Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-002378

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/51652/2023
LH/02981/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 15 September 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

MFI
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Badar, instructed by Londonium Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms R Tariq, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 4 September 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his human rights claim.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh born on 1 July 1980. He has a lengthy immigration history in the UK which I summarise as follows. He arrived in the UK on 29 September 2010, on a family visit visa. On 23 February 2011 he applied for leave to remain outside the immigration rules. His application was refused on 23 March 2011. On 28 December he submitted a reconsideration request and on 21 October 2013 the respondent said that they would reconsider his claim. On 26 May 2015 the appellant was encountered whilst working illegally, in employment obtained with a false British passport, and was served with a notice of liability for removal on 27 May 2015. He made further submissions on 24 June 2015 which were treated as a fresh claim and were refused on 12 October 2015 with a right of appeal. His appeal against the refusal decision was dismissed on 12 December 2016 and he became appeal rights exhausted on 26 September 2017, having been refused permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. On 20 October 2017 the appellant made an asylum claim which was refused without a right of appeal on 20 April 2018. On 12 January 2021 he made further submissions which were treated as a fresh human rights claim, but which were refused on 23 January 2023. The appellant appealed against that decision and it is that appeal that is the subject of these proceedings.
3. The appellant’s submissions of 24 June 2015 were based upon his relationship with his partner, whom he had married in an Islamic marriage, and his family life with her and her dependent children. The submissions were refused on the grounds that the respondent did not accept that the appellant’s partner had any status in the UK and considered that the appellant could not, therefore, meet the requirements of Appendix FM to the immigration rules. The respondent did not accept that the appellant played a parental role to his spouse’s children and considered that in any event there were no insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing in Bangladesh or any exceptional circumstances outside the rules. The Tribunal, dismissing the appellant’s appeal, accepted that he had married his partner according to Islamic rites on 27 September 2014 but did not accept there was sufficient evidence to show that they were in a genuine and subsisting relationship. It was therefore not accepted that there was any family life between them. The Tribunal concluded that Article 8 was not engaged, but even if it was, the respondent’s decision was proportionate.
4. The appellant’s most recent claim, in his submissions of 12 January 2021, was that he had a genuine and subsisting relationship with his British national spouse (the same partner as previously) and her three children from her previous marriage as well as their own biological child who was British. He claimed that there was fresh evidence to support the genuineness of the relationship which included the birth of their child on 21 August 2020. He claimed that, whilst he and his wife had separated for some time, they had since reconciled and were living together. The appellant claimed that their family life could not be conducted in Bangladesh, that there were insurmountable obstacles, and that he could not return there.
5. The respondent, in the refusal decision, had regard to the previous decision of the Tribunal dismissing the appellant’s appeal and refusing to accept the relationship as genuine and subsisting. The respondent considered that the appellant’s partner was not his spouse, as he had only produced a Muslim marriage certificate and did not accept that there was evidence demonstrating that he and his partner had lived together for at least two years prior to the date of his application. It was therefore not accepted that his partner met the definition of Partner, for the purposes of GEN.1.2, and as such the requirements of Appendix FM could not be met. The respondent considered further that the appellant could not meet the requirements of paragraph 276ADE(1) on the basis of his private life, as there were no very significant obstacles to his integration in Bangladesh, and that there were no exceptional circumstances such that the refusal decision would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences. As for the appellant’s claim in regard to his daughter, the respondent noted that there was no evidence that she was British and considered that it would not be unduly harsh for her to be removed to Bangladesh as she was only 2 years of age. The respondent did not accept that the appellant had a genuine and subsisting relationship with his partner’s children and considered that he would be able to re-establish himself in Bangladesh.
6. The appellant appealed against that decision. His appeal was heard by a First-tier Tribunal Judge on 14 March 2025. By that time, the appellant had separated from his partner and the issue no longer concerned the relationship. Rather, the issue arising for consideration under Article 8 was the appellant’s contact with his daughter.
