UI-2025-002384 & UI-2025-002522
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2025-002384
UI-2025-002522
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54882/2023
LP/05252/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
30th October 2026
Before
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL
Between
AO
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms P Solanki, Counsel instructed by Turpin Miller LLP
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 10 August 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This decision concerns cross-appeals from the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Hawden-Beal (“the Judge”), promulgated on 1 April 2025. The Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on protection and humanitarian protection grounds but allowed it under Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. The Appellant challenges the dismissal of the protection appeal. The Respondent challenges the decision allowing the appeal under Article 3 of the ECHR on medical grounds. For ease of reference, I refer to the parties as they appeared before the First-tier Tribunal.
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Nigeria. She entered the United Kingdom unlawfully in 2007 and has never had leave to remain. In July 2014 she was convicted of two counts of controlling prostitution for gain and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. A deportation order was made in February 2015.
3. In December 2015 the Competent Authority made a positive conclusive grounds decision accepting that the Appellant had been trafficked. Her protection and human rights claim was refused on 1 November 2016. Designated First-tier Tribunal Judge McCarthy dismissed her appeal on 12 June 2019. He accepted that she had been trafficked to the United Kingdom but rejected her account of a continuing risk from her former traffickers and found that she could obtain protection or relocate within Nigeria. Those findings were the starting point for the Judge in accordance with Devaseelan v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 00702.
4. The Judge considered the evidence arising after the earlier appeal. This included psychiatric and country expert reports, medical records, evidence from the Appellant’s son and friends, and evidence concerning the position of trafficked women and persons with mental illness in Nigeria.
5. At paragraphs 41 to 49 of her decision, the Judge found that the Appellant had not established a continuing risk from her original traffickers. She relied upon the absence of contact, threats or attempts to recover the alleged debt for approximately nine years, and found that the later evidence did not displace Judge McCarthy’s earlier findings. At paragraphs 50 to 60, the Judge rejected the risk of re-trafficking, finding that the Appellant would return to family support, would not be destitute, had some education and previous trading experience, and would not return as a lone woman.
6. The Judge accepted that the Appellant had serious psychiatric conditions which amounted to an immutable characteristic, and that persons with mental illness in Nigeria may experience stigma and discrimination. She nevertheless found that the Appellant’s condition was not visible and that she would not face persecution for reason of it. The Judge allowed the appeal under Article 3 of the ECHR because, notwithstanding the general availability of treatment, she considered that the Appellant would not have practical access to the treatment she required and would suffer a significant deterioration in her mental health. At paragraph 98, she also concluded that the Appellant’s mental health amounted to an exceptional circumstance outweighing the public interest in deportation.
7. The Respondent’s grounds contended that the Judge had not properly applied the test set out in AM (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] UKSC 17. In particular, it was submitted that the Judge had relied upon a predicted significant deterioration or decline in the Appellant’s mental health without adequately explaining how that met the Article 3 threshold. It was also said that the Judge had not adequately considered the availability of treatment and medication in Nigeria or the support which the Appellant would receive from her family. In granting permission to appeal, Upper Tribunal Judge Khan observed that it was arguable the Judge had not adequately addressed the issue of causation.
8. The Appellant’s grounds challenged three aspects of the dismissal of the protection claim. First, the Judge had misunderstood or failed adequately to assess the evidence concerning the reach of the original traffickers. Second, she had not undertaken the cumulative and individualised assessment required by HD (Trafficked women) Nigeria CG [2016] UKUT 00454 (IAC) when considering the issue of re-trafficking. Third, the finding that the Appellant’s mental illness would not be visible was inconsistent with the medical evidence and undermined the assessment of the risk of persecution. The Appellant also challenged aspects of the Article 8 assessment in her Rule 24 Response. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on all grounds.
