Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-002365
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/59606/2024
LP/13109/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2 August 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SINGER

Between

RDS (ALGERIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr D Lemer of counsel, instructed by Spector Constant & Williams
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. RDS appeals, with permission granted by the Upper Tribunal, against the decision of the First‑tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”) promulgated on 20 March 2025, dismissing his appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 19 March 2024 refusing his protection and human rights claims.
2. At the error of law hearing on 20 July 2026 at Field House, I had a composite electronic bundle of 220 pages (“CB”).
The Appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal
3. The Appellant’s case, as advanced to the Respondent and then to the First-tier Tribunal, was that he is a national of Algeria who had become involved in anti-government demonstrations associated with the Hirak movement. He said that he first participated in demonstrations in February 2019, and that he continued to attend demonstrations thereafter. His case was that, although he was not a member of a political party or formal organisation, he supported the protest movement and assisted with the practical arrangements for demonstrations. The Appellant said that, as a result of his participation in those demonstrations, he came to the adverse attention of the Algerian authorities. He said that he was detained and questioned on a number of occasions, that he was ill-treated during detention, and that he suffered an injury to his leg during one such incident. His case was that the authorities continued to seek him after he declined to surrender his passport, and that he thereafter went into hiding for a period before leaving Algeria. The Appellant relied upon documentary material said to have been obtained from Algeria, including summonses and court documents. He also relied upon photographs said to show his participation in demonstrations, evidence from family members, and material concerning the treatment of persons involved in political opposition or protest activity in Algeria. His case was that those documents and materials supported his account of continuing adverse interest in him by the Algerian authorities. The Appellant’s case was that, if returned to Algeria, he would be at risk of detention, prosecution, and ill-treatment because of his actual or imputed political opinion, his past protest activity, and the authorities’ continuing interest in him. He also relied on the circumstances of his departure from Algeria and his position as a failed asylum seeker returning from the United Kingdom. He maintained that the risk emanated from the state, and that there would accordingly be no effective sufficiency of protection or viable internal relocation.
The refusal letter and the Respondent’s position before the First-tier Tribunal
4. The Respondent’s position, as set out in the refusal letter and advanced before the First-tier Tribunal, was that the Appellant had not established that he was at real risk on return to Algeria. The Respondent did not accept that the Appellant had given a reliable account of his claimed political activity, the extent of his participation in demonstrations, or the alleged adverse interest in him by the Algerian authorities. The Respondent relied upon what were said to be inconsistencies and inadequacies in the Appellant’s account. These included matters relating to the number of demonstrations he had attended, the number and circumstances of his alleged detentions, the chronology of events after the alleged request for his passport, and the circumstances in which he was able to leave Algeria. The Respondent also relied upon section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004, in relation to the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France. The Respondent’s case was that the documentary material relied upon by the Appellant did not establish the truth of his account. The Respondent questioned the reliability of documents said to have been issued in Algeria, and maintained that the Appellant had not shown that those documents could safely be relied upon. The Respondent also did not accept that the medical material established that the Appellant had suffered injury in the circumstances claimed. The Respondent’s position was that, on the evidence as a whole, the Appellant had not shown that he had been targeted by the Algerian authorities, or that there was any continuing adverse interest in him. The Respondent maintained that the Appellant had not established a Convention reason for any feared harm, nor that he would face a real risk of persecution, serious harm, or treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR on return to Algeria.
The judge’s decision
5. The judge found that the Appellant had not given a credible account of coming to the adverse attention of the Algerian authorities as a result of political activity. In reaching that conclusion, the judge relied on what were found to be inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence concerning the number of demonstrations he had attended, the number of occasions on which he had been detained, and the chronology of events after the alleged request for his passport. The judge also took into account the Appellant’s account of having gone into hiding, and the circumstances in which he was nevertheless able to leave Algeria using his own passport. The judge found that the Appellant had not established that he had been detained and ill-treated in the manner claimed. The medical evidence was considered, but the judge found that it did not substantiate the Appellant’s account that he had suffered a broken leg as a result of treatment by the Algerian authorities. The judge also found that the photographs relied upon did not establish the Appellant’s claimed profile or the extent of the political activity asserted. The judge considered the documents said to have been issued in Algeria, including court or summons documents, and found that they were supportive of the Appellant’s account if reliable. Applying the principles in Tanveer Ahmed, the judge found that the documents had not been shown to be reliable when considered in the round and in the context of the adverse credibility findings. On the evidence as a whole, the judge found that the Appellant had not established that he was of adverse interest to the Algerian authorities, or that he would face a real risk of persecution, serious harm, or treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR on return to Algeria. The judge dismissed the appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection, and human rights grounds.
