Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-002427

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/63226/2024
LH/08238/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

1st December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

Fatma Asalya
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Alexander, Counsel, instructed by Kitty Falls Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. K. Reid, Counsel instructed by the Government Legal Department

Heard at Field House on 25 November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. By way of a decision dated 5 November 2025, I found an error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) dated 26 February 2025 which allowed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her human rights claim made. I set the decision of the FTT aside. The error arose in the FTT’s proportionality assessment and many of the unchallenged findings of fact in the original FTT decision can be preserved (as I indicated at [72] of the error of law decision). The scope of the remaking is set out at [73] of the error of law decision and it was agreed at the hearing before me that whether paragraph ADR7.1 of Appendix ADR applies is the sole issue for me to determine.
2. The remaking of the appeal was listed before me on an expedited basis. I had the benefit of the original 270 page error of law bundle, and two further bundles of updating evidence. I heard evidence from the appellant’s son (“the sponsor”) and granddaughter (“Ms Asalya”). Both witnesses were questioned by both representatives.
3. By the time the evidence finished, it was about 5pm. A balance needed to be struck between the need for expedition in this case, and ensuring the parties had the a fair chance to present their case. Ms Reid suggested the parties could provide written submissions. Mr Alexander effectively left it with me as he had no instructions to agree to a course of action which may lead to delay. I decided that sequential exchange of written submissions was the most appropriate solution and, taking into account the commitments of the representatives against the need for expedition, I directed Ms Reid to file her submissions by 3pm on 26 November 2025 and Mr Alexander to do so by 10am on 27 November 2025. In the event I received them both on 26 November 2025 and I am grateful to Counsel for the speed with which they produced their submissions which have assisted me.
4. In the period between the hearing and receiving the submissions, the Court of Appeal decision in IA and Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516 was handed down. I discussed the potential interplay between IA and the instant case in the error of law decision, primarily relating to the application for a stay. Suffice to say, as it was handed down before the parties filed their submissions, they both had an opportunity to address it. Ms Reid made express reference to it. Mr Alexander did not, but as I ensured submissions were sequential, and as Ms Reid referred to it, I am satisfied Mr Alexander had the opportunity to address the decision prior to filing his submissions and there is no need to allow him any further opportunity to do so. I return to IA later in this decision.
Background and the Appellant’s case
5. The background to the appeal is summarised at [8]-[9] of the error of law decision. It arises in the context of the appellant as an adult dependent relative (“ADR”).
6. Since that time, it is now the appellant’s case that she remains in Egypt. Her health has deteriorated, particularly her legs which means she can barely walk, and her mental health has declined. The sponsor travelled to see her in September 2025 and he was shocked to see the change in her, paler and having lost a lot of weight. The sponsor and Ms Asalya have continued to spend money to pay for her care which at the moment they can only afford twice a week (totally $100 per week). Additionally, they continue to fund all of her living costs in Egypt.
7. The sponsor has been making enquiries as to the affordability of the care the appellant needs in Egypt. The cheapest package he can find costs £750 per month for around the clock care. By contrast, if the appellant was permitted to come to the UK she could live free of charge with her sponsor or Ms Asalya and the cost of maintaining her will be absorbed and make little difference to their outlay. Furthermore, they have friends who are doctors in the UK with whom they have negotiated reduced medical fees in order that the sponsor does not need to use the NHS for her medical care. Between the family members, they will be able to care for the appellant 24 hours per day.
8. The sponsor has been very worried about his mother in Egypt. He feels guilty that he is not doing enough for her and he misses her. He wants to be able to be there for her to provide her with the care she required and he is very worried that she may not make it. It is expensive to make trips to visit her and has not seen her since his last visit in September 2025.
Preliminary Matters
9. As mentioned above, it was agreed at the hearing that the only issue for remaking is whether the appellant is able to meet paragraph ADR 7.1 of Appendix ADR. Ms Reid observed that ADR 7.1 was effectively the proportionality assessment within the Rules and was likely to be determinative of the appeal either way. In those circumstances, she would not propose to make further submissions on Article 8 “outside the Rules”. She conceded that paragraph ADR 7.1 permitted account to be taken of the appellant’s situation within the assessment of whether refusal leads to unjustifiably harsh consequences. She submitted that would not be the respondent’s position on a free-standing Article 8 appeal. Mr Alexander agreed with this assessment. Accordingly, it was agreed there was no need for submissions “outside the Rules”.
10. By the time the hearing was due to start, the booked Arabic speaking interpreter had not attended but Ms Asalya said she was comfortable giving evidence without an interpreter in preference to waiting to see if another one could be secured. I checked this with her and she confirmed that to be the case. She seemed to me to have a good understanding of English. I had informed Ms Asalya at the beginning of her evidence that she should say so if she does not understand any of the questions, or if she wanted a break.
11. However, part way into cross-examination, Ms Reids quite properly raised a concern that Ms Asalya may not have understood fully the questions asked of her. After making enquiries, we were able to secure an alternative interpreter who attended over CVP. Ms Asalya confirmed she was able to understand the interpreter. Accordingly, the hearing resumed and Ms Reid went over the answers already given to check Ms Asalya was content with them. Aside from a few discrete occasions when the sponsor notified me that the interpreter may not have quite translated the questions from Ms Reid accurately, Ms Aslaya was able them to give her evidence in her first language.
