letter stated that, in the respondent's view, the appellant had not rebutted the presumption contained within section 72 of the 2002 Act. The respondent disputed the claimed facts and did not accept that the appellant was at risk of harm on return. The respondent considered that the appellant had provided an inconsistent account which was lacking in detail, highlighting that the appellant does not know the details of the individuals he says planted drugs in his luggage.

8. The respondent also considered the appellant's knowledge of threats against him to be vague because they were based on rumours that the appellant's nephew was said to have heard in Jamaica. The respondent did not accept that there was sufficient basis for the assumption made by the appellant that the disappearance of his nephew was connected to his case.

9. By the time of the hearing before the First-tier Tribunal the respondent accepted that the appellant was the biological father of three British citizen children but did not accept he had a genuine existing relationship with them. The respondent did not accept he had a genuine existing relationship with CD and the respondent did not consider that Article 8 considerations outweighed the very strong public interest in the appellant's deportation, given the seriousness of his criminality.

The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal

10. The appellant appealed against the refusal of his protection and human rights claim and the appeal came before the judge on 24 January 2025. The appellant was not represented. The appellant had provided a bundle of documents in advance of the hearing on 27 November 2024.

11. At the beginning of the hearing, the appellant explained that he had been in contact with an organisation called Bail for Immigration Detainees, who told him to ask for the hearing to be delayed so they could help him find legal representation. CD had not attended the hearing. The appellant explained that he had told her not to attend, because there were weather warnings in place due to a bad storm and because he was going to ask for the hearing to be delayed. The respondent objected to the appellant's application to adjourn the hearing.

12. The judge refused the applicant's application for the adjournment, stating:

"I am sympathetic to the appellant's position but I explained unfortunately there is a shortage of immigration solicitors who want to take work on a legally aided basis and I did not consider that his position would be any different in three or four months' time. I had taken into account that the appellant had been searching for his solicitors since September. The appellant accepted my reasons."

13. The judge delayed the start of the hearing to later that day so that CD could attend and provide a witness statement, which she did. The judge treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness and the judge heard evidence from both the appellant and CD.

14. In a decision dated 31 January 2025, the judge dismissed the appellant's appeal. The judge accepted that the appellant had lived in slavery for many years as a child in Jamaica at [27]. The judge found that the appellant was a danger to the community and therefore excluded from refugee protection under section 72 at [50]. The judge rejected the appellant's account that he did not know he was bringing drugs into the UK at [48] and his account that his nephew had disappeared and was probably killed because he was asking questions about the appellant at [53]. Accordingly, the judge did not accept the appellant's claim that he was at risk of serious harm on return to Jamaica at [54].

15. The judge found that the appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with CD and his children at [61] and that it would be unduly harsh for the children to relocate to Jamaica at [62]. However, the judge considered that it would not be unduly harsh for the Appellant’s children to stay in the UK without the appellant at [63]. The judge considered that there were not very compelling circumstances that outweighed the very strong public interest in the appellant's deportation at [64-69].

The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal

16. The appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, claiming that the Judge erred in law by refusing to adjourn his appeal.

17. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal and the appellant applied for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. In that application the appellant stated:

"I do not have any legal representation at the moment but I believe that the judge did not treat me fairly by failing to accept my adjournment request despite becoming privy to my vulnerable position at court."

The appellant also stated:

"Because I need to have a fair hearing which will take all material factors of my case into consideration, I do not have legal representation and I am identified as a vulnerable person with some English (reading and writing) skills."

In the same form, the appellant stated that he may need support from Bail for Immigration Detainees who were processing his application for advocacy/legal representation. He stated:

"I was identified as a vulnerable person in my First-tier Tribunal and this was ignored and the hearing continued. I was left confused, distressed, mentally deteriorated and upset because I did not understand most of the things that was being said and I really struggled to articulate - communicate my needs and what I wanted to say due to my vulnerability."

18. Upper Tribunal Judge Kamara granted the appellant permission to appeal on 30 October 2025. The respondent did not file a response under Rule 24 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.

19. The hearing was listed for 13 July 2026. On 22 May 2025, the appellant requested that the hearing be adjourned. That application was received by the Upper Tribunal on 28 May 2026. The appellant stated that he had spoken to a solicitor who was awaiting approval of legal aid funding and the appellant asked that future correspondence be sent to that solicitor, who he named as Shawstone Associates.