9. At the hearing, I heard submissions from both representatives. It is unnecessary to set them out in full here. In summary, Ms Clewley relied upon the Respondent’s grounds. She submitted that, although the Judge had stated the test in AM (Zimbabwe) (supra), she had not made findings capable of satisfying it. In particular, the references to a significant decline in the Appellant’s mental health and an increased risk of self-harm did not identify the serious, rapid and irreversible consequences required by Article 3. Relying also upon the issue of causation identified in the grant of permission, Ms Clewley submitted that the Judge had not adequately connected any inability to obtain treatment in Nigeria with consequences meeting the Article 3 threshold. She further relied upon the availability of medication and treatment in Nigeria and the Judge’s findings that the Appellant would have family support.
10. In response to the Appellant’s appeal, Ms Clewley submitted that the Judge had properly treated the findings of Judge McCarthy as the starting point and had given sustainable reasons for finding that the later evidence did not establish a continuing risk from the original traffickers. She maintained that the Judge had identified and considered the relevant factors bearing upon the risk of re-trafficking, including family support, education and previous work experience. She further submitted that the Judge had considered the psychiatric and country evidence and was entitled to conclude that the Appellant would not face persecution because of her mental illness.
11. Ms Solanki relied upon the Appellant’s grounds and Rule 24 Response. In answer to the Respondent’s appeal, she submitted that the Judge had considered the medical evidence together with the practical barriers to obtaining treatment in Nigeria and the likely effect of the Appellant’s separation from her son and existing support network. She further submitted that causation had not been raised as a distinct error of law in the Respondent’s grounds. In support of the Appellant’s appeal, Ms Solanki submitted that the Judge had inadequately assessed the evidence concerning the continuing risk from the original traffickers, had failed to undertake a cumulative assessment of the risk of re-trafficking by others, and had not adequately engaged with the expert and country evidence or the outward manifestations of the Appellant’s mental illness. She maintained that those errors materially affected the conclusions on the protection claim and Article 8 of the ECHR.
12. Given the volume of evidence and the submissions made by the parties, I reserved my decision. The representatives agreed that the question of which findings, if any, could properly be preserved would depend upon my conclusions on the errors of law alleged by the parties. I therefore indicated that, once I had reached those conclusions, the parties would be given an opportunity to make further submissions on preserved findings. Regrettably, my directions were not sent to the parties before I went on leave. They were issued thereafter, and I have considered the written representations subsequently filed by the parties.
Consideration
13. The matter comes before me to determine whether the decision contains an error of law. If I conclude that it does, I must then consider whether to set aside the decision. If I set aside the decision, I must either remake it or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
14. I have considered the composite bundle, the parties’ written and oral submissions, and the evidence to which I was taken at the hearing.
15. I begin by reminding myself of the following principles. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find the tribunal misdirected itself simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. I am again reminded of these principles in many subsequent authorities including Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, at [2-4], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, at [26], Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50-51], and Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46-47].
16. I also remind myself that a judge is not required to rehearse every item of evidence or address every submission in detail. A decision must be read fairly and as a whole. The question is whether the reasoning is sufficient to show that the material evidence has been considered and whether the losing party can understand why the appeal has been decided against them.
17. Applying those principles, I am satisfied, for the reasons which follow, that the Judge’s decision involved the making of material errors of law.
18. I begin with the Respondent’s challenge to the decision to allow the appeal under Article 3 of the ECHR on medical grounds. Ms Clewley submitted that, although the Judge had directed herself at paragraph 75 to the relevant test, her findings did not establish that the demanding threshold was met. The Respondent’s challenge centred on the nature and consequences of the predicted deterioration, the availability of medication and treatment in Nigeria, and the support which the Appellant would receive from her family. Ms Clewley further submitted that the Judge had not made sufficient findings connecting any inability to obtain treatment in Nigeria with consequences capable of meeting the Article 3 threshold.
19. Ms Solanki submitted that the Judge had considered the medical evidence as a whole, including the Appellant’s treatment, risk of self-harm, reliance upon her son and support network, and the practical barriers to obtaining psychiatric treatment in Nigeria. She maintained that those findings supported the conclusion that the Appellant would lack practical access to the treatment she required and would experience a significant deterioration in her mental health. She further submitted that causation had not been pleaded as a distinct error of law, but that the Judge’s findings adequately addressed the issue in any event.
