Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002400

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01525/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 8th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RIMINGTON

Between

HH
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr N Paramjorthy, Paramount Chambers
For the Respondent: Ms L Clewley, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity owing to the nature of the appeal.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant seeks permission to appeal the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Monson (the judge) who dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision refusing on 4th March 2024 the appellant’s protection and human right claim made on 30th October 2021.
2. The appellant is a national of Sri Lanka born in 1979 and in 2011 he applied for a student visa which was successful and he entered the UK in October 2011. On 14th September 2012 his leave was curtailed to expire on 30th November 2012 because the sponsor licence for his college was surrendered. On 14th December 2012 the appellant applied for further leave to remain but that was refused on 5th June 2014 under paragraph 322(1a) because the appellant had submitted false documents in regard to his application.
3. The appellant then claimed asylum on 30th October 2021, which was refused. The appellant maintained that he was at risk on return to Sri Lanka as he was suspected by the authorities of raising money for the LTTE/TGTE and via his friend, LS, in Sri Lanka.
Grounds of appeal.
4. It was submitted that the FtT decision was tainted by two errors:
Ground 1
5. It was asserted that the judge’s decision at [30-32] contained a classic Mibanga v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 367 error, in that the judge considered the psychiatric report of Dr S Dhumad, Consultant Psychiatrist, first and then went on to consider credibility and there was no holistic evidence of the appellant's evidence.
6. Whilst it was correct the appellant had not provided GP medical records, the appellant was interviewed by Dr Dhumad for three and a half hours and he found the appellant reported several symptoms of depression, low mood, anxiety, poor sleep and lack of concentration. He further clinically found the appellant suffered from a Severe Recurrent Depressive Episode and at paragraph 13.2 of the report suffered from PTSD. Whilst the PTSD diagnosis may not materially support the claim, the judge had materially erred in failing to engage with the clinical finding of a lack of concentration and from the appellant’s own account at [7] of his witness statement in which he states “I have depression and panic attacks for some time and I have had suicidal ideations for some time and I still have not received my ARC Card”. There was no adequate consideration of the psychiatric evidence.
Ground 2
7. At [34] to [39] the judge demonstrably failed to engage with the appellant’s witness statement pages 5 to 9 of the appellant’s bundle and exclusively considered the appellant’s asylum interview and not the matters that were clarified in the appellant’s witness statement. At [10] to [18], in his witness statement, the appellant explained that he had attracted the adverse attention of the authorities in Sri Lanka as he was suspected of fundraising for the LTTE and that such funds were being sent to the TGTE. The appellant drew a distinction between the TGTE and the LTTE and explained where he collected the funds from, with whom he collected the funds and as to when he collects those funds and why. The appellant clarified as to why the funds were collected, to whom they were being sent and as to LS’s [his friend] involvement.
8. The judge at [34] to [38] rejected the appellant’s credibility of being involved in raising funds for the LTTE that were remitted to the TGTE and drew adverse inferences from the fact the appellant did not know whether his friend was a supporter or member of the TGTE or not. The appellant clearly explained that the TGTE did not exist in Sri Lanka and explained that funds were remitted by LS to the TGTE and yet there was no consideration of this evidence. It was never the appellant’s evidence that he attended LTTE demonstrations in Sri Lanka and the appellant explained in his witness statement that he lived in the Tamil suburb of Wellawatte in Colombo and had lived in the Tamil community and yet this evidence is not considered; instead the judge apparently adopted the findings of the Respondent in the refusal letter in the absence of any consideration of the appellant's witness statement. Further, the appellant had never stated that he sought to advance Tamil separatism, and the judge had erred materially in law.
Submissions
9. At the hearing Mr Paramjorthy accepted that the judge did refer to the witness statements but notwithstanding the appellant advanced his case as set out above.
10. In relation to Mibanga, I was referred to [30] to [33] where the judge did look at the report of Dr Dhumad, but that was based not merely on self-reporting by the appellant but the doctor looking at the symptoms and made clinical findings and I was pointed to [6] of that report.
11. Secondly there was very little cross-referencing of the appellant’s witness statement. It was unusual that this appellant was of Sinhalese ethnicity and gave his evidence in English.
12. The Rule 24 was a general disagreement, and the appellant had a legitimate expectation that there was proper reconciliation between the oral evidence and the written testimony.
13. Ms Clewley, in relation to the first ground, submitted that the judge was correct to observe a lack of GP records and his findings were based upon the fact that the appellant was self-reporting. It was open to the judge to note there was no independent evidence of signs and symptoms of the appellant’s claim. It was open to the judge to consider the diagnosis and report which did not explain away the inconsistencies in the appellant’s account.