12. The cross-examination of Ms Asalya was protracted. Ms Reid took her to much of the detail within various documents. When asked about the utility given the slow progress being made, Ms Reid quite properly said she was ensuring Ms Asalya had a fair opportunity to answer the respondent’s concerns about the documentary evidence concerning her financial circumstances. I accepted that the questions were relevant in light of the public interest question it was necessary for me to determine within the proportionality assessment (and as per the error of law decision). I rose on a number of occasions to permit Ms Asalya a break.
The Legal Framework
13. The relevant parts of Appendix ADR of the Rules say as follows:
“Dependency requirements for an Adult Dependent Relative
ADR 5.1. The applicant, or if the applicant is applying as a parent or grandparent, the applicant’s partner, must as a result of age, illness or disability require long term personal care to perform everyday tasks.
ADR 5.2. Where the application is for entry clearance, the applicant, or if the applicant is applying as a parent or grandparent, the applicant’s partner, must be unable to obtain the required level of care in the country where they are living, even with the financial help of the sponsor because either: (a) the care is not available and there is no person in that country who can reasonably provide it: or (b) the care is not affordable.
……….
Financial requirement for an Adult Dependent Relative
ADR 6.1. The sponsor must be able to provide adequate maintenance, accommodation and care for the applicant in the UK without access to public funds.1
……………………….
Eligibility under Article 8 ECHR for an Adult Dependent Relative
ADR 7.1. If the applicant does not meet all the suitability requirements (subject to ADR 7.2) or does not meet all of the eligibility requirements in ADR 3.1. to ADR 6.4., but the decision maker is satisfied that refusal of the application would breach Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention, because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family, the applicant will meet the Article 8 ECHR eligibility requirement.
……………………………….
Period of grant for an Adult Dependent Relative
ADR 9.1. An applicant applying for entry clearance will, if the sponsor is a British Citizen or settled in the UK, be granted settlement.
…………………………..
Conditions of grant for an Adult Dependent Relative
ADR 9.4. If the applicant is granted temporary permission, it will be subject to the following conditions:
(a) no access to public funds; and
……………………………”
The ADR framework in the Rules was challenged but upheld in Britcis v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 368. At [58] Sir Terence Etherenton MR set out the policy underlying the ADR Rules as follows:
“It is twofold: firstly, to reduce the burden on the taxpayer for the provision of health and social care services to those ADRs whose needs can reasonably and adequately be met in their home country; and, secondly, to ensure that those ADRs whose needs can only be reasonably and adequately met in the UK are granted fully settled status and full access to the NHS and social care provided by local authorities. The latter is intended to avoid disparity between ADRs depending on their wealth and to avoid precariousness of status occasioned by changes in the financial circumstances of ADRs once settled here.”
14. At [59] he said:
“the focus is on whether the care required by the ADR applicant can be "reasonably" provided and to "the required level" in their home country. As Mr Sheldon confirmed in his oral submissions, the provision of care in the home country must be reasonable both from the perspective of the provider and the perspective of the applicant, and the standard of such care must be what is required for that particular applicant. It is possible that insufficient attention has been paid in the past to these considerations, which focus on what care is both necessary and reasonable for the applicant to receive in their home country. Those considerations include issues as to the accessibility and geographical location of the provision of care and the standard of care. They are capable of embracing emotional and psychological requirements verified by expert medical evidence. What is reasonable is, of course, to be objectively assessed.”
15. At [41] of Mobeen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 886, Carr LJ (as she was then) described the test now for entry as an ADR to be “rigorous and demanding”.
16. In the event the appellant is able to meet the requirements of the Rules, then that is generally determinative of the Article 8 assessment and the appeal is to be allowed (TZ (Pakistan) and PG (India) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1109 applies).
The Position of the Parties
17. I have read the written submissions with care and simply set out an overview here.
18. The respondent’s primary position is that there is a particularly strong public interest given that the primary eligibility conditions of the Rules are not met (it was accepted from the outset that the appellant is not able to meet the financial requirements of the Rules). This was on the basis that this is an entry clearance case and the need to ensure the state is not overwhelmed by the financial burden of supporting those who are not financially independent. Ms Reid invited me to find Ms Asalya’s evidence of her financial circumstances incredible, undermining the claim that the family could support the appellant without recourse to public funds, including NHS care. She invited me to find that reduced weight should apply to the family life between the appellant and sponsor given that it is relatively recently formed and due to its particular characteristics. Ms Reid further submitted that there were alternative and more affordable arrangements which could be put in place in Egypt to meet the appellant’s needs. She submitted the evidence as to the impact of the appellant remaining in Egypt on the sponsor and Ms Asalya was lacking. Accordingly, she submitted the consequences of refusing entry clearance would not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant, sponsor or Ms Asalya.
19. Mr Alexander invited me, when evaluating the evidence Ms Asalya gave to take note of the anxiety of the family surrounding these proceedings and the time it has taken to resolve them, plus the protracted questioning of Ms Asalya and the fact that issue had never been taken with her employment. He reminded me of the nature and the extent of the preserved findings of the original FTT judge. He submitted that, in light of these preserved findings, and the extent of evidence showing that the appellant can be supported by her family, the consequences of the appellant remaining alone in Egypt without appropriate care is unjustified and sufficiently harsh so as to outweigh the public interest in effective immigration control and the economic well-being of the country. In making this submission, he relied not just on the evidence of the sponsor and Ms Asalya, which he invited me to find as credible, but also the savings that would be made to the family in no longer having to pay for the appellant’s care and maintenance abroad, plus the associated costs of travelling to see her. He further relied on the fact that it is not open to the family to relocate to Egypt to care for the appellant there (and where there are no other family members). Accordingly, the UK is the only place where family life can continue. In that context, he invited me to find that the consequences of the respondent’s decision are unjustifiably harsh for the appellant and her family members.