20. The applicant's application for an adjournment was refused in a decision dated 2 June 2026. It was refused by an Upper Tribunal lawyer who was not satisfied that the reasons advanced amounted to a proper basis for adjourning the hearing. The lawyer stated that the issue of legal aid funding is a matter between a client and any prospective representative. The fact that funding is said to be awaiting approval does not, without more, justify postponement of a hearing. The lawyer also noted that no evidence had been provided in support of the application and there was no evidence regarding the status of any legal aid application, the steps that had been taken or the time scale within which any decision was expected to be made. The application therefore provided no basis upon which the Tribunal could conclude that representation is likely to be secured within a reasonable period.

21. In respect of the request that correspondence be sent to Shawstone Associates, the lawyer noted that the Upper Tribunal had no record of any representative acting for the appellant. The lawyer recorded that no notice of acting, formal notice of coming on record, notice of change of representative, letter of authority, or any other document confirming instruction had been filed with the Tribunal. The lawyer stated that accordingly, correspondence could not be sent to Shawstone Associates.

22. On 24 June 2026, the appellant applied via email for him to attend remotely, so that he did not have to leave the prison. I granted that request. The Upper Tribunal compiled a relevant file of documents which was sent to the appellant in prison.

23. At the hearing the appellant was produced via video link and there was an officer sitting in the room with him and Mr Parvar represented the Home Office before me in court. I checked the documents with the parties and the appellant confirmed that he was content to proceed with the hearing on the basis of the documents that were in the bundle before him that had been sent to him by the Upper Tribunal. He did note that some further documents had been sent with his application to the First-tier Tribunal that did not appear to be in that bundle. In particular, he identified that a letter had accompanied his original application which, it seems, did not accompany his second application to the Upper Tribunal. I asked if he was happy to continue on the basis that he explained to me what was in that letter and he confirmed that he was. Accordingly, we proceeded with the hearing.

24. The appellant claimed that he was in contact with Bail for Immigration Detainees and Shawstone Associates. However, he stated that all the documents had not been finished yet and that he still did not have a solicitor. Essentially, he confirmed that although he had identified Shawstone Associates, he had not formally instructed them and did not seem to be able to be clear about whether legal aid funding was being sought.

25. In respect of his treatment as a vulnerable witness, the appellant stated that the judge did not consider his claim to be a child slave. I asked the appellant if there were any other reasons where he thought there had been unfairness in the hearing and he stated that there was further evidence that he would have sought to rely on had the matter been adjourned. He stated that the evidence would address threats to his family in Jamaica that occurred a few months ago and that he had visited his family in London the day before the hearing (12 July 2026).

26. Regarding the mental health assessment, the appellant confirmed that an assessment had not been undertaken. He said that he had asked for one in prison but because he had moved around in different prisons it had not happened yet.

27. I heard submissions from Mr Parvar, who submitted that the judge adequately considered whether to adjourn the hearing, that we did not have any evidence that the appellant was any further in obtaining legal representation, that the only new evidence he sought to rely on was evidence of facts that had happened since the hearing and that there was no evidence that there would be a medical assessment.

Discussion

28. I am satisfied that the Judge did not materially err in law. I am satisfied that the judge considered whether the hearing should be adjourned and gave detailed reasons for concluding that it should not be.

29. The hearing before the First tier Tribunal took place on 24 January 2025. It is now 13 July 2026. The appellant is still without legal representation. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the judge was correct not to adjourn the hearing on that basis.

30. I am satisfied that the judge treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness. The judge clearly records that she considered he should be treated as a vulnerable witness the decision at [19]. Having made that decision the judge records that she had the relevant presidential guidance in mind, explained all language should be clear and straightforward and each question should focus on one issue only. She decided that there should be regular breaks and that she would try and keep the language in the decision clear. I am satisfied that the judge treated the appellant as a vulnerable witness.

31. I am also satisfied that the judge had regard to all relevant matters. The appellant submits that the judge did not consider that he had been treated as child slave in Jamaica. That is not correct. The judge accepted that aspect of the appellant’s account at [27] and it formed part of her reasoning to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness.

32. In respect of the appellant's submission that, had the matter been adjourned, he could have obtained further evidence, again, it is over a year later and he has not been able to obtain the evidence of a mental health assessment and there was no evidence before me to show that he would be able to do so within a reasonable timeframe.

33. The other evidence the appellant said he sought to rely on was evidence of facts that have happened since the appeal hearing. He says that his family received further threats in Jamaica a few months ago and that he visited his children in London the day before the hearing before me. The judge was not required to adjourn the hearing so that the appellant could obtain evidence of events that occurred since that hearing.

34. I am satisfied that the judge did not materially err in law and the decision stands.

Notice of Decision

1. The appellant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The decision of the First‑tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and it accordingly stands.

G. Loughran

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 July 2026