14. The judge approached the evidence and relevant matters in the round, and this was reflected at [33] and [39].
15. The consideration of the expert report did not stand alone, and the judge should start somewhere, and the judge had properly explained briefly throughout. At [34] the judge explained the consideration of the evidence and why he reached the decision.
16. In relation to ground 2, the judge did refer to the witness statement at [34] and in terms of confusion of the judge’s understanding as to whether the TGTE and LTTE were separate organisations and the TGTE were operating in the UK, at [9] the appellant records his position that they were separate organisations and again this distinction is considered at [44] and the judge recited the country guidance in detail and the understanding of the group.
17. It was open to the judge to consider the matter as he did, and the grounds were a series of criticisms. The key point was that the appellant’s evidence was inconsistent with the appellant’s notice of involvement in the cause.
18. Mr Paramjorthy submitted the judge’s focus on whether the appellant had a genuine motivation was following the wrong path. In cases concerning the TGTE, it is authority’s perception of risk which was relevant.
Conclusions
Ground 1
19. The grounds accepted there were no GP medical reports, and I note S v the Secretary of State [2006] EWCA Civ 1153 at [32] which states as follows:
“32. I would also refer to the AIT determination of 25 November 2005 in HH Medical Evidence Effective Mibanga Ethiopia [2005] UKAIT 00164. The tribunal there said:
‘20. In the present case it is manifest that the immigration judge has arrived at his conclusions as to credibility by looking at the evidence in the round. At paragraph 16 of the determination he reminded himself that ‘I must look at the case in the round in light of all the relevant circumstances’. At paragraph 20 the immigration judge confirmed that he had ‘considered the appellant's evidence in the round together with the background evidence and her interview record’. Plainly the medical report was part of the appellant's evidence.
21. The tribunal considers that there is a danger of Mibanga being misunderstood. Judgments in that case are not intended to place judicial fact finders in a form of forensic straightjacket. In particular the Court of Appeal is not to be regarded as laying down any rule of law as to the order in which judicial fact finders are to approach the evidential materials before them. To take Wilson J's cake analogy, all its ingredients cannot be thrown together into the bowl simultaneously. One has to start somewhere. There is nothing illogical about the process by which the immigration judge in the present case chose to approach his analytical task.’
I would approve those comments and emphasise how close the present case is to the circumstances of HH as distinct from those of Mibanga.”
20. The judge is not expected to operate within a straightjacket and as confirmed in the authority S the judge has to start somewhere.
21. At the outset at [30] the judge recognised that the appellant’s credibility was the central issue in the appeal and thus it was necessary to address the psychiatric report with Dr Dhumad at the beginning not least to assess the nature of the vulnerability of the appellant in order to assess the evidence. The judge did not fail to consider the medical expert report as part of his consideration.
22. The judge said this:
“30. As the appellant’s credibility is the central issue in this appeal, it is necessary to address the ramifications of the psychiatric report of Dr Dhumad. An Article 3 ECHR mental health/suicide risk claim is no longer pursued, so the report ceases to have relevance to that issue. But it remains relevant to two other questions. The first of these is whether Dr Dhumad’s diagnosis of PTSD is supportive of the appellant’s claim that he was subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment while in detention in May 2011; and the second is whether the inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence can be explained by the appellant’s vulnerability as a mentally ill person.”
23. As the judge stated at [31]:
“There is no independent verification that the appellant has been displaying the signs and symptoms of PTSD for 6-7 years, as he told Dr Dhumad. As Dr Dhumad himself acknowledges, there are no medical records against which the appellant’s account can been assessed.”
24. The judge’s observation that there is an omission of GP reports by Dr Dhumad was in accordance with HA (expert evidence, mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 111 (IAC). As noted at headnote (4) and (5)
‘(4) Notwithstanding their limitations, the GP records concerning the individual detail a specific record of presentation and may paint a broader picture of his or her mental health than is available to the expert psychiatrist, particularly where the individual and the GP (and any associated health care professionals) have interacted over a significant period of time, during some of which the individual may not have perceived themselves as being at risk of removal.
(5) Accordingly, as a general matter, GP records are likely to be regarded by the Tribunal as directly relevant to the assessment of the individual's mental health and should be engaged with by the expert in their report. Where the expert's opinion differs from (or might appear, to a layperson, to differ from) the GP records, the expert will be expected to say so in the report, as part of their obligations as an expert witness. The Tribunal is unlikely to be satisfied by a report which merely attempts to brush aside the GP records.’