Discussion of the Evidence and Findings of Fact
20. I start with the preserved findings which I indicated at the error of law hearing, were situated up to and including [25] of the FTT’s decision.
21. Of particular note are the judge’s finding at [17] that the appellant requires long-term personal care to bathe, dress and prepare food; [18] the medical and other evidence also strongly indicate her inability to perform the above daily activities plus toileting; [19] her mobility is limited making it difficult for her to move without assistance and she requires a wheelchair out of doors; [20] she relies on the sponsor for emotional support and a carer to undertake personal tasks; [21] hiring a full-time carer in Egypt is financially unsustainable and does not provide the level of care required for the appellant; [21] the cost of professional care far exceeds what can be managed from the family’s resources in the UK; [22] the family are unable to provide the necessary support remotely and frequent travel to Egypt is not feasible; [22] the quality of life and care the appellant needs can only be provided through her family’s direct presence; [23] in the UK the appellant’s family will be actively involved in her day to day care, providing the emotional, physical and psychological support she needs; [24] the appellant cannot attend to her needs and the care she requires is not available in Egypt or the Palestinian Territories; [24] as a result of age, illness or disability the appellant requires long-term care to perform everyday tasks.
22. At [62] of the error of law decision, I found it clear that the judge’s findings at [24] particularly when read with [22] that the judge was using the language of paragraph ADR5.1 and ADR5.2 of Appendix ADR in her findings even though she had not expressly referenced them. In effect this means the judge found the appellant to meet those aspects of the Rules. Those findings have not been challenged and Ms Reid did not submit they are not met.
23. I also remind myself that the judge found both the sponsor and Ms Asalya to be credible witnesses.
24. Although the issue for remaking was whether paragraph ADR7.1 applies, integral to that assessment, is the extent to which (if at all) the appellant may be reliant on the public purse as that is relevant to whether or not there is any justification in refusing her application notwithstanding the preserved findings about her need for long-term care to perform everyday tasks which is not available or affordable for her in Egypt.
25. As to the appellant’s care needs, although Ms Reid did not expressly seek to go behind the preserved findings, she asked a few questions of the sponsor about the appellant’s health and need for care. At paragraph 14 of her written submissions, she submitted that none of the preserved findings contained within [17]-[19] of the FTT decision are that the appellant needs require a professional carer which is what the sponsor has researched when looking at the cost of care in Egypt. She submitted an alternative and cheaper care package could be secured thereby mitigating the harshness of the consequences of the appellant remaining in Egypt.
26. Returning to the FTT’s decision, the appellant’s physical care needs are not the only needs the FTT judge identified the appellant as having. She also noted that the appellant needs emotional support which are met by the sponsor [20] and that “the quality of life and care the Appellant needs can only be provided through her family’s direct presence” [24]. Ms Reid acknowledged at [11] of her written submissions that the appellant has emotional dependency upon her family because she says “in this case, where, as set out below, the nature of family life is limited to financial and emotional dependency …..” and again at [12] of her submissions where she talked of “emotional support”.
27. As the Ms Reid’s challenge to the need for “professional care”, this is in response to the sponsor’s evidence as contained within the Schedule of Costs [SB5] where he has said the cheapest care costs he had secured is £750 per month. In the Whatsapp messages it can be seen the sponsor has liaised with the company offering this service “Curexmed” [SB12-13] from which it can be seen that they are a registered care provider, and the quote is for 24/7 care (as per the sponsor’s request). When he asked what will be provided, the answer was “home nursing”. The other company, MedCall, also provided a quote for “a qualified and experienced nurse” [SB15].
28. Mr Alexander submitted the sponsor had no option but to seek the services of professional carers, as unqualified carers would be difficult to secure and would not be able to provide the extent of safe and adequate care the appellant needs.
29. The medical evidence before the FTT at [EB113] says:
“the patient needs caring by her son/family as she’s not able to do her daily activity. Also she uses walker and sometime wheelchair. Delaying the patient to join her family may lead to deterioration in her physical and mental health, that may cause depression”.
30. At [EB111] the evidence of the carer before the FTT judge was that she provided the appellant with the following care:
“bathing, dressing and undressing, general housekeeping, meal preparation and cooking, shopping, laundry, escorting her to and from doctor’s appointments, assisting her to and from the garden and restroom, organising her medication and reminding her to take it on tome, reading to her and providing entertainment”.
31. The carer also said “she struggles to care for herself when I am not present and frequently contacts me for help …. She urgently needs more days of care ….. she has become increasingly depressed, often crying, and once confided in me that she wishes to die because she feels lonely and isolated …. In the meantime she urgently requires daily care including overnight stays, 7 days a week to ensure her safety and well-being”.
32. The updating evidence from the carer on 27 August 2025 [SB1/30] says:
“Based on my direct engagement and close contact with Mrs. Fatma Asalya, I can attest that she is in a grave psychological and physical state. This is primarily due to a lack of proper care and her separation from her son, Ibrahim Asalya, and her grandchildren, who reside in the United Kingdom. Mrs. Fatma has now entered a critical phase, experiencing episodes of screaming and nervous breakdowns. I have recently observed a significant deterioration in her mental and physical health. I am genuinely concerned for her personal safety and well-being……
Mrs. Fatma is living in a state of isolation and profound loneliness, and her condition worsens day by day. I have noticed that she has recently begun speaking to herself and weeping frequently. I have tried to help her on multiple occasions, but her only plea is that I bring her son Ibrahim and her grandchildren to see them before she dies.