7. An adjournment application was made at the beginning of the hearing on the grounds that there were ongoing Family Court proceedings and that the appeal should not go ahead until those proceedings were finalised. The respondent opposed the adjournment and the judge decided to proceed with the appeal and heard oral evidence from the appellant. The judge had before him some Family Court documents and an Order granting permission for the documents to be considered, and noted that there were indirect contact arrangements in place which the appellant appeared to have maintained. It was accepted that there was no relationship between the appellant and the child’s mother to be considered and that the issues related only to the appellant’s relationship with his daughter, who was a British citizen. The evidence was that he had not seen her physically since 2023 but had monthly indirect contact with her. The judge noted that the Family Court documents disclosed that allegations of domestic violence and safeguarding issues had been raised and that the appellant was claiming that they were malicious allegations made up by his ex-partner. The judge accepted that the appellant had maintained indirect contact with his daughter and considered that that could be continued from Bangladesh and therefore did not create a very significant obstacle or an exceptional circumstance to his return to Bangladesh. The judge concluded that the appellant’s removal would not be disproportionate and he accordingly dismissed the appeal, in a decision promulgated on 15 March 2025.
8. The appellant sought permission to appeal the decision on four grounds: firstly, that the judge’s refusal to adjourn the hearing gave rise to procedural unfairness; secondly, that the judge’s approach to paragraph 276ADE(1) was flawed; thirdly, that the judge’s approach to the assessment outside the rules and proportionality was flawed; and fourthly, that the judge failed to take account of relevant considerations in the Article 8 assessment outside the rules.
9. Permission was refused by the First-tier Tribunal. The application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal, primarily on the first ground, whereby it was asserted that the judge’s basis for not granting the adjournment was so unreasonable as to constitute a material error of law. Permission was then granted on that ground, as follows:
“4. It is just arguable that in refusing to adjourn, the judge made an error of law. Although not cited by the judge or in the grounds, it appears to me as though what was said in CJ (family proceedings and deportation) South Africa [2022] UKUT 00336 (IAC) (which in turn reiterated what had been said in RS (immigration and family Court proceedings) India [2012] UKUT 00218 (IAC)) was relevant to the matter at hand. The grounds as drafted are arguably capable of bringing in aspects of the guidance provided by the Tribunal in those cases.
5. I make two observations. First, it may be some relevance to establish whether the judge was referred to any of the authorities in writing and/or at the hearing. Second, it is difficult to see how the family court proceedings would have any relevance to the question of very significant obstacles. Rather, those proceedings would be relevant to the question of family life.”
10. The respondent produced a rule 24 response opposing the appeal.
11. The matter then came before me for a hearing on 4 September 2025. Both parties made submissions before me.
12. Mr Badar told me that the appellant was still seeking to rely on all four grounds of appeal, but that the main focus was on the first ground. He submitted, with regard to the first ground, that the judge had acted unfairly by refusing to adjourn the hearing to await finality in the family court proceedings, given that the outcome of the family court proceedings was material to the outcome of the Article 8 claim since the appellant was seeking direct contact with his daughter. Mr Badar relied upon the cases of CJ and RS, albeit accepting that there was nothing to suggest that the cases were referred to before the judge, but submitting that the first and third subparagraphs of the first head-note in RS were relevant, as the outcome was material and there was no suggestion that the family law proceedings had been commenced by the appellant as a means to delay his removal from the UK. Mr Badar submitted that the judge had therefore materially erred in law in his decision. With regard to the second and third grounds, the judge’s flawed approach to paragraph 276ADE(1) and Article 8 proportionality, Mr Badar submitted that those grounds were relevant to the nature of the contact the appellant had with his daughter. As for the fourth ground, Mr Badar simply relied on the grounds.
13. I asked Mr Badar if he could explain what was the outcome of the fact-finding hearing in the family court in September 2024 and the hearing in March 2025. He took instructions from the appellant and his niece who was accompanying him, and advised me that the outcome of the September 2024 hearing was that the order as to indirect contact was maintained, and the March 2025 was a case management hearing. The case was listed later this month (September 2025) for a dispute resolution hearing. I asked Mr Badar what that hearing involved, when there had already been a full fact-finding hearing, and after taking further instructions from the appellant and his niece, he advised me that it would be based upon a report from Cafcass which was awaited. There would then be a final hearing but it was not known when that would be.