25. The judge noted that the doctor interviewed the appellant only by way of video link and it is correct to state that the first interview had to be terminated after an hour because the appellant started “hyperventilating and became very distressed”. It was recorded that even though the GP records had been requested they were still not forthcoming. Dr Dhumad observed at 11.2 in his report that the appellant’s “mood appeared severally depressed” but added at 11.3, “there was no evidence of thought disorder” (disjointed thinking). It was open to the judge at [32] to conclude that the appellant’s vulnerability as a mentally ill person had not materially affected the quality of the appellant’s evidence.
26. Much of the report was based on the second consultation lasting 3.5 hours, where it was observed at 8.2 that the appellant mentioned “feeling safe and noticed some improvement with his mental health”.
27. Additionally, most of the health conditions said to have existed overtime, were reported by the appellant rather than any particular observation on the part of the doctor and as such the judge’s approach to the medical report, was plainly open to him particularly bearing in mind the abuse was said to have occurred in 2011.
28. The critical point is that the judge referenced the fact that the appellant maintained he had suffered for 6-7 years and notwithstanding that Dr Dhumad may have witnessed signs on the video link itself from direct observation there were no GP reports to confirm that which was asserted by the appellant over the relevant time.
29. In my view the judge was correct in taking the medical report first in an effort to reflect upon the evidence holistically. Indeed as the judge states, “As to the second issue, Dr Dhumad does not assess the appellant as exhibiting any signs of cognitive impairment or memory loss” and the judge goes on to state that “In addition, the adverse credibility challenge advanced by the respondent is not based upon the proposition that the appellant’s evidence is muddled or incoherent, but that it does not stand up to scrutiny. “
30. At [33] the judge specifically stated:
“33. Having considered the evidence in the round, I find that the appellant is simply not credible in his claim that he has now, or that he had in the past, a ‘strong belief’ in the cause of Tamil separatism, and that he was thereby motivated to place himself at risk for the cause by engaging in fundraising for the LTTE or the TGTE in 2010 and 2011.”
31. On reading the decision it is apparent the judge clearly referenced the appellant’s witness statements and his oral evidence.
32. Albeit that it was submitted by Mr Paramjorthy that the appellant was, unusually in the circumstances, of Sinhalese ethnicity (thus would not be aware of certain Tamil traditions), the appellant nonetheless stated, as the judge recorded, that he had been involved in the Tamil community for a very long time [34] and believed in the cause of Tamil separatism [33] when asked about the days celebrated by Tamils he was unable to name any of them in his asylum interview. Further when asked about his participation in demonstrations in support for the LTTE he answered no to all the questions [35] and as the judge said at [36] the following:
“35. Secondly, while he claimed that he was a supporter of the LTTE in interview. when he was asked questions about his participation in demonstrations of support for the LTTE, he answered ‘no’ to all the questions (AIR 70-76).
36. Thirdly, the appellant’s credibility on this issue was further damaged by his oral evidence. If he was genuinely committed to putting himself at risk to promote the cause of Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka, it is not credible that, once he reached safety in the UK, he should abandon all interest in the cause.”
33. Clearly the point the judge was making was that the appellant’s professed commitment to the cause of Tamil separatism contrasted with his participation in demonstrations [35]. The judge was aware that the appellant had not stated he had been involved in demonstrations. That was not the point reached. The judge noted that the appellant stated he had been involved in the Tamil community for a long time, but he had claimed that he was a supporter of the LTTE in interview, although had not participated in any demonstrations. It was open to the judge to conclude that if he was genuinely committed by putting himself at risk to promote the cause of Tamil separatism, it was not credible that once he reached the safety of the UK, he should abandon all interest in the cause. It was open to the judge to conclude there was a marked contradiction between the appellant’s claim to have been deeply involved with the Tamil community in Sri Lanka and yet did not gravitate towards the Tamil separatist diaspora in the UK.
Ground 2.
34. In terms of ground 2, (I reference the findings above) it is effectively asserted that the judge ignored the appellant’s witness statement whereby the appellant drew a distinction between the TGTE and the LTTE and explained why the funds were collected and to whom they were being sent. It was submitted that the judge unfairly drew adverse inferences from the fact the appellant did not know whether his friend was a supporter or member of the TGTE, but the appellant clearly explained that the TGTE did not exist in Sri Lanka but there was no consideration of this evidence. Further there was never an assertion by the appellant that he attended LTTE demonstrations in Sri Lanka. Further, he had never stated that he sought to advance Tamil separatism.
35. In my view, the judge, however, was fully aware the appellant’s case was that the TGTE was the Tamil government in exile in the UK and banned in Sri Lanka and a separate organisation from the LTTE and that it was friend who sent to the money to the TGTE. This is recorded by the judge as part of the appellant’s claim at [9] within the decision as follows:
‘The TGTE was the Tamil government in exile in the UK. The TGTE was banned in Sri Lanka. It was a separate organisation from the LTTE. He and his Tamil friend, [S L], collected the money for the LTTE. His friend sent the money to the TGTE in the UK. The TGTE used the money for charitable projects in the north of Sri Lanka (AIR 52 and 65).’