Mrs. Fatma is in critical need of joining her son and his family with the utmost urgency to avert self-harm or death resulting from severe depression and distress. Currently, she is in dire need of daily and overnight care, seven days a week, as failing which, her life will be at a tangible risk.”
33. None of this medical evidence says the appellant requires care from a trained nurse.
34. I am satisfied the sponsor has been quoted the cost of home nursing care and as MedCall put it “carefully selected and well-trained nurses”. To that extent I agree with Ms Reid that, on balance, the evidence does not support the appellant requiring this level of care. The FTT did not make a finding that the appellant required nursing care. The sponsor accepted in evidence that they would not be hiring a “professional carer” for the appellant in the UK, although he added that his son is an oncology doctor.
35. However, that does not mean to say the appellant could make do with untrained and informal care. In evidence, the sponsor confirmed that her current carer was obtained through an agency. She is not, therefore, informal care. The appellant is displaced in Egypt and I accept that she would not have a network which would be able to informally supply regular and consistent care for her. I am satisfied the sponsor would have to pay for a ‘professional’ carer (as in a commercial carer) which also gives a degree of accountability and reassurance to him. However, I have not been provided with evidence about whether caring services in Egypt offer a professional caring service falling short of nursing care. I take note of the fact that the sponsor did not ask for nursing care, he asked for “someone to care for her 24 hours a day 7 days a week” and both companies came back with a quote for nursing care.
36. On balance, I am prepared to accept that the cost of the appellant being cared for in Egypt on that basis is £750 per month.
37. Ms Reid also submitted that care could be cheaper if the carer visited twice or several times a day to attend to the appellant’s particular needs (bathing, dressing, preparing food, toileting and mobilising outside) rather than 24/7. There is no quote as to how much that would cost. As to whether that would be sufficient to manage the appellant’s physical care needs, the FTT found the appellant required a full-time care [21]. At [49] of the error of law decision, I noted there was no challenge to that finding but, in the alternative, I found the judge was entitled to find that the care the appellant required was daily and unaffordable such that there was no error of law in her decision that the appellant required full-time care.
38. On the preserved findings, the current daily costs of care is $50 per day (which in the sponsor’s oral evidence is 8am to midnight). If that were provided 7 days a week it would cost $350 per week and therefore significantly more than the £750 per month quoted to the sponsor for 24/7 care. I note from the Whatsapp, that the other company (MedCall) discounted its quote on the basis of the duration of care required (although that was still not the cheapest option).
39. On balance, I am satisfied that there is unlikely to be much material difference between the costs of care for the appellant in Egypt notwithstanding the configuration of that care. There appears to be some economies of scale and the difference in cost between daily rates and long term rates are significant on the evidence before me. I am not satisfied that the difference between visits four times per day (as Ms Reid suggested at the hearing) and more constant care would materially alter the financial cost. In submissions, she suggested visits of twice a day. I find this to fall too far short of the preserved findings as to the level of required care to be a realistic suggestion. Accordingly, I find the updating evidence shows the likely cost of the appellant’s care in Egypt is about £750 per month .
40. However, the preserved finding at [21] is that full-time care in Egypt does not meet the appellant’s needs and at [22] the quality of life and the care the appellant needs can only be provided through her family’s direct presence. As noted in the error of law hearing, the respondent has never suggested that it is reasonable to expect the sponsor to relocate to Egypt to care there for the appellant and neither did that form part of Ms Reid’s submissions before me. I remind myself of what was said in Britcis [59] about care needing to be reasonable from the appellant’s perspective (see [15] above.
41. The updating evidence from the carer was not expressly challenged at the hearing. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon me to consider the weight to attach. The letter is headed “professional opinion”. It is not capable of amounting to expert evidence and to the extent it offers an opinion, no weight attaches. I attach no weight to the parts of the letter which advocates for the appellant’s entry into the UK or seeks to attribute responsibility for her condition to the respondent. But given that the author is involved with the appellant’s care and is the person who sees her the most, I am satisfied that some weight should attach to those parts of the letter detailing the appellant’s current presentation. I am satisfied on balance that the appellant is becoming more distressed the longer she remains in Egypt where she has no other family members.
42. I now turn to the submissions made about the credibility of Ms Asalya’s evidence. In so doing I remind myself that Ms Asalya’s evidence was accepted by the FTT and the preserved findings include that she works and has been paying for the costs of the appellant’s care and living expenses in Egypt in conjunction with the sponsor (see [11] and [16] of the FTT decision).
43. I have considered carefully the evidence Ms Asalya gave. At its simplest, she said she works at Pal Europe News Limited as an administrative, advertising and marketing manager. At first, she was paid a combination of a fixed salary and commission. However, recently (and since the date of her latest witness statement on 6 November 2025) she is now paid a fixed net amount of £3,053.29 with a monthly surplus of £1,453.29 which she can use to support the appellant in the UK. I accept that Ms Asalya’s evidence about the payment of commission (the amount and whether or not it was variable until recently) was unclear.
44. Ms Reid took Ms Asalya to her witness statements, payslips and bank statements which Ms Reid submits paint a different picture of the financial position. I’ve looked at them carefully. On the one hand the documents suggest a greater income (see for example page [SB40] which shows total credits into the Lloyds account of £11,754.17 and debits out of £11,748.18); and on the other they do not support the evidence that Ms Asalya has a surplus at all. The same page shows that the closing balance on 11 July 2025 is £13.49 . Ms Reid also identified that on 27 August 2025 just before Ms Asalya’s salary was paid, her balance was £1.88 [SB39].