The grounds of appeal and submissions before me
6. The grounds of appeal to the Upper Tribunal challenged the judge’s adverse credibility assessment. The Appellant contended that the judge materially erred in finding inconsistency in his evidence as to the number of demonstrations he had attended. It was argued that the judge had compared the Appellant’s reference in his witness statement to having attended “several” demonstrations with his oral evidence that he had attended demonstrations weekly, but had failed to take account of his asylum interview, in which he had said that “every week we used to go out and participate”. The Appellant’s case was that, when the evidence was considered as a whole, the asserted inconsistency was not made out, or had not been adequately reasoned.
7. The grounds further contended that the judge materially erred in relying on an alleged inconsistency concerning the number of occasions on which the Appellant had been detained. The Appellant argued that his oral evidence and interview evidence were consistent in saying that he had been detained or arrested 12 or 13 times. It was submitted that the judge had misread another answer in the interview as referring to the number of detentions, whereas, in context, it was said to concern the places where he had been detained.
8. The grounds also challenged the judge’s treatment of the Algerian court document. The Appellant argued that the judge had accepted that the document was supportive of his account, but had then rejected it in reliance on the same adverse credibility findings which were said to be legally flawed. The Appellant’s case was that the document had not been assessed lawfully or fairly in the round.
9. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. The renewed grounds maintained the challenge to the credibility assessment, including the points concerning the Appellant’s evidence about the frequency of demonstrations, the number of claimed detentions, and the treatment of the Algerian court document. The renewed grounds also relied on an additional argument regarding the expert evidence and country material concerning Algeria.
10. Permission to appeal was granted by the Upper Tribunal. The grant of permission considered it arguable that the judge had erred in the assessment of the evidence as a whole, in particular in relation to the Appellant’s evidence about protest activity and detention. Permission was also granted on the basis that it was arguable that the judge had failed properly to address the expert’s assessment of risk on return, including the position of a person returning to Algeria after illegal exit and the implications of the country material.
11. At the hearing before me, Mr Lemer confirmed that the ground relating to illegal exit and the expert’s report was not pursued. That concession was made in light of what the judge had stated at paragraph 43 of the decision. Mr Lemer therefore focused his submissions on the alleged errors in the credibility assessment and on the treatment of the Algerian court document.
12. For the Appellant, Mr Lemer submitted that the judge’s reasoning on the number of demonstrations was flawed. He accepted that there was a potential difference between a reference to “several” demonstrations and evidence of attendance every week, but submitted that “several” was a general expression, particularly where the Appellant did not speak English. He submitted that the Appellant’s oral evidence was consistent with his asylum interview, where he had referred to weekly participation in demonstrations, and that the judge had failed to engage with that part of the evidence. He submitted that this significantly undermined the judge’s reasoning on a key aspect of credibility.
13. Mr Lemer next submitted that the judge’s reasoning on the number of detentions was flawed. He submitted that the Appellant’s oral evidence and interview evidence were consistent in saying that he had been detained or arrested 12 or 13 times. He argued that, when the relevant interview answer was read in context, the Appellant was referring to the locations where he had been detained, rather than saying that he had only been detained twice. He submitted that the judge had therefore relied on an inconsistency which was not properly made out, or had failed to consider the obvious alternative reading of the interview evidence.