20. I have considered the parties’ submissions in the context of the Judge’s findings and the evidence before her. I accept that the Judge considered the Appellant’s diagnoses, medication and therapeutic treatment, the increased risk of self-harm, the role of her son and existing support network in maintaining her mental health, and the practical obstacles to obtaining psychiatric treatment in Nigeria. Nor is there any error in the Judge’s statement of the applicable test at paragraph 75.
21. However, the difficulty lies in the application of that test. At paragraphs 84 and 85, the Judge recorded the medical opinion that removal and separation from the Appellant’s son and support network would cause a significant deterioration or decline in her mental health and increase the risk of self-harm. At paragraphs 88 to 90, she concluded that the Appellant would not have practical access to appropriate treatment in Nigeria. The Judge did not, however, identify the likely course, speed or consequences of the predicted deterioration, or explain why it would amount to a serious, rapid and irreversible decline resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy.
22. Nor did the Judge make sufficient findings on causation. The evidence identified a combination of matters which might contribute to a deterioration in the Appellant’s mental health, including separation from her son and existing support network, interruption of treatment, fear of return and practical barriers to obtaining care. The Judge was not required to identify a single cause. She was, however, required to determine whether any inability to obtain appropriate treatment in Nigeria would cause, or materially contribute to, consequences meeting the Article 3 threshold. Her findings did not establish that connection or address whether the medication, treatment and family support found to be available would prevent the predicted deterioration from reaching that threshold.
23. I am satisfied that those errors are material. The Judge did not make sufficient findings as to the likely course, speed and consequences of the predicted deterioration in the Appellant’s mental health, or adequately connect any inability to obtain appropriate treatment in Nigeria with consequences meeting the Article 3 threshold. Nor did she determine whether the medication, treatment and family support found to be available would prevent the predicted deterioration from reaching that threshold. Those were essential matters in deciding whether the Appellant would face a serious, rapid and irreversible decline resulting in intense suffering, or a significant reduction in life expectancy. In the absence of those findings, I cannot be satisfied that the outcome would have been the same had the Judge undertaken the required analysis. The Respondent has therefore established a material error of law on this ground.
24. I turn to the first ground advanced by the Appellant, namely that the Judge erred in rejecting the claimed continuing risk from the original traffickers. Ms Solanki submitted that the Judge had misunderstood or inadequately assessed the evidence concerning the outstanding debt, the attacks upon family members and the capacity of the trafficking network to trace her in Nigeria. Ms Clewley submitted that the Judge had properly treated the earlier decision of Judge McCarthy as the starting point, considered the later evidence and given sustainable reasons for concluding that it did not displace the earlier findings.
25. I accept Ms Clewley’s submission on this ground. The Judge treated the findings of Judge McCarthy as her starting point, rather than as determinative. At paragraphs 41 to 49, she considered the evidence of the Appellant and her son, the alleged attacks upon family members, the claimed outstanding debt and the expert evidence concerning trafficking networks. The Judge was entitled to attach significance to the lengthy absence of any contact, threats or attempts to recover the alleged debt. She gave adequate reasons for finding that the evidence did not establish either a continuing interest in the Appellant on the part of her original traffickers or an ability to trace her throughout Nigeria.
26. I consider that Ms Solanki’s submissions on this ground amount, in substance, to disagreement with the weight which the Judge attached to the evidence. They do not disclose an error of law. The finding that the Appellant had not established a continuing real risk from her original traffickers was open to the Judge and was adequately reasoned. I am not satisfied that the Judge materially erred in law in reaching that conclusion.