45. Ms Asalya explained that she works a Qatari client who does not wish to be identified and nor did she feel able to explain the nature of the work or any details of which payments relate to that other source of income. But she confirmed that some of the credits into her Lloyds account related to that source of income. Otherwise, she said that she has some savings. She was unclear whether she meant that some money from her savings was paid into that account, but in re-examination she explained that she had two savings account. Neither of these accounts were evidenced in any of the bundles submitted on the appellant’s behalf.
46. Within all of Ms Asalya’s bank statements there were numerous redacted transactions. In addition to the reason given for that above, Ms Asalya also said that she redacted details of her siblings to and from whom payments are sometimes made. She redacted the details so that their information was not shared as it is private. She did the same to her National Insurance number on her payslips.
47. The payslips are corroborated with payments into Ms Asalya’s HSBC then Lloyds accounts from Pal Europe News Limited. In oral evidence, Ms Asalya said her HSBC account is now closed. The statements are incomplete. The HSBC statements cover the period 30 May 2024 to 2 August 2024 and show credits from Pal Europe News Limited of £2,393.31 on 30 May, 7 July and 2 August 2024.
48. The Lloyds bank account covering the period 22 October 2024 to 16 January 2025 show payments of £3,053.29 to Ms Asalya from Pal Europe News Limited on 31 December 2024 and 2 December 2024 (corresponding with the November 2024 payslip).
49. The statement covering the period 22 August 2025 to 1 October 2025 [SB37] shows payment of £3035.29 on 1 October 2025 and 1 September 2025.
50. Statements covering 11 April to 11 July 2025 [SB40-45] show a payment from Pal Europe News Limited of £6,070.58 stated to be for “May June 25” [SB41] with no corresponding payment in May 2025 [SB43].
51. Accordingly, notwithstanding the confused evidence about commission, and the lack of clarity about Ms Asalya’s financial circumstances, I am not satisfied these factors entitle me to reject the evidence about her employment in light of the above evidence of her payslips and bank statements. As Mr Alexander said in his submissions, redacting her National Insurance number does not prevent the respondent making enquiries about Ms Asalya’s employment and, given that until the hearing, the fact of her employment had never been challenged, there is no reason to reject Ms Asalya’s evidence about why she redacted her National Insurance (a desire to keep the information private).
52. Other than that, I find the picture about Ms Asalya’s true financial picture to be confused. I accept she may not have appreciated the need to present a transparent and full picture of her financial circumstances, particularly in circumstances where the FTT accepted her evidence about her income. However, that inevitably makes the job of trying to elicit the true picture to be harder, if not impossible.
53. Whilst many of the redacted transactions were for small amounts, that is not the case for all of them. On examination of the Lloyds account, what is just about clear is that money does not stay in there very long. It is fairly quickly transferred out of that account, sometimes in sums which correspond broadly with the most recent credits into the account, including of Ms Asalya’s salary from Pal Europe News Limited. There is no documentary evidence as to where that money goes, and the oral evidence was that it was either spent or saved. Of course, in addition to the expenses which Ms Asalya listed in her witness statement, her evidence is that she also pays for most of the appellant’s upkeep and outgoings in Egypt. Those expenses are listed in the Costs Schedule and (less the amount inserted for the cost of future care in Egypt as per the Whatsapp messages which is prospective) the expenses are £1560.58 per month plus the current care costs of $100 per week. The preserved findings are that the sponsor only pays £100 per month.
54. Drawing all of that together, I am satisfied on balance that Ms Asalya is employed as claimed and that she earns a net income from Pal Europe News Limited of £3,053.29 per month.
55. I am not satisfied of the provenance of any other of the credits made into her Lloyds bank account and I do not find the evidence sufficiently reliable to satisfy me that Ms Asalya has any other income available to her with which she can support the appellant, whether in Egypt or the UK.
56. The evidence before me from the Lloyds bank account is that money leaves her account quickly and she does not have a balance in that account to support her evidence that she has a surplus each month of £1,453.29 from which she has been supporting the appellant in Egypt. However, the FTT judge’s preserved findings is that she has been doing so. There is corroboration of that in the bundle before the FTT [EB181]. The reality is that someone has been doing so and on balance, notwithstanding the confused picture outlined at the hearing before me, I am satisfied that is mainly Ms Asalya. She just about has sufficient evidenced income to have been responsible for most of the appellant’s expenses and outgoings in Egypt and that money would also be available to spend on the appellant if she were permitted to come to the UK. For the avoidance of doubt, the available sum is about £1,450 per month.
57. There was no challenge to the evidence that both the sponsor and Ms Asalya have accommodation in which the appellant could live, as per the preserved findings [23]. There is supporting evidence of that in the bundle. In fact, Ms Asalya’s unchallenged evidence is that she has moved specifically to a ground floor flat in case the appellant is permitted to enter the UK as that will be easier for her to access than the previous second floor flat.
58. Turning to the likely costs of maintaining the appellant in the UK, both the sponsor and Ms Asalya’s evidence was that such costs would be minimal and effectively absorbed into the costs already incurred in accommodating and maintaining themselves and the other family members. Furthermore, the unchallenged evidence before me is that between the sponsor and his wife, Ms Asalya and other siblings, they would be able to provide round the clock care for the appellant. This accords with the preserved findings [23].
59. Ms Reid made the point that the extra costs of maintaining the appellant will not be ‘nil’. I accept that, but I am perfectly content to accept that (but for the potential medical costs which I address below) they will be negligible and easily affordable from Ms Asalya’s surplus income.