14. Ms Tariq then made her submissions. She maintained the opposition to the appeal as set out in the rule 24 response and submitted that there was no evidence of the ongoing matters in the family court. Although there had now been mention of Cafcass, that was not mentioned before the First-tier Tribunal. At the time of the hearing before the judge there was an unspecified time for the conclusion of the family law proceedings. The judge properly found, at [19] and [20], that the appellant had alternative options such as applying for leave if he was still in the UK or, if he had been removed to Bangladesh, applying for entry clearance to return to the UK, if direct contact was ordered by the family court. The judge had therefore taken everything into account and was entitled to refuse to adjourn the hearing for an unspecified period of time. Ms Tariq submitted that the grounds were simply a disagreement with the judge’s refusal to adjourn the hearing. I asked Ms Tariq to address me on the cases of CJ and RS, and to the practice of the Secretary of State, referred to in CJ, not to remove a person whilst family court proceedings were ongoing. She submitted that the problem in the appellant’s case was that no evidence had been produced to the judge, nor indeed produced since the hearing, of the ongoing proceedings.
15. Mr Badar reiterated his previous submissions in response.
Analysis
16. In granting permission to appeal in this case, the decision referred to the authorities CJ and RS which had not been considered by the judge and which were said to be potentially relevant to the appellant’s case. It is indeed the case that the judge did not cite those authorities, although it is acknowledged that they were not specifically referred to or relied upon by the appellant. Those cases, as well as the earlier case of MS (Ivory Coast) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 133, all relate to circumstances similar to the appellant’s in so far as there were outstanding family court proceedings at the time that the respondent was contemplating removal. In MS, the Court of Appeal held that it was not open to the Tribunal simply to rely on an undertaking by the Home Office not to remove the appellant until the family court proceedings were finally determined, but that the Tribunal should have decided whether the appellant’s removal, on the facts as they were at the time, would violate Article 8. The case of RS provided for various questions which should be considered in cases where there were outstanding family court proceedings, on the basis of which the Tribunal should then decide whether there existed an Article 8 right to remain until the conclusion of the family proceedings or whether there should be a short adjournment of the hearing to await the outcome. The Tribunal in that case adjourned the hearing to await the family court’s decision. In CJ the Tribunal reiterated the questions to be asked in such cases, as set out in RS, and also referred to the Secretary of State’s usual position that removal would not take place during the currency of contact proceedings.
17. In the case of this appellant, and with reference to the questions asked in RS, as set out in the first headnote, Mr Badar relied in particular upon the first and third sub-headings, where the answer was that the outcome of the family court proceedings was likely to be material to the immigration decision and that there was no suggestion that the family court proceedings had been instituted by the appellant to delay or frustrate removal. That does indeed appear to be the case, and Ms Tariq did not dispute that. The relevant consideration for me, therefore, is whether, in the light of those authorities and on the basis of the answer to those questions, the judge ought to have adjourned the hearing as requested in order to await the outcome of the family court proceedings and acted unfairly by refusing to do so.
18. It seems to me that, whilst it was open to the judge to adjourn the hearing, it is not the case that he acted unfairly by refusing to do so, in the terms set out in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418. The judge considered the issue of fairness at [3] of his decision, and gave various reasons for being satisfied that there was no unfairness to the appellant in proceeding with the hearing whilst the family court proceedings were ongoing. He noted that the matter had been before the Tribunal several times and had been postponed owing to the family court proceedings, and considered that at some point progress had to be made. He noted that the position regarding contact between the appellant and his daughter had been stable for some time, with the appellant having only ever been permitted indirect contact with her. He also considered the best interests of the child in the meantime and in the event of the appellant’s removal, where indirect contact could be maintained on the same basis as it had been for the past couple of years.
19. It is relevant to consider that the appellant’s circumstances were very different to those in MS, RS and CJ, in that the appellant had not seen his daughter or had any direct contact with her for around one and a half to two years. The exact period of time was not clear as the judge referred at [10], when summarising the respondent’s submissions, to the appellant not having physically seen his daughter since 2023, but then at [15] referred to August 2022. I assume there was simply a typing error and take the correct date as August 2023, although the appellant’s statement did not provide any relevant information. In addition to that there was no evidence before the judge of the appellant’s relationship with his daughter prior to that time and when he was living with her and her mother, and the only evidence available to the judge suggested a history of domestic violence, abuse and safeguarding issues.