14. Mr Lemer submitted that those two matters were material because they formed key aspects of the adverse credibility assessment. He further submitted that, if the credibility findings were unsafe, that affected the judge’s treatment of the Algerian court document. He contended that the judge had noted the document was supportive of the Appellant’s account, and submitted that its rejection was infected by the pleaded errors in the credibility assessment. He submitted that, if a material error of law were found, the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
15. For the Respondent, Mr Ojo relied on the Rule 24 response. He submitted that the judge had directed herself appropriately on the assessment of credibility, including by recognising that it would be wrong to reject an account because of minor discrepancies. He submitted that the matters relied upon by the judge, including the frequency of demonstrations and the number of detentions, were not minor matters. He submitted that the Appellant had adopted both of his witness statements at the hearing, including the later statement which maintained that he had participated in “several” demonstrations and had been arrested and detained on “several” occasions. Mr Ojo submitted that the judge was entitled to place weight on the Appellant’s latest witness statement, and to treat the difference between “several” demonstrations and weekly attendance over an extended period as significant. He submitted that the answer at question 35 of the asylum interview was not clear, because the Appellant had used the pronoun “we”, and it was not apparent whether he was referring to himself personally, to a group, or to protest activity more generally. He submitted that the judge was not required to refer to every item of evidence. On the issue of detention, Mr Ojo submitted that the interview evidence had to be read as a whole. He submitted that the Appellant’s witness statement was not detailed, and that the judge was entitled to identify inconsistency in the Appellant’s evidence as to the number of detentions. He accepted that, depending on how the interview was read, there was an argument about whether the Appellant was referring to where he had been detained. However, he submitted that this did not show that the judge’s credibility findings were legally flawed. Mr Ojo accepted that, if the Upper Tribunal concluded that the credibility findings were not safe, that would feed into the judge’s assessment of the Algerian court document under Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439. He further accepted that, if a material error of law were found, the appeal would have to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal with no findings preserved.
16. In reply, Mr Lemer submitted that he did not suggest that the judge was required to make express findings on every part of the evidence. His submission was that, where the judge relied on asserted inconsistencies on significant matters, the judge was required to consider the obvious sources of the Appellant’s account, including the asylum interview. He submitted that the judge had failed to do so in relation to both the frequency of demonstrations and the number of detentions. He maintained that the judge’s approach undermined the adverse credibility assessment.
17. I reserved my decision on error of law.
Legal principles
18. I remind myself of what was said by Lady Hale at paragraph 30 of SSHD v AH (Sudan) [2007] UKHL 49. What was said there about the restraint which must be exercised on appeal has been repeated in other cases, including HA(Iraq) and others v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 at [72]. The approach I adopt to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings reflects that and what was said by Lewison LJ at [2] of Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the FTJ failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the FTJ's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
Analysis
19. The first ground concerns the judge’s treatment, at paragraph 25 of the decision, of the Appellant’s evidence about the number of demonstrations he had attended. The judge recorded that the Appellant had said in his witness statement that he had attended several demonstrations, whereas his oral evidence was that he had attended demonstrations every Friday from 2019 onwards. The judge treated that as a serious inconsistency.
20. In my judgment, the judge was rationally entitled to do so. The difference between attendance at several demonstrations and attendance at demonstrations on a weekly basis over an extended period was not a minor or peripheral matter. It went to the claimed extent of the Appellant’s political activity, which was central to his protection claim. The judge was entitled to assess that evidence as part of the overall credibility evaluation, and to conclude that the inconsistency harmed the Appellant’s general credibility in relation to the core of his account.
21. I accept that the Appellant had also referred in his asylum interview to weekly participation in demonstrations. However, the judge was not required to set out every part of the evidence in the decision. Nor does the absence of express reference to that answer show that the judge failed to consider the evidence as a whole. The question for me is not whether the reasoning could have been fuller, but whether the finding was one that was rationally open to the judge. In my judgment, it was.
22. The second ground concerns the judge’s treatment, at paragraphs 26 to 27 of the decision, of the Appellant’s evidence about the number of occasions on which he had been detained. The Appellant’s case before me was that the judge wrongly treated one answer in interview as meaning that he claimed only to have been detained twice, when it could instead have been understood as an answer about where he had been detained.
23. I acknowledge that the interview evidence was capable of being read in that way. It would have been open to the judge to treat that answer as the Appellant responding to what he understood to be a question about the location of detention rather than the number of detentions. However, that does not establish a material error of law. The fact that an alternative reading was available does not mean that the judge was not entitled to read the evidence as she did, or that the judge failed to have that potential distinction in mind. The decision does not disclose that the judge overlooked the relevant evidence or misunderstood the nature of the Appellant’s account.
24. In any event, the reasoning at paragraphs 26 to 27 was not limited to a binary comparison between an account of 12 to 13 detentions and an account of two detentions. The judge also recorded that the Appellant had referred to having been detained almost 12 times. The judge was therefore considering a wider pattern of variation in the evidence about the frequency of detention. The judge was entitled to regard that evidence as relevant to credibility, particularly given the centrality of the alleged detentions to the protection claim.