60. Turning to the potential medical costs. It is not in dispute that the appellant has health conditions for which she is treated with medication (diabetes and hypertension) and others such as osteoarthritis and a broken femur, and for some of those surgical treatment, is likely to be required.
61. As to the sponsor’s evidence that the appellant could be treated at modest and affordable cost in the UK with the assistance of friends in the medical profession, there is no corroboration for that in the bundle. Furthermore, the sponsor was unable to give a definitive cost of the medication and/or treatment the appellant requires as he did not remember what some of it is and, in any event, the appellant would need to be evaluated here and a decision made as to the appropriate medication/treatment for her conditions. Mr Alexander submitted this was a reasonable explanation for why the sponsor could not put a precise figure on the costs and I accept that. However, that does not get around the absence of evidence from the medical friends that they would be able to provide the appellant with whatever medical treatment (Xrays/surgery) that she may require for free. That is quite a commitment for a doctor to make and for the reasons given at [8(ii)] of Ms Reid’s submissions, cogent evidence of that would be required before such evidence could be accepted.
62. The sponsor was able to particularise some medical costs in the bundle. He stated in the Schedule of Costs that she would require some GP visits at £49 per consultation and he estimated that she would need a maximum of 15 per month at a cost of £735. In his witness statement, he explained he has arrived at these figures from internet research of private GPs although I have not been directed to any evidence in support of that.
63. Drawing this section together, if the appellant was permitted entry to the UK, I am satisfied that as a result of the appellant living with the sponsor or Ms Asalya and being cared for by family members, there would be a significant saving on the costs currently being incurred in Egypt. I do not find the costs to be ‘nil’ but I accept they are relatively modest. That leaves most of Ms Asalya’s surplus income to cover any additional costs occasioned by the appellant’s arrival.
64. In light of the medical evidence this involves long-term medication for her chronic conditions, the costs of GP consultations and the investigation into and the treatment for her musculoskeletal conditions (as a minimum), which is likely to include surgical procedures and the necessary follow-up. On balance, for the reasons given above, I am not able to accept the figures which the sponsor has included for that in the schedule of costs or that such treatment would be provided free of charge. Accordingly, I am unable to evaluate the likely amount that the sponsor and Ms Asalya would need to pay to cover the cost of all the medical treatment and medication the appellant would require. It follows that I am not satisfied that it is affordable for them.
65. For the avoidance of any doubt, I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the appellant would be accommodated, maintained and cared for (applying the present care needs at least) within the funds and resources available to the family, but I am not satisfied her medical costs would be covered and accordingly she is likely to represent a burden to the NHS.
66. In arriving at these findings, although maintenance, accommodation and care costs are those referred to in paragraph ADR6.1 as being the costs relevant to the financial requirement of the Rules, I do not suggest that the appellant is able to meet the financial requirements of the Rules. She cannot do so as her sponsor cannot meet these costs but also, neither could Ms Asalya on the evidence before me as it does not meet the specified evidence requirements of ADR6.2 and Appendix FM-SE.
67. Finally, as it will become relevant to the factors to be balanced in the evaluation of ADR 7.1, I briefly turn to the evidence of communication between the sponsor and the appellant. The evidence originally before the FTT corroborates the sponsor’s evidence that he spends a considerable sum each month topping up his mobile phone to permit him to call the appellant. Whilst there is no record of the calls themselves, this evidence was not really challenged and I am satisfied, on balance, that the appellant and sponsor speak regularly, that he last visited her in September 2025 for 2 weeks and the whole family visited her in May 2025. Neither of those visits were challenged although they were not corroborated by documentary evidence.
Application of the facts to paragraph ADR 7.1
68. As was accepted at the hearing, consideration of ADR 7.1 involves a proportionality balancing exercise in order to evaluate the consequences of refusing the application upon the applicant or her family and to evaluate whether they are so harsh that they are not justified and, accordingly, represent a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”). In this context, ‘justification’ means justified by one of the legitimate aims set out in Article 8 (2) of the ECHR.
69. Article 8 (2) says as follows:
“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.
70. Parliament amended the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to include at Part 5A sections 117A-D, which set out factors to which courts must have regard when considering the proportionality assessment under Article 8. In cases not involving foreign criminals, the following parts of section 117B are relevant:

“Article 8: public interest considerations applicable in all cases
(1)The maintenance of effective immigration controls is in the public interest.
(2)It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are able to speak English, because persons who can speak English—
(a)are less of a burden on taxpayers, and
(b)are better able to integrate into society.
(3)It is in the public interest, and in particular in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, that persons who seek to enter or remain in the United Kingdom are financially independent, because such persons—
(a)are not a burden on taxpayers, and
(b)are better able to integrate into society.
(4)Little weight should be given to—
(a)a private life, or
(b)a relationship formed with a qualifying partner,
that is established by a person at a time when the person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully.
(5)Little weight should be given to a private life established by a person at a time when the person's immigration status is precarious.
…”
71. As can be seen, section 117B(1) reminds us that immigration control is in the public interest. It is trite that such control is required in order to ensure the economic well-being of the country, one of the legitimate aims contained within Article 8(2).
72. The Rules are one of the main ways in the respondent is able to manage immigration control and accordingly, when someone is unable to meet the Rules, that is a factor contrary to the public interest applying section 117B(1).
73. In R (Agyarko) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 11, the Supreme Court explained the weight to be given to the Rules in the context of the proportionality balancing exercise [46]-[47].
