Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002358

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66825/2023
LP/11761/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN

Between

LBD
[ANONYMITY ORDER MADE]
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Solomon (instructed by MBM Solicitors)
For the Respondent: Mr E Tufan (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 28 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and his family members are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and his family members. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal brought with permission, by the appellant against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 2nd April 2025 in which the appellant’s protection and human rights appeal was dismissed.
2. In summary the appellant’s case is that she is a national of the Philippines who arrived in the United Kingdom on 16 May 2008 with leave to enter as a visitor. She overstayed and has remained ever since. She claimed asylum on 17 March 2021 on the basis of a fear of returning to the Philippines, due to the risk of harm from her abusive husband and prosecution for committing adultery. In considering that claim, the Respondent accepted that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence, but not that her claim engaged the Refugee Convention based on the appellant belonging to a particular social group. The respondent further concluded that her claim was not well-founded because sufficient state protection or internal relocation was available to her. It was not accepted there was a real risk of the appellant being perceived to have committed adultery upon return.
3. The appellant’s human rights claim further relied upon her relationships with her partner in the United Kingdom and the family, particularly the children she works for as a nanny.
4. First-tier Tribunal Judge Hussain (“the Judge”) did not find the appellant to be a credible witness on important aspects of her claim. He expressly did not go behind the respondent’s concession that the appellant was abused by her husband historically in the Philippines, but he had “serious reservations” about the truth of her account [39] in the following respects:

(i) The Judge rejected as implausible the appellant’s claim to have been threatened by her husband if she ceased financial support to him when she first arrived in the United Kingdom [40] and her description of being brought to the United Kingdom with the offer of employment but then abandoned [40].
(ii) The Judge found the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum and the delay in mentioning a threat from her husband in December 2024 until her oral evidence as damaging to her credibility [41]-[42].
(iii) The Judge also found it incredible that her siblings would maintain an association with her abusive husband [43].
5. For all those reasons the Judge concluded that the appellant had not established a real likelihood of being pursued by her husband upon return [44]. In the alternative, the Judge concluded that for the reasons relied upon by the respondent, the appellant would have sufficient state protection or internal relocation available to her. The Judge noted that the appellant has a number of siblings and adult children who have all supported her asylum claim and with their support she should have no difficulty in re-establishing herself [44].
6. On the issue of prosecution for committing adultery, the Judge considered the expert report relied upon by the appellant but found it failed to address a number of material factors [45]-[46] and [49] and concluded that the appellant had not established that there was a real risk of being prosecuted for adultery [51].
7. The Judge accepted that the appellant had established a family life with her partner in the United Kingdom [52]. However, their relationship was established when her immigration status was unlawful, which the Judge considered weighed heavily in favour of the public interest of removal [53]. The Judge considered that the couple could then seek to end her marriage with her husband and marry her partner in order to return to the United Kingdom. Her partner was noted to have a substantial monthly pension and over £15,000 in savings to support the appellant through this process [54]-[56].
8. The Judge accepted the observations of the independent social worker in relation to the appellant’s family life with her partner and the best interests of the two children to whom she is a nanny but in balancing the adverse impact upon all of them against the public interest in immigration control, the Judge concluded that the balance fell in favour of the public interest [58].
9. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.
Summary of grounds and submissions
10. Mr Soloman for the appellant relied upon the six grounds of appeal, although he was not the author of those grounds. There was no rule 24 response, but it was confirmed by Mr Tufan that the respondent resisted the appeal. We heard submissions on behalf of both parties in respect of all grounds of appeal.
11. Firstly, the appellant contended that the Judge failed to make a finding on whether the appellant’s claim engaged the Refugee Convention on the basis of particular social group. Mr Solomon stated by reference to the ASA that this was an issue between the parties that would inform the determination of real risk of persecution, adequacy of protection and very significant obstacles to integration. Mr Tufan responded that any such failure was immaterial because the Judge did not accept there was a real risk of serious harm. Mr Solomon urged us to consider that the issues needed to be considered in sequence and to reject the failure as immaterial due to subsequent findings was to put the cart before the horse. As an accepted victim of domestic violence, issues such as stigma and discrimination were relevant to the consideration of internal relocation, for which there were very brief findings in the determination that relied upon the respondent’s refusal decision.
12. Secondly, the appellant contended that there was procedural unfairness because the Judge had made adverse findings on 3 issues that she had not been given an opportunity to address. These were (i) the delay in claiming asylum, (ii) the delay in raising the threat from her husband in December 2024 until her oral evidence; and (iii) the failure of the expert to address whether there is a law against self-incrimination and whether the appellant would be compelled to confess that she had committed adultery.
13. In response to an observation from the Bench, that the delay in claiming asylum was an issue raised in the respondent’s review, Mr Soloman submitted that the limited reference was insufficient, and the position was ambiguous because it was accepted that the appellant was a victim of domestic abuse and s.8 credibility was not clearly raised. Applying the essence of Tui UK Ltd v Griffiths [2023] UKSC 48 meant that the Judge should have raised the issue about self-incrimination because this was not raised by the respondent and was only identified by the Judge. In order to achieve procedural fairness, Mr Solomon submits the Judge should have adjourned or recalled the hearing when this issue came to his mind in order to give the appellant an opportunity to address it.
14. Mr Tufan’s position was that the delay points were properly and fairly raised and that there were huge gaps in the expert report, it was not for the Judge to make enquiries about them.
15. Thirdly, although described in the grounds as “applying a higher threshold”, the substance of the complaint is that the Judge did in fact go behind the respondent’s concession that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence by concluding that “there is no objective basis for the appellant fearing any interest by him in her if she now returns there.” [40]. Mr Tufan highlighted that the Judge did not believe everything the appellant said and that was the source of the finding and he did not go behind the concession.
16. Fourthly, the appellant refers to the expert report of Ms Mary Kristine Reyes-Chu and contends that the Judge failed to take the entirety of the report into account and state whether he accepted the expert’s evidence. The appellant sets out four extracts of the report in her grounds of appeal that she says does demonstrate that there is a risk that the appellant could be charged with adultery and potentially face a six-year sentence of imprisonment. The four extracts set out the relevant provision of the Penal Code, that once the appellant is within the jurisdiction of the Philippines her husband could file a complaint, adultery prosecutions can be based on circumstantial evidence with a particular case that reached the Supreme Court given as an example.
17. Mr Tufan submitted that the extracts of the expert report referred to in the grounds are immaterial because there is no circumstantial evidence in this case that could lead to a prosecution.
18. Fifthly, the appellant contends that the Judge failed to make any findings on the issue of very significant obstacles to integration. Mr Solomon submitted that it was insufficient that the Judge made findings on the availability of family support, it could not be read into these findings that there are no very significant obstacles to integration, clear findings were needed considering her age and lengthy period of absence from the country. Mr Tufan accepted that the Judge did not explicitly address this issue but encouraged us to consider the totality of the Judge’s findings and that it was inherent in those findings that there were no very significant obstacles to integration and therefore is not material.
19. Sixthly and finally, the appellant contends that the Judge failed to take account of the best interests of the two children she looks after. Mr Soloman submitted that there were inadequate reasons and weight attributed to this issue. Mr Tufan noted that this did not concern a parental relationship and there was adequate consideration in those circumstances.
20. We reserved our decision.
Conclusions
21. In reaching our conclusions we have taken account of the general principles regarding the restricted jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal to errors of law set out in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at §26.
22. We find that there are no material errors of law identified in grounds of appeal for the following reasons.
Ground 1
23. The failure of the Judge to make a conclusion as to whether the appellant’s claim fell within a particular social group for the purpose of the Refugee Convention is immaterial. The Judge rejected that the appellant would be at risk from her husband if she returned today for sustainable reasons based on credibility issues pertaining to facts arising after and separately to the previous domestic abuse and there being sufficient protection and internal relocation alternatives available in any event. There was also no reason to conclude that she was at real risk of being prosecuted for adultery. We reject that in the circumstances of this case that the Judge’s analysis of those issues was impacted in anyway by the failure to consider whether she also falls within a particular social group because it was accepted as a matter of fact that she had suffered historic abuse.
Ground 2
24. The respondent’s review (§6) clearly raised the appellant’s lack of explanation for the thirteen-year delay in claiming asylum. There was still no explanation before the Judge. The appellant was plainly on notice of the point, and it is unarguable that any unfairness has arisen.
25. A recent threat from the appellant’s husband is a significant fact in her claim. The respondent’s review identified (§5) that the appellant had not seen her husband for twenty years, it was not accepted that given the passage of time she would be at risk from him. The appellant was plainly on notice that current risk was an issue and in light of the appellant’s witness statement being two years old at the date of the hearing and that she was legally represented, the Judge was entitled to expect that such a significant fact would have been properly advanced in her written evidence rather than arising for the first time in her oral evidence if it were to be seriously believed. It is unarguable that any unfairness has arisen.
26. The respondent’s review referred to two sources of objective evidence relevant to the appellant’s claim to be at risk of prosecution for adultery (§14-§16). The first deals with the need for some form of evidence of sexual contact and the second relates to the options for lawful termination of a marriage. The review states that the expert has failed to deal with these scenarios. In dealing with the expert evidence, the Judge raises a number of gaps in the evidence but essentially, they all relate to whether there is or would be any evidence to found a prosecution, which was plainly an issue raised by the respondent. That is why the Judge considered the issue of self-incrimination because unless the appellant were compelled to confess, there does not appear to be any basis at all that would place the appellant at risk of prosecution for adultery. We do not understand her husband to even know of her partner in the United Kingdom.
27. Whether there is a real risk of the appellant being prosecuted for adultery upon return was clearly in issue as was shortcomings in the expert report. No unfairness arises.
Ground 3
28. The Judge states in terms that he did not go behind the respondent’s concession that the appellant was a victim of domestic abuse [39]. However, his analysis of whether the appellant would be at risk from her husband on return twenty years later, necessarily included an assessment of the credibility of relevant facts arising after she left the Philippines. It was for those reasons the Judge rejected that she was at risk, and those findings were open to him. The Judge did not apply a higher threshold to the appellant’s case, just because part of her history was accepted did not dictate a conclusion that she would be at risk from her husband today.
Ground 4
29. We agree with Mr Tufan that the lack of any circumstantial evidence in this case results in this ground being immaterial.
Ground 5
30. It is correct that the Judge did not make any specific findings on the issue of very significant obstacles to integration. However, reading the decision as a whole and specifically having regard to the findings that with the support of her family members she should have no difficulty in re-establishing herself [44] and [56], we do not consider this to be a material error.
Ground 6
31. The Judge unarguably addresses the best interests of the children by reference to the evidence of the independent social worker [57]-[58]. He quotes from the report which deals with the best interests of the children assessment and states that there is very little to disagree with. The respondent is correct to point out that this is not a parental relationship and as such the provisions of s.117B(6) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 do not apply. The best interests of the children are a primary consideration but are not paramount and in the circumstances of this case the Judge’s decision that the balance fell in favour of the public interest cannot be faulted.

Notice of Decision
32. The appeal is dismissed.
33. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

E Daykin

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 August 2025