25. I am not satisfied that either the finding at paragraph 25, concerning the number of demonstrations, or the finding at paragraphs 26 to 27, concerning the number of detentions, involved an error of law. Further, even if the second of those findings had been expressed with greater caution, I am not satisfied that any arguable deficiency was material to the outcome.
26. Materiality must be assessed holistically and in context. The judge did not dismiss the appeal because of one or two isolated points. The adverse credibility assessment was based on a number of matters, many of which are not challenged in the grounds of appeal.
27. At paragraph 21, the judge took into account the Appellant’s failure to claim asylum in France when he had the opportunity to do so. At paragraphs 22 to 24, the judge considered the absence of consistent medical evidence to support the Appellant’s account that he had suffered a broken leg in the circumstances claimed. At paragraph 25, the judge addressed the inconsistency concerning the number of demonstrations. At paragraphs 26 to 27, the judge addressed the evidence concerning the frequency of the Appellant’s detentions.
28. The judge then identified further evidential shortcomings. At paragraph 28, the judge addressed the evidence about the place of arrest when the Appellant was said to have been asked for his passport. At paragraphs 32 to 33, the judge observed that the expert had not considered the court document dated February 2024. At paragraph 34, the judge identified a material inconsistency in the evidence about whether the Appellant had stayed at his brother’s house for 10 days, for three to four months, or for seven months.
29. The judge also considered matters relating to the Appellant’s activities and movements within Algeria after the claimed adverse interest had arisen. At paragraphs 35 to 36, the judge found inconsistencies and implausibilities in the evidence about the Appellant visiting his family and working in his home area. At paragraphs 37 to 38, the judge addressed the Appellant’s account of remaining in Algeria for seven months, of being blacklisted, and of being able to work in his home area.
30. Those findings were all part of the judge’s overall assessment of the evidence. They were not dependent on the challenged findings alone. In my judgment, the judge was rationally entitled to treat the evidential shortcomings identified in the decision as damaging to the Appellant’s credibility.
31. The third ground concerns the treatment of the documentary evidence, including the court document. The Appellant’s case was that the judge had accepted that the document was supportive of his account, but had rejected it because of the adverse credibility findings which were themselves said to be flawed. I do not accept that this ground establishes a material error of law. The judge, I am satisfied, considered the documentary evidence in the round. The judge did not reject the court document solely because of a general adverse view of the Appellant. The judge considered the document in the context of the evidence as a whole, including the credibility concerns, the absence of the original summons documents, and the expert evidence. At paragraph 41, the judge was entitled to take into account the failure to retain the original summons documents. At paragraphs 32 to 33, the judge was entitled to note that the expert had not considered the court document dated February 2024. The assessment of documentary evidence was a matter for the judge, applying the well-established approach in Tanveer Ahmed. The question was whether the documents could be relied upon when assessed in the context of all the evidence. Given the findings which were open to the judge, I am satisfied that the judge was rationally entitled to conclude that the documentary evidence had not been shown to be reliable.
32. At the hearing before me, the ground relating to illegal exit and the expert’s report was not pursued, in light of what the judge had stated at paragraph 43 of the decision. I therefore do not need to determine that ground.
33. Standing back and considering the decision as a whole, I am not satisfied that the grounds identify a material error of law. The judge directed herself to the need to assess credibility with care. The judge gave reasons for the adverse credibility findings. The judge considered the Appellant’s evidence, the documentary evidence, the medical evidence, and the expert evidence. The conclusions reached were adequately reasoned and were open to the judge on the evidence.
34. Even if the judge had not made the finding at paragraphs 26 to 27 concerning the number of detentions, I am satisfied that the omnibus concluding findings at paragraphs 40 to 43 would inevitably have been the same. The remaining findings, taken together, provided a sufficient and lawful basis for the judge’s conclusion that the Appellant had not established his protection claim.
35. For those reasons, the making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal, dismissing the appeal, is to stand.

Anonymity
Because this appeal concerns an international protection claim, and publication of the Appellant’s identity could undermine the effective discharge by the United Kingdom of its obligations under the Refugee Convention, I am satisfied that the normative principle of open justice is outweighed in this case and that the anonymity order made by the First-tier Tribunal should therefore be maintained.

R Singer

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
24.7.26