74. This was reiterated at [159] of IA when the Court of Appeal said:
“The SSHD's point is that it is not her policy (as represented by the Rules) to admit all persons who share family life with a person lawfully settled in the UK. That is not a question of floodgates or numbers likely to apply from war zones across the world. It is a question of respect for the UK's laws and democratic process, and for what the government determines is necessary in that society to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK. The courts must always, as Lord Reed said, attach considerable weight to the SSHD's immigration policies at a general level, alongside considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case.”
75. At [166] the Court of Appeal in IA said:
“Immigration control is to be assumed in this respect, and in the view of the SSHD, to be in the public interest and protective of the economic well-being of the country.”
76. And at [167]:
“The SSHD's policy is a matter for her and for the UK government…. The decision as to what is necessary in UK society to protect the economic well-being of the UK and the rights of citizens of the UK is the business of the SSHD and the Government. The courts must, as Lord Reed said in Agyarko, and we would respectfully endorse, attach considerable weight to the SSHD's immigration policies at a general level, alongside considering all the factors which are relevant to the particular case.”
77. It is relevant to note that, unlike in the case before me, there was no route of entry available to the appellants in IA under the Rules. Furthermore, the respondent had made a decision not to create a route to assist those stranded in Gaza. In IA the position was only ever considered outside of the Rules.
78. In her submissions, in the specific context of an entry clearance case, Ms Reid relied on the judgment of Rix LJ in Odawey v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 840 at [49]:
“states are entitled to have regard to their system of immigration control and its generally consistent application, and a requirement that an entrant should be maintained without recourse to public funds is an ultimately fair and necessary limitation on what would otherwise become a possibly overwhelming burden on all of its citizens.”
79. As Carr LJ said at [50] of Mobeen:
“What was meant by "exceptional circumstances" was made clear at [54] to [60] in Agyarko, namely circumstances in which a refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the individual such that the refusal of the application would not be proportionate. This is to be assessed in the context of a proportionality exercise which gives appropriate weight to the policy in the Immigration Rules, considers all factors relevant to the specific case in question, and ultimately assesses whether, giving due weight to the strength of the public interest in the removal of the person in the case before it, the Article 8 claim is sufficiently strong to outweigh it. In general, in cases concerned with precarious family life, a very strong or compelling claim is required to outweigh the public interest in immigration control.”
80. I also have regard (and as relied on by Ms Reid at paragraph 5 of her submissions) to what Carr LJ said at [68] of Mobeen:
“whether or not the appellant would have qualified for entry under the ADR ECR is not determinative of the question of whether or not the refusal decision was compatible with Article 8. However, as set out above, the fact that the SSHD, in the discharge of her statutory duty to regulate immigration, has set out a clear policy, reflected in the ADR ECR, as to the requirements to be met by ADRs seeking to settle in the UK will be a powerful factor in any Article 8 assessment of proportionality. This proposition is clearly established on the authorities (for example in Agyarko (at [47])).”
81. Although the applicable Rules are now contained within Appendix ADR rather than ADR ECR, the operative parts for this appeal are the same.
82. At paragraph 3 of her submissions, Ms Reid referred to the respondent’s policy “Family Policy, Adult dependent relatives Version 7.0” (“the policy”) as to the meaning of ‘unjustifiably harsh consequences’:
“’unjustifiably’ harsh consequences are ones which involve a harsh outcome or outcomes for the applicant or their family which is not justified by the public interest, including in maintaining effective immigration controls, preventing burdens on the taxpayer, promoting integration and protecting the public and the rights and freedoms of others.”
83. With all of that in mind, and applying the preserved facts and my updating findings of fact, I turn to the balancing exercise.
Factors supporting maintenance of the respondent’s decision
84. Looking first at section 117B(1) of the 2002 Act, the appellant is not able to meet the financial requirements of the Rules (see [67] above). In light of the above authorities, the fact the appellant is not able to meet the way in which the SSHD has decided she could be permitted entry is a factor of significant weight. That is particularly so in this instance when the medical evidence establishes that there are medical needs over and above the appellant’s care needs.
85. In the circumstances of the appellant’s case, if she is successful in this appeal on the basis of paragraph ADR7.1, she will be granted settlement given that her sponsor is a British citizen applying ADR 9.1. As can be seen from ADR9.4 it is only those granted temporary permission who are subject to the condition of ‘no access to public funds’.
86. Accordingly, significant weight must attach to the public interest in protecting the economic well-being of the country by permitting entry to someone who is not able to fulfil all the requirements of the route the SSHD and Parliament has designed for such persons.
87. As for section 117B(3) of the 2002 Act, but for her NHS cost, I am satisfied the appellant would be financially independent as she can be supported and accommodated by Ms Asalya (or possibly the sponsor) and cared for by her family members. This is important as it is this part of the Rules which governs the public interest on financial grounds. Accordingly, it is a neutral factor.
88. For the avoidance of doubt, the fact the appellant is otherwise financially independent does not reduce the public interest in her inability to meet the financial requirements of the Rules. This reflects the fact that the appellant could not meet them with her sponsor at all but also in relation to Ms Asalya, as the appellant has not shown she could meet the specified evidence part of the Rules.
89. There is no evidence the appellant can speak English which is contrary to the public interest applying section 117B(2) of the 2002 Act and attracts weight on the respondent’s side of the scales. Mr Alexander invites not to place much weight on this as the appellant is likely to need her family to interpret for her in any case in light of her age and because she is not likely to be able to integrate much outside of her family for a similar issue or work, so the public interest at play is not changed by her lack of ability to speak English. I do not find these to be factors reducing the weight to attach to the lack of English, but I accept in the context of this appeal, it is unlikely to be the determinative factor.
