Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM
CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002357

First-tier Tribunal No: EU/50038/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

30th October 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JARVIS

Between

NICHOLAS KOFI AFRANE
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M. Azmi, Counsel instructed by Stillwater Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S. Lecointe, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 13 October 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge promulgated on 30 March 2025 (hereafter “the Judge”). Partial permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 9 May 2025 in respect of grounds one, two, three and five.

The decision of the Judge
2. The Judge noted in the introduction that the Appellant claimed to be the stepson of a relevant EEA citizen for the purposes of entry to the UK under Appendix EU (Family Permit) of the Immigration Rules.
3. At §13, the Judge referred to a Document Verification Report (“DVR”) dated 6 November 2023, upon which the Respondent based the assertion that the birth certificate (certified as a true copy on 31 May 2023) provided by the Appellant to confirm his relationship to his claimed father and therefore the relevant EEA citizen was a forgery.
4. At §20, the Judge noted the Appellant’s argument that the DVR should not be given significant weight on the basis that the document did not explain why the birth certificate was a forgery. At §21, the Judge concluded that the document should be given weight on the basis that the UKVI in Accra had contacted Mr Debrah (Senior Assistant Registrar at the Registry in Ghana) who had completed internal checks and confirmed that the document was not genuine.
5. In respect of the further documents provided by the Appellant to establish his assertion that he is in fact the stepson of his EEA sponsor, the Judge observed at §22 that these documents did not assist much. The Judge reasoned that if someone was prepared to pay to obtain a forged birth certificate in order to deceive the Respondent then they would not likely balk at obtaining a forged baptism certificate, hospital records and verification letter from the Registry.
6. At §23, the Judge went on to observe that the Tribunal did not have the facilities to check the authenticity of the Appellant’s additional documents as contrasted to the contacts available to the Respondent.
7. Furthermore, at §§24 & 25, the Judge noted a discrepancy in one of the money transfer receipts which the Judge observed could indicate that the Appellant was the nephew and not the stepson of the relevant EEA citizen. I note that the Judge did not in fact make a final finding on this and went on to observe that the Appellant could have made a fresh application without paying a fee and thereby provide the new documentation to the Respondent for consideration and checks (§26).
8. The Judge also posited that Mr Debrah, as named in the DVR, should have been contacted by the Appellant to avoid the suspicion that another false document had been provided (§28).
9. Furthermore, the Judge concluded that the relationship could have been proved by way of DNA evidence (§30).
The error of law hearing
10. I heard oral submissions from both representatives of which I have kept my own note. Mr Azmi relied upon his detailed and well-drafted grounds of appeal; Ms Lecointe asserted that the Appellant’s grounds of challenge amounted to disagreement and that the DVR was an expert report which the Judge permissibly gave conclusive weight.
Findings and reasons
11. In my judgment the Judge did materially err in law when assessing the weight to be given to the DVR and the additional evidence provided by the Appellant in respect of his birth and parentage.
12. Firstly, I accept the Appellant’s contention that the Judge has effectively misunderstood or mis-characterised the Respondent’s DVR document. Contrary to the Judge’s observation (at §21 of the judgment), I find that there is no direct evidence in the DVR that Mr Debrah confirmed that the document was not genuine after internal checks were carried out.
13. The only evidence from the Respondent’s enquiries about the birth certificate is at page 183 of the consolidated error of law hearing bundle. The response constitutes a stamp on a copy of the certified copy of entry in the register of births for the Appellant from 22 December 2012 stating: “not traced” and dated 3 November 2023.
14. I accept Mr Azmi’s submission that the Respondent did not provide any direct evidence to show that Mr Debrah had confirmed that the document was fraudulent.
15. In any event, I accept the Appellant’s argument at 2.3 of the Grounds that the Judge should have given reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s argument that the ‘not traced’ result might arise from reasons unrelated to fraud and therefore affect the weight which could be given to the evidence in the DVR. I am content to accept Mr Azmi’s contention that these arguments were advanced to the Judge as he was the advocate at the First-tier hearing, applying Abdi & Ors v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455 at §25. I note for completeness that the Respondent has not provided a rule 24 response (without explanation) where any disagreement could have been raised and Ms Lecointe did not contest Mr Azmi’s assertion in her submissions.
16. I have also taken into account that the Appellant provided a detailed skeleton argument for the First-tier proceedings which expressly challenged the weight to be given to the DVR at paragraphs 16-22.
17. In my view, it was incumbent upon the Judge to give reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s challenge to the weight to be given to the DVR bearing in mind that the burden of proof is upon the Respondent in establishing the allegation and the fact that this was the main point of refusal.
18. Furthermore, I also accept the Appellant’s argument at Ground 3 that the Judge failed to properly assess the Appellant’s documentary evidence produced to counter the Respondent’s assertion of forgery.
19. In my judgment, the Judge’s apparent conclusion at §22 that the verification letter, baptism certificate and hospital records were likely forged is infected with legal error. I accept the Appellant’s argument that the Respondent did not allege that the further documents provided by the Appellant were false and I therefore find that this conclusion was not open to the Judge.
20. Additionally, the Judge’s further reasoning that material weight should not be given to the rebuttal documents on the basis that the documents had not been put before the Respondent by way of a fresh application is misconceived. As the Appellant points out, the Entry Clearance Officer is the Respondent in these proceedings and is required to engage with the Appellant’s further evidence (and legal arguments) by way of a review.
21. It is evident from the review that the Entry Clearance Officer did not assert that the additional documents provided were forgeries but simply submitted that they were not sufficient to rebut the Respondent’s evidence of forgery without more.
22. I therefore find that the Judge took into account irrelevant matters when reducing the weight to be given to the Appellant’s rebuttal evidence in the assessment.