36. Simply, the judge at [33] found that it was incredible that the appellant would place himself at such risk for engaging in fundraising for either the LTTE or the TGTE whilst in Sri Lanka.
37. The judge took all of the appellant’s evidence into account including the oral evidence at which the appellant had the opportunity to a current explanation and the judge stated this at [36]
‘Thirdly, the appellant’s credibility on this issue was further damaged by his oral evidence. If he was genuinely committed to putting himself at risk to promote the cause of Tamil separatism in Sri Lanka, it is not credible that, once he reached safety in the UK, he should abandon all interest in the cause.’
38. The criticism of the judge’s treatment of the explanation by the appellant who claimed that he did not know that his friend was a member or supporter of the TGTE despite that being the destination for the funds, is not sustainable. The point the judge was making was the parallel explanation by the appellant. On the one hand the appellant was involved in fundraising owing to friendship and on the other because of his commitment to the Tamil cause (a claim he still held to believe when he made his witness statement in November 2023 see [38]).
39. Overall, at [38-39] the judge made the following comprehensive findings:
“38. The appellant’s parallel explanation for his absence of interest here was to the effect that he had only got involved in fundraising in Sri Lanka out of friendship – he was just helping a Tamil friend of his. But the appellant did not know whether his friend was a member or supporter of the TGTE (AIR 61) despite the TGTE being the alleged destination for the funds. In addition, this explanation is wholly inconsistent with his original explanation for his involvement, which was that he had a strong belief in the cause of Tamil separatism, a belief which he still claimed to hold at the time that he made his witness statement in November 2023.
39. Accordingly, having considered the evidence in the round, I find that the appellant has not discharged the burden of proving to the lower standard of proof that he is a witness of truth. I find that there are not substantial grounds for believing that the appellant engaged in fundraising for the LTTE or TGTE in Sri Lanka in 2010-2011, or that he was arrested and detained by the CID in May 2011 on suspicion of fundraising for a terrorist cause, or that, despite being of ongoing adverse interest as a funder of terrorism, he was released on payment of a bribe and required to report once a week.”
40. The appellant in his witness statement signed and dated November 2023, at paragraph 8 plainly confirmed his ‘strong belief for separate Tamil state for Tamils’. The judge’s approach was not in error.
41. In terms of perception of the authorities, the judge correctly cited the relevant guidance in KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 00130 (IAC) and also was fully aware of GJ and others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG [2013] UKUT 00319 and specifically cited (7)(a). The judge properly set out the position of the approach of the Sri Lankan authorities at [44] by stating: “While it is the case that the GoSL treat the TGTE as being a front for the LTTE, the TGTE themselves completely repudiate this.”
42. In particular, the judge at [44] noted the background to the establishment of the TGTE, and its aims were set out at [154] to [158] of KK and RS. The judge specifically noted that the proposition that the appellant was collecting funds to be sent to the TGTE in the UK for these funds, with a view to these funds being sent back to the north of the country for humanitarian relief, and found this to be both internally contradictory and also contrary to the external evidence as to the aims and objectives of the TGTE itself. At [44] the judge sets out the appellant’s claim and further describes the relationship between the LTTE and TGTE.
43. There was no misunderstanding by the judge of either the appellant’s claim or the background of the LTTE and the TGTE.
44. The judge plainly made his own findings and did not merely adopt the reasoning within the refusal letter of the Secretary of State. It is notable that the judge rejected, on sound reasoning, the assertion that the appellant had been fund raising for either the LTTE or the TGTE. On his own evidence the appellant had not undertaken sur place activities. Following the adverse credibility findings, the appellant would not be expected to tell untruths (as to previous activity/commitments) on return and as to the perception of the Sri Lankan authorities, it was open to the judge to find at [43] that there was no real risk the appellant would ‘currently be perceived to have a significant role in relation to post-conflict Tamil separatism within the diaspora and/or renewal of hostilities within Sri Lanka’.
45. Overall the judge concluded the appellant had not discharged the burden of proving to the lower standard of proof that he was credible or that he would be at risk on return to Sri Lanka owing to his past involvement and indeed the judge was fully aware of this and set out the asserted links or otherwise between the TGTE and the LTTE at [44].

Notice of decision
The decision of the FtT contains no material error of law and will stand. The appellant’s appeal remains dismissed.

H Rimington

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3rd February 2026