Factors pointing away from maintaining the respondent’s decision
90. The most significant factor in the appellant’s favour is the preserved finding that the requires full-time and long term personal care to perform everyday tasks which she is not currently receiving at a level to meet her needs and which is not available or affordable to the level she requires. This is important as it means the public interest is safeguarded as the appellant is able to meet the primary high threshold set by the respondent as to who should be permitted under this route. It is only the most needy and those whose needs cannot be met elsewhere who are able to enter and settle in the United Kingdom with the ability to access medical treatment. That the appellant is able to satisfy this threshold is a factor attracting significant weight.
91. Next I consider the weight to attach to the family life the appellant has with her sponsor. At [30] the FTT decision says “there are further elements of dependency, involving more than emotional ties”.
92. IA tells us that “the strength of family ties is relevant to proportionality” [151] and therein the Court of Appeal set out various factors relevant to that consideration. Here the sponsor is the appellant’s only child; effectively he has assumed responsibility for her since the war in Gaza and her injury and it was he who arranged for her to leave and relocate to Egypt where he arranged the appropriate care and accommodation for her. Of course there is the financial dependency and there have been visits since, notwithstanding the cost of the same and regular phone contact to provide the emotional support which the FTT judge found was required and given.
93. Given the evidence in this appeal, I am not in a position to find that family life (in Article 8 terms) existed prior to the war in Gaza so, to that extent, I accept it has been relatively recently formed and at a time where there can have been little expectation that the appellant would be permitted entry to the UK in order to enjoy her family life here. I accept that there have been familial visits over the years as the sponsor said in evidence, but without more they are not capable of amounting to “additional elements of dependence“ more than the “normal emotional ties”. These are factors which reduce the weight which would otherwise attach to the family life.
94. However, I still find the family life to be deserving of a reasonable degree of weight. I say that in light of the evidence about the impact upon both the appellant and the sponsor of their continued separation. The impact on the appellant is such that both the carer and the sponsor have become very concerned about her. The sponsor’s evidence about the impact on him was not challenged. Whilst Ms Reid sought to underplay the sponsor’s evidence, I find that to be an unfair characterisation. He set out clearly at [11] of his recent witness statement how his mother’s situation impacts him and I have no reason to doubt that. It is compounded by the fact his mother has not got the care she requires as he set out in his last sentence at [11]. I also take into consideration that family life cannot be enjoyed elsewhere as the sponsor would not be permitted to reside in Egypt anymore than the appellant and, in any event, it has never been suggested he could do so. Finally under this head, I also take into account the unchallenged evidence that there are no other family members in Egypt with whom the sponsor is able to share a family or private life and the only family life she has is the one with her sponsor in the UK. These are all factors to which weight can and does attach.
95. As Ms Reid accepted at the outset of the hearing, ADR7.1 permits account to be taken on the consequences of the respondent’s decision on the applicant. If the respondent’s decision is maintained, she remains displaced in Egypt where she lives alone, has no entitlement to reside and her residence there is precarious and that impacts her ability to obtain medical treatment [EB62]. As set out at [49] of the error of law decision the unchallenged evidence of the sponsor at the FTT hearing (and his evidence was accepted by the FTT judge) is that on days the carer does not attend the sponsor stays in bed in her clothes. Her distress in Egypt is worsening over time. The unchallenged evidence of the sponsor is that she is now visibly frailer when he saw her in September than the last time (which was in May). I have rejected Ms Reid’s submissions that an alternative care package could mitigate the effects. I place significant weight upon the impact upon the appellant of continuing the respondent’s decision.
Are there unjustifiably harsh consequences?
96. I have considered this question very carefully. I am satisfied the public interest is protected to a large extent by the fact the appellant meets ADR5.1 and 5.2 of the Rules.
97. The Rules provide a route for someone who cannot meet the all of the requirements of the Rules to nevertheless still qualify for entry (ADR7.1). The appellant cannot meet all the requirements of Appendix ADR as her sponsor did not meet the financial requirements. Ms Asalya is not the sponsor.
98. However, I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the public interest is also safeguarded as the appellant can be maintained, accommodated and cared for without recourse to public funds.
99. With all I have said above in this section, having attached the weight that I must to the public interest, I am nevertheless of the view that the consequences for the appellant are unjustifiably harsh. In effect, unless permitted entry to the UK, she is destined to see out her days as a displaced, ill and disabled person with no reliable access to medical treatment, inadequate care arrangements which do not meet her needs, without any family around her and with her condition deteriorating, in part, as a result of the lack of family support. There is no alternative way for the members of this family life to pursue their family life given where the appellant lives and the family and financial circumstances of the family in the UK. There is no alternative way in which the appellant is able to obtain the appropriate care she requires and which she was found to require by the FTT judge (not challenged and upheld at the error of law stage). The appellant can be maintained, accommodated and cared for here without recourse to public funds. As Britcis confirmed (and still noted as being such in the current version of the respondent’s policy) the fact that the appellant will access NHS services at taxpayers expense is part of the underlying policy decision the respondent made in permitting people entry under this route (and of course by finding ADR7.1 to apply to her, it is entry under the ADR route that applies here – ADR9.1).
100. It follows that I find the appellant able to meet the requirements of ADR7.1 such that she is able to meet the requirements of the Rules on that basis. As agreed at the hearing, a finding to this effect disposes of the appeal on Article 8 grounds (TZ (Pakistan) applies).

Notice of Decision
The appellant’s appeal is allowed.

SJ Rastogi
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 November 2025