23. For completeness, I do not accept Ms Lecointe’s submission that the author of the DVR applied any particular expertise. The only evidential basis advanced by the Respondent in the DVR for the allegation of fraud is the scan of the stamped document said to have been provided by Mr Debrah.
24. I therefore conclude that the Judge did materially in law when assessing the weight to be given to the competing evidence.
Notice of Decision
25. On the basis of my findings I conclude that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside in full.
The remaking of the decision
26. Both representatives agreed that should the Tribunal find material error in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, the appeal should be considered by the Upper Tribunal on the papers provided, without oral evidence or a further hearing.
27. As both representatives were in agreement as to next steps, I have decided that it is fair to conclude the substantive appeal on the paperwork as requested.
28. In coming to my conclusions, I have had regard to the consolidated bundle of 184 pages; I have applied the balance of probabilities and reminded myself that the burden is upon the Appellant other than in respect to the allegation that he has provided a false document which rests upon the Respondent.
29. I have applied the Court’s judgment in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at §§22-23:
“22. The legal burden of proving that the Appellant acted dishonestly lies upon the Secretary of State. There is a three-stage process: (i) the Secretary of State first must adduce prima facie evidence of deception ("the first stage"); (ii) the Appellant then has a burden of raising an innocent explanation which satisfies the minimum level of plausibility ("the second stage"); and (iii), if that burden is discharged, the Secretary of State must establish on a balance of probabilities that this explanation is to be rejected ("the third stage"). This staged approach was approved by the UT in SM and Qadir v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ETS - Evidence - Burden of Proof) [2016] UKUT 229 (IAC), by the High Court in R (Abbas) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWHC 78 (Admin), and, by the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Shehzad and Chowdhury [2016] EWCA Civ 615 and Majumder and Qadir v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 1167.
23. The civil standard of proof applies and is flexible in its application. Where there are allegations of fraud or deception, which if established will have serious consequences, a careful examination of the standard and quality of the evidence adduced is required: R v SSHD ex parte Khawaja [1983] UKHL 8, [1984] AC 74; SSHD v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47. The allegation against the Appellant, made by the SSHD, was plainly of high seriousness given it consequences.”
30. In respect of the first stage: whether the Respondent has provided prima facie evidence of deception, I am of the view that this has not been made out on the basis of the DVR provided.
31. It is important to highlight the material parts of the DVR relevant to the allegation of forgery:
a. Mr Debrah is a Senior Assistant Registrar.
b. Mr Debrah was contacted by telephone.
c. Mr Debrah “completed internal checks and has responded through official means, that the document has been assessed ‘fraudulent’”.
d. The copy of the certified copy of entry in the register of births is the only direct evidence – it shows that the copy was “not traced” and is dated 3 November 2023.
32. It is also important to note that the anonymised Entry Clearance Assistant who completed the DVR does not purport to have exercised any of their own judgement as to the veracity of the document. I therefore do not accept Ms Lecointe’s assertion that the author of the DVR is an expert and that weight should be given to that fact.
33. I have taken into account the Appellant’s arguments in the grounds of appeal and the original skeleton argument at paras. 16-22 in respect of the weight to be given to the DVR.
34. Overall, I find that there is insufficient evidence in the DVR to make out the allegation that the copy document is a forgery:
a. The Respondent has not disclosed the official response from Mr Debrah in which it is asserted that he assessed the document as fraudulent.
b. At its highest, someone who may or may not be Mr Debrah stamped the copy of the document as ‘not traced’ in 2023.
c. At its highest the fact that the copy was not traced does not exclude the possibility that the document is genuine. As the Appellant has argued, there may be obvious procedural/administrative reasons why the document could not be traced which are not dealt with in the DVR.
d. The Respondent has not sought to bolster the DVR by the production of further information/evidence despite the Appellant’s previous criticisms of the DVR in the First-tier Tribunal skeleton argument.
35. If however I am wrong about that, I nonetheless find that the Appellant has provided reliable evidence rebutting the assertion in the form of: 1) a formal verification letter from the Ghana Births and Deaths Registry issued on 10 October 2024; 2) the Appellant’s health records showing that his father is Mr Kwadwo Afrane; 3) a baptism certificate confirming the same paternal link.
36. The Respondent’s challenge to these documents before me is minimal. Ms Lecointe was content for the appeal to be decided on the papers and did not request the opportunity to cross-examine the Sponsor about the further evidence. The Respondent’s review (25 October 2024) merely contends that the new evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the relationship.
37. In my judgment, and in the absence of direct challenge, the Appellant’s documentary evidence is to be preferred when looking at all of the evidence in the round. I therefore give material weight to the evidence from the Birth and Death Registry (dated 10 October 2024) which confirms that the Appellant’s birth was registered on 22 December 2012 and that the birth certificate issued on 31 May 2023 is genuine.
38. I also give material weight to the Appellant’s health records and the baptismal certificate.
39. Ms Lecointe did not seek to rely upon the discrepancy in one of the money remittance documents describing the Appellant’s mother as his step-mother’s sister-in-law. As I have noted above, the Judge did not in fact make a finding on this point – the Judge instead noted the discrepancy and recorded that an explanation had been given but then simply moved on to criticise the Appellant, erroneously in my view, for not making a fresh application.
40. I therefore accept the Appellant’s response that this was a one-off mistake in the papers looking at the evidence in the round and in the absence of challenge.
41. In respect of the requirements in the definition of ‘child’ in Annex 1 of Appendix EU (Family permit), I note that the Appellant is under the age of 21 years at the relevant time and is related as claimed. Subparagraph (a) of the definition of ‘child’ in Annex 1 does not require such a child to be dependent.
Conclusion
The Appendix EU (Family Permit) appeal is allowed.

I P JARVIS

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 October 2025