20. Of particular relevance is the fact that the judge was not provided with any evidence of the family court proceedings other than the Order of 30 October 2023 whereby the Family Court declined to make an interim direct contact order, having taken into account the allegations of abuse and a Cafcass safeguarding letter, and directed that a fact-finding hearing was to take place where the witnesses would give evidence and all allegations and evidence of abuse would be considered. A notice of hearing for that fact-finding hearing on 9 September 2024, estimated to last two days, was before the judge. The appellant gave evidence before the judge that at that fact-finding hearing, and at a further hearing on 7 March 2025, the same indirect, monthly contact arrangement remained in place. The appellant stated that there was to be another hearing in September 2025, which was not the final hearing. No evidence of any of those hearings was provided, in particular the details and any order made following the fact-finding hearing, despite the Tribunal having made directions for all documents from the family court to be produced. There was no evidence or indication of any time-line for the ongoing proceedings. Accordingly the judge was faced with a situation where he had evidence of the main, fact-finding hearing having taken place with indirect contact only permitted, and no independent evidence or information of any further hearings, albeit that he accepted that the proceedings had not yet come to an end.
21. Indeed it remained the case, at the hearing before me, that there was no further evidence in relation to the family court proceedings, of any next steps to be taken by the family court or when a final decision was to be taken. Mr Badar, upon instructions taken from the appellant and his niece, told me that the September 2025 hearing was for the family court to consider an updated Cafcass report, but there was no supporting evidence for that and nothing to suggest that the family court intended to hear any further evidence from the appellant. There was therefore nothing further produced before me to suggest a likelihood of any change in the contact arrangements, which in turn could have raised concerns about the judge having proceeded to hear the appeal when he did.
22. In the circumstances it seems to me that the judge made a proper judgment in deciding to proceed with the appeal. Had the appellant provided some clarity on further steps and evidence of the proceedings thus far in the expectation of an adjournment being granted (and he had the benefit of legal representation in so doing), the judge’s decision to proceed may arguably have been questionable, but given the circumstances the judge faced it seems to me that he acted properly and fairly in proceeding as he did. Although he acknowledged that he could not speculate, he considered the situation in the event that the family court at some stage made a different order in relation to the contact arrangements, and properly observed that the appellant would be able to apply for some form of leave if he was still in the UK or to apply for entry clearance of he was outside the UK. There was certainly no evidence before the judge to suggest that the appellant’s presence would be required for any further proceedings in the family court. I therefore reject the assertion that the judge acted unfairly in refusing to adjourn the hearing and I reject the assertion that the appellant was deprived of a fair hearing.
23. As for the substance of the judge’s decision, the challenges in the three remaining grounds before the First-tier Tribunal were not set out again in the renewed application but neither were they withdrawn by the appellant or excluded by the grant of permission. Mr Badar made only brief submissions on those grounds, and rightly so as they are without any merit. There was no error in the judge’s approach to paragraph 276ADE(1) or to proportionality/ Article 8 outside the rules. The judge considered the question of ‘very significant obstacles’ to the appellant’s integration in Bangladesh at [14] to [18] and assessed proportionality from [18] to [21], taking account of all the evidence available to him and all relevant circumstances, in line with the correct legal and statutory framework. He took account of the appellant’s length of residence in the UK and his immigration history, his integration into the UK and the circumstances he would face on return to Bangladesh. He had regard to the best interests of the appellant’s daughter and considered the public interest factors in section 117B of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, providing full and cogent reasons for concluding that the appellant’s removal would not breach any Article 8 rights. He was perfectly entitled to reach the conclusions that he did.
24. For all these reasons the grounds are not made out. The judge properly and fairly proceeded with the appeal on the basis that he did. There was no unfairness or prejudice to the appellant in the appeal proceeding as it did. Having fully and carefully assessed all the evidence, the judge made cogently reasoned findings and reached a decision which was fully and properly open to him.
Notice of Decision
25. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error on a point of law requiring it to be set aside. The decision to dismiss the appeal stands.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 September 2025