27. The Appellant’s second ground concerned the risk of re-trafficking by persons other than her original traffickers. Ms Solanki submitted that the Judge had failed to undertake an individual and cumulative assessment of the relevant risk factors in accordance with HD (supra). She relied upon the Judge’s treatment of family support, the Appellant’s historic education and trading experience, her psychiatric condition and previous trafficking, and the expert and country evidence concerning the treatment of a forced returnee at the airport and the possible disclosure of her history. Ms Clewley submitted that the Judge had identified the relevant factors and was entitled to find that the Appellant would return to family support, would not be destitute and had some education and work experience.
28. I accept Ms Solanki’s submission on this ground. Although the Judge identified a number of relevant matters, she did not adequately assess their cumulative effect. She relied upon the presence of the Appellant’s mother, brother and extended family in Nigeria without determining their practical or financial ability to provide her with stable accommodation, treatment and support. The evidence was that the family had previously depended upon remittances from the Appellant and that their circumstances had not materially improved. Their willingness to receive the Appellant did not, without more, establish that they would be able to provide the support she required.
29. The Judge also relied upon the Appellant’s education to the age of 16 and her experience of market trading before she left Nigeria in 2007. She did not assess whether experience acquired approximately 17 years earlier would provide the Appellant with a realistic means of supporting herself upon return, particularly in light of the psychiatric evidence concerning hallucinations, dissociation, impaired concentration and reduced daily functioning.
30. Further, although the Judge accepted that the Appellant’s mental illness was a relevant vulnerability, she did not evaluate its interaction with her age, lengthy absence from Nigeria, history of trafficking, limited work experience and uncertain family support. Nor did she consider whether the circumstances which had previously rendered the Appellant vulnerable to trafficking remained relevant to the risk she would face upon return. The Judge did not, therefore, undertake an adequate individual and cumulative assessment of the relevant risk factors required when applying the country guidance in HD.
31. I am satisfied that the error is material. The matters which were not adequately assessed bear directly upon whether the Appellant would have access to stable accommodation and effective support, whether she could obtain treatment and maintain a lawful livelihood, and whether her circumstances would expose her to destitution and renewed exploitation. I cannot be satisfied that the Judge would have reached the same conclusions on the risk of re-trafficking, the sufficiency of protection or internal relocation had she undertaken the required cumulative assessment. The Appellant has therefore established a material error of law on this ground.
32. The Appellant’s third ground concerned her protection claim based upon mental illness. Ms Solanki submitted that the finding at paragraph 67 that the Appellant’s condition was not visible failed adequately to engage with the medical evidence concerning its outward manifestations. She submitted that this error undermined the Judge’s assessment of whether the Appellant would be perceived as mentally ill and, as a consequence, exposed to a real risk of persecution. Ms Clewley submitted that the Judge had considered the psychiatric and country evidence and was entitled to conclude that the Appellant would not be exposed to the treatment described in the background evidence.
33. At paragraph 62, the Judge accepted that the Appellant’s serious psychiatric conditions amounted to an immutable characteristic and that she would be perceived as different by Nigerian society. Her conclusion at paragraph 68 that the Appellant was not a member of a particular social group is difficult to reconcile with those findings. The material error, however, lies in the assessment of risk.
34. The finding that the condition was not visible did not adequately engage with the medical evidence. Dr Kemmis described auditory and visual hallucinations, the Appellant speaking back to voices, command hallucinations to harm herself, panic when approached, nightmares, shaking, crying, shouting and screaming. Lisa Davies’s report described dissociation, loss of awareness of her surroundings and episodes of “zoning out”. Those manifestations were capable of being observable even if the diagnosis itself was not immediately apparent.
35. I accept that the Judge was not required to recite every part of the evidence. She was, however, required to explain why, notwithstanding that evidence, the manifestations of the Appellant’s condition would not be discernible to her family, community, the police or those providing traditional, religious or institutional care. The reasoning at paragraphs 62 to 68 does not adequately address that question. The background country evidence described stigma, ostracism, detention, chaining and abuse in some state, traditional and faith-based settings. Without a properly reasoned finding as to how the Appellant’s condition was likely to manifest itself and be perceived by others, the Judge could not adequately assess the risk arising from that evidence. I am therefore satisfied that the Judge’s assessment involved an error of law.
36. I am also satisfied that the error is material. Whether the Appellant’s condition would be visible or otherwise discernible was relevant to whether she would be perceived as mentally ill, how her family and community might respond to her, whether she would be exposed to harmful treatment, whether any such treatment would be for a Convention reason, and whether effective protection would be available. I cannot be satisfied that the Judge would have reached the same conclusion on the protection claim had she undertaken the required assessment. The Appellant has therefore established a material error of law on this ground.
37. Following the hearing, I invited the parties to make written submissions on the findings which should be preserved. I have considered the representations filed by both parties in light of the errors of law identified above and the extent to which the Judge’s findings are properly severable.
38. I find that the errors identified in the Judge’s assessment of the protection claim do not undermine the discrete findings at paragraphs 41 to 49 concerning the risk from the Appellant’s original traffickers. Those findings are not dependent upon the flawed assessment of the risk of re-trafficking by others or the protection claim based upon mental illness. They are therefore preserved.
39. The errors do, however, affect the findings at paragraphs 50 to 69 concerning the risk of re-trafficking by others, the protection claim based upon mental illness, the sufficiency of protection and internal relocation. The conclusions on humanitarian protection at paragraphs 70 to 72 depended upon the same assessment of risk and therefore cannot be preserved.
40. Nor can the findings on the Article 3 medical claim be preserved. Although some passages record matters which were not individually disputed, paragraphs 73 to 90 form part of the evaluative assessment which I have found to be legally inadequate. In particular, paragraphs 84 to 89 lie at the centre of the deficient analysis of the Article 3 threshold and causation. Preserving isolated parts of that assessment would risk constraining the fresh evaluation required.
41. The Judge’s conclusion under Article 8 cannot safely stand. Although the Respondent’s grounds were directed to Article 3, the Appellant challenged aspects of the Article 8 assessment in her Rule 24 Response. More fundamentally, the conclusions at paragraphs 96 to 99 relied upon the same findings concerning access to treatment and deterioration in mental health which I have found to be legally inadequate. The findings concerning family support, the Appellant’s relationship with her son and her ability to establish herself in Nigeria also overlap with matters which must be reconsidered.
42. I have considered whether the findings at paragraphs 91 to 95 can be severed from the remainder of the Article 8 assessment and preserved. I am not satisfied that they can. Those findings concern the Appellant’s family relationships, her circumstances in Nigeria and the likely effect of removal, all of which overlap with matters upon which findings must be made afresh. The Article 8 assessment must therefore be set aside in its entirety. Accordingly, save for the findings at paragraphs 41 to 49 concerning the risk from the Appellant’s original traffickers, the findings from paragraph 50 onwards are set aside.
43. Substantial findings must be made afresh on the risk of re-trafficking by persons other than the original traffickers, the protection claim based upon mental illness, the sufficiency of protection, internal relocation, humanitarian protection, Article 3 and Article 8.
44. The remaking of the appeal will require a detailed evaluation of the medical, expert, witness and country evidence, together with any updating evidence admitted by the Tribunal. Having regard to paragraph 7.2 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement, I am satisfied that the nature and extent of the necessary fact-finding make remittal the appropriate course. The appeal is therefore remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing, subject only to the findings at paragraphs 41 to 49 of the Judge’s decision which I have preserved.
Notice of Decision
45. The Respondent’s appeal is allowed.
46. The Appellant’s appeal is allowed in part.
47. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors of law in its assessment of the Article 3 medical claim, the risk of re-trafficking by persons other than the original traffickers, and the protection claim based upon mental illness. For the reasons given above, the conclusions on humanitarian protection and Article 8 cannot stand.
48. The decision is set aside, save that the findings at paragraphs 41 to 49 concerning the absence of a continuing real risk from the Appellant’s original traffickers are preserved.
49. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before a judge other than Judge Hawden-Beal, subject to those preserved findings.
R. Bagral
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
23 October 2026